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ABSTRACT

INTERPRETING MATERIAL COOPERATION AS A FUNCTION OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT TO GUIDE MINISTRY FORMATION

By
Steven Joseph Squires
May 2012

Dissertation supervised by Gerard Magill, Ph.D.
While not exactly back room political bargaining, the traditional use of
cooperation has been by moral theologians attempting to define the level of cooperation
for a particular situation. This chosen definition, in turn, may help focus the range of
appropriate actions in response to the situation‘s circumstances. In this customary usage,
an organization‘s associates (employees) may assist the implementation of relevant
responses to a cooperation analysis, whether the issue is clinical or organizational in
nature. They have not been integral to the decision-making process – until now.
Cooperation has been the proverbial candle under the bushel (Matthew 5:15).
This paper proposes the involvement of organizations‘ associates not only for decisionmaking and discernment, but for their own moral development. The foundation of this
thesis is not only that organizations are moral agents, but also that organizations are

iv

reflective of the moral development of their associates when they exercise their agency.
Using this model, this theory advances a use of the principle of cooperation by
interpreting cooperation as a function of moral development for advancing associates.
Advancement, in this case, means that, optimally, the process will expose participants to
individuals in various stages of moral development, challenge them in appropriate ways,
and enhance their moral development as characterized by Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol
Gilligan. Even if participants do not advance in their moral development, the model
proposed here will form participants in moral decision-making within the Catholic moral
tradition. To a lesser degree, it is also a useful ministry discernment tool if appointed to
discriminate responses to some of the individual and organizational issues (topics)
mentioned above.
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Chapter One – Introduction
I. Foundational Assumptions: Individual and Group Concepts as Context for the
Principle of Cooperation
This dissertation includes a breadth of scholarly disciplines. Ethics, theology, and human
development (psychology) are primary to developing this proposed application of the
Roman Catholic moral principle of cooperation. To a lesser degree, other significant
subjects are philosophy, education, and anthropology. As a result of this span, the task of
this first chapter is to set a sufficient foundation for subsequent chapters.
The chapter begins with a description of cultures in order to properly situate the
context for most uses of the principle of cooperation, a notion that the final chapter will
challenge. Defining communitarianism and the common good provides the basis for
fleshing-out the philosophical and theological milieu of Catholic culture. Detail
accompanies the relationship of individual and society because this is the basis for
understanding the principle of cooperation as a social principle. Significant care and
attention go to this section‘s development for this reason as well as the reader‘s
understanding of the foundational philosophical and theological assumptions about
individual-societal relationships behind cooperation.
At this point, the chapter‘s attention modifies to introduce why this is a relevant
and timely dissertation, especially for Catholic health care given its tribulations. The
reality is that Catholic health care is facing a number of challenges in contemporary U.S.
culture. These trials are daunting, many of them having to do with maintaining integrity
while acting as agents serving in the Spirit of the Gospel and carrying forward the healing
ministry of Jesus Christ. It may seem outrageously optimistic to suggest that one
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principle in the Catholic tradition serves as an inherent social principle and, furthermore,
is well suited to address the constant bombardment of tests to personal or organizational
integrity. Adversity notwithstanding, this is exactly the claim.
The progression of this thesis has a focus both on the challenges to Catholic
health care systems in the U.S. as well as the particular mechanisms to resolve them.
There are three preeminent trials for Catholic health care: diminishing numbers of women
religious, organizations‘ failure to fully develop their associates, and incomplete
appreciation about the individual-societal relationships, culpability, and accountability.
A principal test is the rapid decrease in numbers of women religious who founded most
of the U.S. Catholic health care systems. This presents difficulties for maintaining the
identity and culture of organizations, which have distinct manners of thinking and
behaving, with individuals who are unfamiliar with organizational identity and culture
(and with little or no guidance from members of the founding congregations). Another
tribulation generally pertains to how organizations fail to let their associates grow in their
own development. People, particularly but not exclusively those in Catholic health care,
integrate their and the organization‘s values into decision-making. Values based
decision-making, ethically integrated decision-making, and integrating mission and
values into discernments are focal topics in the literature. Navigating disagreements
about mission-, values-, and ethics-based decisions is not a prominent literature topic. An
omission such as this is both glaring and awkward because people do not develop without
challenges to the status quo. This barrier is noteworthy even if it is hidden or
subconscious. Full appreciation of the relationship between person, organization, and
society – as well as a method for discussing the culpability of persons and organizations
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with an evil, injustice, or malfeasance – is the final ordeal. The remainder of this chapter
defines the principle of cooperation as an inherently social principle; explains how it is
complementary to some of the difficulties facing individuals and organizations because
of its nature; and entertains why its suggested new uses, such as group discernment for
non-traditional issues, bring cooperation back to its original purpose.
IA. Anthropology for the Traditional Use of Cooperation: An Illustration of Self vs. Other
All are agents of culture. Patterns of human behavior (i.e. beliefs, values,
attitudes, norms, knowledge, religion, order and hierarchies, etc.) – that people are
capable of learning and transmitting from generation to another – describe how people
embody culture. It is possible for large numbers of people, a large group or society, to
have similar behavior patterns. A dominant culture is a group of persons where the
majority in the group, or the persons in power within the group, has similar or shared
patterns of behavior. A group that shares various behavior patterns with the dominant
group whilst having its own distinct behavior patterns (from the dominant culture) is a
subculture. Occasionally, subcultures‘ behaviors involve rejecting the dominant group,
establishing the group as countercultural. 1
The character and type of relationship or interaction between the dominant
culture, subcultures, and countercultures depends on where and when one looks as well
as the scope (range, boundaries) for such an investigation. For instance, a contemporary
Caucasian European, Roman Catholic lady from the Basque area may likely find herself
in the current dominant European culture. Still – with willing suspension of disbelief –
she would find herself in a subculture, or counterculture, nearly anywhere in the 1800s
within the United States. Shakespeare‘s writings are replete with characters that are not
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part of the dominant culture: He contrasts Shylock and other Jewish characters in The
Merchant of Venice2 and the noble Moor Othello in Othello3 to the prevailing Venetian
culture.
With a counterculture, one may infer a dissonance or disconnect between the
subculture choosing to part with the dominant culture. This does not imply a total
synergy between a dominant culture and subcultures. Differences are, in fact, what
differentiate subcultures from a dominant culture. Occasionally, these distinctions have
been pronounced – enough so that they form a palpable wedge between the cultures. The
wedge, in some cases, pierces so profoundly that a tension develops between the cultures.
A counterculture arises when cultural tensions advance into outright rejection of the
dominant culture by the subculture. Examples of a well-known counterculture are the
hip-radical movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s that was effectively two
subgroups, the hippies and the radicals. 4
At the outset, the reader may assume that this dissertation hones its scope to two
relevant cultures, each with contextually specific subcultures discussed below. The two
cultures are, after all, the two typically discussed in issues of applying the principle of
cooperation, which is the Catholic moral principle at the core of this dissertation. These
cultures are relevant to this milieu; still there is broader appeal beyond the two groups.
The conclusion explains the expansive applicability of the model detailed here.
First, one culture is the Roman Catholic culture, generally, with its beliefs, values,
attitudes, mores and norms, knowledge, religious identity, hierarchies, artifacts and
possessions. The Roman Catholic culture is wide-ranging. There are about
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1,146,656,000 persons (17.3%) who identify themselves as Roman Catholic worldwide
(world population of approximately 6,617, 097,000).5
Narrowing the focus slightly, this dissertation studies predominantly the Roman
Catholic Church in the United States (U.S.). One in four persons in the U.S. are Catholic,
meaning that about 25% of the adult (>18 years-old) U.S. population self-identifies as
Catholic. The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life corroborates their findings with
General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago starting in 1972 about the dynamic changes that have and will
occur with the numbers of Catholics in the U.S.: The 25% of Catholics in the U.S. has
held steady in recent decades. Although the number is static, assuming little change in
the influences of this percentage is wrong. Of the Pew Forum U.S. survey respondents,
about one-third of those self-identified as raised Catholic are not currently Catholic,
meaning that 10% of Americans are former Catholics. This American attrition is offset
somewhat by the people who convert to Catholicism (2.6%) but also the large number of
Catholic immigrants to the U.S. For instance, one of every three adult Catholics in the
U.S. is Latino, which ―may account for an even larger share of U.S. Catholics in the
future.‖6
Catholics are a subculture within the U.S., where the Protestant culture still
predominates. Framing U.S. cultures as Christian and non-Christian, Christian culture
prevails, with Catholicism as a part of the dominant culture. Catholicism differs in many
significant ways from Protestantism and, as such, it is easy to frame it as distinct from
Protestantism using the former distinction rather than the latter.
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Almost any organization could apply this cooperation model, as discussed later.
Still, the traditional use of cooperation has occurred largely within Catholic health care
organizations and systems. Associates or employees in Catholic health care may be
another relevant Catholic subculture according to conventional uses. In the U.S., there
are about 62 Catholic health care systems, 615 Catholic acute care organizations, and
1,400 Catholic long-term care organizations (nursing homes), surgical centers, and clinics
present in all 50 states. These Catholic health care organizations treat one of six people
(15.5%) hospitalized in the U.S., accounting for 20% of all admissions in 20 states, and
provide work for over one million people, with 598,934 full-time equivalent employees
(FTEs) in Catholic acute care organizations. 7 Not all associates working in Catholic
health care are Catholic themselves. Irrespective of their personal faith traditions
(gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, socio-economic status), associates of Catholic
health care organizations abide by the tenets of the Catholic Church as articulated by a
variety of sources.
Second, the other extensive culture is society. This includes secular society
counting other-than-Catholic persons. Not every group categorically adheres to the
principles and goals of the Catholic faith. In a world of about seven billion people, less
than 20% belong to the first cultural group (Catholics).
The expression that the former group, the Catholic Church and those who embody
its values, ascribes to the latter group, society, is the common good. The common good
is ―the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their
individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.‖ 8 The
Catholic social encyclical Rerum novarum refers to the definition and purpose of the
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common good.9 Stated differently, Catholics understand the common good as the most
basic, foundational condition for a good society, which all members of the diverse human
community share.10 Foundational to the common good are at least two concepts. The
first is the respect for the human dignity of each person, which is the responsibility of
everyone. 11 The principle of solidarity encapsulates the second. Solidarity is the
recognition that everyone in the world depends on each other; people are interdependent
and ―keepers [of their] brothers and sisters.‖12 The demands of the human community
surpass all individuals‘ differences (i.e. ethnicity, nationality, socioeconomic status,
gender, age, and sexual preference).13 It is through the model of Jesus and his agapaic
love (a.k.a. non-erotic, sexually-disinterested love, similar to friendship or social
charity14) that persons respect the needs of the others by ordering their goods and works
toward the common good, rather than the wants of particular individuals.
A question surfacing when comparing and contrasting these cultures is about the
appropriateness of assuming that the relevant subcultures of society for this dissertation
are the U.S. culture and local sub communities (cities, districts, states, regions) if U.S.
Catholics and Catholic health care are relevant subsets of Catholicism worldwide. Yes,
this assumption is appropriate and correct. Still, the issue about the relation between
Catholics and Catholic subcultures with society for the common good is complex.
The common good is a declarative statement about justice, similar to the idea of a
socially just society. As a justice concept, there are different ways that one may measure
the ‗achievement‘ of a just society (i.e. each person achieves his or her due based on
merit or achievement, freely agreed social contract, the maximization of happiness and
minimization of pain, community consensus or concurrence about priorities, expanding
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or making the most of individual liberties or working agreements, or through the absolute
equity of each individual). Additionally, each one of these, as well as other,
measurements implies a different method or mode to work towards the fulfillment of a
just society.
Historically, the Catholic Church has witnessed similar considerations – that is,
different modes of working towards, achieving, and defining universal goods and justice
– with the common good. Charlie Curran summarizes some of the developments
associated with the common good in his book Catholic Social Teaching 1981 - Present:
A Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis: First, Catholic social teaching has
moved from a denunciation of concepts perceived as individualistic such as liberty,
participation, and equity to their emphasis in current teaching. Second, contemporary
Church teaching acknowledges a distinction between the temporal common good and the
spiritual common good, which is not the case in earlier teaching. Third, the scope of the
common good has become worldwide in current Catholic social teaching as opposed to
previous emphases on specific societies and nation-states.15
IB. Philosophical Milieu for Typical Uses of the Principle of Cooperation
One may correctly assume that Catholic concept of societal common good,
meaning the rapport and affiliation between Catholics (and those embodying Catholic
ideals and ministering within the Catholic tradition) and society-at-large, is not only
enmeshed but presupposes certain ethics and justice theories. In other words, achieving
the common good benefits Catholics and other-than-Catholics alike. Boundaries between
Catholics and other-than-Catholic society are porous and nebulous. Chapter two
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discusses the perimeters and flux between Catholic and societal ideals in much more
detail.
The most basic supposition of Catholic ethics and justice theories is that they have
their basis in empirical metaethical absolutist theory. Metaethical absolutism generally
means that ethical judgments ―have meaning and can be verified.‖ 16 There can be many
sources of reality including supernatural or divine revelation, rationality, intuition (moral
sensibility), or reality in this case. Thus, the verification of meaning for empirical
metaethical absolutist theory is through the study of reality. Objects of study may
include the individual and society through modes of study that use reason and experience.
Examples within the Catholic tradition include scripture and the magisterium, both of
which affirm independently validated and discerned facts of human experience. It is
from this ‗starting position‘ that many other ethics and justice frameworks have their
grounding, such as the natural law.17
An ethics or justice theory presupposed by empirical metaethical absolutism is
communitarianism. Mark Kuczewski, a bioethicist and self-disclosed and public
communitarian, describes communitarianism:
Communitarianism is a neo-Aristotelian philosophy that focuses
on the common good [emphasis added] and is concerned with the
relationship between the good person or good citizen and the good
of the community or society. As would be expected, it has much
in common with other neo-Aristotelian approaches, such as
casuistry and virtue ethics. Communitarianism is both a critique of
the dominant Western ideology of liberal individualism and an
orientation to ethical problem solving. 18
Communitarians believe that elements of collective understanding have been lost and
warrant discovery or rediscovery. The process of rediscovering is not an easy one, but
according to some, it is the only germane salve for the wound of a fractured society. One
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may have difficulty labeling all communitarians. Nevertheless, many communitarians
are skeptical of deontological ethics and liberal democratic theory and practices.
Differences between communitarians evidence themselves in the nuances of the critical
assessments of liberal theory. 19 Individuals need to interact together in society in order to
discover a core or common morality shared by individuals bound through common
culture(s).
Justice for the communitarian is dependent on history, tradition, solidarity, and
relation of individuals to the community and vice-versa. Community needs and goods
take priority before individual needs and goods. For some communitarians, the basis for
true societal consensus and justice is a core or common morality resulting in ―a shared
vision of the good life or shared hierarchy of goods.‖20 ‗The proof is in the pudding,‘
meaning that members of society would not debate the constitutive elements of the
shared vision or hierarchy of goods if they rediscovered their common morality. Given
the divisiveness within contemporary American society – ranging from issues counting
pro-life or pro-choice ideologies in the abortion debate, and access to reasonable
healthcare as a right or healthcare as a commodity in American politics – a shared vision
and hierarchy of goods is far from reality. Hence, it is tricky to argue that persons share a
core or common morality. The pudding is not there. For other communitarians, there are
easier ways of reconstituting the common morality of sub communities, and then societyat-large.
Kuczewski believes that the communitarian movement started in the early 1980s
with works that emphasized the topics of responsibility and community. Examples of
acknowledged early communitarian works include Alasdair MacIntyre‘s After Virtue
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(1981) and Michael Sandel‘s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).21 The
communitarian philosophical review of liberalism in the 1980s gave rise to even more
communitarian approaches in the 1990s.22
Social psychology and the relationship of the self to others is a metaphor for
communitarianism and the relationship between Catholicism and society. One of the
fundamental concepts for each person is a sense of self. Still, people realize quickly in
their infancy that they are social creatures and rely on others, while their conscious
awareness about their environment expands. 23 Environment and others influence
persons‘ behavior and conception of self. These influences are so significant that a
branch of psychology, called social psychology, is the systematic study of the thoughts,
influences, and relationships of others to self. As a capstone for this point and metaphor,
the chapter on social psychology in an introductory psychology textbook begins with a
quote from Herman Melville: ―‗We cannot live for ourselves alone, for our lives are
connected by a thousand invisible threads.‘‖ 24
IC. Theological Milieu for Typical Uses of the Principle of Cooperation
Readers and participants in the model detailed in this dissertation who are
Catholic, work for Catholic systems, or otherwise commit to Catholic ideals and
foundations may identify with the foundations of Catholicism directly. Many can speak
in the first-person about their knowledge and experiences related to Catholicism and its
ministry, ideals, and interaction with society; Catholicism is self for those in this group.
Similar to the skin, which is the barrier demarcating self from environment and others,
one can identify those who claim to uphold the Catholic faith including one‘s own self.
Environment may be a part of self, defined in a Catholic context. For instance, entering
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any door to walk inside a Catholic health care organization, such as an acute care
hospital, may serve as a reminder about self or, at least, the Catholic faith and its
interdependent function with society. An associate (employee) of a Catholic hospital
ministry may think, The people within these walls are the living legacy of the founding
Sisters, and as one of these people, I am an exemplar, who is to live the mission and
ministry of the Sisters and the Catholic Church both inside and outside of these walls.
Catholic social encyclicals consistently emphasize the collective and social nature
of human beings, which is the foundation of Catholicism and strikingly similar to, if not,
communitarianism in its origin. 25 Towing the line between capitalism without welfare
and socialism, Pope Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum, 1891) defines the proper role of the State
as serving the common good of its people, calls for strengthening entire commonwealth
by achieving its Christian end, condones distributive justice because the goal of society is
to make people better, asks citizens to contribute to the common good and rulers to
protect the community and common good.26 Pope John XXIII states that persons are
innately social and, as such, live in community and further each other, thereby creating an
ordered society in the (1963) encyclical Peace on Earth (Pacem in Terris).27 In addition
to Rerum novarum (mentioned above), Pope Paul VI‘s (1967) On the Development of
Peoples (Populorum progressio) enunciates, again, that it is social connection that binds
all persons together. It is the responsibility of all people to advance society‘s
development. The reality of being human with societal solidarity corresponds with the
reality of obligation to all members of society. 28 Pope John Paul II, in (1987) On Social
Concern (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis), comments:
The obligation to commit oneself to the development of peoples is
not just an individual duty, and still less an individualistic one, as if
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it were possible to achieve this development through the isolated
efforts of each individual. It is an imperative, which obliges each
and every man and woman, as well as societies and nations. 29
He reaffirms the teachings of Rerum novarum in (1991) The Hundredth Year (Centesimus
annus) by reiterating and insisting that human goods, including work (that is also
communal in nature) and facets of private property ownership, are for everyone.
Everyone should distribute accordingly with this end in mind. 30
Pope Benedict XVI, quotes the Leviticus 19:18 (―You shall love your neighbor as
yourself‖) as constructing an obligation to share love with others, which is reflective of
God‘s love for all, in his encyclical (2005) God Is Love (Deus Caritas Est).31 Pope
Benedict XVI echoes his own message in Deus Caritas Est with (2009) Charity in Truth
(Caritas In Veritate):
Another important consideration is the common good. To love
someone is to desire that person's good and to take effective steps
to secure it. Besides the good of the individual, there is a good that
is linked to living in society: the common good. It is the good of
―all of us‖, made up of individuals, families and intermediate
groups who together constitute society. It is a good that is sought
not for its own sake, but for the people who belong to the social
community and who can only really and effectively pursue their
good within it. To desire the common good and strive towards it is
a requirement of justice and charity. To take a stand for the
common good is on the one hand to be solicitous for, and on the
other hand to avail oneself of, that complex of institutions that give
structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically and
culturally, making it the pólis, or ―city‖. The more we strive to
secure a common good corresponding to the real needs of our
neighbours, the more effectively we love them. Every Christian is
called to practise this charity, in a manner corresponding to his
vocation and according to the degree of influence he wields in the
pólis.32
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As stated above, agapaic love is the sisterly or brotherly love modeled by Jesus. Charity
is imbedded in agapaic love. Loving others with charity means that one treats them justly
because justice is indivisible from charity. Justice and charity have an inextricable link. 33
ID. Interactions and Boundaries between Individuals and Communities (Society)
Personal success and leadership consultant and author Linda Galindo uses
foundational social psychology in her book The 85% Solution. The environment and
others influence people. The extent that society and environment modifies behavior,
including how behavior modifies, is up to the individual as a result of her conscious,
subconscious, or unconscious choice. People tend to be happier or more successful the
more that they take responsibility for their own actions, rather than blame challenges on
the environment or society. 34
Galindo‘s observations are particularly relevant to the communitarian and
Catholic contexts. Some people may find it all too easy to ‗opt out‘ of communal
decision-making for several reasons. In response, on one hand, apathy and disinterest do
not dissolve the inherent bonds between the person – or small group – and the rest of the
community (society). For instance, consider the petulant teenager who considers other
family members square and not cool. No amount of denial about family attachments or
wishing for disownment will resolve the inherent union of person with family. The same
holds true for Catholics who wish to totally cloister themselves from other-than-Catholic
society or, at bare minimum, from other individuals who are not Catholic. Functioning in
contemporary civilization, with only a few exceptions, necessitates a baseline of
interactions with others, whether it is for food, education, or work to secure basic
necessities. Additionally, and discussed in greater detail in chapter two, there is a Gospel
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message that yields a paradoxical relationship: the Church lives in the world to spread her
message throughout, whilst still retaining qualities that make her distinctive for Catholics
and Christians.
Denial is a similar quality to apathy and disinterest for these purposes. Like
apathy and disinterest, denying the connections between self and other – or Catholicminded and other-than-Catholic-minded – does not absolve intrinsic correlations
between. The ending of the documentary film Food, Inc. unequivocally draws out this
connection. Movie viewers discover the unethical practices in the food industry,
including the inhumane treatment of animals, may wish to conduct ‗business as usual.‘
For many of us, the norm includes eating foods of convenience (despite inhumane,
unsanitary harvest and slaughter practices of unhealthy foods to begin with) that we
purchase cheaply (despite the fact that most food is the most inexpensive it has ever been
in history). While pontificating on the abhorrence of such practices, some will do things
like stop for fast food on the way home from a late night at work. Thoughts (intent),
articulations (communication), and behavior (action) are incongruent in this case, similar
to previous examples. One of the narrators, Michael Pollan or Eric Schlosser – Schlosser
authored the bestseller book called Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All American
Meal that serves as one of the inspirations for the movie – nicely summarizes the idea
that denial can contribute to inequitable or unethical practices. He suggests that there are
things persons can do to ensure congruence between thoughts and actions. They can buy
organic, local crops and, if we choose not to be vegetarian, meat from humanely raised,
free-range animals. Like it or not, everyone affects food industry practices with their
vote. Everyone cast their vote on this issue at least three times a day. 35
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These examples serve not just as exemplars of community decision-making and
its relation to the individual; they provide for other meanings (understandings) of
communitarianism, including methods or processes in addition to structures or
compositions. From Kuczewski‘s description, the reader may rightly understand that
individual rights and welfare are inherently tied with the rights and welfare of others (the
community). Ideally, there is a balance between individual and community good, which
is difficult in practice (discussed later). In situations of competition or conflict,
communitarians understand that the community may take priority over the individual.
Communitarianism also is process, describing forms of communal deliberation using
specific means to advance mutual group decisions and norms. 36 Scholars have proposed
several different methods for communal consideration, 37 so one does not need to lock
communitarianism into one particular method. (It is beyond the scope to detail all the
various communitarian deliberative mechanisms beyond a cursory sketch. Mark
Kuczewski masterfully summarizes the ―whole tradition‖ method of reconstructing moral
concepts within the specific tradition(s) that will truly understand them, as advanced by
Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas. Moreover, Kuczewski discusses the
framework called liberal communitarianism, typified by a public deliberative process
with participants from various moral traditions. This means that communal consensus
defines and structures this ―whole tradition‖ method, which reflects the minimal shared
understandings and respects the rights of all its individual participants, as advanced by
Ezekiel Emanuel.)38
Individuals – especially in societies that value individualism such as the U.S. –
may feel highly uncomfortable with community as the locus of decision-making as well
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as the idea that community needs and good may trump individuals‘ needs and goods.
Communitarianism is not totalitarianism. 39 (Gerald Gutek typifies totalitarianism as ―a
system, headed by a single person or party, that seeks complete or total control over all
aspects of life – social, cultural, economic, and educational. It uses the agencies such as
courts, schools, the media, churches, youth organizations, and art to carry out the policies
of the leader or party…[the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini are examples of totalitarian
establishments].‖) Beauchamp specifies that in communitarianism, groups are given
preference in decision-making and priority (moral preference of values, duties, goals, or
consequences) with decisions over individuals, but this does not mean that the
community decides everything. Individuals have liberty to determine their own
priorities, which communitarians acknowledge and may include a conscious or
unconscious refutation of communal priorities. Ethics is an enterprise that is both
descriptive, determining what is, as well as prescriptive, establishing what ought to be; in
communitarianism, the community prescribes or determines what ought to be. It may
deem a person who disregards the communal norms as either inconsequential or immoral,
especially if the person‘s values are different from the community‘s values. Some draw a
more decisive line between the individual and community. Those persons accept that
individuals‘ autonomous actions are contrary to the larger groups (i.e. sub communities,
communities, society) that exist to guide decision-making.40
A profound tension exists between balancing individual freedoms (liberties) with
community needs. Stated differently, the strain itself is about where to ‗draw the line‘
between respecting the autonomous choice of individuals and the justice for the
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community. This stress is one that communitarians and other scholars, both secular and
religious, are aware of its existence.
Jonathan Moreno, a secular philosopher, describes individual-societal tensions as
they relate to this thesis of consensus:
Consensus…is reached in a social context. To understand
consensus processes fully requires the study of subjects proper to
fields such as communications and small group theory. The study
of consensus also comports with the recent growth of philosophical
interest in the idea of community. Those who strive to find a
middle ground between individualism and socialism often call
themselves communitarians, emphasizing the importance of
common interests and responsibilities as a basis for novel means to
manage seemingly recalcitrant societal problems. I do not claim
expertise in this philosophy, but the study of consensus is surely an
important feature of communitarianism. 41
Not all philosophers understand individual-societal relationships in the same way. John
Gray introduces the concept of modus vivendi, which refers to working relationships
between people and society. Individuals do not have inherent, immutable rights. They
have ―enforceable conventions,‖ and it is in the best interest of government or society to
recognize, respect, and protect these conventions. 42 The individual-societal tension is
evident, albeit in a different form than Moreno‘s. Think of modus vivendi individualsocietal affiliation as a pendulum that tries to stay at its lowest point. This point is the
place where there is a balance between individuals and society. Raising the pendulum up
on one side creates potential energy that tries to turn into kinetic energy so the pendulum
will go back to its center. The metaphor continues that the pendulum going up on one
side is similar to a government or society that does not respect the conventions of the
individual. The transfer of potential energy into kinetic represents the changing of
societal regimes in order to readjust the individual-societal arrangement.
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Church documents also reflect the paradoxical nature between individual freedom
and advancement of the common good. A passage in Pope Leo XIII‘s Of New Things
(Rerum Novarum) quotes Thomas Aquinas with reference to personal property and
possessions. It is lawful and possibly necessary, according to Aquinas, to have personal
property and possessions. However, the end or purpose of ownership is not only for the
self. Persons should consider possessions as common to all, taking only what they need
and giving the excess to others. Doing this should provide everyone with necessities
without surplus.43
Pope Paul VI‘s (1965) Joy and Hope (Gaudium et spes) specifies that individual
freedom is a prerequisite to seeking good. On one hand, some use their individual
liberties to act selfishly either due to internal motivations or yielding to external pressures
by pursuing those things that benefit themselves (the individual). Actions such as these
may, in fact, ignore or disadvantage the community. These behaviors are the result of
social tensions between the social, economic, and political spheres on one level. In a
more basic way, individual conceit, greed, and egoism cause disequilibria on the societal
level. On the other hand, others either consciously or unconsciously realize that
individuals are reliant on one another. This reliance grows and persons become more
interdependent as the world develops through technological and intellectual innovations.
Full respect for individual dignity includes comprehending how secular laws and society
promote a vision of Christian revelation that encourages the complete communion of
human persons. The counterweight or ‗equal and opposite reaction‘ to the duty of
individuals to society is the obligation of society to provide basic necessities such as
food, clothing, and shelter as well as fundamental rights such as liberty, education,
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employment, existence in good repute, respect, suitable information, to act in accord with
one‘s conscience, to defend privacy, and religious freedom. The tie or mediating factor
between the individual and society is the interdependence needed for the development of
both. An insoluble connection exists between individual and community flourishing.
After all, the purpose of social institutions is for the person who is, in turn, totally reliant
on social institutions for his or her prosperity. 44
Pope John Paul II cites the biblical passage about Cain and Abel (Genesis 4:9)
and being ―our brother‘s keeper‖ as the foundation for similar comments about the
paradoxical dependency of individuals to society and vice-versa. God grants freedom
and this freedom is innately communal and relational. A person can abuse his or her
liberties:
…The roots of the contradiction between the solemn affirmation of
human rights and their tragic denial in practice lies in a notion of
freedom which exalts the isolated individual in an absolute way,
and gives no place to solidarity, to openness to others and service
of them… [W]hen freedom is made absolute in an individualistic
way, it is emptied of its original content, and its very meaning and
dignity are contradicted.
There is an even more profound aspect which needs to be
emphasized: freedom negates and destroys itself, and becomes a
factor leading to the destruction of others, when it no longer
recognizes and respects its essential link with the truth. When
freedom, out of a desire to emancipate itself from all forms of
tradition and authority, shuts out even the most obvious evidence
of an objective and universal truth, which is the foundation of
personal and social life, then the person ends up by no longer
taking as the sole and indisputable point of reference for his own
choices the truth about good and evil, but only his subjective and
changeable opinion or, indeed, his selfish interest and whim. 45
Evangelium vitae continues with the explanation about why the use of freedom in this
way is a distortion of communal life. Absolute autonomy – in the form of positive liberty
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(a state of existence structured towards allowing people to act in whatever ways they
wish) – intrinsically results in impinging the autonomy – in the form of negative liberty
(a state of being totally free from force, coercion, or harm) – of others. Society becomes
merely a collection of individuals without any shared ties. Practices do not advance the
common good; their design is for the progression of each person individually, in order to
further the agendas of individuals.46
The anthropological, philosophical, and theological stage has been set, positioning
the background for more specific problems facing health care generally and Catholic
health care specifically. A philosophical theory, communitarianism, and its theological
embodiment, fidelity to the common good, create an undividable link between
individuals and their society with community at the core of moral decision-making.
There is tension involving boundaries, or where to draw the line around individual
autonomy and community justice for the benefit of others. Whereas the tension is
applied and tangible (e.g., the accumulation of personal possessions and wealth versus
appropriately tithing for the maximum benefit of the community), it will remain
predominantly theoretical for our purposes. Its service was groundwork for the latter
portion of the chapter, which investigates some of the tangible challenges facing Catholic
health care organizations.
II. Pivotal Times for Catholic Health Care: Challenges as Straws Piling on a
Camel’s Back
Roman Catholic health care is facing challenging if not perilous times. Certain
needs, like decreasing acute care patient volumes and reimbursement for services, are
universal challenges in U.S. health care and, as such, not unique to Catholic health care.
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Other facets of these difficult times are unique to the identity and mission of Catholic
health care. Catholic identity and mission are venerable and essential, albeit that their
existence places additional demands on the ministry of Catholic health care. This
dissertation addresses the distinctive nature and demands of Catholic health care before
extrapolating insights to other organizations in the final chapter.
Two broad categories suffice as the starting position for describing the precise
characteristics of the summons for Catholic health care. First, one group relates to the
role of Catholic health care organizations with society, meaning external influences of
organizations, which is critical. Perhaps the external pressures are the best known
because they are the most visible to the people working outside of Catholic health care.
The progression of the line of reasoning will be chronological because some external
challenges have opposed Catholic health care since its advent in the U.S.
IIA. Historical Tests for Health Care and Catholic Health Care
Almost by definition, Catholic organizations reflect the story of courage and
optimism in the face of adversity, down to their placement or locale. Catholic
organizations are often in geographic areas with high concentrations of indigent and
neglected people where Catholicism is not the primary religion. 47 Their geographic
placement is deliberative, because the prophetic mission of such organizations
corresponds with service to those who are poor or neglected. 48 The first Catholic
infirmary – established in Baltimore by the University of Maryland physicians in 1823 –
is an example, which had the mission of delivering ―‗piety, charity, and usefulness…for
the sick, aged, infirmed,‘‖ … ―‗poor, prisoners and others.‘‖ 49 (A notable distinction
from the Christopher Kauffman is that the Ursuline sisters opened a state facility in New
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Orleans around 1627. This was considered an almshouse and not a hospital or
infirmary.) 50
Placement of Catholic hospitals has been strategic since the advent of Catholic
health care in the U.S. The central consideration and barrier in hospital placement is how
to best meet the needs of communities. Approaches or tactics reflect the dichotomies
between self and other as well as honoring integrity, Catholic integrity in this case, while
serving in the larger community, which was and is pluralistic.
Exemplifying this was Bishop of New York, John Hughes, who established St.
Vincent‘s in New York during the mid-1800s. According to Bishop Hughes, two reasons
existed for the existence and strategic placement of Catholic hospitals. 51 (For people
such as Hughes and Kenrick, their intentions were reflected in the second item – Catholic
institutions should be bastions of Roman Catholicism. The mainline Protestantism
prevalent in society was a clear and present danger for the few Catholic organizations at
the time. Their ideology suggested a fear that the new American, Protestant society
would ‗water down‘ the mother sauce of Roman Catholicism into a mushy, melting pot,
resulting in a diluted roux of American Catholicism. Hospitals were only one facet of
their desire to establish multiple institutions, including schools, infirmaries, hospitals,
churches, and other outreach missions.)52 Primarily, they should attract people in need
from any denomination or faith tradition together with their spiritual advisors. Catholics
at the time knew of instances, now documented, when priests were not allowed access to
Catholic patients in Protestant hospitals and wards. Catholic hospitals‘ staff members
were to be open and accepting, serving as exemplars and virtuous role models for
pluralistic communities. Fulfilling this need had profound results. Proselytism of
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patients and advocates was somewhat successful and certainly commendable according to
Bishop Hughes. Subsequent to this, Catholic hospitals also served a role for Catholics in
the local communities. Bishop Hughes was candid about his perspective that Catholic
hospitals provided Catholics safe havens or sanctuaries from the predominant Protestant
culture. Protestants, according to Hughes, were known for their religious prejudice,
paternalism, and (ironically) proselytism. 53
Demand for the Church‘s healing mission grew. Tom Nairn comments on the
relationship between external need (demand) and the Church‘s response (supply):
[In the 18th and 19th centuries,] more and more religious
communities of women were founded to carry out particular
apostolic activities. Caring for the sick once again became a
communal vocation. When these religious communities came
to the United States, hospitals were among the institutions that
they founded. 54
Many of these communities devoted themselves to either education or health care. In
1949, approximately five of 16 communities of women religious in the U.S. were actively
engaged in health care. About 75 Catholic hospitals existed by 1875, and nearly 400
existed by the turn of the century (1900). With the mission of caring for sick poor and
underserved, the challenge for communities of women religious became the rapid
expansion of the country and increases in this population. 55
For years, women religious, including congregations of sisters, met the rapid
growth of U.S. society. Women were involved prominently in most aspects of Church
ministry. They were the infrastructure of the parish, and in many ways, the most visible
parts of parish ministry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many more
women entered convents when compared to their brothers in seminaries and monasteries.
Triple the number of women religious existed for every priest by 1965. 56
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The demand (need) for deliberately placed (location) health care services
continues, but the intricate expansion (―evolution‖ was not used because it suggests
sophistication that the modern U.S. health care system lacks) of health care delivery
placed new demands on Catholic hospitals and health care systems. There were several
reasons for the rapid changes in health care delivery. First, shifts in the focus of health
care itself began, from managing symptoms of large groups in epidemics in the late
1800s and early 1900s, to surviving acute events and trauma in the mid-1900s, to chronic
disease management in the late 1900s, which continues today. Second, the rapid
expansion of technology – that was minimal in the early 1900s but had unparalleled
growth in the mid-1900s and late 1900s – transformed the way acute care organizations
delivered care. Hospitals focused not just on caring and symptom management. The
science of medicine changed them to places for cure – they were byproducts of the new
emphasis on scientific methods, research and inquiry, and identification using
laboratories.57 New technology, equipment (X-rays in the late 1800s and the
electrocardiogram and electroencephalogram in the early 1900s 58) and medications (e.g.
penicillin, sulfonamides, and vaccines in the mid-1900s59), procedures (e.g. antiseptic
surgery in the late 1800s60), and techniques required superior skills and backgrounds
from medical professionals. To compete, acute care organizations needed a greater
breadth of professionals than ever before. 61
Hand-in-hand with other changes, the social organization of health care in the
U.S. itself changed from virtually nothing in the early 1900s to our current system of
infinite, unwieldy intricacy. Rudimentary efforts to provide medical services at a
discount (for the volume) was the employment of physicians directly by industries (i.e.
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railroads, lumbar, textile, and mining), lodges, and fraternal orders in the early 1900s,
followed by the establishment of the first private physicians‘ group practices. Rather
than industries employing physicians directly, industries instituted contractual
relationship with hospital associations, especially within the states of Washington and
Oregon and Texas, in the 1930s and 1940s.62 Just prior to this time was ―the birth of the
Blues‖ (the now-mammoth Blue Cross and Blue Shield), which began in Dallas in 1929
when several hospitals including Baylor University Hospital and Methodist Hospital
contracted with school teachers and others groups to provide up to a few weeks of
hospital care for $6-9 per person.63
Employer and hospital cooperative insurance expanded as well as other new feefor-service indemnity health insurance arrangements after World War II. These
eventually included the dawn of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the 1970s
and preferred provider organizations in the 1980s. Patchwork efforts by the U.S. Federal
Government have extensively altered provisions of care for the public, purchasers,
payers, providers, and brokers as well as created public assistance or welfare medicine
programs. Examples include the Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 founding
Medicaid, instituting Medicare in 1965 after the precursor Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act in 1957, the 1973 HMO Act allowing for economic incentives to start
federally qualified HMOs, and the creation of Medicare diagnosis related groups (DRGs)
with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TERFA) in 1982. 64 Rapid changes
continued from the mid-1990s until the present day. Philip Keane identifies the major
trends of the transformation, which consist of ―the burgeoning growth of managed
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care…[and] a government policy of piecemeal changes in health care coupled with
substantial reductions in the rate of government spending on health care.‖ 65
All of the described changes had profound impact on the expectations of hospitals
and other acute care facilities, beginning with the need for sterile surgical suites after
popular use of antiseptics. Space for both surgical services and recovery (post-op) was at
a premium, and hospitals needed to expand in order to provide a continuity of care. The
addition of dedicated technical laborers (e.g. medical technicians and specialists) and
necessary support functions in the physical facilities (e.g. hotels, food services and
cafeterias, and laboratories) required new financial resources. To a lesser extent, an
‗answer‘ to this strain was the systematic, business-model management of hospitals,
signifying a transition from informal, trustee management to formal, bureaucratic
management that still exists in the present day. To a greater extent, income arrived
through the requirement of greater payment for services by patients, which catalyzed at
least two other events. Hospitals benefited by having additional space available for more
paying patients. Another way to encourage hospital patriotism or allegiance was to
increase the number of staff appointments and affiliated physicians who brought their
own patient clientele. The expansion of hospitals was so rapid that it outpaced the
graduation rate and numbers of physicians; demand for physicians increased as well as
the competitiveness between hospitals. Lastly, technological progress, financial
incentives to control costs, and decreasing inpatient volumes produced most of the
present difficulties for hospitals – the need to integrate delivery across the continuum of
care, expand services (i.e. provide more outpatient and ambulatory services), leverage the
economies of their size and scale, and provide local access to highly specialized
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services. 66 The outcome of all the influences was a chain reaction that continues
presently and accounts for the modern-day challenges of hospitals.
Perhaps the most visible and striking symptom of contemporary hospital
tribulations is in the creation of hospital systems and the merging of hospitals and
systems. 67 James Tubbs reports on a 2002 study by Bazzoli and colleagues that listed the
top three reasons for hospital mergers in 1983-1986 and 1989-1996 (the top three reasons
were the same in both time periods): to consolidate services, for operational economies,
and to strengthen the organizations‘ financial stability. 68 Hospitals characteristically
consolidated (and continue to consolidate) services in two ways – horizontally or
vertically. Horizontal integration is when facilities and services at the same point or
stage in the continuum of patient care join that streamlines services, eliminates excess
and waste, and leverages economies of scale (useful for purchasing). Examples are
several hospitals coming together to form a health care system. Vertical integration
describes situations when a single organization organizes or commences several, often
sequential, stages in patients‘ continuum of care. Examples are the assimilation of
physicians‘ practices, rehabilitation clinics and centers, acute care facilities, long-term
care, and geriatric services.69 The type of management provided by multi-hospital health
care systems varies, with some having a loose, holding system management and others
having a tight, corporate operational management and supervision. 70
Consolidation of hospitals and services began in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting
from the variables mentioned above, and rapidly picked-up pace in the mid-1990s with
relevant current examples. 71 Before these time periods, there were few mergers and
consolidations. Only five examples of consolidations existed in 1961. About fifty per
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year occurred in the early 1970s. There were between 176 and 245 multi-hospital
systems in 1980 (depending on the survey used), accounting for about 30 percent of
hospital beds in the U.S.72 According to Tubbs, citing data about hospital mergers and
acquisitions from Irving Levin Associates:
The trend peaked in the period 1994-1997…with 163 deals
completed in 1996 and a record 197 deals in 1997. During that
period the number of hospitals belonging to health networks or
systems also increased significantly, from 56.2 percent in 1994
to 70.9 percent in 1998. By the beginning of the new century,
the frequency of deals had declined somewhat, to 86 in 2000
and 83 in 2001, yet these numbers remain much higher than
pre-1990 levels. 73
While the number of mergers and acquisitions steadily decreased from the 1990s until
2003, the trend of mergers has crept back up from 2003 to 2008 with the number of
hospitals within the deals between 149 and 249 for three of the years in this period. 74 In
other words, the era of hospital and health care system mergers and consolidations has
hardly tapered off, and evidence subsists of mergers between bigger hospital and health
care systems.
IIB. Contemporary Challenges for Catholic Health Care
Catholic health care is not immune from the external stresses mentioned here. In
fact, Catholic organizations are just as susceptible to pressure from the outside as otherthan-Catholic institutions. Recent challenges to health care mentioned above, including
the requisite to curtail expenditures, create new dilemmas for Catholic organizations with
missions of providing care for, especially, the poor and underserved, based off of the
fundamental commitment that health care is an essential, human right. 75 New structural
and operating arrangements such as mergers and collaborations with other organizations
are ways to continue operations and, sometimes, to ensure survival. Not surprisingly, the
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numbers of mergers, affiliations, and joint ventures between non-Catholic and the
nation‘s largest private health care provider, the health care facilities of the Catholic
Church, continue to be higher than pre-1990s levels.76
The other set of issues also have to do with Catholic health care carrying out her
mission. Contrary to the former group, this consortium of dilemmas has to do with
internal struggles and the availability of resources to fulfill the mission of Catholic health
care. Internal predicaments mentioned below may be distinctive to Catholic health care,
whereas the external quandaries indicated above are considerable but not exclusive to
Catholic organizations.
It is safe to presume that there will always be people available to continue the
healing ministry of Jesus, as told through the Gospel stories. Equally as reasonable is the
supposition that the constituency or characteristics of people who carry out the Gospel
ministries of healing have not and will not remain the same. As implied in the chapter‘s
beginning, culture is not stagnant but is always shifting. Dynamics of Catholic health
care are in such transition that one may wonder if previous shifts were mere tremors
before ‗the big one,‘ meaning the record setting, off-the-Richter-scale earthquake of
movement within Catholic organizations currently.
Congregations of men and women religious founded most of the Catholic health
care systems in the United States.77 Sisters especially were actively involved, not only in
mission and governance, but in administration and operations. Until the mid- to late 20th
Century, nuns were so represented in day-to-day caregiving (i.e. clinical care, spiritual
care, food services, and housekeeping) that patients thought of them symbolically, as
God‘s earthy presence rather than as people. 78 Women religious acknowledged,
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accepted, and fostered their angelic persona. Christopher Kauffman quotes Mother Mary
Xavier Clark, a Sister of Charity, who wrote the following in a manual for sister nurses:
On the modesty; prudence and religious spirit which should
always adorn a person consecrated to God The eyes of a sister
should never rest upon any man‘s face; she should merely give
the look that charity demands of her, and see… if the patient
looks better or worse and that will suffice. A patient should be
able to say, when a Sister leaves his bedside, ‗That Sister is
more like an angel than a human being: — The very sight of
her makes me think of God and love him.‘79
This was congruent with the memory and personal experience of elders in the Squires
family (including the extended family, the Grasleys and the Downings). Generations of
the Squires family, dating back to the 1800s, lived in southeastern Michigan where the
Saint Joseph Mercy Hospital in Ann Arbor has served community residents. It has been
there for all stages of life; family members have been born, ill, and have died within the
hospital and under the auspices of its extended care services. Loyal Grassley, a Squires
family member, wrote a poem titled ―Angels in Our Midst‖ remembering a bout of illness
requiring hospitalization and thinking of his nurses, some of who were nuns. (Loyal
Grassley was this author‘s great grandfather and paternal grandmother‘s, Laura May
Squires, father. He wrote the poem after an experience at Saint Joseph Mercy Saline,
which part of the Saint Joseph Mercy Health System.) Ransom Squires recalled when
nuns sat with patients, one per room, throughout the course of their illness, even if they
did not have any pressing needs. Their visibility and presence to patients was what
differentiated Catholic health care from others. (Ransom Squires was this author‘s
paternal grandfather who was a farmer all of his life. He died in 2008 while receiving
care from Saint Joseph Mercy Health System home hospice after being treated for cancer
at Saint Joseph Mercy Hospital in Ann Arbor.)
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Men and women in Catholic health care ministry were the Jacks-and-Jills-of-alltrades. The same brothers and sisters often tended to many now-separate functions while
a patient was in the hospital; they were the orderlies, nurses, housekeepers, spiritual
caregivers, food service workers, and administrators (trustees). Because of the loose
structure of hospitals, organizations had more institutional self-determinism, and its
employees (associates) had additional leeway when compared with present day
counterparts.80
A couple reasons exist for the change in this now-dated milieu, typified by less
involvement from women religious in the day-to-day operations and administration of
hospitals. First, discoveries and advances in science and technology led to medical care
in hospitals, laboratories, and schools being more formal, systematic, and specialized, as
noted above.81 These improvements had recognizable side effects. Professional
colleagues joined the likes of the scholarly profession of medicine with the establishment
of formal academic programs and skills training. For example, Paul Starr traces the
professionalization of nursing in the U.S. to the founding of three training schools in New
York, New Haven, and Boston in 1873.82 More laypersons83 slowly entered hospitals and
health care systems as qualifications became more specific. Just as gradually, the
predominant concern of Catholic health care became the encroachment of secularization.
Nuns and brothers accommodated the change by becoming professionalized while still
maintaining their individual subcultures, both Catholic and to their religious congregation
or order. Women and men religious were less diversified but had more specialized
knowledge and skills than their 1800s counterparts.84
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Second, Catholic health care was affected by a decline the number of women
choosing religious life as their calling, which was symptomatic and indicative of a larger
multinational trend. Congregations of women religious have been a part of the Catholic
Church almost since the beginnings of Christianity; despite their early establishments,
they face a current crisis. 85 There were 181,421 U.S. nuns in 1965. This number of
women dropped to 153,645 by 1970 when, along with declines in women taking vows,
4,337 women left their orders and congregations. There were 92,107 nuns in 1995,
roughly half the amount in 30 years prior, 68,000 in 2006, and only 59,000 in 2009.86
The decline in the amount of nuns was 54 percent between 1945 and 2000 (from 122,159
to 79,876).87
The statistics validate the experiences and observations of associates (employees)
in the Trinity Health Home Office (corporate office) who have witnessed the
diminishment in the number of sisters in all areas of the Trinity Health Home Office.
Within the last five years, women religious have gone from at least half-a-dozen full-time
associates to one full-time and one part-time associate. Trinity Health is not the only
health system to experience the reality that as smaller numbers of women go into
religious life, fewer women religious enter the health care setting. 88
The founders of Catholic health care systems bring many notable qualities to the
table that laypersons generally have less familiarity with. Such features were and are
innate to persons religious. They are also attributes that help make Catholic health care
unique and meaningful to patients. Nuns, brothers, and priests owe, in part, these
attributes to their specialized training, which involves their vocation and formation.
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The journey begins with vocation, which depicts when men and women who have
an ―inner conversion experience of the transforming power of divine grace…[followed
by] a public commitment to a calling…which took the form of disciplines and productive
work.‖89 Those persons, who profess themselves within the Catholic Church, although
vocation may be a secular term as well, commit to a life that has both individual and
societal import.90 Some religious orders are geared towards the contemplative life, but
others are active. Although orders and congregations began being specialized in the
1930s, there were elements of their enculturation or formation that remain. Women and
men religious have unique cultural ideologies of values, beliefs, ideas, theology, symbols,
and ecclesiology. They have social order, which incorporates various role relationships
(hierarchies within, between, and outside the orders or congregations). Each group has
its own social resources, such as education, training, professionalization, and physical
(‗bricks-and-mortar‘) facilities. 91
A detailed description of formation is in chapter five of this thesis. At a glance,
formation is inculcation or indoctrination into a way of being. Forming religious
candidates has the goal of initiating the person to religious life and generating awareness
of distinctive characteristics within the Church, seeking to support candidates and persons
religious through recognizing and appreciating their call to Christ through words of the
Spirit, by means of spiritual, apostolic, doctrinal, and practical components. 92 Formation
catalyzes candidates to realize and then incorporate and expand their religious identity so
that the person will be pertinent, helpful, and authentic in their witness and participation
with God and the works of the Spirit. 93 Both before and after the Second Vatican
Council (Vatican II), formation of men and women religious has been a priority of the
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Catholic Church. Evangelical counsels produced a series of recommendations for
superiors, provincials, and formation directors, which include precise and universal
directives for the formation of candidates into religious life (e.g. how to practice chastity,
poverty, and obedience).94
Congregations of women have distinguishing attributes common to all, which is
similar to many communities of men: They live simply and are celibate. The community,
rather than the individual, makes decisions. Inasmuch as it is the predominant
characteristic of some communities, all communities deliberately dedicate time to
thoughtful prayer and contemplation. In addition, communities work to address the needs
of others, especially the poor, disenfranchised, and underserved. (The charter of religious
communities, even the cloistered ones, to have a service component ‗in the world‘ was a
byproduct of the 20th Century Church and the Second Vatican Council.) 95
In addition to universal directives, each religious congregation or order has its
own charism or distinctiveness that permeates religious orders and communities, giving
them a unique disposition. 96 The following examples use the two predominant founding
congregations of Trinity Health in its 2000 establishment: Sisters of the Holy Cross
embody the characteristics of their founder, Fr. Basil Moreau, with the core values of
compassion, faith, prayer, and community for the ends of serving as prophetic witnesses
to transform and bring hope to a fragmented world, supporting right relationships in
diverse communities, promoting ecological sustainability, advocating for systemic
change with poor, underserved, impoverished, and excluded persons through political,
economic, and social mechanisms. 97 The Sisters of Mercy of the Americas exhibit their
charism by serving in education, health care, and other ministries in order to advance the
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further the well-being (that may be social, political, economic, or spiritual) of God‘s
people, address concerns, care for the poor and women, create a spirit of hospitality, and
address Christ‘s mission through mercy, justice, and collaboration by working alongside
others.98,
There are other examples of charisms including the Dominican Sisters of St.
Cecelia, who define their congregation as both contemplative – by dedicating times and
places to silence, living in community and cloistered (at times), wearing a habit, regular
prayer and devotions, choral recitations, and living simply in poverty – and active –
mainly through teaching, education, and religious formation. An additional example is
the sisters in the Mother Joseph Province of the Sisters of Providence and their
expression of their charism as ―the manifestation of the mysteries of the Providence of
God and Our Mother of Sorrows in compassionate love and creative, prophetic solidarity
with the poor.‖99
These circumstances beg a question about how organizations prepare themselves
continue the specific missions of the founding sisters by reflecting and serving within the
distinctive charisms of the founding congregations, even though the numbers of sisters
are shrinking. It is commonplace now to have predominantly laypersons in the
administration and operations of hospital systems. Laypersons can and do answer
callings to serve in business and corporate culture, including hospitals and health care
systems. 100 Still, they do not have the training and backgrounds, the formation, of
religious sisters.
Additional considerations and demands on an organization‘s internal resources
include its ability to maturely discern or reflect on issues that are important to the
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organization. Discernment and decision-making are processes that, at least in Catholic
health care, include mechanisms to encourage the integration of an organization‘s
mission, vision, values, and behaviors with the relevant issue. During discernments or
decision-making, associates project their own development, values, and mores into their
choices. Organizations are reflective of their constituent parts; therefore, it benefits an
organization for its associates to make good decisions, which presumably embody the
culture of its religious founders. The decrease in nuns, brothers, and priests and increase
in laypersons within hospitals and systems begs other inquiries related to moral and
values based discernment and decision-making: One may speculate about lay associates‘
awareness of the charisms, values, and priorities of the religious congregations or orders
that founded the hospital or health system (often partially articulated in mission, core
value, integrity, and behavior statements). Given awareness of these characteristics, one
wonders about their application and implementation in organizational decisions and
discernments. Another reasonable query also pertains to decisions and discernments,
namely if they are reflective of the priorities, charisms, and values of the founding
congregations or orders.
The broad answer to many of the internal and external challenges in Catholic
health care is the development and formation of lay associates in health care systems.
Obviously, the lives and careers of most professionals do not permit them to take vows to
religious orders or congregations for similar knowledge and training to the organization‘s
founders. This is not only impractical; it is unreasonable to suggest for reasons that
involve family, lifestyle, commitments, finances, and time. Consequently, health care
formation programs have structures that are conducive for participants to acquire
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knowledge and skills using modes that are much more accessible for working
professionals.
All these features act together with each other much like a pressure cooker.
External and internal demands rise like heat from a burner. A high temperature causes
the pressure to increase in the sealed vessel, or the cooker, which represents the
organization. The fare inside the cooker is akin to the internal and external stakeholders
of the organization, meaning those people within and outside of the organization who are
impacted by its decisions. The pressure needs to be just right to cook the food. Too little
is usually not the problem – the meal needs to cook longer. Too much pressure not only
ruins the meal, but it can be disaster in the form of an explosive cooker ejecting its
contents with such force that it damages everything around it. Continuing the metaphor,
excessive strain on an organization, including its associates and communities they serve,
can spell disaster in the form of collateral damage. What an organization needs is a
release valve.
This dissertation describes a new, novel, and innovative use of the principle of
cooperation as this valve, more specifically, by interpreting the principle of cooperation
as a function of moral development. Moral development of participants with the model is
not guaranteed. Even if participants do not develop, the model is an instrument for
ministry discernment and ministry formation. Material cooperation is a principle of
Catholic moral theology; and as such, moral theologians are the primary users, applying
it to a specific range of issues confronting Catholic organizations. This proposal
theorizes that the principle lends itself to a broader interpretation, use, and application,
mainly for moral development, and to a lesser degree, ministry formation and ministry
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discernment. It is precisely material cooperation‘s complexity that lends itself to these
purposes. When used in this way, (completing the metaphor) the principle is not only a
release valve on the pressure cooker, it is akin to loosening the lid or opening the vessel
so that the pressure is right all the time.
IIC. The Ideal Release Valve: Cooperation as a Social Principle
A natural, next question is about what makes cooperation the appropriate release
valve? The characteristics that make cooperation unique and distinct from other
principles in Catholic teaching are answers to this question. This section addresses the
distinguishing attributes of cooperation, which make it best for development and
formation.
Many principles reveal inherent concern with the integrity of decisions. For
example, the principle of subsidiarity pertains to persons making decisions at the most
appropriate level and forum. In other words, leaders should not trump decision-making
or sequester decisional authority. Decisions should belong to those people most affected
by the results of that decision, thus ensuring a measure of integrity in the process of
decision-making. 101 Cooperation, as well, intrinsically concentrates on decisional
veracity.
In contrast to other principles, including subsidiarity, we know that people, otherthan-Catholics in many cases, do things that those in the Catholic tradition do not fully
agree with. An option is for persons to indiscriminately participate in the questioned
activity. Another is total removal and isolation from set questionable activity. Tensions
exist between these two, arguably, diametrically opposed choices. Christians live in
society, which is one they may not totally agree with, and they must question where to

39

‗draw the line‘ between loosening the veil to let down their hair and building up their
cloisters even higher. Stated differently, it is responsibility of those upholding Catholic
norms to consider where the line is, based upon the characteristics of a situation. In some
cases, this means sticking to Catholic norms and principles at the expense of participating
in community. In others, it means recognizing that continuing in the spirit of the ministry
of Jesus, articulated in the Gospels, means that Catholics and Christians inevitably get
their hands dirty. Cooperation inherently expresses this particular tension in ways that
other principles, such as subsidiarity, does not.
Various different agencies, some explicit and others implicit, accompany different
Catholic moral principles. This statement merits further attention. A significant number
of Catholic moral principles address only one agent, which is the person acting or
refraining from a moral decision, one behavior, which may be an action or omission by
the same or another agent, and predominantly one stakeholder, meaning that the import
of the action or omission is principally one person. These principles are individual in
character. For instance, a hospital ethics consultant attends to a case where an 88-yearold man and father of two, ‗Lou,‘ with decisional capacity in multiple organ system
failure looks to frame his treatment options. The intervention that is foremost in his mind
is his dialysis, but he would also like to consider his rapidly escalating hospital bills left
for his family. This case is similar to others where the moral agent is also the primary
stakeholder. The ethicist or clinician structures the conversation using the principle of
proportionate and disproportionate means, articulated by Directives 56 and 57 in the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs) and the
ordinary and extraordinary means distinction in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
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Faith‘s (CDF‘s) Declaration on Euthanasia.102 Lou is the agent making the decision,
will authorize one behavior (or interconnected series of behaviors), and will bear the
import of his decision. The context of the principle is individual.
Likewise, the clinicians and ethicist working with Katherine‘s, a 51-year-old
patient and mother of three, request for framing options, including double mastectomy,
responding to her aggressive but still local cancer may know about the principle of
totality and integrity. They mention the approach with the best outcomes and least bodily
harm. Katherine ultimately makes the decision, approves a behavior that may also be a
series of behaviors, and is the person most affected by the decision. Similar to
proportionate and disproportionate means considerations, the principles of totality and
integrity – describing the duty to preserve the body and spirit in total form unless there is
a proportionate benefit to the harm or side effects103 – are individual in their situation.
Other principles may seem social in character, but are more individual than not.
For example, double effect reasoning (DER) or the principle of double effect (PDE)
describes an action or omission that has two foreseen effects, one intended and the other
not. An action is licit or ―permissible if and only if‖ it meets a series of, typically, four
conditions (discussed later).104 The action or omission under consideration is the result of
one agent, can impact another person, and a third person could authorize the choice. It is
understandable why DER may seem social or communal. Still, it is not because DER
only refers to the agent and that person’s choice, including intent and circumstances,
despite its appearance. DER is largely a single-agency principle.
The principle of cooperation joins the likes of other principles and theories, such
as common good and the closely related distributive justice, which are social or
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communal. The common good and its necessary components of respect for persons,
social welfare, and peace and security apply to a choice or series of choices. 105 It reminds
the agent and decider that choices have greater import and impact than ‗just‘ the
individual. Distributive justice is another consideration interconnected with the common
good. This is the justice due to individuals from a community or society, which may
depend on individual needs (wishes) and contributions, communal or societal resources,
and the organization of distribution mechanisms. 106 It is equitable allocation for
individuals and groups that incorporates benefit, burden, macroallocation, and
microallocation factors.107 Common good and distributive justice relate such that
―society ought to structure itself so that individuals are able to participate in it and ought
to distribute its goods and resources in ways that are equitable (which is not the same as
equal).‖108 Using Kantian terminology, the common good is the end that depends on
needs, resources, and order (organization) while distributive justice describes any number
of means to that end. In other words, distributive justice describes various routes for
achieving the teleological goals of the common good. (Teleology is the ethics theory of
orienting ones decisions and behavior to a final cause or goal. Aquinas linked the
concept of finality with ―the good‖ because agents position themselves to achieve
both.)109 An individual or group may make the decision, approve a behavior or series of
behaviors, and the decision impacts multiple stakeholders who may or may not be the
person(s) making the decision. Applying common good and distributive justice
considerations to a situation has a much more communal- or group-orientation than the
principle of proportionate and disproportionate means, the principles of totality and
integrity, and DER.
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A unique factor regarding the principle of cooperation when compared with other
communal principles and theories is that it is inherently a multiple-agency principle.
There are two people or groups with moral instrumentality – the agent is the one
responsible for the sin, injustice, or malfeasance in question (that cooperators or others
are assessing) while the cooperator is the one with some type of connection (relationship)
with the agent. There are two behaviors (acts or omissions) – the behavior of the agent
and the behavior of the cooperator. The cooperator clarifies the naturalistic fallacy. (The
origin of the naturalistic fallacy is the philosopher G.E. Moore, who observed that people
often justify moral conclusions as ‗good‘ because they are linked to happiness,
development, evolution, or survivability. In contemporary philosophy, it is also known
as the ―is-ought‖ distinction or problem because it describes situations where people infer
what ought to be from what is.)110 This person questions, What should our level of
participation be with something we do not agree with, irrespective of the current
situation? Should what is also be what ought to be? The cooperator implements his or
her agency by either forming or continuing a relationship with the agent or distancing or
ending the relationship. Cooperation refers to multiple agents and their choices and, as
such, is a multi-agency principle.
Previously discussed and other Catholic moral principles and theories have
multiple agents focused on a decision, which may or may not involve a series of
behaviors towards a desired end, outcome, or duty. (That is, one could describe social
principles as being deontological, teleological, or consequential.) For instance, the
common good and distributive justice may apply to numerous people – there can be many
stakeholders. Likewise, multiple persons can make and authorize a decision with
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common good and distributive justice considerations that affects the stakeholders. The
common good remains unfulfilled. Nonetheless, it has received well-deserved attention,
enough to surmise that what is does not comport with what ought to be. The decision-athand is a vehicle – who, what, when, why, and how – for achieving the desired state or
goods. For instance, the principle of stewardship, a chief concern for Catholic health
care, implores its users to take responsibility for God‘s creations, as humans were
entrusted with ―limited dominion‖ over the environment and animals. 111 Human and
other animal life as well as the environment deserves careful consideration when human
activities impact them. 112 Similar to the common good, the principle of stewardship may
entail multiple agents making choices that affect multiple stakeholders. The focus in the
application of the principles is the decision itself, and how the decision bears on the, as
yet, unachieved goal, consequence, or duty.
In contrast to these other principles, the principle of cooperation intrinsically is
about relationships with an achieved goal, consequence, or duty. The endpoint of
applying cooperation has been determined – it is the evil, injustice, or malfeasance
committed by the moral agent. Perpetration of the ‗sin‘ either has or continues to occur.
(Persons will not agree to the weight and categorization of any particular action as sin,
injustice, or malfeasance. For these purposes, the Catholic Church weighs and
categorizes sin even though we may personally disagree.) For example, a small, regional,
Catholic health care system regards a partnership with a Protestant hospital within the
same region that continues to perform elective sterilizations. Due diligence catalyzes the
request from the Catholic system that the Protestant hospital cease and desist its elective
sterilization program. The Protestant hospital does not agree. In this case, the evils
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defined by the Catholic Church continue, and the cooperator questions: What must be the
nature of relationship, if at all, to the Protestant hospital for the Catholic system to
maintain its integrity while working with this system doing evil according to the Catholic
Church? The agent (the Protestant hospital in this case) can agree to stop committing the
evil. As a result, the need to use the principle of cooperation may not exist, as it is
generally about the relationship with someone committing evil. It is cooperation,
however, that may catalyze appreciation for the need to maintain apposite distance from
another‘s moral evil, which results in a cease and desist request to the other moral agent.
Even in this scenario, the impact of cooperation on new relationships is evident. The
cooperator proclaims to the agent: Continuing to behave in this way may impact our
plans for continuing or developing our affiliation.
The import of cooperation in the ministry of Catholic health care is significant
already. The entirety of Part Six in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services (ERDs) uses cooperation as a framework for the formation of new
partnerships with Catholic health care. Cooperation‘s impact becomes even more
significant as a multi-agency principle for fostering organizational virtue for a couple
reasons. As inferred from the example above and detailed later, organizations are moral
agents; they have moral agency. Organizations must determine the best option between
competing or conflicting choices in order exercise their agency with integrity. This is the
work of both organizational ethics and cooperation, when used in this context. The
‗other,‘ meaning the agent(s) under scrutiny for questionable decisions, may be secular
(non-religious) organizations and society. It may also be the organization itself. In other
words, organizational integrity concerns how organizations respond to internal dilemmas
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and decisions with questionable morality. Virtuous organizations have moral integrity
because they have both internal and external focus. From a psychological and
developmental standpoint, moral organizations have both customer-focused agency,
focused on product and societal impact, as well as self-discerning or self-reflective
capacity, with a focus on ethical process. Incidentally, the last description is also one
commonly captured in the definition of organizational ethics. 113 Cooperation enjoys
unique standing as a multi-agency, social principle oriented to relationships and good for
analyzing choices both internal and external to the organization that the agent does not
agree with.
It is worth mentioning some examples of what multi-agency dilemmas in
organizational ethics within Catholic health care systems look like. This first of two
examples involves a dilemma faced by many health care systems, while not referencing
any actual, existing system in particular: The human resources department in hypothetical
Agape Health recently made a controversial decision regarding employee benefits. In
short, Agape Health approved an initiative for every associate to purchase a minimal
level of health care and life insurance benefits. This requirement did not exist previously.
They are considering broadening this to other benefits such as dental and vision. Income
and position within the organization do not make a difference. Associates in human
resources justify their decision on the grounds that many within the organization with
lower incomes do not buy insurance, even though these people need it the same or more
than others. They argue that support is found within Catholic social teaching, which
states that everyone has ―the right to life, rest, medical care, … [and] security in the event
of sickness.‖114
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The second example occurs before commentary about the first, as the discussion
of each has similar elements and follows this example. Alike to the first, it references an
oft-encountered situation, without referring to any existent health system in particular.
The disputed situation, in contrast to the first situation, occurs outside the organization: A
regional, Catholic system, St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH), signed a letter of
intent (LOI) to form a partnership with a small, accountable health network, St.
Bernardine of Siena Wellness System (SBW), originally Catholic, sold to a Protestant
denomination, which sold it again. A secular company operates SBW now, which is
locally reputable and gaining national attention, mainly for its high reported patient
satisfaction scores and efficient coordination of care. SBW includes two acute care
facilities and a number of point-of-care, multi-specialty clinics with state-of-the-art
technology for diagnostics, wellness (fitness), and coordination of care (e.g., electronic
appointment scheduling and video and IM capabilities with physicians, nutritionists,
therapists, wellness coaches, and other professionals). The LOI, signed after the due
diligence processes of both organizations, specifies that they will slowly increase their
operational integration over two years. This process recently started.
Some of the associates from SFH notice what they describe as troubling processes
at SBW despite the unproblematic due diligence. First, more questions now exist about
the technological capabilities of SBW. In short, access to care is great for those who
have computers with internet connections. Customer service is poor for persons using the
telephone. This issue is one of socio-economic justice: people who are more affluent
receive better service. Second, SBW is beginning a preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) program. PGD describes ―techniques involving both genetic diagnostic
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technology and assisted reproductive technology (ART) to gain genetic information about
a newly conceived embryo prior to the establishment of uterine pregnancy,‖ 115 The
developing PGD program did not appear in the due diligence process and most ART is
problematic and prohibited by Catholic teaching. Third, SBW has not stopped its
involvement with the selective reduction (e.g., multifetal pregnancy reduction is the
abortion of one or more fetuses to increase chances for normal gestation, development,
and viability for the remaining fetuses). 116 Due diligence provisions from SFH demanded
the program‘s abolition prior to the integration of the organizations, because of Church
prohibitions of affiliations with organizations that terminate pregnancies. Fourth, there is
evidence of patient ‗cherry-picking‘ and ‗dumping,‘ practices designed, in this case, to
retain patients who are healthier and give better satisfaction scores, despite the moral
repugnance and illegality of such practices. One could assess any of these practices
individually using the principle of cooperation. Another concern is that SBW and SFH
associates witnessed SBW administrators commenting, ―We are too far along now to
make such changes,‖ ―This deal needs to go through,‖ and ―We can sweep this under the
carpet and revisit when there is less scrutiny.‖ The overarching concern is now about the
cultural fit of SBW with SFH.
In the first example, the problem is that other elements are missed with a narrow
focus on Catholic social teaching, which has many facets. For instance, one component
may be the living wage and the inability of people with low incomes to pay bills for basic
needs along with health care for family. The central question is about if there other ways
to provide health care for the working poor and underserved without creating additional
problems, such as loss of income. The second example involves the issue of cultural fit
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between a Catholic system, which fosters respect for all people in words and actions, and
a system that seems to be deceptive or negligent in many areas. In both cases, the social
effects of using this multi-agency principle to assess the situations are evident, albeit with
multiple agents within the same organization in the former example and multiple agents
in different organizations in the latter.
IID. Future Hindsight – A Solution Becomes a Problem: Lessons Learned from Casuistry
The model of cooperation proposed here would be effective for moral
development and ministry formation of associates in addition to the application of
cooperation as issue discernment. Chapter two discusses some of the emblematic
functions of cooperation; it is a staple for mergers and acquisitions. As this thesis
demonstrates, its contemporary use and relevancy to the similar types of situations is
ominous.
Lord Byron and Lord Halifax both comment that the past is the best predictor of
the future.117 Søren Kierkegaard is attributed with the quote, ―Life can only be
understood backwards, but it must be lived forward.‖118 The wisdom of these sayings has
relevance for these purposes. Account for and learn from the past while bearing in mind
that future situations in the experience of living life forward may not share the same
characteristics of the past. Analyzing the present and adapting for the future requires a
measure of creativity when applying lessons from the past.
Such is the case with applying the learning from the historical context of
cooperation and casuistry, which is a method of argumentation predominantly driven by
making analogies between case features.119 Casuistry was the method of choice for the
Catholic Church for ritual and ecclesiastical discipline that began early in this history of
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Christianity. Penitential books, canon law, and confessional books all exhibited casuistic
reasoning. The period began with extrapolating natural law theory within the sources
mentioned above to account for the variations of everyday life and situations. Decisions
were highly dependent on reasoning, conscience, prudence, and circumstances. 120
Casuistry exploded in use, reliance, and popularity during the Middle Ages.
During this time, various theologians developed their own practical confession books,
meant to provide those taking confessions with guidelines for discussion and resolution in
parishioner confessions. For instance, John of Fribourg made his own collection called
Summa Confessorum (c. 1280), a Franciscan composed Summa Atestana (c. 1317), the
Franciscan Angelo Carletti wrote Summa Angelica (c. 1480), the Dominican Sylvester
Mazzolini of Priero compiled Summa Summarum (c. 1516), and the Dominican Thomas
de Vio Cajetan penned Summula Peccatorum (c.1523). The Summas were highly
intricate, encyclopedic in scope, (eventually) rarely relied on conscience or discernment,
applied maxims to circumstances, and directly repeated other Summas.121
The downfall of casuistry was the byproduct of any number of dynamics. The
abuse referenced in the title of the book The Abuse of Casuistry was the result of
confessors who could astutely shape casuistic reasoning to ―alibi the misdeeds of their
patrons,‖ which discredited the method. 122 Additional abuses in application include
confessors who would categorize the confession and penance before hearing all the
relevant detail from the patron. In other words, a full understanding of the sin is
necessary if intent, circumstances, and context matter.123 Problems existed in the writing
of the guides. Casuistry gradually loosed the tether to its natural law, which is the belief
that God or nature is responsible for creating persons‘ ends or goals. 124 Authors began to
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repeat each other and texts became increasingly subject to individual interpretation, as a
consequence of misunderstanding, imprecise translation, and undue liberties creating new
examples.125 The rampant application of casuistry failed for other reasons such as ―hard
to find paradigm cases, weak maxims, and obedience to rules rather than moral value.‖ 126
It was in this milieu, after the high period of casuistry, that Alphonsus Liguori,
who was the originator of cooperation, commented on moral theology. One word sums
up the difference in Liguori‘s moral theology – moderation. This meant navigating the
tumultuous waters between a rigorist view, where adherers searched for a coherent moral
system from the Gospels, and a lax view, where they ―were content with plucking the
most liberal opinions from the most recent authors if only they had the slightest shadow
of probability.‖127 Unlike others, he was not ready to throw the enterprise of casuistry
into the fire, but strict casuistry was similar to strict legalism, a practice where a person
resorts to a rule for everything without intentional discernment, which Liguori abhorred.
Application of principles, cases, and discernment require moderation from
knowledgeable persons with well-guided consciences.128
Similar to the casuists during the high period, Liguori was interested in providing
practical and useful help to those priests listening to confessions. Liguori comments:
The office of the confessor is the greatest – it concerns eternal
salvation – and the most difficult. The most difficult because it
requires knowledge of all the sciences, all work, all the
professions; because it touches upon every kind of problem;
because it presupposes knowledge of a huge number of positive
laws and sacred canons that have to be rightly interpreted and,
finally, because there remains the had work of applying all of this
to the diversity of cases for which circumstances call for different
solutions.129
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What is now the principle of cooperation is the ideal example of Ligouri‘s even-keeled
approach, which originally served as guidance for those taking confessions. Persons
employing the principle cannot resort to strict legalism or casuistry; it requires users to
discern the situation, context (intent, circumstances), applicable Church teaching, and the
instrumentality, directness, and consequences of cooperating. Liguori wished to catalyze
consciences rather than substitute reasoning with a scheme of rules.
Hundreds of years after Liguori, contemporary observations about the state of
casuistry and cooperation reveal a peculiar set of circumstances. Kuczewski comments,
―Casuistry…was discredited in philosophical circles for several hundred years but was
revived by bioethicists in the 1980s…It is currently considered by many to be the
quintessential method of medical ethics.‖ 130 As discussed in chapter two, the principle of
cooperation has been formalized into a scheme or nexus with copious differentiators. Its
contemporary application is for more than just confessions, and it is useful for individuals
and organizations. Despite the seeming breadth of issues for application, people
frequently use it for the same types of issues with mergers between Catholic
organizations and other-than-Catholic organizations performing sterilizations being the
paradigm case. In fact, one could make the case that the many applications of
cooperation are a type of casuistry. For instance, organizations made widespread use of
duress for providing services to communities in mergers and joint ventures that would not
be licit otherwise. These categorical uses led to a universal rejection of using duress for
justifying organizations to be in immediate material cooperation with moral evil. 131
One wonders how Liguori would react to this state of affairs. On the one hand, it
is conceivable that he would think that contemporary society reduced the application of
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cooperation to the legalism that he was trying to get away from. It could be that the
customary, current use of cooperation is casuistry run amok for Liguori. This is difficult
to categorically assume. On the other hand, Liguori may think that there are there
methods to broaden the application and use of the principle while being more discerning
and formative about issues. This may or may not get closer to Liguori‘s intent and
purpose. This dissertation proves that the last approach, cooperation becoming more
discerning and formative, is possible in the five chapters that follow this.
IIE. Chapter Summaries
Chapter two is the Theological and Ethical Analysis of Material Cooperation.
The beginning of the chapter connects theology and ethics when addressing material
cooperation, provides the historical context of cooperation, and establishes an
understanding of theological ethics as a framework for right action. The latter part of the
chapter defines material cooperation within the Catholic tradition of theological ethics,
places it in relation with other ethical principles within the Catholic theological tradition,
locates cooperation within the history of theological ethics, categorizes typical individual
applications of cooperation to issues in Catholic health care, and identifies fundamental
controversies in the application of cooperation.
The focus changes from individual to organizational in chapter three, titled
Material Cooperation within the Organizational Context of Health Care. Critical
backdrop to this chapter is establishing that organizations have moral agency, validated
historically, which is a function of organizational ethics. There are pertinent differences
between individual and organizational applications of the principle of cooperation that
the chapter addresses along with usual applications of cooperation with organizations.
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Chapter four shifts gears from theology to address psychology and development,
appropriately titled Interpreting the Implementation and Use of Material Cooperation as a
Function of Moral Development. It is moral development that serves as the foundation
for moral agency to identify wrongdoing, and two developmental theories – Kohlberg‘s
Theory of Moral Development and Gilligan‘s Theory of Woman‘s Moral Development –
are key to this foundation. After aligning moral development with discernment and
organizational agency, the chapter concludes with the understanding that applying
material cooperation is a function of moral development.
Chapter five not only ties together all the previous concepts but it introduces the
new model of cooperation. Its heading is Material Cooperation as Model for Ministry
Formation and Ministry Discernment and it begins by situating the model as a complex
moral intervention. Then attention and detail goes to the model itself including its
structure, roles, and process.
The conclusion is chapter six. The chapter begins with specifications about the
strengths and weaknesses of the model. After reflecting on the complexity of
cooperation, significant attention goes to justifying the utility of this model in other-thanCatholic settings. All sorts of organizations have mission statements, behaviors, and
values that they may or may not pay attention to in action. In addition, anyone may find
out that he or she, or an organization, is somehow complicit in a distasteful, immoral
practice. Any of these issues can happen in every setting, providing a ripe environment
for using this model based off of the Catholic principle of cooperation.
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Chapter Two – Theological and Ethical Analysis of Material
Cooperation
I. Theological Ethics as the Context for Understanding Ethical Practice
The latter section of the chapter addresses the principle of cooperation as an application
of theological ethics. Before this, the initial section establishes theological ethics as the
context for understanding ethical practice. Essential to this establishment is bonding
theology and ethics when addressing cooperation, explaining the historical context for
addressing cooperation, and then understanding theological ethics, based on the bond and
historical context between theology and ethics as a framework for right action.
The Georgetown University bioethics bibliography defines bioethics ―as the
systematic study of value questions that arise in health care delivery and biomedicine.‖ 132
Bioethics is the crossroads of ethics and the life sciences. The modern emergence of
bioethics has had profound impact on other disciplines, such as medicine, biology, the
social sciences, law (legal), public policy (government), literature, philosophy, and
religion. 133
David Kelly observes at least two important things about the name and origins of
bioethics. First, with respect to the name, Van Rensselaer Potter coined ‗bioethics‘ in the
early 1970‘s, and delegated a broad, ecological meaning to it.134 Bioethics has a more
expansive meaning today, as it applies ethics to the environmental and animal milieu,
than health care ethics and medical ethics, which designate value distinctions associated
human condition of illness and the methods for attending to illness. Medical ethics and
health care ethics are the most specific terms for our context and, like Kelly, their use is
interchangeable.
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The contemporary emergence of the multidisciplinary bioethics began in the
1950s and 1960s. Factors leading to its materialization included the advent and prolific
use of advanced medical technologies such as dialysis, artificial respirators, intensive
care units, and organ transplantation. Other dynamics included social developments and
reforms such as the civil rights and feminist movements as well as the social welfare
programs mentioned in the first chapter.135
Kelly, second, notes that Roman Catholicism has been the most influential to the
contemporary, Western development of medical ethics. The reason for this is because
theologians, and Roman Catholic theologians more specifically, have commented on the
link between morality, religion, and medicine for hundreds of years before the present
time. A paradigmatic example of this is Francisco de Vittoria, a Spanish, Dominican
moral theologian who lived from 1486 to 1546 and made the following comments in his
Reflection Theologicia:
One is not held to protect his life as much as he can…[Secondly], I
say that one is not held to lengthen his life because he is not held to
use always the most delicate foods, that is, hens and chickens, even
though he has the ability and the doctors say that if he eats in such
a manner he will live twenty years more… And even if he knew
this for certain, he would not be obligated. Just as one is not held
to live in the most healthful place, neither must one use the most
healthful foods. If one uses food, which men commonly use and in
quantity, which customarily suffices for the preservation of
strength, even though one‘s life is shortened considerably, one
would not sin. One is not held to employ all the means to conserve
life but is sufficient to employ the means…intended for this
purpose and which are congruous… If one had moral certitude that
drugs would heal and prolong life, then one should take the drugs
himself or give them to a sick neighbor. If…not, he would be
excused from mortal sin. But because a cure can seldom be certain,
one need not use drugs even though very ill. 136
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Readers may notice at least two concepts prevalent in contemporary Catholic health care
ethics. First is the concept of proportionate and disproportionate means discussed in the
first chapter. Second, de Vittoria applies this mechanism of weighing burdens and
benefits to food. His logic has resurfaced both explicitly and implicitly in the current
discussions about medically assisted nutrition and hydration (MANH) with people who
have chronic conditions such as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or locked-in.
The purpose of the example is not to discuss the issues, but simply to illustrate that
Catholic theologians have been discussing morality as a matter of moral theology for
hundreds of years. Albert Jonsen observes that moral theology emerged as a distinct
discipline in the 1400s, and it immediately attended to matters of medicine and health as
illustrated by the example.137 This interface of ethics, religion, and medicine (health)
continues today.
IA. Introduction: Connecting Theology and Ethics when Addressing Material
Cooperation
The relationship between ethics and theology deserves more overt attention.
Theology itself is the study of God or rational discourse about God. Theologians in the
Western tradition do this by thinking about the history of interaction between God and
humans. In this way, theology is a reflection on the faith relationship between persons
and God. There are various different theologies because there are many different faith
traditions.138 Christian theology, for example, is the methodical contemplation on all
facets of human life from a Biblical vantage. 139 Special attention goes to answering
questions about what it means to be human within this historical context. There are two
predominant strands of theology. One, there is a speculative theology that seeks to know
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more about the relationship between God and humankind, called dogmatic, doctrinal,
speculative, or systematic theology. Two, another strand of theology attends to the
behavior and lives lived by those who believe in God, called pastoral, practical, or moral
theology. It is the second kind of theology, moral theology, which serves as the primary
point of engaging the tradition. 140 Moral or pastoral theology is the main way that
theology engages the doctrinal foundations of Catholic tradition. That is, theology has an
investment in the rules or ideas taught to believers as the truth.141
Ethics, too, has branches and divisions much like theology. Generally, ethics
involves matters of common and reflective persons,142 and it describes the methodical
and meticulous study of moral norms. 143 It is normative anthropology. 144 There are three
major branches of ethics. Metaethics is the closest branch of ethics to doctrinal,
dogmatic, and systematic theology. It is the branch that examines the significance and
import of terms, the reasons behind moral reasoning, and focuses on ontology,
epistemology, and justification. Descriptive ethics focuses less on what should be the
norm and more on how it is we view circumstances involving ethics and morals. In other
words, it seeks to depict how we think and behave in moral situations. Normative ethics
applies to what we ought to do by attending to questions in a methodical and attentive
manner.145
Other closely related terms to ethics deserve explanation. Ethical theory describes
the attempt to find a sufficient normative concept to attend to moral problems. 146 Ethical
methodologies are endeavors to provide methodology or means ―for producing a
normative framework, for using the framework once it has been identified, or for
navigating the complexities of moral life in the absence of a framework.‖147 The goal of
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theory is not just academic;148 the response must be proper conduct in the form of doing
good or doing right.149 James Walter distinguishes that potential versus actual conduct
illustrates the difference between the terms morality and ethics – ethics describes the
normative ought (to act a particular way) while morality depicts the descriptive is (about
actions).150 In effect, it is ethics that attends to the normative justification of actions
within the tradition.
IB. Describing the Historical Context for Addressing Material Cooperation
Previous examples and discussion reveals that theology and ethics relate
hermeneutically in the Catholic tradition to distinguish right and wrong action. On one
hand, this happens within the context of nature through natural law. Natural law is the
individual and collective experience of using reason to discover right and wrong within
God‘s continuingly unfolding creation.151 Ought as well as is are functions of natural
law, meaning that God is the creator of all things such as the environment and humans
use these conditions along with their reason to determine what should be. 152 Richard
McCormick shares natural law as specified by Thomas Aquinas, namely that there are
three tiers of natural tendencies and their corresponding good. First, all beings share a
propensity to good that is compatible with their common nature. Other commonalities
exist, second, with all animals that are taught by nature, i.e. reproduction and care of
offspring. All rational creatures, third, have the predilection to rationalize in search of
knowledge, truth, and quality interactions with others. 153 Reason helps people determine
the order designed by God for all creatures that all other conventions measure against; it
also involves recognition of innate qualities and invention of standards. 154 It is natural
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law that is the groundwork for discriminating morality, establishing conduct standards,
and providing significance for moral conduct.155
On the other hand, the hermeneutic relationship between theology and ethics in
the Catholic tradition that distinguishes right and wrong action also occurs within the
grace granted through divine revelation. In the most basic sense, ―grace is God‘s
deliverance…a gift from God that we do not deserve; it is not self-righteousness that we
achieve by our own good works.‖156 Aaron Mackler draws attention to the association
between grace and original sin, namely that God‘s grace is not something we can live
without because of the existence and prevalence of sin. 157 We are aided by supernatural
grace;158 it is our divine forgiveness for when we sin or make judgment errors. This
grace generates agapaic love, which binds all people and establishes a basis for human
conduct because of our love for God and our neighbors. 159
Theological ethics or moral theology is the context for understanding ethical
practice for our purposes. The inclusiveness and distinctiveness of moral theology and
Christian theological ethics is a noteworthy discussion. A foundational issue in moral
theology is the existence and characteristics of a distinctly Christian ethic. 160 It begs the
question about where to place Christian moral theology on a scale of integration with
other ethical theories (e.g. secular, humanist ethics). On this scale, one endpoint
delineates that moral theology is unique and distinctive from other ethics, and the other
endpoint indicates Christian theology is universal. In other words, does a Christian ethic,
a universal and human ethic,161 possess distinctive characteristics? Perhaps being
universal and distinctive are not mutually exclusive. Christian ethics can be global in
scope while including particular, distinguishing attributes. 162 The minimal agreement
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between theologians about being universal yet unique is the basis of Christian ethics in
scripture and religious teachings, taken from the ministry of Jesus. Christian ethics
contain descriptive statements about God‘s connection with humankind as well as the
actual condition of humankind. 163 The Gospel provides a context for understanding
human experience. 164 A particular subset of Christian ethics is Catholic moral theology.
Catholic moral theology discriminates a range of viable options within the framework of
nature and grace in the Catholic tradition. 165
IC. Historical Context for Cooperation and Theological Ethics as Framing Right Action
Theological ethics as a path for right action is a difficult one, 166 possibly due to
the exemplar of taking the right path, even if not the road less traveled. The challenge
and ideal of the Christian ethic is in part or wholly due to the exemplar of Christian ethics
– Jesus Christ. Christ is a moral exemplar, and his virtue-based model serves as a guide
for good and moral behavior, details that have not escaped theologians and other
scholars.167
By no means do persons understand Christ, as well as his morality, in the same
way. That is, each person has his or her own Christology, meaning an understanding of
the import of Jesus Christ to the Church. 168 Some identify most with Jesus as the Son of
God, a high Christology, which is a characteristic of the Gospel of John. Using this
interpretation, Jesus shares God‘s divinity, implements divine authority, and conveys his
authority unambiguously. 169 He knows the perfect way to act because he is one with
God. This includes being the ideal moral exemplar and teacher while accounting for all
the various diversity and combinations of people and situations. Most likely, this is
Christology that Martin Luther ascribed to when he referred to Christ‘s ethic an
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impossible one. 170 Others recognize Jesus mainly as the Son of Man (sic) with a low
Christology, which occurs in the contexts of ―Jesus‘ activity and teaching during his
ministry, statements concerning his death and resurrection, and passages dealing with his
ascension and apocalyptic return.‖171 Jesus, from this perspective, was an enigmatic and
charismatic prophet and teacher. Even if not the perfect exemplar, he was skilled
nonetheless as a teacher of morality.
Biblical and historical references do not record any examples of Jesus Christ
delivering a complete, methodical, or common ethical framework. He taught moral
lessons in parable format, which is a manner of speaking that has an enlightening and
moving proverb, allusion, analogy, or image. Numerous examples exist – all of them are
Jesus responding ad hoc to situations and questions. Some of them include the parable of
the sewer (Matthew 13:24-30) or examples of how to gain eternal life by total submission
to God using the analogy of the camel and eye of a needle (Mark 10:17-25), the plower
looking ahead rather than back (Luke 9:62), or cutting off an appendage that hinders
one‘s moral behavior (Matthew 18:8-9, Mark 9:43-48).172
Despite any theological significance, differences based on Christology, Jesus as
moral teacher, and Jesus as moral exemplar are of little relevance to this discourse. The
end is the same whether persons identify with Jesus as God or Jesus as man. On one
hand, Christ as God would know the perfect and ideal way to transmit moral lessons to
people. The Gospels promote the ideal moral teacher and exemplar – knowing exactly
how to respond to every different context and situation. On the other hand, Christ as man
may not have known the idyllic way to teach, act, and respond. Nevertheless, he did
respond in the various parables and sayings, many of them having a moral lesson,
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counting the divided house (all four Gospels including Mark 3:23-26), mustard seed (all
four Gospels including Mark 4:30-32), wicked tenants (all four Gospels including Mark
12:1-11), fig tree (all four Gospels including Mark 13:28-29), two builders (Matthew
7:24-27; Luke 6:47-49), yeast (Matthew 13:33; Luke 13:20-21), lost sheep (Matthew
18:12-14; Luke 15:4-7), wedding banquet (Matthew 22:1-14; Luke 14:15-24), talents or
pounds (Matthew 25:14-30; Luke 19:11-27), the growing seed (Mark 4:26-29), hidden
treasure (Matthew 13:44), pearl (Matthew 13:45-46), great net (Matthew 13:47-48),
unforgiving servant (Matthew 18: 23-25), two sons (Matthew 21:28-31), ten bridesmaids
(Matthew 25:1-13), creditor (Luke 7:41-43), good Samaritan (Luke 10:30-37),
unexpected guest (Luke 11:5-8), rich fool (Luke 12: 16-21), barren fig tree (Luke 13:6-9),
lost coin (Luke 15:8-10), prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32), dishonest manager (Luke 16:18), rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), Pharisee and the tax collector (Luke 18:9-14),
good shepherd (John 10:1-18), and vine and branches (John 15:1-10).173 Arguably, the
worth of Jesus Christ as moral teacher and exemplar is relevant whatever Christology one
chooses. The proof is in the pudding. The significance of his life and teaching is
manifest in the popularity and widespread use of the Bible today, with the impact and
weight of his teachings to past and present contexts, and as a subject of attention with
contemporary theologians and scholars.
Following the life of Christ, the Church and its believers have and continue to join
Christian virtue from its exemplars with basic Christian principles. 174 L. Gregory Jones
offers examples of the most prominent virtues in Scripture – ―receptivity, humility,
truthfulness, courage, charity, and imagination.‖175 Some gospel lessons seem obvious.
For others, we have to interpret gospel stories in light of our present-day situation.

69

Applied ethics, secular or religious, is the application of virtue and principles in
practice with all of their various interpretations. 176 Ethical practice does not occur in a
vacuum, meaning that our actions impact others and a just society. Scholars comment on
the link between theory and action. James Tubbs, Jr. defines applied ethics as:
A term referring to the application of ethical theory, ethical
reasoning, or ethical perspective to particular areas of human life
and activity – for example, business ethics, legal ethics, health care
ethics, or pastoral ethics – or to particular problems, such as the
moral issue of abortion or of warfare. The term ―practical ethics‖
is often used as a synonym for applied ethics. 177
James Rachels states that the end or purpose of morality is to direct conduct, using reason
in order to effectively consider the import of behavior to others. 178 There are more than
enough reasons to apply ethical theory, reasoning, and perspectives to particular
problems. Thomas Aquinas believed that morality and human acts are synonymous,
meaning that every act has a moral dimension. 179 According to David Kelly, pastoral
medicine was a theological form of applied ethics, designed for physicians and
theologians to apply moral theology to the practice of medicine.180
Dr. Martin Luther King taught, ―An individual has not started living until he can
rise above the narrow confines of his individualistic concerns to the broader concerns of
all humanity.‖181 Prosaically, Dr. Martin Luther King also used a quote from the 19th
century abolitionist and Unitarian minister Theodore Parker, ―The moral arc of the
universe bends at the elbow of justice.‖ 182 He understood, as others do, that applying
ethics to practice and situations relates to both individual action as well as social
justice. 183 The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) summarizes the
connection between the moral life of individuals and social communities including the
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family, the nation, and the international community in a 1976 pastoral letter on the moral
life:
While the ultimate and most substantive values inhere in
individuals, individuality and community are inseparable elements
of the moral life. So, for instance, honesty, courage and hope,
which abide only in individuals, can be fostered by freedom to
learn, protection from violence, adequate income, and the
availability of health care. As followers of Jesus we are called to
express love of neighbor in deeds which help others realize their
human potential. This, too, has consequences for the structures.
Law and public policy do not substitute for the personal acts by
which we express love of neighbor; but love of neighbor impels us
to work for laws, policies, and social structures which foster
human goods in the lives of all persons. 184
Underpinning this statement is the concept that, ideally, we behave ethically not just for
ourselves but also for others. Like it or not, social, organization, and systemic injustices
are reflections of weaknesses in individuals‘ morality. One need not look any further for
a contemporary example of this link than the 2009 financial collapse in the U.S. and its
connection with the greed of more than a few individuals in power.
Relating this back to Christ‘s example and Christian virtue and practices, ethical
practice is rational discourse through natural law in the Catholic theological tradition. 185
As John T. Noonan notices, Catholic moral teaching is not dormant, but awake and
active; it changes over time and is prone to misstep.186 Thomas Aquinas realized this and
expected a dynamic tradition.187 The evolution of ethics as rational discourse within the
natural law happens for several reasons. First, reasoning in light of personal experience
varied because no two people experience and interpret the same way. 188 Second, any
rational agent can reason, which does not hold a privileged status among Catholics or
Christians. It does not matter if the person reasoning has faith or not. 189 Third, Aquinas
also recognized that human nature changes over time. 190 As persons‘ natures change, so

71

do morality and the unfolding of natural law. Even respectful dissent from Church
teaching is a part of the contemporary understanding of ethics within the context of
natural law. 191
II. Material Cooperation as an Application of Theological Ethics
IIA. Defining Material Cooperation in the Catholic Tradition of Theological Ethics
The use of the term ‗cooperation‘ in the Catholic Church and in Catholic moral
theology differs from other general terms describing partnerships, such as collaboration
or participation. Cooperation is association, affiliation, or some other partnership with
evil; it is assistance in an immoral act by another. The Catechism of the Catholic Church
(CCC) expresses cooperation:
We have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we
cooperate in them
 by participating directly and voluntarily in them;
 by ordering, advising, praising, or approving of them;
 by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an
obligation to do so;
 by protecting evil-doers.192
Cooperation is the choice of an individual or institution to assist an immoral act by an
agent, usually another individual or institution. 193 The CCC continues with repercussions
of sin on others:
Thus sin makes men accomplices of one another and causes
concupiscence, violence, and injustice to reign among them. Sins
give rise to social situations and institutions that are contrary to the
divine goodness. ―Structures of sin‖ are the expression and effect
of personal sins. They lead their victims to do evil in their turn. In
an analogous sense, they constitute a ―social sin.‖ 194
The above passage is a reminder that both sin and cooperation in the sins of others may
lead additional people to into sin. Cooperation is well suited to structure the relational
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impact of others‘ sins as described in the first chapter. This particular multi-agency,
social principle is perfectly positioned to address the social nature and impact of sin
illustrated by CCC definition above.
Collaboration describes something different in the context of Catholic teaching.
Whereas the ―evil act is the ultimate referent of the principle of cooperation,‖ this is not
so for collaboration, which describes a ―deliberate joint…action.‖ 195 This collaborative
mutual behavior, presumably through action or omission, is not in reference to a moral
evil. Therefore, collaboration is extraneous to this discussion it is not in reference to evil,
injustice, or malfeasance, which are the focus of this dissertation.
Specifications are in order before discussing the divisions of cooperation. First, a
cooperator‘s participation may be either positive or negative. Positive or direct
cooperation involves a cooperator‘s action that, in some way, assists the principle agent
in the form of counsel, petitions, incentives, requests, directives, or imperatives;
conversely, the cooperator ―does nothing to impede [the agent‘s evil]‖ in negative or
indirect cooperation, which often takes the form of disregarding an occasion to warn
someone or obstruct their action. 196 Second, according to Canon Law, cooperation may
have physical and/or moral form, may precede (pre-) the immorality (injustice) or
accompany it (peri-), and may be according to an agreement or not in accord with an
agreement.197 Just as there are many ways to sin, there are various ways to assist the sin.
Manualist theologian Henry Davis remarks that cooperation may be after the evil itself
(post-) by defending or sheltering the evildoer.198 A tangible example of post-evil
cooperation is the declaration of U.S. President Bush immediately after September 11,
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2011, when he said that he would consider any country or faction who harbors terrorists
as sympathizing with them and an enemy of the United States.
Cooperation uses a taxonomic scale to assess the level (amount) of participation
in evil. Because cooperation is conceptually difficult, the following ―Figure 1: The
Taxonomy of the Principle of Cooperation‖ should provide visual assistance for
conceptualizing the principle of cooperation.
Figure 1: The Taxonomy of the Principle of Cooperation199

The initial taxonomic divisions of cooperation are formal and material cooperation.
Formal cooperation occurs when a cooperator helps an agent in sin while intending the
sin. 200 It is participation in sin while espousing the evil intent.201 Clarifications of formal
cooperation are in order. One is that participation in evil is independent of the attitude or
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motive of the agent or cooperator,202 meaning that the motives (justifications) of intent
are irrelevant to the definition of formal cooperation. Another relates to slightly different
descriptions some commentators use to explain formal cooperation. Some explain that
formal cooperation is the cooperator‘s approval of evil. 203 Others describe it as consent
or concurrence to the evil by the cooperator.204 If there are subtle distinctions between
‗intention,‘ ‗approval,‘ and ‗concurrence,‘ they are irrelevant; all of these are the same for
this discussion. An additional clarification, related to the former, pertains to the extent
that one who is cooperating must register disapproval that, by extension, illustrates a
cooperator‘s different intent from the agent.205 For instance, one may evidence
displeasure by cooperating with a perfunctory measure, not cooperating, or thwarting the
agents‘ and others‘ participation while not cooperating.
Formal cooperation has two divisions, explicit formal cooperation and implicit
formation cooperation. Explicit formal cooperation is when cooperator‘s intention (ex
fine operantis) is the agent‘s sin. 206 The end of the cooperator and the agent are the same;
the cooperator makes a specific act of the will that directly approves of the agent‘s
immorality. 207 A definition of implicit formal cooperation is when the cooperator claims
no intent or approval because the act (or omission) is not sinful in itself, but the nature
(object) of the act cannot have any other meaning (ex fine operis).208 The Appendix of
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs) describes
implicit formal cooperation:
Implicit formal cooperation is attributed when, even though the
cooperator denies intending the wrongdoer‘s object, no other
explanation can distinguish the cooperator‘s object from the
wrongdoer‘s object.209
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No other explanations for the cooperator‘s action exist other than the wrongdoer‘s object
itself, because ―the object of the act excludes any other meaning.‖ 210
Material cooperation is different from formal cooperation in at least one important
way. This difference is one of intent; Keenan offers, ―The manuals agree‖ that ―material
cooperation requires that one cannot actually intend the illicit action.‖ 211 Therefore, the
absence of evil intent defines material cooperation. 212 It is cooperation without the
knowing and willing assent, or approval, of the agent‘s act on the part of the
cooperator.213 The intent could be many things: personal gain, profit, or convenience as
well as the avoidance of harm, loss, or nuisance 214 – just not the evil intent of the moral
agent. Some commentators differ about the conditions necessary for one to prove that he
or she does not assent (intend) the evil. Noldin defines material cooperation as the
absence of intent and does not address approval. 215 Kelly believes the cooperators must
indicate disapproval ―by show[ing] in some way that they do not approve of [the evil]…
otherwise their unprotesting assistance would imply approval.‖ 216 Any tension resulting
from these distinctions alleviates by defining approval as intention, and material
cooperation as participation in evil without intent or while evidencing disapproval. After
setting aside the issue of intent, the focus is on the act itself. Manualists observe a
necessary precondition for material cooperation is that the cooperator‘s act is not sinful in
itself, that is, by the object of the act.217
Similar to the divisions of formal cooperation, material cooperation has two initial
subdivisions. Material cooperation may be either immediate or mediate. In immediate
material cooperation, ―the object of the cooperator (nature of the cooperation) is the same
as the object of the illicit activity‖ but the cooperator does not intend the evil
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(cooperator‘s intent is apart from the moral agent‘s intent).218 As the moral theologian
Charles McFadden explains it, immediate material cooperation is participation in an
immorality, in part.219 In this way, the critical component of immediate material
cooperation is the essentiality, or primacy, of the contribution to the evil act; this is
because the cooperator directly helps to provide part or all of the conditions necessary for
it. Some consider that immediate material cooperation is any willful, intentional
contribution to the essential circumstances of the agent‘s immoral act while not intending
the object of the act.220 In other words, a cooperator knowingly cooperates but does not
approve of it. As can be assumed, mediate material cooperation occurs when the
cooperator assists the evil act by contributing in a non-essential, or secondary, way. The
cooperator‘s act is lesser when compared with the primacy of immediate cooperation, and
the cooperator does not intend the evil of the primary agent in mediate material
cooperation like immediate material cooperation. 221 Other explanations for the ‗degree of
separation‘ from the act are ―something antecedent or consequent to the evil,‖ 222 ―a
preparation to a sinful deed,‖ 223 ―an action which one would ordinarily have a right to
do,‖224 or a contributing to the ―nonessential [not indispensable] circumstances before,
during, or after the act.‖225
Further delineations divide the subcategory of mediate material cooperation. In
proximate mediate material cooperation, the cooperator‘s help intimately connects with
the evil of another. The cooperator‘s help does not closely connect with the agent‘s evil
in remote mediate material cooperation. 226 McFadden further elucidates and exemplifies
the proximate and remote classifications of mediate material cooperation:
Mediate cooperation is called proximate or remote, according as it
is more or less intimately connected with the act of the principal

77

agent. Thus, a nurse who would stand beside a surgeon who was
performing an immoral operation and hand him all the required
instruments and material would be rendering proximate assistance.
In contrast, a nurse who would prepare the patient in a hospital
room for the forthcoming immoral operation, or the nurse who
would sterilize and set out the instruments for the operation, would
be rendering remote assistance [emphasis in the original]. 227
In other words, proximate mediate material cooperation has a more direct causal
relationship than remote mediate material cooperation. 228 A description of the
relationship of proximate and remote cooperation with proportionate reason occurs
below.
Four other concepts have an intimate association with the description and
application of cooperation to any situation. First, the gravity of the moral evil is part of
ascertaining cooperation. The history of magisterial teaching and pastoral application
supports that certain moral evils, abortion and euthanasia for instance, are much more
grave than others, such as direct sterilization and birth control. 229 When applying
cooperation, the weightier the moral issue, the more the weight anchors the application of
cooperation. It becomes less likely that any sufficient distance exists to make tolerable
mediate material cooperation with an especially grave evil. Yet, as one scholar notices
about the words of John Paul II, ―circumstances can mitigate even to a notable degree
subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability of those who make these choices
which in themselves are evil.‖ 230
Second, duress has a pronounced association with cooperation. Thomas Aquinas
provided a basic definition of duress: one‘s will ―moves towards [an evil], albeit not for
its own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is
feared.‖231 Duress is significant because it is an important distinction when considering
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material cooperation and the legitimacy of immediate material cooperation. A cooperator
may face a situation where he or she does not share the evil intent of the agent but,
nevertheless, essentially or secondarily participates in an immorality (injustice) because
of duress. In particular situations such as these, ―If the cooperator could avoid it, he or
she would do so; but, given the fact that duress is present the cooperator does do
something that helps the principle agents to accomplish evil.‖ 232 In general, the duress
involved in any situation is greater when fewer alternatives (options) exist. 233 Duress can
take any one of a number of forms: individual or social, corporeal or emotional
(psychological), fiscal or material, direct or indirect.234 Historically, rare exceptions for
regarding immediate material cooperation as legitimate due to duress have been allowed.
Prudential judgment must be the basis for such decisions where there are little or no
options. 235
Third, another concept important for understanding cooperation is scandal. The
Holy See defines scandal as the following:
[Scandal] is an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil.
The person who gives scandal becomes his neighbor‘s tempter. He
damages virtue and integrity; he may even draw his brother into
spiritual death. Scandal is a grave offence if by deed or omission
another is deliberately led into a grave offense… Anyone who uses
the power at his disposal in such a way that it leads others to do
wrong becomes guilty of scandal and is responsible for the evil
that he has directly or indirectly encouraged. 236
The moral manuals specify that scandal is seduction that causes another to sin, which
includes offering the occasion to sin for the purpose of sin; it is conduct having the
appearance of evil, leading a neighbor to the occasion of spiritual ruin. 237 Scandal is
relevant to the principle of cooperation. As summarized by Directive 71 in the ERDs,
―Cooperation, which in all other respects is morally licit, may need to be refused because
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of the scandal that might be caused.‖238 Assessing scandal in cooperation is important,
particularly as it applies to mediate material cooperation. Even though a cooperator‘s
action or omission might not be intrinsically evil, leading a third party to think less of the
Church, its teaching, or its authority is sinful. 239
Proportionality, fourth and lastly, correlates with any application of the principle
of cooperation. Proportionate justification factors into material cooperation as a sliding
scale, and it is especially relevant when determining if mediate material cooperation is
licit. Less separation between cooperator and the evil (proximate) requires a more
serious justification for the cooperation, while more separation between the cooperator
and the evil (remote) requires a less serious justification for the cooperation. 240
Validation for cooperation does not occur without proper proportionate justification.
IIB. Relating Cooperation with Ethical Principles in the Catholic Theological Tradition
As discussed in chapter one, cooperation is both related to and distinct from other
theological concepts and principles. Three additional principles are worth mentioning,
both for their similarities to and divergences from cooperation. The reason for detailing
these principles now is because they, at first glance, may seem to be similar to
cooperation in their function, history, or application. Perhaps it is more important to
explain how the principles are sufficiently different and, subsequently, less valid for the
purpose of this dissertation than specifying them only.
Theologian William May articulates the significance of human actions:
Human acts are not physical events that come and go, like the
falling of rain and turning of leaves, nor do they ‗happen‘ to a
person. They are, rather, the outward expression of a person‘s
choices, for at the core of a human act is a free, self-determining
choice, which as such is something spiritual which abides within
the person, determining the very being [emphasis in original] of
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the person. The Scriptures, particularly the New Testament, are
very clear about this. Jesus taught that it was not what enters a
person that defiles him or her; rather, it is what flows from the
person, from his or her heart, from the core of his or her being,
from his or her choice (cf. Matthew 15: 10-20; Mark 7: 14-23).241
St. Thomas Aquinas specified that moral acts have moral object, intent, and
circumstances. According to the ‗three-font‘ (‗tres fontes‘) or three sources of morality
principle, the object is an act of the will, formed by conscience, which expresses the
rational order of good and evil. It is in reference to the act itself. Intention, the
secondary end of the act, has a close connection with the object, and is a part of the
agent‘s will. Circumstances are ancillary, or tertiary, elements involved in any moral act,
and they may alter the goodness of that act. Neither good circumstances nor intention
may justify an intrinsically evil act (by its object).242 Object, intent, and circumstances
must have a proper disposition in order for an act to be morally good.243
It is the dissimilar ways of considering of the object, intention, and circumstances
that account for the range resulting from the assessment of human acts. Physicalists, for
instance, accentuate the corporal dimensions of acts and do not regard other dimensions
as important, such as the psychological, spiritual, and social. In contrast, personalists
believe that all dimensions of an act (i.e. psychological, spiritual, and social as they relate
to object, intent, circumstances) are significant. Personalists predominantly focus on the
interpersonal and human characteristics of an action, including circumstances, as they
relate to its goodness.244
The three-font principle also relates to the movement and method dubbed
proportionalism, also referred to as revisionism or consequentialism. David Kelly traces
the origins of proportionalism to an article by Peter Knauer in 1965 where Knauer
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asserted that doing evil must have a ‗counterbalance,‘ which is good serving as
proportionate reason for the evil. Despite proponents‘ arguments to the contrary, Kelly
argues that proportionalism represents a change from legalism to judicious (i.e., not an
extreme form of) situationalism or, to phrase this differently, a shift from deontology to
an ―intrinsic consequentialism.‖ 245 Proportionalists are critical of physicalists because
reducing an act to its physical properties does not account for other important factors. It
is more likely that a proportionalist will not view an action as ontic or premoral evil; an
act is wrong when proportionate justification does not accompany it. 246 ―Thus, just as not
every killing is murder, not every falsehood a lie, so not every artificial intervention
preventing (or promoting) contraception is necessarily an unchaste act.‖247
John Paul II declared proportionalist reasoning as unfaithful to Church teaching in
his encyclical Veritatis Splendor (1993),248 which does not repudiate the three-font
principle. The denunciation means that one should not use proportionate reason as the
sole or chief determinate about the acceptability or illicitness of actions. This relates to
cooperation because the Church affirms that certain acts are ontic or premoral evils,
irrespective of circumstances, which can be the focal point of cooperation.
Many know double effect as the ‗principle of double effect.‘ Daniel Sulmasy
caveats that people employ the use of the terms ‗doctrine of double effect,‘ such as Quinn
in 1989, 249 and ‗rule of double effect,‘ such as Ramsey in 1978.250 Scholars Thomas
Cavanaugh and Christopher Kaczor expound that this classification as a single ‗principle‘
is a recent occurrence, given the extensive history of concepts innate to double effect. 251
Scholars and theologians after Aquinas did not remark about one principle alone, but a
sequence of conditions with more than one effect. 252 Therefore, according to Cavanaugh,
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it may not be clear that these criteria are principles. Cavanaugh employs the use of
―double effect reasoning‖ (DER) to evade any misinterpretation, a convention that
Kaczor adopts.253
Questions abound as to the origins and formulators of DER because the current
formulation of DER does not reflect the pre-conglomerated existence of potentially
disparate, distinct concepts. According to Kaczor, some scholars believe that Thomas
Aquinas was the originator of DER, as traces of the modern concept are in Summa
Theologiae, either in his attention to killing in self-defense or discussion of the direct and
indirect voluntary.254 Thomas Aquinas was not the originator of DER according to other
scholars,255 despite little evidence of concept‘s components existing before Thomas
Aquinas.256 In either event, DER was contrary to the prevailing Christian teaching of St.
Augustine that one should not kill another in self-defense, an almost universal
prohibition, because bodily life is subordinate to eternal life. 257
According to Kaczor, Aquinas addressed moral acts having two effects, one that
is intended and the other apart from the intention, in Summa Theologiae. He continues
by quoting Aquinas as he addresses intention, effect, and proportionality:
Nothing prevents that there be two effects of one act: of which the
one is in the intention, but the other is outside the intention.
However moral acts take their species from that which is intended,
not however from that which is outside the intention, since it is per
accidens, as is clear from things said before. Therefore, from the
act of one defending himself a twofold effect is able to follow: one
the preservation of his own life, the other however the death of the
aggressor. Therefore an act of this type, from the fact that the
preservation of one's own life is intended, does not have the
character of the illicit, since it is natural to anyone to preserve
himself in his being insofar as he is able. 258
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Little was written about DER for about 200 years after Thomas Aquinas. Then Cardinal
Cajetan elucidated his interpretation of Aquinas and DER in the early 1500s, as it applied
to self-defense. DER clearly derives its current form within his wording, and other
implicitly accepted formulations by the end of the 1500s. It was not until the mid-1600s
that the Salmanticenses used DER as a general line-of-reasoning, as opposed to always
being attached to particular cases such as self-defense.259 Mangan quotes theologian
Joannes Gury, where he specifies the four conditions necessary for legitimate, lawful
action:
1. The ultimate end of the author must be good, that is, the author
may not intend the evil effect, because otherwise he [sic]
would intend something evil and consequently commit sin.
2. The cause itself of the effects must be good or at least
indifferent, that is, as an act the cause must not be opposed to
any law. The reason is evident. For, if the cause is evil in
itself, of itself it makes the action imputable as a fault.
3. The evil effect must not be the means to the good effect. The
reason is that, if the cause directly produces the evil effect and
procures the good effect only by means of the evil effect, then
the good is south by willing the evil. And it is never lawful to
do evil, no matter how slight, in order that good may come of
it… Therefore, one may never tell a lie even to save some
man‘s life.‖
4. There must be a proportionately serious reason for actuating
the cause, so that the author of the action would not be obliged
by any virtue to omit the action. For natural equity obliges us
to avoid evil and prevent harm from coming to our neighbor
when we can do so without proportionately serious loss to
ourselves.260
Some theologians believe that it was Gury – the French, Jesuit theologian, referenced
above, who lived in the 1800s – who coalesced some of the principles in DER and, thus,
was the originator of contemporary DER. 261
Unlike cooperation, which depends on two agents and acts (or omissions), DER
concerns one agent and one act (or omission) with two foreseen effects. The connection
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between DER and cooperation is that cooperation becomes an issue only for those issues
that do not pass DER. DER is apparent in each of the following common examples:
Categorically, informed clinicians and other associates in Catholic health care systems do
not worry about treating women‘s ectopic pregnancies, taking out women‘s
hemorrhaging uteri, or removing cancerous portions of women‘s reproductive tracks.
Any one of these actions may render a woman infertile or sterile. As discussed later, the
Church prohibits procedures that render someone infertile. Still, the purpose of the
Church teaching are those procedures performed with the intent of inducing sterility.
Ectopic pregnancies, cancer, or a hemorrhaging body parts are present and serious
pathologies that, depending on the specifics of the situation, generally pass DER. Other
health care procedures employing the use of DER include the separation of conjoined
twins, terminal sedation, organ donation, and transplantation. 262 Procedures that do not
pass DER are ones that may require the use of the principle of cooperation. In other
words, cooperation is not needed, even if it could apply, for something that is licit per
double effect. Catholic hospitals may perform those procedures covered by DER.
The direct/indirect distinction relates closely to double effect. Thomas Aquinas
discussed the direct/indirect distinction, but his use of the terms is different from their
present form. He distinguished between direct and indirect within a larger discussion of
voluntariness.263 More contemporary issues revitalized the description and discussion of
the distinction with results that were far from unanimous about its explanation. For
some, direct become synonymous with immoral, and evil has justification only with
indirect means. Scholarly discourse about abortion in the early 1900s typified this
description. 264 Peter Knauer understood the distinction as describing the presence or
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absence of proportionate reason in his essay on double effect in 1965. 265 Bruno Schüller
critiqued the significance of the direct/indirect distinction in 1972 and 1979, arguing that
its users overemphasized its significance. According to Schüller, the direct/indirect
distinction was about the intending will (direct) and the permitting will (indirect) having
similar temperaments.266
Richard McCormick and Daniel Maguire both believed that disagreements about
the definition and use of the direct/indirect distinction were part of the problem. There
was no agreed definition about the distinction. Still those using it interpret that direct is
illicit and indirect is licit. This led to what he referred to as absolutism and abuse of the
distinction. An illustration of this a person who likens something as morally justifiable
because its cause is indirect, but the action clearly is not morally justifiable. 267 Maguire‘s
theory may hold true to the extent that most commentators do not comment on how they
use the direct/indirect distinction. It is unclear if something indirect when it ‗passes‘
double effect. Is, for instance, sterilization direct if the intent of the agent is to cease
reproductive functioning, or is it direct merely in the absence of a severe and threatening
pathology? The answer to this clearly depends on the definition of direct and indirect. A
problem is that scholars are not always clear about the use of direct or indirect. 268
In order to reduce complexity, rather than add to it, the indirect/direct distinction
will be synonymous with double effect for our purposes. If an action or omission ‗fails‘
double effect, using the previous definition of double effect, than it is direct. It is indirect
if it passes double effect. Using this definition, cooperation concerns do not involve
those things that are indirect. For example, Catholic health care organizations may not
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directly sterilize men or women, but procedures may respond to a present and serious
pathology even if they cause sterility. 269
IIC. Locating Material Cooperation within the History of Theological Ethics
In contrast to the reasoning and principles mentioned above, the origin of the
principle of cooperation is, most likely, not Thomas Aquinas.270 The framework and
guidelines that coalesced into the principle of cooperation are the work of Alphonsus de
Liguori.
The previous chapter outlined the context surrounding Liguori but did not detail
the man along with his life and works as they relate to what is now the principle of
cooperation. Alphonsus Maria Liguori was born on September 27, 1696 in the Kingdom
of Naples, which was under Spanish rule at the time, to a noble family. His father, Don
Giuseppe Liguori, was an accomplished naval officer and renowned as a commanding
officer. Donna Anna Cavalieri, his mother, dedicated her life to service and the
education of her eight children, four girls and four boys (three of whom besides
Alphonsus became priests or nuns), of which Alphonsus was the oldest. The maternal
grandfather of Alphonsus was one of the kingdom‘s chief magistrates. 271
His parents were both devout Catholics, and his interests in and contributions to
the fair may be due to his pious upbringing. Alphonsus seemed to appreciate his
mother‘s discipline and morality. As a young adult, he learned and practiced the arts,
became an accomplished musician and fluent in three languages (Latin, Greek, and
French), and studied civil and cannon laws, mathematics, literature, philosophy, and
science. The extensive studying paid off – he became a doctor in 1713 when he was a
little over sixteen years old and a practicing lawyer shortly thereafter. By his twentieth
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year, he had a successful legal practice with a number of clients, some of them famous
persons.272
Alphonsus remained interested in leading a virtuous life, which led him to
maintain a reserved and pious life, join religious retreats with popular theologians, enter
the service of others such as volunteering at hospitals, and devote himself to prayer. He
renounced the legal profession after a particularly prominent and difficult case in his
early twenties. His father renounced him after years in solicitude away from the legal
practice. This furthered his intent to dedicate himself to God by entering the priesthood
in 1723, a decision that disappointed his father. As a priest, he became even more ardent
with strict spiritual exercises. In 1726, Alphonsus, now in his late 20s, was ordained. 273
He became as well known as a skilled orator and saver of souls. Liguori not only
enjoyed bringing peace to troubled souls, he was quite adept at it. There were numerous
occasions of Liguori skillfully responding to those in confession as well as bringing the
most obstinate and hardened-heart individuals back to the faith and good moral conduct.
He conducted retreats, went on missions, and founded a retreat center and a religious
congregation. Alphonsus was elected rector-major in the 1740s when he began to write
his many works including Moral Theology, published in 1753. Liguori declined the
bishopric one time but did not when he was asked thirty years after he founded his
congregation. He accepted the calling well into his seventh decade of life. 274
As an accomplished theological scholar, Liguori had many theological interests,
with one of the foremost being the instruction, formation, and training of priests. A
critical subset of this, for Liguori, had to do with the important practice of priests
listening to the confessions of parishioners and responding appropriately to the occasions
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of sin. The duty of being a spiritual director and hearing confessions was paramount, and
priests should not take it lightly. 275 Hearing confessions and responding appropriately –
as well as being pastoral while also having concern with truth due to those seeking
eternal salvation – is a difficult job as described by St. Alphonsus Liguori himself:
The office of confessor is the greatest – it concerns eternal
salvation – and the most difficult. The most difficult because it
requires knowledge of all the sciences, all work, all the
professions; because it touches upon every kind of problem;
because it presupposes knowledge of a huge number of positive
laws and sacred canons that have to be rightly interpreted and,
finally, because there remains the hard work of applying all of this
to the diversity of cases for which circumstances call for different
solutions.276
The role is so difficult that, according to Liguori, angels fear to tread on the office
because, as described by St. Lawrence Justinian, there is nothing more delicate and
hazardous than the duty of providing to God a description of others‘ lives. 277 He took the
‗office of confessor‘ seriously and expected others in the office to do the same.
Chapter one expressed the cultural milieu surrounding Liguori and the pushback
against casuistry along with Liguori‘s sensible morality. Alphonsus Liguori comments
more specifically about the cultural forces mentioned in chapter one:
Some pride themselves on being scholars and distinguished
theologians and disdain to read the moralists whom they scornfully
call casuists. It is enough, they say, for the confessor to know
general principles of morality to solve every particular case. It is
certainly true that all particular cases are to be solved in light of the
principles. But the whole difficulty consists exactly in applying to
particular cases obscured by complex circumstances the general
principles appropriate to them. Reason comes into play in order to
weigh the pros and cons of each principle. This is the task
performed by the moralists. 278
Liguori‘s morality is sensible because prudence, reason, and wisdom mediate the
application of more abstract rules, principles, and values to specific situations that include
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various intentions and circumstances. For the reasons expressed, Liguori considers moral
theology one of the most difficult duties persons (presumably both priests and
laypersons) may enter into for a few reasons. First, it requires knowledge of several
disciplines (some mentioned above). Second, moral theology encompasses a gargantuan
amount of information due to the first reason. Third, decisions are dependent on other
variables such as intent and circumstances. No two situations may be exactly alike. The
principles, concepts, and solutions employed for one case do not necessarily work for
other cases, even ones that seem similar to the first. It is this density and complication
that renders the proper practice of moral theology so difficult. 279
One can find the concept now called the principle of cooperation in his writings.
Not surprisingly, Alphonsus conceptualized components as ways to guide clergy listening
to confessions. Confessors – who intentionally or unintentionally participate in the sins
being confessed – sin themselves:
Priests who see insults offered to God and remain silent are called
by Isaias mute dogs. But to these mute dogs shall be imputed all
the sins that they could have but have not prevented. ‗Do not be
silent,‘ says Alcuin, ‗lest the sins of the people be ascribed to you.‘
Some priests abstain from reproving sinners because they do not
wish to disturb their peace of mind; but, says St. Gregory, for this
peace that they desire, they shall miserably lose peace with
God…St. Leo adds: ―The priest who does not withdraw another
from error proves that he is himself involved in it.‖ 280
Liguori does not refer to this explicitly as cooperation. However, formal cooperation
describes when a cooperator participating in the sin of the agent in such a manner that the
sin of the cooperator is indistinguishable from the sin of the agent. In other words,
Liguori is expressing the modern understanding of formal cooperation.
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Evidence exists of the modern-day concept of material cooperation in Liguori‘s
writings. Again in the context of confession, Liguori gives the example of the tightrope a
confessor walks with a person who keeps himself or herself in the company of proximate
or remote sin:
The occasion may be remote or proximate. The remote occasion is
that in which a person rarely sins or in which men, commonly
speaking, seldom fall. The occasion that is itself proximate is that
in which men always, or nearly always, fall. The occasion that is
proximate by accident, or the respective occasion, is that in which
a particular person frequently sins. This is the correct definition of
the respective occasion, according to the true and common opinion
of theologians, in opposition to those who hold that the proximate
occasion is that in which a person always, or nearly always, yields
to sin. The occasion of sin is also divided into voluntary and
necessary. The occasion is voluntary when it can be removed; it is
necessary when it cannot be avoided without grievous loss or
grievous scandal to others.281
Restating this, persons keeping themselves in the proximate occasion of sin may require a
‗tough love‘ approach from a confessor when compared to counterparts who are in
remote proximity to sin. Proximate occasions of sin typically require more rigor than
remote occasions, which may include, on the one hand, not absolving the sinner until the
proximate reasons to sin have been removed. On the other hand, the confessor may
absolve a person staying in the presence of proximate sin a couple times but no more if
the sinner promises to remove the occasions for sinning. Proximate sins are much more
difficult to remove than remote ones. 282
An example of proximate (mediate material) cooperation Alphonsus gives is a
parishioner who keeps a concubine in his house.283 The supposition from his writing is
that the concubine is the moral agent who sins. He does not mention if the parishioner,
who is the cooperator, has already sinned. Still, the example infers that by merely aiding
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a sinner, while not intending the transgressions of the sinner, provides reasonable
occasion for the cooperator to sin because of the assistance or relationship to the moral
agent. Albeit not by name, this situation describes what now is proximate mediate
material cooperation.
In the former example, the role of the confessor is to appropriately challenge the
parishioner, lest he become inappropriately connected with the transgressions by
ignoring, trivializing, or otherwise condoning the situation. Again, this is a delicate
balance for the confessor, as Liguori‘s writings reveal:
In choosing an opinion, when it is a question of removing a
penitent from the danger of formal sin, the confessor must often
follow the most tolerant options, to the degree that Christian
prudence allows him to do so…If, however, the penitent‘s opinion
places him in close proximity to the danger of formal sin, then the
confessor must advise him to follow the stricter opinion. I say
advise because if the penitent holds a truly probable opinion and
wishes to follow it, he cannot be refused absolution, since, by his
confession which he has already made, he has acquired the right to
receive absolution…A confessor [realizes that his penitent is
committing sins the gravity of which he is unaware]; if he foresees
that his admonition would do no good, must he nevertheless warn
him? No. The confessor can and must leave him in good faith. Of
two evils it is necessary to choose the lesser. When the choice lies
between material and formal sin, one must at all costs avoid the
latter, for it alone God punishes because by it alone is He offended.
But what then of the truth? Certainly, the confessor cannot deceive
his penitent if the latter asks him. But he is not only a teacher, he
is a physician. And his faculty to hear confessions is first of all a
ministry of charity. Is the truth to be sacrificed then? In no way.
He does not choose between truth and charity. He practices charity
toward the penitent and towards God [who will not be formally
offended] without doing injury to the truth. He does not speak it
[because it is not good to utter every truth]…A single formal sin is
more serious than all the material sins together. 284
Notice that prudence requires the confessor to react differently to various situations. The
ideal is the removal of sin or the occasion to sin in totality. Yet this may not be optimal
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for any number of reasons. In these cases, the lesser of two evils is material proximity to
sin rather than formal, as well as maintaining the parishioner‘s good conscience if he or
she is unaware of the sin‘s gravity rather than objectively informing the parishioner of the
sin‘s gravity.
Church hierarchy and officials grew weary and suspect of (what scholars now
dub) high casuistry ―because it sometimes became oversubtle and even intellectually
dishonest‖ around the time of and shortly after Ligouri. 285 Therefore, after Ligouri, the
significant applications of cooperation were by Manualists, who often defined it then
applied it to health care and cases of assisting in illicit procedures as well as other
assistance in evil. 286 The purpose and name of the manuals originated from the desire of
moral theologians for seminarians to use deductive reasoning, to reason from universal
principles to individual situations. Theories, teaching, and principles were codified into
textbooks or manuals predominantly from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. 287
The following is a survey of some more recent, English moral manuals. They are
in chronological order by book edition: Henry Davis defines cooperation, explains the
taxonomy and malice of cooperation, and provides practical examples of cooperation in
his 1945 edition of Moral and Pastoral Theology. His examples include a priest giving a
consecrated Host to an ―unworthy recipient‖ during Communion (an application Liguori
would appreciate), associating with immoral books and papers (i.e. printing, writing,
publishing, selling, advertising, and so on), promoting idolatry (e.g. creating offensive art
such as provocative statues, making Masonic emblems), selling sinful objects, illicit
operations (i.e. surgeries such as direct sterilizations), spouses who use contraceptives,
managers who ask employees to sin, associating with unjust laws and sentences, selling
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furniture from churches, reading or reciting Anglican prayers, helping in public welfare
clinics that give information about or distribute contraceptives, and participation in
Chinese rituals.288 Heribert Jone and Urban Adelman applied cooperation, in their 1952
edition of Moral Theology, to cases of interacting within Protestant churches (e.g.
attending a service, designing worship space) and with Protestant clergy (e.g. last rites),
donations for building and maintenance of non-Catholic institutions (e.g. schools,
orphanages), printed works with controversial content (i.e. authoring, printing, editing,
proofing, advertising, selling, setting the typeface, and so on for inappropriate books,
papers, or magazines), immoral shows and dances (i.e. arranging, conducting, financing,
playing music for, or being security for an inappropriate exhibit or show), employers who
sin (e.g. preparing a meat dish for an other-than-Catholic employer during a day of
abstinence), laborers and tradespersons (e.g. sewing a revealing dress), and with a judge
executing an unjust law through a sentence (e.g. invalid marriage, divorce). 289 In his
1963 manuals The Law of Christ, Bernard Häring focuses on avoiding cooperation to
begin with, as his rules for conduct in cooperation portray:
First Principle: It is never permitted, directly or indirectly, to
cooperate in an act which is in itself evil, even though one
anticipates the very greatest good as a result of the act.
Second Principle: There is no universal obligation to omit a
good or indifferent act because of the evil effects which it may also
have because of the hazard of circumstance or the malice of others.
But there must be a proportionate reason for performing the action.
Third Principle: If no relatively higher good is at stake,
ordinarily love of neighbor, zeal for the kingdom of God, and
frequently justice itself commanded us to omit actions which will
have foreseen but unintended evil effects.
Fourth Principle: The obligation to prevent or avoid the
unintended evil effects of our actions is all the more urgent, 1) the
more baneful the effect can be, 2) the more immediately it flows
from our action, 3) the more the duties of our state of life or of our
vocation command us to prevent such evil efforts. 290
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Thus, his conceptual understanding of avoiding cooperation to begin with is more fitting
than his examples, which seem to border on DER (e.g., a male gynecologist becoming
aroused while examining female patients, killing in self defense, a priest giving the
consecrated Host to a congregant whom he denied absolution). Using Häring‘s
reasoning, we cooperate when we do not have proportionate reason to act or do not try to
avoid the evil effects of an action with two foreseen effects. 291 This is Häring‘s way of
saying that participators‘ cooperate with evil when an act or omission fails DER.
Some manuals focused on medicine and its moral practice in particular. One who
had many editions of such a manual was Charles McFadden, whose first edition of
Medical Ethics was in 1945. In his 1961 edition, he defines cooperation, explains the
association between cooperation and DER, gives preconditions for using cooperation and
DER like Häring, and applies it to a series of issues. Of significance to McFadden is a
professional‘s (usually a nurse‘s) assistance in a suspect or immoral procedure, which is
the title of his chapter (―Assistance at Immoral Operations‖) and a subject he nuances
within. As McFadden knows, this is not the only form of cooperation within the medical
setting. He also addresses mercy killings, referrals for illicit procedures, being ‗ordered‘
by a superior to do something immoral, working in an office where a physician
recommends contraception to patients, sterilization by non-surgical means, and working
in a public health clinic. 292 Thomas O‘Donnell, a Jesuit and Georgetown University
professor, wrote Morals in Medicine in 1956. After defining cooperation and its
taxonomy, he suggests that DER is the litmus test for the acceptability of mediate
material cooperation. It is less likely that a cooperator‘s action is mediate material
cooperation if the act does not pass all four elements of DER (the act is not intrinsically
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evil, the agent intends the good and not the evil, the evil is not the means to the good, and
proportionate reason exists). The cooperator‘s act would be formal or material
cooperation. If the act passes DER, it could qualify as mediate material cooperation. 293
O‘Donnell‘s examples are similar to ones mentioned above, used by other manualists.
He addresses cooperation in Church Canon law, which is more concerned with what
kinds of cooperation are punishable by ecclesiastical penalty than what kinds are
immoral. Using O‘Donnell‘s interpretation, cooperation can be an act, omission, morally
necessary or not, according to agreement, or in preparation to the evil act or omission. 294
Jesuit Gerald Kelly wrote popular manuals beginning in the late 1940s. Many of these
were condensed to make Medico-Moral Problems in 1958. Kelly only briefly addresses
cooperation in Medico-Moral Problems’ ―Chapter 38: Cooperation in Illicit Operations,‖
where he introduces the principle of cooperation through the example of a nurse assisting
in an illicit operation.295
Commentary about cooperation the application of cooperation to situations did
not end with the manualist tradition. Far from it, contemporary discussion ensues.
Developments make obsolete some discussed applications of cooperation in the moral
manuals (e.g. attending Protestant services, preparing meat during periods of abstinence).
People find new ways to apply cooperation as a result of new technologies (e.g. Esure,
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, stem cell research), unfolding Church teaching, and
arguments for its use.
The influence of cooperation was evident when it was added to Part Six and the
Appendix of the third edition (1994) of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services (ERDs) and when Part Six and the Appendix were substantively

96

revised in the fourth edition (2001). At least three reasons contributed to the revisions
between the third and fourth editions: First, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith (CDF) alleged that Catholic health care organizations were misusing the ERDs for
agreements, arrangements, and cooperatives with other-than-Catholic organizations.
Second, the CDF challenged that cooperation distinctions applying to individuals, a topic
in this chapter, did not apply the same way with organizations, the focus of the next
chapter. Organizational agreements had commenced with the assumption that individual
and organizational distinctions were similar. Third, the justification of duress was
inappropriately applied in Catholic organizations. 296 All three of the above issues
intricately relate to one another. Despite the changes between the third and fourth
editions, Part Six has stayed consistent with subsequent ERDs’ revisions, including the
most recent fifth edition (2009) of the ERDs. Discussion of contemporary uses of
cooperation occurs in the next section.
IID. Applied Material Cooperation to Issues in Catholic Health Care
There are litanies of ways that one can apply cooperation to issues that arise with
individuals either in Catholic health care or pertaining to Catholic health care. This will
not survey all the possible ways someone can apply cooperation, but simply attend to the
main ones for individuals. Attention to the topics will include a thorough explanation of
the topic, the relevance of cooperation, and the variety of different ways to apply
cooperation. Literature is replete with the subsequent topics.
IID1. Assistance in Morally Illicit Procedure(s) (Termination, Direct Sterilization)
Catholic health care professionals or those who align with Catholic values,
including the ERDs, may encounter situations when they must respond to requests to
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assist a morally illicit procedure. Morally questionable or objectionable procedures are
those that go against the conscience of the individual that often accounts for Catholic
teaching about morally grave procedures. For instance, Pope John Paul II affirmed in
Evangelium vitae that direct abortion – meaning deliberate or direct killing of life in utero
from conception to birth as an end or means – is always morally grave and disordered
according to the Catholic Church.297 Direct sterilization – that is any procedure that
dispossesses a man or woman of the ability to reproduce intended in itself or as a
means298 – is also illicit even though it has a less severe moral gravity than abortion. 299
In other words, direct sterilizations are for the purpose of contraception either in intent or
in the absence of other mitigating reasons;300 they are intrinsically evil according to the
Catholic Church. Some patients wish to end their lives for various reasons, often
involving chronic, intractable pain associated with a terminal illness. Concurrently with
such wishes, patients prefer to die in a humane way, as death with some illnesses is
undignified, and ask for their physician‘s help in doing so. Physician assisted suicide
(PAS) is the practice when physicians provide the means for a patient who is able to
commit suicide and does so.301 According to Pope John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae:
[PAS describes the cooperation or perpetration] of an injustice
which can never be excused, even if it is requested. In a
remarkably relevant passage Saint Augustine writes that ―it is
never licit to kill another: even if he should wish it because,
hanging between life and death, he begs for help in freeing the soul
struggling against the bonds of the body and longing to be
released; nor is it licit even when a sick person is no longer able to
live.‖ Even when not motivated by a selfish refusal to be burdened
with the life of someone who is suffering, euthanasia must be
called a false mercy, and indeed a disturbing ―perversion‖ of
mercy. True ―compassion‖ leads to sharing another‘s pain; it does
not kill the person whose suffering we cannot bear.302
Per this passage, PAS is impermissible in the Catholic tradition.
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Other reasons exist for objecting to something or considering it immoral besides
the moral norms of the Catholic Church. In one case, for instance, a surgeon may object
to a request from a patient for an unreasonable or unsafe procedure. In another, a nurse
may consider restraining a pregnant woman for delivery morally repugnant, even after
knowing of the infant‘s acute, severe distress and the woman‘s seemingly unreasonable
objections to the Cesarean Section because she does not like surgical pain. Whereas
these instances exist and cooperation may assist, they are topics inherent in chapters four
and five and do not aid the understanding about the application of cooperation to this
category of issues. This line of reasoning will concentrate on moral evils according to the
Catholic Church.
Cooperation applies to individual participation in abortion, sterilization, PAS, and
other moral evils defined by the Church. Scholars comment on participation in illicit
medical procedures, such as abortions and sterilizations. 303 Gerald Kelly, in particular,
defines an important caveat and applies cooperation to the individual assistance in an
illicit procedure. His caveat is that there should not be any illicit procedures in a Catholic
hospital, so no issues should exist in reference to assisting such procedures in a Catholic
hospital. The issue he attends to is Catholic nurses participating in illicit procedure,
presumably, in a secular hospital or clinic. In these cases, nurses‘ actions are not the ones
in question. Nevertheless, they may assist other clinicians, most likely physicians, in
procedures running contrary to Catholic teaching. 304 Kelly is astutely aware that the
principle of cooperation is apposite for instances such as these.
Health care professionals in these situations should register their disapproval. Not
doing this is tacit approval of the procedure and formal cooperation. It is disapproval that
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exemplifies material cooperation, where the cooperator does not intend the evil of the
moral agent. The ideal is that the supervisor excuses the professional wishing to decline
for reasons of conscience. Depending on various factors, honoring the professional‘s
objection would either place the professional in remote, mediate, material cooperation or
would eliminate cooperation altogether. This may not happen. If it does not, the
professional faces a choice whether to resign from the position or stay. Factors
influencing this evaluation (staying or leaving) are the availability of other positions both
within and outside the organization based on geography and travel, job market, family
structure and dynamics, and personal or family finances. 305
Although not referred to by name, these features have to do with the presence and
intensity of duress. Occasions when a professional has options, such as moving to other
jobs without the same trying conditions, are ones the professional should exercise
because the duress on that person is low. Conversely, not everyone will have this option.
Family, geography, finances, and job markets may create higher degrees of duress and
limit options. Professionals in such situations may be in proximate, mediate material
cooperation, which is licit with proportionate justification, or immediate material
cooperation, which is typically not licit but may be so under duress. The ‗distance‘ from
the procedure also matters along with the essentiality of the cooperator‘s action.
Examples are a nurse, the cooperator, who operates the suction machine during an
abortion as opposed to a nurse who takes care of women after the abortion. The latter is
not only more distant from the abortion itself; the nurse does not provide anything
essential or significant to the abortion. This is not true of the former situation. 306 Edwin
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Healy and Charles McFadden interpret that only an extremely grave reason should justify
the former.307
IID2. Assisting in Suicide(s)
PAS may involve a number of health care and other professionals (cooperators)
who play roles in supporting the patient (agent) in his or her suicide. Involved
professionals may be ―a hospital administrator, a nurse, a pharmacist, and possibly even
an orderly if the orderly must retrieve the lethal dose from the pharmacy.‖ 308 The
professionals who may or may not cooperate depend on the means used to facilitate the
suicide. Means may be proactive or reactive, and the discussion of both occurs below.
In the event of a patient request for medical assistance, there are a series of ways
that a health care professional could act, with all the ways fitting into the nexus of
cooperation. For instance, the patient‘s physician could agree with the patient‘s request
and write a script for enough controlled substances to provide a lethal dose. The
physician may articulate disapproval of PAS but justify it with another belief, such as
autonomy and individual choice, and write a script for the substance. The latter incidence
is implicit formal cooperation while the former is explicit formal cooperation; both
explicit and implicit formal cooperation are prohibited. Another scenario is that the
physician could object to the patient‘s request just to be told by an insurance provider that
she or he cannot question intent when patients request potentially lethal doses of
medicines all the time. Prescribing a dose despite suspect circumstances that a patient
uses for suicide is immediate material cooperation with duress. Robert Miech, a person
commenting on all levels of cooperation with PAS, believes that the loss of livelihood is
not significant enough to claim duress for legitimate immediate material cooperation in
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this case. Miech is equally rigoristic with an example of mediate material cooperation he
provides – covering a fellow coworker‘s duties while she or he attends to the patient‘s
suicide request. Proportionate reason means having no other work available, and this
type of organizational policy must not give rise to scandal according to Miech. His
specific example of proximate, mediate material cooperation is a physician advising
another to buy stock in a pharmaceutical company that is releasing a new substance that
one could use or dispense for suicide. Remote, mediate material cooperation is a
physician writing a script for a substance that happens to have the same manufacturer that
produces and markets a substance prescribed for PAS.309
Philip Boyle and the ethics department at Catholic Health East consider a
different situation related to cooperating with another‘s suicide:
Harry is 82-years-old and has Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD) and has the initial signs of memory loss.
Admitted to the hospital unconscious after a failed drug overdose
and attempted suicide, he was placed on a ventilator. An out-ofhospital DNR and other advance directives make it clear he does
not want CPR or other invasive treatments. His duly appointed
healthcare agent [a.k.a. durable power of attorney for health care
(DPOA-HC)] requests that the vent be removed on Harry‘s
previous statements. Staff wonders whether they will be
cooperating in Harry‘s suicide.310
Again, staff members confront a range of options for reacting to this situation that serve
as models for others facing similar situations. Health care professionals know that
removing the ventilator based on this information alone (assuming Harry did not have a
DNR order or other expressed wishes to forgo invasive treatments) will make them
complicit in Harry‘s choice to commit suicide. This is tantamount to formal cooperation.
The existence of the DNR order and other advance directives to forgo aggressive
treatments, though, are justifiable reasons to limit interventions. Ethicists at Catholic
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Health East point out that the cooperators, the hospital staff in this case, must make it
clear that they would not cooperate with the agent and that person‘s intent, Harry‘s
attempted suicide in this case. The ethics department does not resolve how immediate or
mediate material cooperation would ‗look,‘ meaning what actions, if any, the staff could
take to presumably honor advance directives while still depicting that they are not
intending Harry‘s suicide. 311 On one hand, not honoring the patient‘s advance directives
would likely remove the opportunity to cooperate altogether, but would disrespect
Harry‘s self-determinism and expressed wishes. On the other hand, there is conscientious
objection and referral to a different physician, as long as that physician will be more
comfortable with the suicidal patient while still preventing the suicide itself. 312 Such
referrals from one uncomfortable professional to another would be neither formal nor
immediate material cooperation.313 An ethics consultation and subsequent chart note,
potentially referencing the use of cooperation in discerning the issue, before tapering
down or withdrawing invasive interventions would be another way for the staff to
illustrate their disagreement with the patient.
Helen Watt shares a nuance related to the gravity of the moral evil of suicidal
patients as an application of the principle of cooperation. In the three font (tres fonts) or
three sources of morality criteria explained above, acts change according to their object,
intent, and circumstances. With this in mind, all suicide attempts or suicidal patients are
not of the same ilk. Watt distinguishes a range of suicidal thoughts and actions where
patients on one side are strongly suicidal and weakly suicidal on the other. A strongly
suicidal patient is one who articulates the motive of committing suicide and seems to
make an unreasonable refusal; the patient justifies his or her decision based on burdens,
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but others do not perceive the burdens as justifying refusal, even taking into account the
particular patient‘s context. A weekly suicidal patient is one who has the primary, week
or strong, motive of avoiding a procedure based on his or her benefits and burdens
calculus. (Presumably, others do not question the patient‘s decision given the situation‘s
benefits and burdens.) The intent to die is only a week motivation – an acceptable
byproduct, or foreseen consequence, of avoiding an intervention or procedure. A patient
between these two extremes is one who ―is strongly suicidal, but is, in addition, strongly
set on avoiding on the procedure itself.‖ 314
Discerning correct action is thorny given the range of intent and circumstances in
these situations. A cooperator may think of the following question: Keeping in mind
Helen Watt‘s distinctions, does a cooperator need a more compelling proportionate
reason to cooperate with a ‗strongly suicidal‘ patient (in essence, making even proximate,
mediate material cooperation difficult) than a ‗weekly suicidal‘ patient? Using this
reasoning, cooperating with a strongly suicidal patient is more grave than cooperating
with a weekly suicidal patient. Another line of reasoning is that assisting a weekly
suicidal patient is not a cooperation issue at all. The basis for this idea is that weekly
suicidal patients ‗pass‘ DER. Such a claim is not easy to adequately justify because it
involves a primary intention and a secondary order of the will. In other words, it is
possible to intend to decline a procedure based on a weighing of benefits and burdens
while simultaneously willing a suicide. It is this complex nature of intention that makes
at least one criterion in DER difficult to justify. As the use of DER here is a side issue,
few reasons subsist to pursue this particular conundrum any further.
IID3. Allowing, Prescribing, or Distributing Contraceptives (Birth Control, Condoms)
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The prescription or distribution of contraceptives such as birth control and
condoms are other opportunities to apply the principle of cooperation to individuals. As
cooperation is always in reference to evil, it is prudent if not crucial to define what evil is
in reference to artificial contraceptives. In Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul VI reaffirms the
magisterial teaching that there are two purposes of the marital act or sexual intercourse
between spouses: it is unitive, meaning that it connects husband and wife, and
procreative, signifying that it is open to the generation of life. 315 These two functions of
the act should be inseparable from each other; humans should not tear asunder those
things willed by God.316 Artificial means to separate the unitive and procreative function
include sterilizations, ‗the pill‘ (birth control pill), condoms, and others. These are
‗unlawful means‘ according to Humanae Vitae.317 Lawful means utilize the rhythm
method, which is when a couple uses the woman‘s cycle by resorting to intercourse
during infertile times only. 318 John Paul II reiterated these teachings again in Familiaris
Consortio.319
Catholics or those adhering to Catholic teachings may find themselves in a variety
of situations related to the prescription or distribution of contraception or birth control.
In secular supermarkets and drug stores, for instance, a clerk may face the choice of
selling (distributing) contraceptives at a customer‘s request. Pharmacists specifically and
regularly deal with requests and scripts to dispense birth control and the morning after
pill (such as ―Plan B‖). Catholic health care organizations, similar to their secular
counterparts, have in-house pharmacies in acute care facilities and primary care and
gynecological clinics where physicians and pharmacists receive requests for birth control,
fitted contraceptives (such as diaphragms), and abortifacient substances. Moral
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theologians comment on the appropriateness of applying the principle of cooperation,
which is fitting in these situations. 320
An important caveat is in order before applying cooperation to some
representative occasions of contraception. Various examples of conscientious objection
to the distribution of contraceptive substances and mechanisms involve professionals
other than the persons prescribing them. It is the attending, primary care, or specialist
physician (nurse practitioner or physician‘s assistant), for instance, who prescribes the
contraceptive that then goes to the in-house (within the clinic, acute care, or other
facility) or commercial pharmacist to fill. When the pharmacist fills the script, he or she
does not know the clinical indications of the patient when doing so. Instances of
conscientious objection demonstrate the professional‘s presumption that dispensing the
substance or mechanism illicitly ties them to a moral evil. Such a presumption may not
be accurate, per the use of DER and cooperation.
A case may assist understanding of this claim. Supposing a woman visits her
gynecologist for abnormal periods, which she describes as being both painful and having
a heavy flow. Her gynecologist diagnoses her with primary dysmenorrhea and profuse
menstruation, 321 which are of great concern because she is now anemic and is developing
other severe conditions.322 Hormones, an often-effective treatment for such conditions, 323
to regulate the menstrual cycle in the form of a specific birth control pill is the
recommendation of the physician, who writes a script for the patient.
This is a classic use of DER. Going through the conditions of DER, this situation
will result in two foreseen results with the intended effect of diminishing or eliminating
her heavy, painful periods causing serious illnesses and the unintended effect of
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contraception: The object of the act, which is swallowing a pill or hormonal regulation, is
not evil in itself. Attending to the serious condition is the intent, not the contraception.
Both effects occur simultaneously, meaning that the evil effect is not the gateway to the
good effect. Proportionate reason exists for the pill as treatment, not only because of the
heavy and painful periods themselves, but also because of the other resulting conditions‘
severity such as the anemia. The case passes DER using this reasoning.
The patient takes the script to the pharmacy in a local drug store that is part of a
national retail chain. She hands it to the pharmacist on duty, who is Catholic and refuses
to fill the valid script. The pharmacist is not the treating physician and does not know the
clinical indications that led to the prescription. Accepting the application of DER above,
the pharmacist‘s presumption has its basis in the use of contraception as evil in this case,
which is not accurate because it passes DER. No need for using cooperation exists,
because moral evil is not there.
One could respond that many of the scripts falling under the pharmacist‘s purview
are for the purpose of contraception or birth control, which is not permissible in Church
teaching. Such responses lack empirical evidence. Arguments such as this are
categorical by nature – persons using them make unfounded empirical claims.
Notwithstanding this categorization, professionals such as pharmacists have the principle
of cooperation to gauge their complicity.
A different, hypothetical example portrays the application of cooperation to the
dispensing of substances and mechanisms. St. Ignatius Hospital has a dispensary in the
emergency department (ED), similar to other hospitals, which requires the in-house
pharmacist to key into the safe cabinet for the relevant pharmaceutical. A physician in
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the ED calls the pharmacist to dispense levonorgestrel, commonly known as Plan B, for a
patient. The pharmacist refuses by phone, verbalizing her conscientious objection as an
―obedient‖ Catholic serving within a Catholic hospital. As is often the case, the in-house
pharmacist does not know the clinical indications for dispensing this, or any,
pharmaceutical. Treating physicians could use medications, including Plan B, in direct or
indirect ways.
From one perspective, categorical situations – occurrences when we do not know
case-based specifics – do not lend themselves well for applying cooperation, which
depends on knowing specifics like the moral evil, injustice, or malfeasance; from another
perspective, an agent could try applying cooperation to what little is known in this
situation. The pharmacist, or other evaluator, may have difficulty equating her actions
with formal cooperation. Any evaluator does not know the intent of the physician
ordering the substance. It could be to treat a sexual assault victim, which is licit
according to the Church teaching expressed in the ERDs. It might be that the physician
does not know about such licit and impermissible distinctions within Catholic health care.
The script was signed out of apathy, not bad or malicious intent. Circumstances may
exist where a physician disregards the Church and orders something not permitted by
Catholic teaching. The pharmacist may reasonably assume good intent based on the
continuing education about Catholic teaching for physicians within the hospital. The
significance of this statement is that associates in the Catholic hospital reason through
issues using their knowledge of Catholic teaching, meaning that most requests should be
licit. Playing Devil‘s advocate, an objecting pharmacist may assume the opposite, or that
Catholic teaching prohibits most requests, and apply cooperation categorically. The
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pharmacist still does not know the intent of the agent, is unable to articulate the same
intent, and, therefore, cannot assume explicit formal cooperation. It would be as equally
as difficult for another evaluator to allege implicit formal cooperation. In fact, sufficient
reason exists to show that the pharmacist does not have the same intent as a physician,
even assuming a physician ordered the substance for use in a direct and illicit manner.
Discerning correct action with Catholic moral teaching on the part of the pharmacist
exhibits concern for the relationship and respect for Catholic teaching, which does not
conform to the intent of the agent. One could allege that the primacy of providing the
medication for an illicit purpose makes the cooperative act immediate material
cooperation. It is unlikely that any one pharmacist‘s contribution is essential, as another
could easily complete the order in the absence of another.
James Keenan addresses the example of dealing with the realistic occasion that
not all persons with HIV or AIDS chose to live a chase life. In these instances, the
principle of toleration is not the apposite principle for considering barrier methods of
contraception known to reduce the spread of HIV through sexual intercourse, but
cooperation is. Keenan employs the use of six questions in order to ascertain the
cooperation level:
First, what is the object of [the cooperator‘s] activity? Second, is
the cooperator‘s cooperation in the agent‘s illicit activity formal or
merely material? Third, is the cooperation immediate or simply
mediate? Fourth, is the cooperation proximate or simply remote?
Fifth, does the cooperator have sufficient cause for acting? Sixth,
is the cooperator‘s cooperation indispensable? 324
He answers all six of his questions when applying cooperation to giving condoms to
persons with HIV/AIDS to protect others from transmission during sex.
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His reasoning is as follows: Answering the first question is tricky and Keenan
spends considerable attention trying to navigate the precise object of the act. Keenan‘s
conclusion is that the object of the act is the distribution of accurate information and, on
another level, ―to give hygienic advice for diminishing the threat to the common good as
found in an action with two objects, sexual activity and endangerment of the common
good.‖325 Arguing that this action is implicit formal cooperation does not suffice because
of the inability to separate the common good apprehension from the illegitimate sexual
intercourse. Implicit formal cooperation is for instances that exclude any other meaning,
and these are not examples of them. Cooperation is, therefore, material. The object of
the cooperator‘s act is the same as the object of the agent‘s act in immediate material
cooperation. This is not so because there is a difference between sexual unions and
educational and health programs, so cooperation must be mediate material. Keenan
classifies the cooperation as remote (mediate material), with grave reasons for the
cooperation, which are restraining a pandemic (HIV/AIDS), preserving life, and
defending the common good. Contrary to other writers on this topic, Keenan has ―not
found any case that better illustrates the ‗dispensability‘ of cooperation than this case.
Thus, we see that the letter‘s proposals of cooperation in no way assist the person to
commit the act [emphasis in original].‖326
Someone contrary to Keenan‘s categorization of the distribution of contraceptives
for health (HIV/AIDS) reasons is Bernard Häring. His comments about applying
cooperation to supplying contraceptives in The Law of Christ precede Keenan‘s analysis
by decades; still Häring‘s analysis appears remarkably different than Keenan‘s:
[Pharmacists, druggists, or drugstore clerks who are aware of the
immorality of contraceptives being sold are] guilty of formal
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cooperation in every instance of sale…A conscience attuned to the
divine law steers clear of [evasions] and of the evil deed. This is
not to deny that the manager or owner of the store in question
obviously must be charged with far greater guilt than a mere
clerk.327
Häring‘s application appears different from Keenan‘s because the context or
circumstances of the response are slightly different. Keenan‘s comments are in response
to the specific context of HIV/AIDS and its education, prevention, and impact on the
common good, as addressed by the NCCB‘s 1987 document The Many Faces of AIDS: A
Global Response, as well as the follow-up 1989 Called to Compassion and
Responsibility: A Response to the HIV/AIDS Crisis.328 It seems that Häring‘s statement is
much more general to contraceptives, appearing to be a physicalist in nature even though
Häring, like Liguori, did not like the legalism that often accompanies physicalism.
Perhaps Häring would understand the specific situation Keenan comments on in a similar
way, which seems much more personalist.
IID4. Allowing, Prescribing, or Distributing Erectile Dysfunction Substances
The next category of situations where individuals individually apply the principle
of cooperation needs additional specification. Generally, this grouping includes any
clinician who prescribes or person who distributes erectile dysfunction substances.
Examples of these include Viagra (Sildenafil), Levitra (Vardenafil), and Cialis
(Tadalafil). Unlike other examples, Church teaching does not nuance the conditions
associated with the justifiable use pharmaceuticals for erectile dysfunction. The Church
does not need to comment, as it is the person using the pharmaceutical who determines its
legitimacy.
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A couple possesses the ability to separate the unitive and procreative functions of
the marital act in any number of ways, despite the Church teaching that they should not
be split:329 The couple is homosexual with a sexual relationship. A couple is
heterosexual and having sex where one or both are single (i.e. unmarried), married and
―cheating‖ (i.e. sex with another who is not the spouse), or married while engaging in
pleasure other than penile-vaginal intercourse (e.g. oral sex, anal sex). Any duo may also
use a barrier or other contraceptive method such as condoms, spermicide, diaphragms,
and so on. (For the purposes of discussion, it is better to assume that the use of a
contraceptive barrier such as a condom is not for health reasons such as HIV/AIDS.
Cooperation assumes a moral evil, injustice, or malfeasance. Something is licit that
passes a Catholic moral principle such as DER, the Church does not address in its
teaching, is not part of the Church‘s authoritative Magisterium, is a matter of following
one‘s conscience, or Church teaching establishes as legitimate. Recent Church teaching
represents an unfolding line of reasoning with respect to the use of contraceptives such as
condoms and grave health threats that include the HIV/AIDS crisis. 330 As such, it is
easier to assume that one of the intimate partners does not have a grave health risk.)
Privacy, confidentiality, and relationships have expected connections to applying
cooperation to the prescription of erectile dysfunction substances. The first of these,
privacy, may cause one to question how these personal and intimate subjects relate to
physician-patient relationships. Quite simply, there are at least two ways that patients
share private information with their physicians. Doctors‘ offices and clinics typically
request demographic and personal data at the first patient visit in order to begin a new
patient chart. Categories and questions comprise indications about marital status. In
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addition, patients always have the option of sharing sensitive, personal information under
the umbrella of the physician-patient relationship, which relates to the second topic,
confidentiality. Consider an admission, for instance, to an urologist from a gentleman
who admits to having ―two girlfriends‖ who are sexual partners in addition to his wife.
This information is mostly irrelevant unless the physician knows about a health or safety
threat to the patient, his wife, and his girlfriends such as HIV/AIDS. However, it may
have relevance to a Catholic practitioner, or a clinician working in a clinic or office
owned, managed, appropriated, or operated by a Catholic health care system. The third
topic, the relationship between physician and patient, becomes paramount given the
disclosure about infidelity and, upon appropriate screening, the patient‘s request for the
physician to prescribe an erectile dysfunction substance.
Cooperation enters the equation at this point. Writing a script for an erectile
dysfunction pharmaceutical is, most likely, formal cooperation with clear indications that
the person is heterosexual and unmarried, cohabitating, cheating on a spouse, or
homosexual. Especially given specific requests, the purpose of such controlled
substances is the restoration of normal sexual functioning for a male. It would be
difficult for a physician to justify his or her script for anything else (assuming the patient
asks or its use is not for a different condition). The cooperator, the physician, shares the
same intent as the moral agent, the patient. Even if the physician denied the intent,
another could allege that he or she engaged in implicit formal cooperation. The
assistance is immediate material cooperation assuming that one could convincingly
establish a different intent for the cooperator because of the instrumentality of the erectile
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dysfunction medication. Upon appropriate testing and diagnosis, men diagnosed with
primary erectile dysfunction are dependent on medicines to be sexually active.
Mike Delaney, a general practitioner, comments on another central feature related
to the last comment above. A man‘s erectile dysfunction may correlate with another
illness or disease process. In other words, the dysfunction is secondary to another
concern. Restoring health also restores erectile functioning. For this reason, Delaney
proclaims that there is no moral dilemma because, ―The doctor has simply fulfilled his or
her professional obligation to investigate and treat disease.‖ 331
Moral dilemmas do not exist from the perspective of Church teaching, as DER
applies to the treatment of disease that has two foreseen effects, the alleviation or
abolition of a disease state as well as the restoration of this component of sexual
functioning. The mitigation or eradication of disease is the intended effect. Restitution
of the ability to maintain an erection may be an unintended effect given indications that a
patient indulges in immoral sexual activity according to the Church. Medications or
exercises to treat a condition such as heart disease are not evil by their object. Their
intent is to allay the condition and to restore, as much as possible, what Norman Daniels
calls species-typical normal functioning, which ailments hinder; they block not only our
biological wellness but ―reduce the range of opportunity open to the individual in which
he [sic] may construct his [sic] ‗plan of life‘ or ‗conception of the good.‘‖ 332 The evil
effect is not the way to the good effect. In fact, quite the opposite is true, if at all. The
physician, in all likelihood, does not know if treating heart disease and high blood
pressure will resolve erectile dysfunction. If it does, the treatment of the heart and blood
pressure precedes any resolution of the sexual dysfunction. Proportionate reason exists
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for the possible restoration of the patient‘s sexual functioning that he could use for illicit
purposes. The proportionate reason is the re-establishment of an even more critical
condition or disease, such as heart disease and high blood pressure. Because it passes
DER, there are no reasons to use cooperation in instances of secondary erectile
dysfunction.
Dr. Delaney handles cases of primary erectile dysfunction slightly different – a
sufficient moral solution avoiding formal cooperation that he reached after many years
and consulting with experts. Using the information sources mentioned above, he assumes
a marriage is valid unless he hears otherwise (as he points out, he is a physician and is not
in a place to judge a marriage). He may clarify with a superficial question about marital
status, and commences by treating the married while forgoing treatment from
homosexuals (irrespective of marital status), ―cohabitating‖ persons, and the
unmarried. 333
IID5. Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening
Another area for individual applications of the principle of cooperation in the
health care setting is prenatal genetic testing. Prenatal genetic testing or screening
describes the exercise of diagnostic equipment to establish a genetic account of an
embryo or fetus before birth.334 Methods of prenatal testing or screening include three
methods, listed in order of most to least frequently used and described according to the
―Genetic Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing‖ entry in the
Encyclopedia of Bioethics by Nancy Press and Kiley Ariail:
1. Amniocentesis – is a technique for removal, via a needle
puncture of the uterus, of amniotic fluid from the sac, which
surrounds the fetus during pregnancy…performed in the
middle of the second trimester of pregnancy. [The test is
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invasive, carrying the risk of fetal (and maternal) harm, and
costly.]
2. Chorionic villus sampling (CVS) – is a technique for removing
fetal tissue cells, the chorionic villi, which are precursors of the
placenta…by a transabdominal or transvaginal
biopsy…performed safely as early as the tenth week of
pregnancy. [The test is invasive, carrying the risk of fetal (and
maternal) harm, and costly.]
3. Maternal serum fetal cell recovery – [is a less invasive
procedure than amniocentesis and CVS for the mother and
non-invasive for the fetus administered] through a maternal
blood draw…[where] a small number of fetal cells are
sloughed off and cross into maternal blood
circulation…[Difficulties include the difficulty of fetal cell
identification and isolation, the numeric rarity of fetal cells in
the maternal serum, and the fetal cell types being suboptimal
for detection, isolation, and analysis.] 335
A test called the maternal serum alpha fetoprotein (MSAFP) is not a genetic test. It is,
however, a procedure that detects a substance present in the maternal bloodstream that
the developing fetus generates. It was the first screening test offered to all pregnant
women and detects the risk of particular fetal anomalies such as neural tube defects
(NTDs), but has a lower sensitivity to accurately detect chromosomal anomalies such as
Down syndrome.336 Scientists have developed probes from the gene responsible for the
disease (disorder) or molecular markers linked to the disease (disorder) gene. There is
common and wide use of these probes in the prenatal testing and screening for
Huntington disease, cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, and hundreds of additional genetic
diseases (disorders).337
James DuBois lists some of the reasons why parents opt for prenatal genetic
testing or screening:



To enable parents to make an informed decision whether or not
to continue a pregnancy
To diagnose disorders that can be treated or that require special
management of a pregnancy
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To help parents to prepare for the birth of a child with special
needs
To put parents‘ minds at ease
To satisfy a physician‘s legal requirement to provide patients
with information338

The difference between prenatal genetic testing and prenatal genetic screening is that
people with a known genetic risk employ testing to identify genetic disease in their
progeny. On the contrary, people who do not have any known genetic conditions or
disease use screening to detect a higher disposition of a defect or carrier status in their
children.339
According to Catholic moral teaching, there is nothing inherently evil about
prenatal genetic testing or screening, as articulated by John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae
and directive 50 in the ERDs:
Special attention must be given to evaluating the morality of
prenatal diagnostic techniques [emphasis in original] which enable
the early detection of possible anomalies in the unborn child. In
view of the complexity of these techniques, an accurate and
systematic moral judgment is necessary…When they…are meant
to make possible early therapy or even to favor a serene and
informed acceptance of the child not yet born, these techniques are
morally licit.340
Prenatal diagnosis is permitted when the procedure does not
threaten the life or physical integrity of the unborn child or the
mother and does not subject them to disproportionate risks; when
the diagnosis can provide information to guide preventive care for
the mother or pre- or post-natal care for the child; and when the
parents, or at least the mother, give free and informed consent… 341
This begs an answer to questions about what the cooperation issue is, given that this
statement in the ERDs coincides with DuBois‘ second, third, fourth, and fifth points in
his list. The answer is simple. Directive 50 concludes with a sentence about not
employing prenatal diagnosis tests or screenings when doing so with the intent of
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terminating the pregnancy if the child has a significant defect.342 DuBois articulates this
same concept in his first point; obviously the Catholic Church disagrees with this as a
valid option because abortion is a grave evil. 343
Abortion is the connection that makes the advice pre- and post-testing (screening)
for the prospective child‘s parents a cooperation issue 344 – and such an important one to
address from a Catholic perspective. The Church is unambiguous about its condemnation
of abortion, a perspective that is evident throughout Church teaching since the first
century.345 Moreover, abortion is something that has a particularly high moral gravity,
meaning that it is a severe mortal sin because of the absolute sanctity of human lives.
Pope John Paul II warned the faithful that they should cooperate with abortions in any
way because of the sin‘s gravity and the risk of scandal and corruption. 346
Using cooperation, DuBois suggests that recommending abortion is formal
cooperation, which is accurate because the cooperator, the counselor, shares the intent of
the agents, the parents, to terminate a child. He goes on to state, ―[Genetic counselors in
Catholic health care]…must refrain from presenting it as merely one among several
legitimate options [emphasis added].‖347 Explanation about why does not accompany his
statement, leaving the question open as to the level of cooperation (implicit formal,
immediate material, or mediate material) and significance with the act of mentioning
pregnancy termination as one of several options (the mere mention of abortion or the
absent objection to this in order to clarify it as an unacceptable option, for instance).
Defining and applying cooperation appropriately, presumably mediate material
cooperation at most, during genetic counseling is not simple because of the options and
divergences in experts‘ opinions and advice.
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This issue deserves closer attention with the qualification that greater awareness
will not ‗settle‘ the issue, meaning that moral and theological consensus about the
application of cooperation to genetic counseling does not exist. The following writings
represent a range of opinions about the application of cooperation in these instances. On
one side, Norman Ford infers the mere mention that abortion is not a service provided in
religious organizations is acceptable. 348 While not overtly referring to Catholic
organizations, his logic is solid that most religious organizations share a common sanctity
for the value of human life and do not perform direct abortions. The declaration that the
Catholic hospital does not recommend or perform abortions to parents consenting to
genetic screening or testing shows the counselor‘s difference in intent from the parents
who may intend abortion if the procedures reveal fetal abnormalities. Such declarative
statements delineate the counselor‘s response as material, not formal, cooperation.
Furthermore, information is hardly essential or primary to the evil itself, nor is
indispensable to the choice, given the prevalence of abortion as a popular societal issue
and the availability of information from sources such as the Internet. Informative
disclosure is at most proximate, mediate material cooperation.
On the same side, as well, are Michael Panicola and Ron Hamel in their
commentary about full disclosure about options counting abortion during genetic
counseling in a Catholic health care organization. Their reasoning is:
1. The object of the cooperator‘s activity is the communication of
factual information to patients about their condition [or the
condition of the fetus] and the options available to them.
Arguing that this is promoting or condoning practices
[prohibited] by the Church…is a hard case to make, especially
when the information is provided in an objective manner as
part of the informed consent process and within the context of
a Catholic moral vision.
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2. Cooperation is material [emphasis added] because options
were provided out of a sense of professional obligation, with
the intent to inform the conscience of the patient and meet the
legal requirements of informed consent, and within the context
of a Catholic moral vision.
3. It is mediate material cooperation [emphasis added], as neither
the Catholic provider nor the patient would actually be engaged
in the morally illicit action and full disclosure…in the form of
stating options about which the patient probably already knows
and for which the information is obtainable elsewhere, does not
rise to the level of essential support.
4. Cooperation is proximate, mediate material [emphasis added]
because it is very far removed from the patient‘s actually
undergoing an abortion…in that he or she would still have
much work to do to get from the stating of the option to the
actual performance of the morally illicit action.
5. Proportionate reasons exist to cooperate [emphasis added] for
several reasons. There is the moral responsibility to inform the
conscience of the patient. Withholding information could
seriously undermine patient trust in the patient-professional
relationship. The need [subsists] to provide moral guidance to
the patient in a time of great need.
6. The cooperation would not be indispensable [emphasis added],
as the patient could pursue one of the prohibited options
without having been told by the Catholic provider, since the
information is available elsewhere and is probably already
known by the patient.349
Panicola and Hamel‘s account does not address the need or importance of a perfunctory
disapproval of abortion from the genetic counselor to the parents. Presumably, it is not
needed or important because the requisite info is so causally removed and differently
intended than abortion itself.
On the other side, Germain Grisez and William May represent a different and
opposite perspective regarding the application of cooperation to genetic counseling.
William May makes a recommendation for counselors to give a blanket disclaimer,
presumably with each patient, that they respect the sanctity of human life from
conception to natural death. Accordingly, the counselor cannot direct anyone to
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procedures contrary to Catholic teaching, such as contraception, sterilization, and
abortion.350 One can reasonably infer from May that the only time the counselor
mentions contraception, sterilization, or abortion is in the disclaimer; the counselor does
not address abortion as an option in response to troublesome genetic information after the
procedure and examination of the genes. May refers to Grisez in his segment on genetic
counseling within Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life. Grisez is even more
cautionary than May on this issue in the third volume of his The Way of the Lord Jesus.
He recommends that Catholic health care professionals (or those upholding Catholic
teaching), including physicians and genetic counselors, draft a broadly based
conscientious objection clause with their organizations of employment. The clauses
should include not only the provision that they will not do procedures such as
sterilizations and abortions, but they ―will give no medical advice regarding these matters
and no information about their availability, and…will not refer patients to others from
whom they might obtain any service, advice, or information that…[they] would not
provide personally.‖351 Grisez appears to have more stringent standards than May.
A complete cooperation breakdown does not accompany May and Grisez‘s
application of cooperation to genetic counseling, unlike Ford, Hamel, and Panicola. It
should suffice to claim that May implies some form of illicit cooperation (formal or
immediate material) without the counselor‘s specific disclaimer indicating her or his
disapproval. Without the disclaimer, May surmises a reasonable person may infer that
the counselor intends the evil act (e.g., sterilization, abortion, contraception, etc.). Grisez
is even more regimented. His reasoning is that any mention of procedures by a
professional, counting direct sterilizations and abortions, is a form of illicit cooperation.
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Standards recommended by May and Grisez seem too cautionary, even
counterintuitive, for at least two reasons. First, imagine the implications if discussion of
illegitimate acts was, itself, tantamount to recommending the acts. The works of most
moral theologians, Catholic health care ethicists, and this dissertation would be formal or
immediate material cooperation. Second, even the opinions of May and Grisez could
lead others into sin. They are not recommending acts such as direct abortion and
sterilization. Still, a reader could read their argument, realize that there are options he or
she did not know, and exercise options if he or she were in a similar situation. Someone
applying cooperation in a manner similar to May and Grisez could summarily render the
opinion that either commentator was in immediate material cooperation. Scandal does
not seem to a significant consideration to either theologian.
Another situation, as a supplementary note to this issue, validates Grisez‘s
application as farfetched. It involves the 1995 German legalization of abortion during the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy and role of counseling through the Catholic Church.
Shortly summarizing events after the legalization, the German bishops protested but also
consented to being part of the abortion boards, which women were required to have a
certificate from in order to demonstrate they took part in counseling. The bishops
reasoned that the Church-state sponsored and operated boards were, in fact, a good way
to dissuade mothers from abortion. Pope John Paul II and the Vatican required the
Church boards to issue a different kind of certificate that the pregnant woman could not
use to procure an abortion. Despite doing this, three out of four women were able to use
the Catholic caveat certificate for abortions. This became a divisive issue for the German
bishops and others. Some believed that complicity with abortion was illustrated by
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backing away from the boards. Others thought the previous level of involvement was
tantamount to giving Catholic, German bishops a ―license to kill.‖ 352 Recounting this
situation, Bishop Anthony Fisher recalled that no party alleged formal cooperation with
the counseling agencies during exchanges amongst involved Catholic Germans and
between they and the Vatican. Although it is ―naïve to assume that all [emphasis in the
original] those involved in such agencies shared the bishops‘ abhorrence of abortion.‖ 353
This recollection diverges from Grisez‘s application and justification of cooperation,
which he would surely describe this situation as formal cooperation.
As a summary note on this issue, scripts assist genetic counselors by providing
them with highly regimented procedures as well as answers to frequently asked or
difficult questions. Screening – from Table 1of Nancy Press and Kiley Ariail‘s ―Genetic
Testing and Screening: Reproductive Genetic Testing‖ in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics,
3rd Edition – includes questions about age, family genetic disorders, a partner‘s ethnicity
or culture or country of origin, prenatal care. An algorithm then follows, depending on
the answers to the questions. For instance, answering that age is over thirty-five years
should catalyze a referral for an amniocentesis or CVS. People of certain ethnicities and
cultures (e.g., African-American, Ashkenazi Jewish, Mediterranean such as southern
Italian, and some European American people) are often referred for blood testing.
Depending on the results, parents may need to go through further testing. 354 DuBois
remarks that there is a prevailing model of genetic counseling is ―non-directional,‖
meaning that the counselor does not actually recommend any option. 355 Counselors are
highly adept at ‗staying on topic,‘ ‗sticking to a script,‘ and answering difficult questions.
All of these variables provide an advantage to the counselor who wishes to maintain an
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acceptable distance for licit cooperation…at least using an application of cooperation per
Panicola and Hamel. Those adhering to orthodox interpretations of applying cooperation
may find the counseling role more difficult or regimented.
IID6. Stem Cells, Research, and Other Uses of Embryos and Aborted Fetuses
The category of research and therapies derived with stem cell lines from aborted
fetuses is expansive because it subsumes various other topics. It is possible, albeit not
necessarily ethical, to conduct scientific research on embryos and fetuses in nearly any
stage of development. For instance, researchers use embryos before implantation and
before the fourteenth day of development, embryos before implantation and after the
fourteenth day of development, implanted fetuses, and aborted fetuses. 356 Several
discoveries resulted from research on tissues from embryos and fetuses. There is also the
prospect of additional discoveries with the goal being useful information and therapies.
In some cases, embryonic research is for the identification of genetic disease in embryos,
called preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), where scientists implant healthy
embryos and discard diseased ones.357 In others, it is the hope of therapies from
embryonic stem cells. Embryonic stem cell research began in 1998 at the University of
Wisconsin and describes the harvesting and use of undifferentiated cells.
Stem cells can ―propagate indefinitely‖ while being appropriately assisted in the
laboratory. 358 Pluripotency refers to the stem cells that have the potential to develop into
many different tissues and organs. Totipotency is the earliest cells in an embryo, located
in the inner embryo called the blastocyst, which can differentiate into any type of bodily
tissue. The hope is that influencing (if not manipulating) cells will enable them to grow
into whatever tissue we see fit for tissue damage and diseases: pancreatic cells to help
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with diabetes, kidney tissue for those with kidney disease, liver cells for those in liver
failure, heart tissue for those in heart failure, and neurons for those with Parkinson‘s,
spinal cord injuries, Alzheimer‘s, and multiple sclerosis for example. 359 The potential
impact of versatile stem cells on even a single health issue mentioned above is amazing.
For instance, with organ transplantation, there is the hope of considerably ―decreasing the
annual death rate of nearly 4,000 patients awaiting transplants in the U.S.‖360
While anchoring the moral evil is easy, it is much more difficult to categorically
define cooperation. The moral evil is research or therapies derived from embryos or
aborted fetuses. The level of cooperation depends on the cooperative act, which varies
according to the particular uses referred to above. It is outside the scope to discuss every
use of embryos and fetuses, so only the most discussed issues follow.
Vaccine development and production has used cell-lines from fetuses aborted in
the 1960s and 1970s. Any current research and development for vaccines does not use
the fetal cells themselves. They are derivatives from an original line of cells, which
required some manipulation in order to produce the cell lines. 361 Examples of vaccines
with origins and cell-lines from aborted fetuses‘ lung cells are MRC-5 and WI-38, which
Merck & Co., Inc. used for the rubella vaccine ―Meruvax,‖ Merck & Co., Inc. used for
the chicken pox vaccine ―Verivax,‖ and SmithKline Beecham used for ―Havrix‖ that
treats rheumatic fever, scarlet fever, kidney inflammation, and other hepatitis A
infections. 362
This is a moral issue and cooperation applies. A few points related to cooperation
and vaccines are worth noting. Using stem-cell lines for development of vaccines from
aborted fetuses is contextually different from using stem-cell lines from aborted fetuses
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for research. There is demonstrated benefit with vaccines where the benefit is uncertain
for research. Benefit is general or collective, rather than individual, because we do not
know if inoculating a person will benefit that person.363 Another noteworthy
specification is that some vaccines use other means for deriving future vaccines other
than the original embryonic material. Time and replication methods make a difference
because they add distance to the original act.364 There is little risk of scandal because the
same cell lines grow in culture. ―There is little incentive to being new human cell lines
when these are will established and their various scientific properties well understood.‖365
Most commentaries on the type of cooperation associated with vaccines derived
from fetal or embryonic tissue agree that the cooperation is mediate material, if at all, and
licit.366 Commenter Alexander Pruss reinforces this by adding that even the most
orthodox ethicists consider the use of abortion-derived stem-cell lines licit. Those who
use the vaccine clearly do not share in the intent of those who chose the abortion, nor is
there anything in the use of vaccines that encourages past abortions. 367 Likewise, ―the
abortion was not done for the purpose of obtaining the vaccine.‖ 368
In embryonic stem cell research, the process begins with technicians ‗creating‘ a
blastocyst, which is an embryo in an early stage of development, created through in vitro
fertilization (IVF) or somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). Technicians remove the inner
cell mass. This, in turn, kills or destroys the embryo. 369
Again, this is a moral issue for the Catholic Church, as it involves the moral evil
of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and violating the protection of life from
conception until natural death through the embryo‘s death; cooperation pertains, given
the moral evils. 370 Similar to other applications of cooperation, one may become
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affiliated with embryonic stem cell research in any number of ways. For instance, the
scientists doing the research and developing therapies, research sponsors and financiers,
companies providing the laboratory space, clinicians who administer therapies, and
legislators involved in creating or altering laws pertaining to stem cell research all have
some connection, some more direct than others, to embryonic stem cell research.
Martin Onwu provides a broad analysis about the use of cooperation given the
type of act and cooperation as well as a moral caveat to this issue:
[The] principle does not justify any form of medical research in
this new field. For examples, the principle cannot justify
therapeutic cloning which entails the creation of embryos via
nuclear transfer method and their subsequent destruction via the
extraction of stem cells; moreover, the principle of cooperation
cannot justify the creation of embryos for research. However, the
future of potential [embryonic stem cell] therapies, utilizing
immortalized cell lines created from stem cells extracted from
human embryos (despite their unavoidable destruction in the
process) in principle may possibly be justified under the principle
of cooperation. 371
Using preserved embryonic stem cells lines for research is parallel to the licit use of
suspended fetal stem cell lines for vaccines. Putting it simply if not bluntly, ‗the deed is
done.‘ It would not make the ―user complicit in the previous destruction of embryos
insofar as the use of therapies would be distinct from the act of destruction and there
would appear to be a sufficient distance between the different acts.‖ 372 As Birgitta
Mackiewicz comments, ample separation exists between the principal agent(s), who
destroyed the embryos, and the cooperators, who wish to advance and preserve people‘s
health. 373 Cooperation is mediate material because the preserved cell lines do not cause
the embryos‘ destruction. Michael Prieur and colleagues paraphrase Peter Cataldo ―that
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to study and investigate what such stem cells are and can do has no essential relation to
how they are obtained.‖374
An essential qualification subsists. Cooperation is material only when enough
time has passed to inherently create sufficient distance between the cooperator and the
principle agent. Therefore, it is one thing to use, per Onwu‘s terminology, ‗an
immortalized cell line‘ initially created from the tissue of embryos or fetuses.375 Scholar
Gerry Magill offers that it is another to claim clean hands by ordering another agency to
do the dirty work. His example is National Institute of Health (NIH) researchers who use
private companies to remove stem cells from embryonic or fetal tissue. The NIH can
allege sufficient distance by using another company for the moral act, but such claims are
morally insufficient. Stem cell researchers know better than most that harvesting stem
cells destroys embryos. The NIH request is an order to this effect. Magill describes this
as formal cooperation.376 Indeed, this is a textbook example of the academic distinction
of implicit formal cooperation, when the cooperator does not claim to have an evil intent,
but the act of cooperation cannot have any other meaning.
Those who create, rescind, or alter legislation regarding embryonic stem cells also
have involvement and moral complicity, presenting another occasion to employ
cooperation. (Participation in unjust or immoral legislation is the topic of the next
section. Arguably, this topic could belong in either this or the next section.) Magill also
uses cooperation to contrast the policy decisions concerning embryonic stem cell research
of President Clinton and President G.W. Bush. President Clinton‘s executive order in
2000 permitted NIH research of embryonic stem cell research as long as NIH researchers
are not the persons to remove the embryonic stem cells. Presumably, the purpose of such
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orders or legislation was to create distance between the research and the embryo
destruction caused by removal of stem cells. 377 President Bush opposed President
Clinton‘s stance a year later. While President Clinton‘s policy approved ongoing
harvesting, President Bush‘s policy was to use immortalized embryonic stem cell lines. 378
Using these stem cell lines, as Onwu stated, does not require further destruction of
embryos. By doing this, President Bush ―adopted a practical policy ‗without crossing a
fundamental moral line by providing taxpayer funding that would sanction or encourage
further destruction of human embryos.‘‖ 379
Both leaders sought to create a distance between the destruction of embryos and
stem cell research; though, President Bush was more successful in this endeavor from the
perspective of licitly applying the principle of cooperation. Continuing to harvest
embryonic stem cells is an example of implicit formal cooperation, as the section below
details. As Magill states, ―In the getaway car, the driver wants to ‗work with‘ the loot in
the bags – similarly, the scientist under President Clinton‘s policy is driving a research
agenda that wants to ‗work with‘ embryonic stem cells involving the ongoing harvesting
of these stem cells [emphasis in the original].‖ 380 Theoretically, President Bush‘s policy
is mediate material cooperation because it does not intend nor provide anything essential
for the destruction of embryos, uses immortalized cell lines, and seems to yield
proportionate benefit. Some bishops express a reluctance to categorize President Bush‘s
policy as licit because of the slippery slope argument that the magnitude of embryonic
stem cell research and therapies will become an impetus to harvest additional stem
cells. 381
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A noted objector to the use of any fetal- or embryonic-derived stem cell lines,
which seems to include immortalized cell lines, is a National Catholic Bioethics Center
(NCBC) ethicist and education director, Tadeusz Pacholczyk. Anything associated with
the grave moral evil of fetal or embryonic demise renders collaborators in treatments and
research complicit in the evil. Pacholczyk‘s ‗answer‘ is to only collaborate with efforts
that use adult stem cells, which is not a cooperation issue at all. 382
IID7. Involvement in Unjust (Immoral) Legislation or Legislators
The last individual cooperation issue addressed in this section is involvement,
mainly through voting, for unjust or immoral legislation. This also applies to voting for
legislators with a history of supporting unjust or immoral legislation. Abortion is the
most relevant issue involving policy, political candidates, and elected officials. It is also
the issue receiving a great deal of publicity because of President Obama‘s health reform
plan, popularly referred to as ―Obama-care.‖
In 2010, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), acting for
the U.S. bishops, and the Catholic Health Association (CHA), representing Catholic
health care in the U.S., took opposing sides to this health care reform. 383 CHA as well as
many orders of women religious opined the exclusion of any federal money supporting
abortions in the Affordable Care Act. The USCCB stated that the new legislation would
permit federal funding for abortion.384 Seemingly, neither group used cooperation in the
analysis because, according to one side, there was not a connection between the bill and
the moral evil; a reasonable assumption for the other side is that the gravity of abortion is
so severe that the supporting the bill was formal cooperation.
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Abortion is a ‗cut-and-dry‘ moral evil in the Catholic Church, but the issue
becomes much more complicated considering the ways that a vote or voter influences
legislation. In other words, laws are never as simple as ‗yea‘ or ‗nay‘ to the issue itself.
Laws have nuance, provisions and caveats, as well as history. Acts may catalyze
existing, just legislation becoming more strict or less strict. Acts can influence existing,
unjust (immoral) laws by adding or loosening restrictions.
An exchange about voting for unjust legislation(s), apparent with chapters in
Cooperation, Complicity, & Conscience, typifies the disparity about how to apply
cooperation. It is beyond the scope to detail the nuances of the various perspectives. In
summary, one set of positions holds that any vote cast for a position other than total
repeal of a current abortion is unjust and formal cooperation. 385 Included in this is that
making an abortion law – whether it is restrictive, moderate, or tolerant – more lenient or
permissive is inappropriate, as well as voting for candidates with track records of voting
for such permissive legislation. 386 Likewise, equally as inappropriate are legislative votes
to block an even more restrictive amendment or alteration. All of these are formal
cooperation.387
Equally valid alternative considerations exist. One alternative is a caveat to the
amendments and appropriations mentioned above. ―A legislator who, having tried and
failed to exclude abortion funding from a general appropriation bill, then votes for the bill
only to bring about the good things it will fund.‖ 388 Rather than formal cooperation, this
is mediate material cooperation according to Bishop Anthony Fisher. 389 Perhaps it is licit
cooperation because the legislator openly demonstrated her or his disapproval with the
appropriations before discussion ceased. Bishop Fisher interprets Evangelium Vitae as
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promoting proposed legislation that would limit the harm done by a previously existing
bad law.390 Another perspective is that many reasons exist for voting for something other
than total repeal of an unjust, unethical law – and the reasons are not necessarily formal,
illicit cooperation. It would be only mediate material cooperation and licit to vote for a
bill or amendment if an imperfect law (one permitting abortion totally or in certain
circumstances) already exists, if no other sufficient bill exists to restrict even more, if the
bill sets more limits that current law, and if it does not abolish future possibilities for
additional limitations. 391
IIE. Identifying Fundamental Controversies when Applying the Principle of Cooperation
There are a few observations about cooperation worth noting. Implicit formal
cooperation is a frequent topic of discussion and debates among Catholic moralists.
Conversations in academic publications center around implicit formal cooperation as both
an academic distinction and formal cooperation ‗trump card.‘ As discussed previously in
the chapter, implicit formal cooperation is when the cooperator claims that he or she does
not intend (will, act) to cooperate, but no other reasons support such statements. Third
parties who witness the cooperation often cite implicit formal cooperation when there is
no other reason for the cooperator‘s intent except for willing (assenting, intending) the
same evil as the evildoer.
Accepting this, the difficulty is that anything can become formal cooperation if
the third party evaluates a cooperative arrangement as such. All cooperation is subjective
and dependent on the person evaluating the level of cooperation; formal cooperation is
perhaps a more transparent component for the subjectivism of those persons who apply
cooperation. The foundation for this claim is the introduction of another distinct moral
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agent, an evaluator, in addition to the previous representatives. Examples below in
Figure 2 and Figure 3 and depict how two possible arrangements may look before and
after another evaluative moral agent:
Figure 2: Implicit Formal Cooperation Structures392
Preexisting Arrangements
(i.e. before the addition of an additional agent)
Original Arrangement A –

Original Arrangement B –

1) Agent (i.e. the one or group
directly associating with the evil,
injustice, or malfeasance)
2) Cooperator (i.e. the one or group
somehow participating in the sin
of the agent)

1) Agent
2) Cooperator
3) Primary Evaluator (i.e. the person
or persons assessing cooperation
levels, whom may cooperate,
too)

New Arrangements
(i.e. after the addition of another agent)
Revised Arrangement A –

Revised Arrangement B –

1) Agent
2) Cooperator
+ Primary evaluator (additional
agent)

1)
2)
3)
+
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Agent
Cooperator
Primary evaluator
Secondary evaluator (additional
agent)

Figure 3: Implicit Formal Cooperation Structures393

In any instance of implicit formation cooperation, including those mentioned above, there
is someone else evaluating the actions of the connection between the agent and
cooperator. The cooperation in arrangement A either did not include an evaluator, or the
cooperator also served as the first evaluator. Arrangement B already included one
evaluator and appends another. Again, the secondary evaluator deems the actions of the
cooperator to be in formal cooperation with the agent in every case. An evaluation of the
cooperation level contradicts the assessment of the cooperator or evaluator in some cases.
In others, explicit evaluation does not exist, so the evaluator disagrees with the statements
of the cooperator, who does not claim any intent to cooperate; however, as explained
above, the evaluator can find no other reason for the actions of the cooperator.
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Examples of implicit formal cooperation are helpful. In Figure 1, Michael
Panicola uses the example of a how various forms of providing a ladder for a thief to
break into a house and steal have different forms of complicity. Holding the ladder to
steady it as the burglar breaks into the home and steals possessions is formal cooperation,
while making the ladder that a thief eventually uses for theft is a remote type of mediate
material cooperation. His example of implicit formal cooperation is when someone
directs a crook to a house and a ladder whilst claiming not to want the theft to occur. 394
Suppose another moral agent, one who would evaluate the level of cooperation, was
included in this scenario. The first evaluator assesses the act and intent of the cooperator,
and determines that the cooperator neither intended nor condoned the robbery. In other
words, the cooperation is some form of material cooperation. A second evaluator
labeling this implicit formal cooperation would be disagreeing inherently with the first
evaluator, because the cooperator who directs and gives tools, for two reasons. First, the
cooperator provides necessary and essential elements for the agent‘s sin (robbing).
Second, there can be no other reason for the cooperator‘s help, presupposing he or she
knows the agent is a thug, despite any statements from the cooperator to the contrary.
In tribute to Liguori‘s views on the confessor‘s office, the next example of
implicit formal cooperation uses the connection between a sinning but penitent
parishioner and the confessor priest. The situation, in general, is nothing new to either
party, as it is a perpetual reoccurrence, which Liguori refers to as relapsing sin (those
who revert back to similar sins after confessing them).395 Yet again the parishioner
confesses to having extramarital sexual intercourse with a prostitute at a local residence,
identified by many as a brothel. The priest, feeling defeated from his inability to stop this
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reoccurring sin, forgoes his previous warnings and suggested repentance. ―If I know the
building you are talking about,‖ explains Father who continues, ―it has been shut down
by the cops just this week.‖ Without any mental reservation, he adds sarcastically, ―You
obviously haven‘t found the other brothel hideout behind the metal fasteners building to
the side of the old 4th Street Bridge.‖ The priest may claim that he was only being
acerbic and flip, and that his cooperation is only material. Still, such an act is essential,
bearing little other moral meaning for this recognized, perpetual sinner than intent for the
evil to continue.
An historical controversy in the application of cooperation is around the issue of
duress. At least one reason for the seeming difficulty using duress as a mitigating factor
while applying cooperation to a situation pertains to the arduous task of defining duress.
Theologians and ethicists comment on the disjunction between the individual and societal
uses of duress. Common examples of duress involve instances with perceived threat(s) of
bodily harm to individuals (emphasis added).396 There is disconnect when defining and
applying duress to an organizational context. For example, The Congregation for the
Doctrine of Faith (CDF) as well as Cataldo and Haas reflect that intimidation(s) to an
individual‘s life do not transfer to the organizational level because nothing mimics the
gravity of losing one‘s life. 397 Scholar Thomas Kopfensteiner recognizes institutional
forms of duress;398 The National Catholic Bioethics Center, like the CDF and others,
believes there are no institutional forms of duress; 399 a concern of Peter Cataldo is that
acknowledging institutional duress led institutions to cooperate when they should not. 400
Duress was in the appendix of the 1995 ERDs before its omission in the fourth edition of
the ERDs in 2001. Purported misapplications of duress were the subjects of many
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debates, eventually leading to a change in the ERDs. Working towards the changes to
Part Six and the Appendix of the ERDs resulted in tensions between the CDF, CHA,
national bishops‘ conference, religious congregation leaders, and Catholic health care
system leaders.401
Disparities in implicit formal cooperation and duress are the result of several
different factors. First, scholars define concepts such as material cooperation,
proportionality, gravity, scandal, and, of course, implicit formal cooperation and duress
differently. 402 Second, a definitional issue also pertains to the fact that someone may not
perceive a particular association as cooperation. The affiliation may be some other form
of complicity, such as toleration. 403 Third, scholars may define concepts in the same
way, but could interpret and apply the same understanding to the same situation in totally
divergent ways. Finally, and most importantly, how we define, interpret, and apply
cooperation is representative of ideological and methodological differences. 404
An illustration of differences based on ideology, methodology, and the application
of cooperation is in the writings of Germain Grisez, William May, Richard McCormick,
and Benedict Ashley and Kevin O‘Rourke (consider Ashley and O‘Rourke as one). All
of these theologians comment on applying cooperating with other health care systems
providing direct sterilization. Cooperation in and with organizations and groups is the
chief focus of the next chapter. Still, this is the issue that all of these theologians
comment. Some minute differences subsist in the issues they apply cooperation to, which
the concluding comments address.
Germain Grisez presents an opinion that using a third party to oversee functions,
such as direct sterilization, is formal cooperation. 405 William E. May believes that
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Catholics and Catholic hospitals may be in material cooperation with evil acts only under
expressly particular conditions. He goes onto specify particularities with direct
sterilization. For instance, he does not see any reason to cooperate at all in locations that
have respectable other-than-Catholic facilities. Likewise, Catholic hospitals that are sole
providers for communities may wish to reallocate resources or relocate to an area where
tension between service in resource scarcity, witness, and Church ‗teaching‘ does not
exist. Concurrently, those evaluating such agreements must consider the likelihood of
scandal, which may be an overriding factor in Catholic sole provider situations. 406
In their first edition of Health Care Ethics, Ashley and O‘Rourke recounted that
the Second Vatican Council changed some of the thinking around cooperation.
Previously unjustifiable acts now were licit. A greater emphasis was placed on acting
according to conscience and respecting others‘ consciences. ―Thus, we may sometimes
cooperate with other persons out of respect for their right to act according to their
conscience, even when we cannot in good conscience ourselves cooperate with their acts
as such.‖407 Even in the fourth edition of Health Care Ethics, they state, ―[W]e believe
that exceptional cases may occur in which material cooperation of the Catholic hospital
would be justified if it is mediate cooperation only.‖408 Without Ashley, O‘Rourke
responds to other moral theologians such as Grisez who contend that allowing a third
party to perform direct sterilizations is illicit. Classifying this as formal cooperation
―seems to rigorous:‖409
[T]he Catholic hospital‘s officials could explain their position
without persuading someone else to perform the proscribed
procedures. … Would it ever be acceptable for the third party that
provides the prohibited procedures to do so in the Catholic
hospital, or in a hospital managed by a Catholic health care
corporation? … In theory, it is possible, and has indeed been
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approved in a few situations in which a Catholic corporation has
been employed to manage a community hospital. … Serious
reasons would be required for such a ‗partnership‘ to occur. [It
may require] a different hospital, … personnel performing
prohibited procedures would have to be employed and managed by
a third party, … and the diocesan bishop would have to determine
that scandal would not arise. 410
McCormick conceptually recognizes that the principle of cooperation applies to
working with other health care systems for direct sterilizations. He hesitates to call such
arrangements as applications of cooperation for two reasons: First and unlike some
others, he recognizes that psychological, emotional, social, spiritual, and medically
indicated reasons are valid; consequently, sterilizations categorized by others as direct are
actually indirect for McCormick and justified for the overall good of the patient. Second
and related to the first, cooperation becomes merely ―a cautious and controlled approval
in individual instances‖ because few instances exhibit ―less than adequate reasons.‖ 411
The implication of McCormick‘s view is that Catholic hospitals should act in accord with
their consciences, which means acting for the overall good of the patient. Cooperate with
others who will act for the holistic good of the patient, with sufficient justification of that
good, when others restrict options available in the Catholic hospital. 412
In summary and explanation of some differences, the above passages provide
enough information for one to extrapolate the differences between authors based on their
applications of cooperation. While Grisez comments on establishing third party
oversight, it is a reasonable presumption to assume that most third party referrals and
arrangements for direct sterilization, whether formalized or by practice, are formal
cooperation for him. May wants to allow material cooperation only in specific instances,
most likely for medically indicated reasons before psychological, emotional, social,
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medically indicated, and spiritual ones (such reasons would qualify sterilizations as direct
for May). The specific instances, which May mentions, are so few that he cannot find
any in regions where there is an other-than-Catholic organization in close proximity.
Furthermore, he seems so concerned with scandal in instances where the Catholic
organization is the sole provider that he recommends getting out of the business of being
sole providers. Similar to Grisez, this leaves few options or exceptions to categorizing
most instances as formal cooperation. Unlike May, Ashley and O‘Rourke seem to
recognize more occasion to partner with other-than-Catholics, even in standing
arrangements. Such agreements, partnerships, or referrals are merely material
cooperation. Their caution is to achieve total separation between the entities for sake of
appearances and possible scandal allegations. McCormick is less cautious about
categorizing anything as formal cooperation. Catholic health care organizations should
be free to partner or refer whenever needed with other-than-Catholics, especially if the
Catholic organization will not provide total care of the individual – body, mind, and
spirit.
Another way to discuss the above moralists is to place them into a scale based
upon perceived stringency or flexibility with cooperation. The basis for this
determination is the result of constructed assumption and interpretation of this author.
The scale placement derives from comments May, Ashley and O‘Rourke, and
McCormick make about specific applications of cooperation. Not allowing any
cooperation (no cooperation) is on one end of the scale (see Figure 4 below) and allowing
every opportunity for cooperation (indiscriminate cooperation) is on the other. The latter
position serves society at will, compromising Catholic identity and teachings, while the
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former upholds Catholic identity and teachings at the expense of keeping hands clean as
an isolated entity from society. This is what the scale would look like (endpoints of the
scale are on top in italics; commentators are on the bottom with extreme positions in
bold):
Figure 4: Cooperation Scale with Moral Theologians 413
No cooperation

Grisez

Indiscriminate cooperation

May

Ashley & O‘Rourke

McCormick

N/A

(N/A = None of the Catholic moral theologians adopt a position of arbitrary cooperation.)
III. Conclusion: Interpreting the Ethical Principle of Material Cooperation within
the Catholic Tradition of Theological Ethics
In summary, this chapter grounded theological ethics as the context for
understanding ethical practice. It then interpreted the ethical principle of material
cooperation within the Catholic tradition of theological ethics. A major component of the
interpretation of cooperation within Catholic theological ethics was describing traditional,
individual applications of the principle.
Cooperation is likely to have greater use in the future as Catholic health care
systems form new partnerships and make new care delivery arrangements. In fact, at
least one ethicist views cooperation as the most important issue in Catholic health care in
years to come.414 The next chapter focuses on the fundamental shift from individual to
organizational use of cooperation in Catholic theological ethics.
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Chapter Three – Material Cooperation within the Organizational
Context of Health Care
Cooperation not only applies to individual contexts such as the ones mentioned in the
previous chapter. It applies to institutional or organizational settings. This section places
cooperation within the organizational context of health care. While cooperation is a
Catholic principle, the implications of this chapter and this dissertation in its entirety go
beyond the walls of Catholic health care. Discussions about cooperation within an
organization apply to health care generally, which includes Catholic health care
organizations.
The groundwork for establishing material cooperation within health care
organizations is through interpreting the moral agency of organizations. Achieving the
examination of organizational moral agency is through defining and describing
organizational moral agency, clarifying this agency through the lens of theological ethics,
and establishing this agency as a function of organizational ethics. Differences in moral
agency are apparent when individuals and organizations apply the principle of
cooperation. This chapter explores many of the relevant differences, such as the greater
scope of decisions (decisional affect) and possibility for scandal with organizations.
Much like the previous chapter, this chapter concludes by featuring how health care
organizations act as moral agents while applying the principle of cooperation. Issues
specific to organizational applications of cooperation are at the heart of this final segment
of the chapter.
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I. Interpreting Moral Agency within Organizations
The previous chapter established the various ways individuals express their
morality, mainly through applying the principle of cooperation. This chapter considers
moral agency with organizations, both generally and through the lens of cooperation.
Beginning this section properly necessitates exploring the concept of moral agency, as
compared and contrasted between individuals and organization.
IA. Defining Organizations and Their Moral Agency
Organizations act as moral agents.415 Agency and identity for organizations is
more than the cumulative agencies and identities of its associates. As such, organizations
are distinct as moral actors.416 They have behaviors and actions, which may or may not
be ethical. Organizations also think, decide, and justify. 417 Prerequisites to being a moral
agent, in either an individual and organizational context, are the ability to make
meaningful promises and fulfill (i.e. carry out, execute) those promises. The former case
requires competence or capacity (the distinction between competence and capacity
applying to individuals does not translate to organizations so uses are interchangeable);
the latter requires not only resources, but also the ability to ‗make good‘ on promises and
commitments.418
The relationship between organizational culture, thinking, decisions, actions and
behaviors, and justification with agency is composite and intricate, as the following
example illustrates. Professor Ronald Sims quotes Goodman and Dean from ‗Why
Productivity Efforts Fail‖ in Organization Development: Theory, Practice, and Research
with respect to definitions for organizational acts and behaviors. They are ―‗performed
by two or more individuals, persist over time, and exist as a part of the daily functioning
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of the organization.‘‖419 The previous statements about actions and behaviors may seem
like the organizational agency is the ―mere sum of the individuals within them.‖ 420 This
is a façade because of the other factors that influence organizational agency. Physician
and philosopher Edmund Pellegrino quotes A.V. Dicey, ―‗Whenever men act in concert
for a common purpose, they tend to create a body which…differs from the individuals of
whom it is constituted.‘‖421
In any situation, actions and behaviors are the visible signs of less-overt culture,
thoughts, decisions, and justifications. In some instances, organizational thoughts and
values, articulated through mission statements and core values, are congruent with
decisions that are, in turn, harmonious with actions and behaviors. In others, associates
ignore mission and value statements in their decisions, actions, and behaviors. 422
Referencing the Sims definition above, common and repeated organizational acts and
behaviors may be chance or unintentional at minimum. At maximum, they are cultural
artifacts or decision making that does not reflect preferred or ideal articulation of mission
and values. While it is possible for groups to back flawed or repugnant ideals, Pellegrino
makes the claim that is more likely for moral community to work for good when ideals,
commitments, values, and behaviors have there foundations in more than just selfinterest.423
Other inherent minutiae with organizational agency and moral communities are
perceptible. In some cases, particular individuals within the group or organization speak
for others within the same group or organization. This representation includes
occasionally describing or protecting the morality of other group members.424 Dynamics
within and between communities, described next, are in addition to the characteristics of
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organizational moral agency mentioned above. Organizations are competitive and will
use their agency by trying indirectly to assume a superior position with other
organizations. Coercion and misrepresentation also factor into organizational dynamics.
In this context, coercion is an intentional effort to alter another‘s behavior such that it is
incongruent with ideals and values. Misrepresentation is counterfeit influence, which
depends on the pretense of genuine discourse and relationships with others. Discourse is
only the constructed means to the end of generating an artificial trust. Rhetoric and
persuasion is a more legitimate dynamic to influence others and is available for use
within and among organizations. Another dynamic among groups and organizations is
appealing to other parties (i.e. third-parties, tertiary agents, outside observers) for
validation and persuasion. It is also possible to appeal to internal and external
stakeholders for future hopes and promises; stakeholders reciprocate with faith in the
organization that it will improve, steward resources, adapt to changes, and ensure a future
for the benefit of all. 425
With respect to the above details, the author of the ―Organizational Ethics in
Healthcare‖ entry, Robert Hall, in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, third edition,
summarizes some of the discussions about organizational agency. On one side, authors
question the substantiality of institutional agents, given that they are unlike individuals
who possess feelings and understandings, purposes and intentions, and scruples. On the
other side, organizations possess characteristics of moral agents; they decide, make goals,
act to achieve goals, are accountable for harm and praised for good, and are responsible
for the evaluation and assessment of the suitability of those goals and behaviors. After
his summary review of discussions, Hall concludes that organizational agency is vaguely
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different from individual agency. Still, ―It cannot be doubted that they are responsible
agents in an ethically meaningful sense.‖ 426
Generally, one of the ends of organizational agency is respect and congruence for
individuals. Moral communities persuade members and stakeholders to share ethical
concerns involving the organization (community) in order to considerately and
thoughtfully resolve them. They also exhibit consistency between their publicly stated
and professed ideals and values and the actions and behaviors witnessed by various
stakeholders (associates or employees, patients, families, community). 427 So as not to
confuse the naturalistic fallacy (is/ought distinction), the previous claims sound like
empirical descriptions of moral communities. This is not entirely accurate as they are
normative accounts of what the ideal organization or moral community could be.
Similar to individuals, communities and organizations change and are never
stagnant. They grow and develop through interactions and discussion,428 constantly
assimilating and interpreting new information in light of its ideals and, ideally, its goals.
Organizations and communities consider ―proposed alternative meanings for various
behaviors that matter in the group…Discursive action to create community means
building shared and mutually beneficial interpretations of reality that become the takenfor-granted basis for valued action.‖429
Organizational moral agency is, in fact, the model of business ethics.430 Magill
and Prybil stipulate that business ethics attends to value and justice issues, such as
financial and purchasing practices in management and care delivery, within and among
organizations. Corporate ethics is the consideration of value and justice matters with the
corporate identity and character of hospitals and their congruence with articulations of
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identity and character, including their policies, procedures, and guidelines. 431
Organizations, their agencies, and their influences are considerable. Scholar Susan Dorr
Goold considers organizations as the principal actors in contemporary society:
Organizations expand our abilities in ways that allow common
people to do uncommon things: a trauma center is able to achieve
what no individual, no matter how skilled or talented, could hope
to accomplish. As dominant actors in health care, organizations
merit our moral attention for several reasons. First, they create
role expectations that have moral content…In addition to creating
role expectations, organizations as actors respond to social
conditions… Finally, organizations have a normative structure.
They set goals and express values and norms in addition to
creating role expectations.432
Multiple theories of business ethics subsist – the integrity, virtue ethics, pragmatist, and
social contract approaches for instance – similar to assorted, general ethical theories. All
approaches recognize organizational moral agency, and some believe that the social
contract approach has enough substance and malleability to become the prevailing
approach.433
IB. Clarifying Organizational Moral Agency in Theological Ethics
Moral agency of organizations is and has been recognized by scholars of religion
and the tradition of theology. Recognition of moral agency within groups is not a new
development in the Catholic moral tradition. Manualists have commented on the moral
agency of groups. Some representative examples should suffice. In Jone and Adelman‘s
Moral Theology (1952), they speak of legal persons, such as the State in instances of
eminent domain, appropriately acting in the interest of the common good or common
welfare. One may also argue that organizational agency is inherent in their discussion of
eternal law, precepts, and customs and their legislators (e.g. God, pope), promulgators
(e.g. cardinals, bishops), and subjects (e.g. Catholic faithful). 434 In other words, the
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Catholic Church, many individuals as one, is an organization with agency regarding
ecclesiastical matters. Gerald Kelly infers organizational agency when he appeals to the
authorities of Catholic hospitals to ensure the duties, witness, and virtue and set the tone
for personnel, patients, and policies. This is, in fact, one of the first things he discusses
within Medico-Moral Problems (1958) in his review of the Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Hospitals, second edition, which is the precursor to the
contemporary Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, fifth
edition.435 Manualists John Ford and the aforementioned Gerald Kelly discuss the
relationship between individual and group agency in Contemporary Moral Theology
(1960). Specifically, an argument was levied that certain groups (e.g. artists, scientists,
politicians and statespersons, etc.) and the individuals in them were categorically exempt
from moral laws. Ford and Kelly comment on the statements from Pope Pius XII;
organizations and the individuals within them are not exempt from moral laws. 436 The
conclusion is that group (organizational) agency does not absolve the agency of
individual, representative agents. Moralist Edwin Healy assumes organizational moral
agency within Moral Guidance (1960) in his discussion of corporations and unions, as
these relate to topics such as just wage, living wage, strikes, and benefits.437 McFadden
infers the moral agency of groups of medical professionals in the segment titled ―The
Value of Ethics to the Profession‖ in Medical Ethics (1961). A distinction he makes is
that the character of the medical professional mirrors the culture of its members.438
Papal encyclicals, Catholic social teaching, and Canon law address the moral
agency of groups and organizations. In reference to papal encyclicals, evidence of the
recognition and articulation of group moral agency dates back over one hundred years.
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Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum (―On Capital and Labor,‖ 1891) – as one may reasonably
assume from the title – focuses on human work and labor, including the role of
organizations and associations. There is an unequivocal acknowledgment of the
autonomy of associations and organizations, which should allow their members to
achieve their individual spiritual ends. 439 In addition, they should work for the good of
society itself:
It is clear that [associations] must pay special and chief attention to
the duties of religion and morality, and that social betterment
should have this chiefly in view; otherwise they would lose wholly
their special character.440
Specific statements such as these are tacit acknowledgment of organizational agency.
Pius XI devotes significant attention to the development of workers‘ associations and
workplaces, wages and contracts, and the morality of institutions (organizations) in
Quadragesimo Anno (―After Forty Years – On the Reconstruction of the Social Order,‖
1931). Corporations and groups are juridical personalities having the moral authority to
work for their interests, their associates (employees), and the common good according to
Pius XI.441
Encyclicals from the ladder half of the 1900s continue to take in hand
organizations and their moral agency. Mater et Magistra (―Mother and Teacher –
Christianity and Social Progress,‖ 1961) by John XXIII speaks to the role of private
associations, workplaces and organizations, and unions as mediums for social growth –
for individuals and the common good.442 They should use their agency for these
purposes. He emphasizes the need to form groups and organizations in order to advance
human dignity and freedom while fostering responsibility, which individuals could not do
by themselves, in Pacem in Terris (―Peace on Earth,‖ 1963).443 To state this observation
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differently, organizational agents can achieve what individual agents cannot. Within the
same encyclical, he refers to states and intermediate groups as having juridical status and
agency that must correspond with the moral order.444 Laborem Exercens (―On Human
Work,‖ 1981) is one platform where John Paul II attends to the role of organizations as
agents. For instance, he appeals to organizations to act justly by hiring and creating
suitable environments for disabled persons. 445 He directly connects groups and
organizations, such as agencies and centers, with ethical agency and responsibility, in
Evangelium Vitae (―The Gospel of Life,‖ 1995).446 Benedict XVI attributes some of the
financial collapse to the breakdown of businesses that have concentrated more on their
own self-interests than broad social responsibility and stakeholders other then the
proprietors in Caritas in Veritate (―Charity in Truth.‖ 2009).447 The agency of some
organizations lacked evaluative, reflective, self-discerning, self-observing egos; the result
was a narrowing scope that excluded or ignored the charitable, altruistic dimensions of
their moral agency.
With respect to Catholic social teaching, the section on business initiatives and
business goals in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church affirms the
following about how organizations should use their agency:
A businesses‘ objective must be met in economic terms and
according to economic criteria, but the authentic values that bring
about the concrete development of the person and society must not
be neglected …All those involved in a business venture must be
mindful that the community in which they work represents a good
for everyone and not a structure that permits the satisfaction of
someone‘s merely personal interests. 448
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) infers, now reconfirmed by the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), that organizations are agents
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and may act ethically in the ―medical-moral issues‖ and ―prophetic role‖ sections of
Health and Health Care: A Pastoral Letter of the American Catholic Bishops (1982).449
Similarly, phrases in Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social
Teaching and the U.S. Economy (1986) validate organizational (corporate) agency:
Businesses have a right to an institutional framework that does not
penalize enterprises that act responsibly. Governments must
provide regulations and a system of taxation which encourage
firms to preserve the environment, employ disadvantaged workers,
and create jobs in depressed areas.450
Organizations (agencies, associations) not only have voices and actions, they can use
their agency for more than just their narrow self-interest – they can be moral by acting for
the benefit of others. The U.S. bishops go on, in a later document, to stress that
―economic choices and institutions must be judged by how they protect or undermine the
life and dignity of the human person, support the family and serve the common good.‖451
Arguably in an example of an organization on a macro-level, the U.S. bishops
maintain that Church teachings support that the State, or government itself, has moral
agency that it should use for guarding human rights and ensuring justice for all. 452 In
fact, in another statement, the U.S. bishops define the relationship between two types of
group agents – the state and non-state organizations. No need exists for state intervention
and imposition into additional areas of life when there is responsible use of non-state
organizational agency for the common good.453 Similar to the concerns about the state,
the Church has concerns about abuse of multinational corporations and organizations.
The agency of large groups may turn into a tyranny, which may oppress or subjugate
others either intentionally or unintentionally. 454
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Church procedures and canon law address the agency of organizations. For
instance, the protocol proposed by The Archdiocese of Philadelphia addresses the role of
group agency in its suggested procedure for collaborative relationships. Put simply, some
factors that merit consideration use organizational agency by:
a. Helping to implement the church‘s moral and social teaching.
b. Furthering the health care ministry to the community
c. Witnessing to a responsible stewardship of limited health care
resources.
d. Providing poor and vulnerable persons with a more equitable
access to basic health care.455
Changes to an organizational agent in the form of joint ventures or collaborative
relationships require a nihil obstat (i.e. ―nothing stands in the way‖ or a Catholic Church
censor ensuring there is nothing damaging to the faith) from the Secretary for Catholic
Human Services. 456 John Boyle provides a summary about the canonical status of
Catholic hospitals and the Catholic Church in the U.S.:
The interorganizational relationship of Church and hospital in the
United States has usually taken the form of Church sponsorship of
hospitals. The hospital is usually under the direction of a religious
community or diocese, which in canon law forms a ―moral
person‖… The hospital is then usually incorporated separately, but
with arrangements that give the sponsoring religious group
decisive control through its control of the corporate membership,
majority membership on the board of directors, or some other
similar arrangement. This the organizational relationship is
strongly reinforced in the United States by legal and canonical
arrangements that vest ownership and control of the hospital in the
religious sponsor who is, in turn, tied by legal and canonical
arrangements to the hierarchy of Church authority. 457
The eight-and-a-half year, CHA-sponsored project on shared understandings around the
principle of cooperation and its applications also discussed the moral agency of groups
according to canon law:
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As understood in canon law, a moral person is a group of
natural persons who have a particular relationship to one
another, and because of this relationship, may be conceived of
as a single entity which does not exist in reality and cannot be
conceived of apart from the people who comprise it.
In church law, a moral person is called a juridic person and has
been given recognition by proper authority. The moral person
has rights and responsibilities recognized by society and civil
law. Like natural persons, it must fulfill these rights and
responsibilities in order to act ethically.
The notion of moral agency of institutions is also rooted in the
church‘s social tradition. The tradition presupposes an
understanding of the moral agency of corporate entities such as
governments.458

From the above description, it may seem that group agency is more ethereal, nondescript,
and therefore less substantive than natural persons‘ (individuals‘) agency. This inference
is not entirely correct. It may take additional time and energy to articulate boundaries
and scope of organizations, but this does not make them nondescript.
The canonical and ecclesiastical understanding of the hospital as moral person is
similar to the understanding of other moral agents, such as professionals and professional
groups. As described by moral theologian Philip Keane, the Code of Canon Law
acknowledges the autonomy and sphere of influence of qualified professionals who are
knowledgeable in their profession.459 Such is the agency with organizations. They have
a scope and a sphere of influence whilst simultaneously understanding the overlap of
other individual agents (e.g. associates or employees, stakeholders) and organizational
agents (e.g. the Church, state).
The theological community is not the only one to accept organizational moral
agency. The secular community supports this idea. Regulatory, legal, and compliance
recognition of organizational agency is prevalent. Attention to organizational morality is
a requirement of the regulatory agencies that regulate health care. For instance, the Joint
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Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) requires all health
care organizations to have a method for resolving ethical issues and disputes arising
within the organization. Initially, requirements had a clinical focus for organizational
morality. However, more recently (1995) this regulatory agency recognized the
importance of also having an organizational focus, given the prevalence of organizational
dilemmas and the need to attend to them. 460 The new mandate included a requirement for
health care codes of conduct to govern external relationships, marketing, billing,
admissions, and discharge or transfer. Other groups enumerated in the expected conduct
consisted of payers, other health care providers, and educational institutions. 461
As previously mentioned, there is secular, legal precedent for the identification of
organizational agency. One of the earliest, pivotal, and defining legal cases in bioethics
is In re Quinlan (355 A.2d 647, N.J. 1976), which the Supreme Court of New Jersey
opined. The case details are not important for this discourse. Yet, the segment of the
opinion, titled ―IV. The Medical Factor,‖ delivered by Chief Justice Hughes encourages
the use of institutional ethics committees for inter-institutional dilemmas. Legal
professor Jerry Menikoff elaborates, ―While [ethics committees] are now standard in
modern hospital care, this was a new concept at the time…The court was also ahead of its
time in concluding that ‗a practice of applying to a court to confirm such decisions would
generally be inappropriate.‘‖462 Statutes and other legislation in the States of Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Arizona mention the helpful role of ethics
committees in attending to moral dilemmas. 463 It is a reasonable supposition to suggest
that such proposals not only exhibit appreciation for organizational agency, they imply
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trust or conviction that organizations, in certain circumstances, may use their agency to
attend to internal dilemmas.
Institutional compliance programs are illustrations of the balance between
individual agency (persons‘ autonomy) and organizational agency (groups‘ autonomy).
Categorical examples include anonymous, error-reporting systems for adverse events and
other mistakes as well as confidential integrity hotlines. Individual mistakes and adverse
events may have implications to the organization. In using the system or hotline,
individual stakeholders are human moral agents acting for the good of the organization
and its agency. Phrased another way, individual agents leave problems that may impact
the institution for the organization to solve. It does so with its agency. The suggestion of
the President‘s Commission in 1983 suggested the utility of health care ethics programs
to act, in at least one capacity, as a method of compliance and dispute resolution for
organizations. 464
IC. Clarifying Organizational Moral Agency as a Function of Organizational Ethics
Organizational moral agency is a function of organizational ethics. Parts of
organizational ethics‘ origins are from business ethics, which was discussed above, and it
is often contrasted with clinical ethics, although any distinction between the clinical and
organizational ethics is often nebulous. Providing some definitions of organizational
ethics, sometimes called institutional ethics, 465 may be useful and, as defined by religion
and ethics professor James Tubbs, one such description is that it is moral discernment
about the determinations and actions of health care organizations and institutions, often
comprising board, juridic person, executive committees and groups, administrators, and
other organizational authorities.466 Scholar and professor Gerry Magill defines it ―as the
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integration of values into decision making, policies, and behavior throughout the multidisciplinary environment of a health care organization.‖ 467 Two professionals involved
with ethics in the Sentara Healthcare define organizational ethics and its goal as crafting
and framing appropriate options in order to alleviate or abolish organizational ethics
dilemmas. 468 Common situations in organization ethics include justice and ethics as they
connect with safety and workplace conditions, charity and other uncompensated care,
environmental impacts associated with health care provision, confidentiality of patient
information, changes to managed care understandings, associate (employee) relations and
benefits, just wages and living wages, and discriminatory practices. 469 Other issues,
depicted ‗from a higher altitude,‘ include clarifying appropriate care broadly and within
the organization as well as stewarding resources in order to balance multiple stakeholders
(e.g. associates, providers, payers) and fluctuating dynamics (e.g. access, cost, quality). 470
Further approaches to redefine organizational ethics and its functioning have met
with mixed reviews, both theoretically and practically. Ethicist and Loyola University
Chicago professor David Ozar insists that ethics education within the institution should
be a trademark of organizational ethics, similar to the education function of clinical
ethics.471 Likewise, ethicist Robert Orr suggests that organizational ethics shares
functional similarities with clinical ethics:
…John Fletcher, one of the pioneers in clinical ethics, made a
cogent observation. He noted that early efforts in clinical ethics
aimed to make the clinical decision making in medicine more
transparent, and this met with initial resistance from clinicians.
More recent efforts in organizational ethics aim to make business
decision making in medicine more transparent, and it should not be
surprising that this is meeting with some resistance from hospital
administrators and boards of trustees. The following is a story of
―forced transparency.‖472
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For Orr, transparency is a mode to honor shared decision-making and to use a Catholic
moral principle, subsidiarity, in order to achieve a more respectful and unified
organization. Another function of organizational ethics has gained traction in the
literature – organizational ethics as a change agent. Many health care organizations face
the need to change with the increasing demands on clinical quality, safety, efficiency,
equity, and effectiveness – as recommended by reports such as To Err is Human:
Building a Safer Health System and Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health Care
System for the 21st Century – and organizational ethics processes are positioned to
facilitate changes. 473 A number of other ethicists and moral theologians have commented
on the significance of organizational ethics within health care. 474
Catholic health care systems have an organizational duty beyond the ones
mentioned above. Identity as a Catholic organization is a function in addition to making
decision in light of mission and core values. Catholic identity has particular
commitments, requiring promotion and defense of human dignity, action on behalf of
justice, promotion of the common good, attention to the whole person (i.e. body, mind,
and spirit), care for poor and vulnerable persons, stewardship of resources, and behaviors
in communion with the Catholic Church. Organizational ethics is also useful as a method
to interpret challenges and conflicts in light of Catholic identity, mission, and core
values.475
The broad footprint or scope of ethics in health care generally may be, in part, one
of the attractions to the Next Generation Model of Ethics (also called Next Generation or
Next Gen) because Next Generation programs attend to both clinical and organizational
ethics issues. Next Gen ethics integrates many of the considerations in organizational
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ethics mentioned above in addition to the core elements of case consultation, education,
and policy review and development as mentioned in the President Commission‘s report
on forgoing life-sustaining treatment.476 Specifically, many Next Gen ethics programs
have the foundational characteristics of being strategically proactive (i.e. responsive
fluctuating dynamics such as access and costs and to an organization‘s quality, safety,
efficiency, equity, and effectiveness), having measurable outcomes (i.e. transparent about
its own effectiveness, alleviates or abolishes inequities and dilemmas), staying
organizationally integrated (i.e. program functions as a change agent, integrates into the
multi-disciplinary health care setting), and including an orientation to mission and values
(i.e. ensures congruence between identity, commitments, and behaviors). 477
To expand on the link between organizational agency and organizational ethics,
organizations exercise their moral agency when making organizational decisions that
impact associates, patients, or the community. Often, this occurs within the context of
organizational ethics, or integrated ethics (e.g. Next Gen ethics), deliberations and
decisions, 478 which are attempts to ensure that ethical decision-making and morality
diffuse throughout the entire organization. 479 Actions and behaviors may be the result of
organizational agency through organizational ethics or catalysts for organizational ethics
consideration. Similar to previous discussions about organizational agency,
organizational ethics programs may consider an issue, but the decision does not result in
noticeable action. Organizational agency still occurs – noticeable in considerations and
deliberations rather than actions and behaviors.
Similar to clinical ethics or ethics generally, it can be both descriptive and
prescriptive.480 It is descriptive because ethics observes human behavior, attempting to
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define what behavior is. An example of descriptive organizational ethics is
organizational or system ethics audits to ascertain the ethics of behavior and practices
with some specificity. 481 It is prescriptive because it posits or recommends certain
thoughts, behaviors, and omissions as having more or less value than others; ethics
defines what should be. Another organizational ethics example, prescriptive this time, is
expressing the value behind organizational assumptions, policies, strategy (strategic
planning), and decisions in terms or recommended behaviors and actions. 482
The CHA ―Report on a Theological Dialogue on the Principle of Cooperation‖
provides a series of theological conclusions. The conclusions serve as a summary of the
material covered in this section:






Institutions are considered to be moral agents, though analogously.
They decide and act. They have an obligation to do good and
avoid evil. They are held accountable for their decisions and
actions, and are praised or blamed for what they do. The moral
agency of institutions is recognized in civil and canon law, in
business, and many other fields.
The moral manuals assume institutional moral agency, e.g., the
armed forces, political parties, quasi-religious sects are identified
as possible wrongdoers. If institutions can be wrongdoers, they
can also be ―cooperators‖ in wrongdoing.
The moral agency of institutions is recognized in the church‘s
social teaching on workforce issues, the responsibilities of
governments and states, and societies themselves. 483

Furthermore, organizational ethics is one way to exercise organizational moral agency.
Organizational ethics as a discipline is both equivalent to and disparate from clinical
ethics, not unlike individual and institutional applications of the principle of cooperation
– the emphasis of the next section.
II. Differences in Moral Agency when Individuals and Organizations Apply the
Principle of Cooperation
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The previous section interpreted the moral agency of organizations, including the
use of that agency in organizational ethics considerations typically impacting associates,
patients, and the community. A few of the examples above pointed out the similarities or
congruency between group (organizational) agency and individual (natural person)
agency as well as organizational ethics and clinical ethics. Similarities persist between
organizational and individual applications of the principle of cooperation.
Descriptions, comparisons, and contrasts thus far have explained some of the
dichotomy between individual agency, group agency, clinical ethics, and organizational
ethics. Little attention has gone to similarities and differences between individual
applications of cooperation and organizational (group) applications of cooperation.
While some uses are analogous, many are disparate on both a theoretical and practical
level. The focus of this next section is on the differences in moral agency between
individuals and organizations while applying cooperation.
IIA. Cooperation Used with Organizations as Well as Individuals
The following is a simple statement, but one worth making: In addition to
individual uses, organizations may use the principle of cooperation by applying it to
appropriate organizational situations. 484 The task force and theological dialogue on the
principle of cooperation sponsored by CHA stipulated that there was consensus among
the participants that cooperation applies to institutions. Some of the noteworthy
observations included:



As moral agents, institutions encounter evil and cooperate with
evil. There seems to be no other available principle to assess
the morality of their actions than the principle of cooperation.
The principle of cooperation in the wrongful acts of another
applies to moral persons (juridic persons) as well as to
individual ―physical‖ persons.
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The fact that the principle has not been widely applied to
institutions [and corporate entities] until recently is not a
sufficient reason for saying it cannot apply. There is not
adequate basis for saying that it does not apply.
Given the evidence in the tradition, it seems that the burden of
proof for saying that moral principles, both primary and
secondary, may not be applied by corporate entities in a way
analogous to their application by an individual falls on those
who say it may not.485

Cooperation is the relevant principle for organizations by default, despite the clarity that
initial applications of cooperation were for individuals (natural persons). The
contemporary emphasis on organizational applications of cooperation speaks to natural
law and the ever-unfolding revelation of the eternal law. Humankind learns more about
itself and God‘s expectations for persons as moral beings with additional uses of
cooperation.
Differences in moral agency prevail between individual and organizational
applications of the principle of cooperation. 486 These differences are significant.487 As
described by the CHA task force on cooperation, ―When one applies the principles
governing cooperation to instances of institutional cooperation, however, there are certain
characteristics of institutional cooperation that may affect the outcome of the moral
assessment in significant ways.‖ 488 To reemphasize a point from above, just because
there are noteworthy differences does not mean that the principle applies only to
individuals. Peter Cataldo explains that the distinction is indicative of the disparity
between the various types of moral agency – the principle applies to institutional
agents.489 The remainder of this section details some of the relevant differences in
agency between individual and organizational applications of the principle of
cooperation.
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IIB. Greater Possibility of Scandal with Organizations
One stipulation is in order before a discussion of organizational cooperation and
scandal. Scandal was defined as leading another into evil in the previous chapter under
the section titled ―Defining Material Cooperation in the Catholic Tradition of Theological
Ethics.‖ One should interpret scandal in a ―strict theological sense,‖ which is in accord
with the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) definition (nn. 2284 and 2287) – the
exact definition provided in chapter two.490
Regarding the moral issue, a greater possibility of scandal exists with
organizational cooperation when compared to individual cooperation. This concern is
intrinsic to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith‘s (CDF‘s) statement about
sterilization in Catholic hospitals. The CDF affirms that the principle of cooperation is
appropriate when considering referrals or partnerships to institutions that will provide
direct sterilizations. However, the Catholic organization must take all possible
precautions to avoid the scandal and hazards created by misunderstandings.491 The CHA
task force studying cooperation concluded that, ―When the principle of cooperation is
applied to institutions, scandal is a heightened moral concern with regard to Catholic
hospitals and Catholic hospital affiliations.‖ 492
To some, it may seem trivial to explain why scandal is an increased concern with
institutions. It is, nevertheless, a necessary task to reduce any misgivings or
misunderstandings. This has to do with the types of agency.
All individual agents may cooperate with someone or something that generates
scandal. Depending on the issue, many individual agents (natural persons) have a narrow
scope vis-à-vis how many people could (or will) regard an action or behavior as
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scandalous. Consider the following hypothetical situation. Your Aunt Gertrude lives in a
small, Midwestern U.S. town. She is Catholic and prides herself on being well informed
about contemporary Church and social justice issues. One weekend in 2010, Aunt Gertie
visited close friends in a larger city, which is within a few hours driving distance of
Gertie‘s home. Her friends take her to Mass in the larger city‘s cathedral, where Gertie
hears about the dispute between the bishops, nuns, and CHA regarding the proposed
health care act in the homily. The bishop, who delivers the homily, tells parishioners not
to support legislators who, in turn, support the health care proposal. While telling this
story, Aunt Gertie adds, ―I don‘t care what the bishops said – I was at Berkeley in the 60s
– and I am not afraid of authorities. So I wrote my senators in support of the act. The
bishops are being ridiculous. Other legitimate organizations find that none of the federal
funds will go towards abortions. Don‘t they realize that little, no, or unaffordable health
care kills people, just like abortions? In fact, some studies find that inadequate or
unaffordable health care kills more people than abortions.‖ Without discussing
conscience and faithful dissent, one would have a legitimate argument that Aunt Gertrude
was scandalous while informing you and others of her opinion that was in opposition to
the bishops. Still, Aunt Gertie‘s scope is small. She scandalizes her family members and
a few friends within her small town.
Gertie‘s example, while not trivial, has much less impact than the scandal from
institutions. Whether the locales are urban or rural, community members are aware of
Catholic organizations and their identity. Scandal is on a different level with cooperation
such that laypersons – such as associates (employees) of the Catholic organization and
community members – are unclear, confused, or led into sin. Generally, the amount and
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severity of scandal with organizations greatly outweighs the scandal produced by
individuals when using a benefits and burdens (i.e. consequential, utilitarian) analysis.
The effect is more profound for more people with organizational scandal.
There are exceptions. Some persons have regional, national, or international
esteem as public figures, celebrities, or authorities. By analogy, one could make a
legitimate argument that scandal certain individuals can create is similar, in amount and
severity, to organizations. This is not the case with most people, but deserves additional
consideration for individuals who are high profile.
IIC. Organizations’ Actions Affect More than a Few People (Greater Scope)
Discussion about the differences in agency between individual and organizational
applications of cooperation with the first issue, scandal, also touches upon the second
issue, scope. As mentioned above, organizations‘ actions and behaviors affect more than
a few people. 493 Their scope of influence is greater than individuals‘ scope.
Theologian and ethicist Jan Heller explains this influence as it relates to his
definition and scope of organizational ethics:
Broadly (and very briefly) construed, organizational ethics is
concerned with what elsewhere I have called the three domains of
ethics: conduct, character, and conditions – and these form the
perspectives of two types of moral agents: the individual and the
organization. That is, organizational ethics is concerned with the
moral conduct of individuals as they are effected by conditions
established or affected by the organization; with the moral
character that inclines these same individuals to choose habitually
in certain ways; and, with the organizational conditions that
influence the conduct and characters of these individuals. Further,
organizational ethics is concerned with the moral agency of the
organization itself, for individuals in organizations may act jointly
as a collective moral agent, and as a bounded whole the
organization can by help morally (and legally) accountable for
their actions individually and collectively. 494
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Organizations are not only accountable, as Heller explains, for the individual and
collective actions of their associates (employees); they are also accountable for the
repercussions and impact on the wider community.
Some community impacts are caustic but may be unconscious or latent to the
organization and its associates. The Jesuit Thomas Massaro traces the development and
future of Catholic social teaching in his book Living Justice, where he examines social
sin as a developing, prominent area of contemporary teaching. Social sin addresses the
way groups of people (e.g. institutions, associations, municipalities, governments, nationstates) perpetuate injustices and inequities, albeit often inadvertently, through destructive
behavior patterns. This has been a topic of Catholic social teaching since the 1970s, and
it often involves actions and behaviors that individuals unintentionally and subtly
inculcate (i.e. learn) and then transmit (i.e. perpetuate). The accumulation of these
behaviors and actions results in an undeniable, manipulative effect on others in society.
Examples are institutional and social elitism, sexism, ageism, or racism. Even though, in
the words of John Paul II, social sin has its foundations in individual sins and evil choices
(end paraphrase), corporations could do a better job about identifying their contributions
to institutional and social sins: 495
As the quip goes, when we think about sin, most of us imaging the
bedroom, not the boardroom. In other words, most of our
awareness of sin and practice of sacramental confession remains
squarely focused on the level of our larger-scale involvements in
social institutions such as corporations. 496
Discourse about social sin is an attempt to show that groups have greater scope and
influence more people.
IID. Decisions Last Longer for Organizations
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Person‘s earthly lives and the decisions made during that time tend to be short in
duration. An example of this goes back to Aunt Gertie. Her decision to write her
senators in favor of the health care proposal has a defined, time-limited duration. Any
repercussions are likely to be temporary, as well, for Aunt Gertie – even if an outcome
lasts for the rest of her life. Especially likely, the particular circumstances surrounding
this issue will not be exactly the same in a few years, meaning that the proposal will be
passed and enacted into law, or debates will still exist, albeit with different variables that
change the context. The relevance this has to Aunt Gertie is that, similar to decisionmaking capacity, this decision is relevant for this particular issue at this time for her.
Princeton Theological Seminary professor Patrick Miller writes about longevity
with communities, which applies to organizations and associations:
The community is one that exists in time and space. It assumes a
conventional locale, proximate relationships, place to live, and the
provisions for life. But the community [discussed in the chapter] is
not fixed in a particular time and space. It may be constituted at
different times and places. It is assumed that the community
created by this formal and given definition of the character of its
life together is a continuing community [emphasis in original]. The
assumption of that community is tied to [particular] relationships,
to successive generations, whose instruction in the moral character
of the community is a prime concern. 497
Miller describes two divergent types of communities. One sort has temporal and physical
anchors, making them sensitive to time and space. The other sort has no such temporal
and physical moorings.
Debatably, this is true of organizations and associations as communities. Some
are time-dated and organized to be so. For instance, the creation of task force or ad hoc
workgroup is for discussing and resolving a particular issue. Task forces and workgroups
either have a hard stop (i.e. time limit) for considering an issue, or they dissolve when the
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issue resolves. In the discipline of clinical ethics, the Veterans Health Administration‘s
(VA‘s) Integrated Ethics model, disseminated by the VA‘s National Center for Ethics in
Health Care, promotes ―ad hoc workgroups convened to address specific topics identified
by the Integrated Ethics Council.‖ 498 These workgroups may disband after the six-step
ISSUES approach to quality improvement as others sustain, disseminate, and continue
improvements.499
Other organizations and associations do not have such constraints. Their
foundation and operation, in most cases, does not include any thought of ending. In fact,
the establishment of an organization, and its respective agency, is to survive as long as
possible into the foreseeable future. Numerous examples exist of corporations that
survive well beyond the lifetimes of their founders – Ford Motor Company (1913 start of
mass production),500 Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Limited (1904 as C.S. Rolls & Co.),501
Macy‘s, Inc. (1929 was the union of Abraham & Straus and Filene‘s to form Federated
Department Stores, Inc.),502 Boeing (1916 as Pacific Aero Products Co.),503 and Proctor
& Gamble (1837).504
The question remains, despite hints in the descriptions above, as to what group of
organizations health care, or Catholic health care more specifically, belong. Without
question, they are part of the second group that transcend time and place. Referring to
Miller‘s distinction, Catholic health care is a community of committed, knowledgeable,
and skilled persons in health care delivery, all with specific trades, skill sets, or
backgrounds (i.e. clinicians, finance, admissions, administration, etc.); it has and
continues to function through successive generations, transcending both time and
physical locations (refer to the history of Catholic health care in chapter one); and it
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maintains a commitment to its Catholic identity, organizational mission and core values,
as well as a continuing prophetic and healing witness of Jesus Christ.
Such is the same with the decisions of organizations. ―Institutional decisions may
perdure longer than those of individuals.‖ 505 It appears that the reasoning behind this
claim is because organizations‘ decisions typically impact more than one individual and,
in some cases, they involve other organizations resulting in a marked impact on
stakeholders such as associates and the community. Bear in mind that an organization‘s
cooperation may entail situations that are continuing, episodic, or contractual. 506 Any
kind of these decisions has the ability to affect groups of people.
IIE. Less Organizational Capability to Create Moral Distance from Injustices or Evil
The descriptor ―moral distance‖ portrays how close the cooperator is to the
primary agent, who is the person committing the sin, injustice, or malfeasance. An
example is the bank manager who, under gunpoint, enters the code or combination to the
safe so thieves can steal gold bullion. In contrast, the used car salesperson who sold a
deluxe, high-speed, sports car to the robbers – not knowing their intent nor what they
would use it for – is in a different position than the bank manager. The car salesperson
has more moral distance, being further removed, from the moral evil than the bank
manager. In terms of cooperation, the bank manager is in immediate material
cooperation under duress, which is a mitigating factor; while the used car salesperson is
in remote, mediate material cooperation. Per the cooperation matrix, there is more
culpability in a cooperator‘s behavior if that cooperative agent is closer to or intends the
wrongdoing.
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An individual (natural person) who cooperates often has a certain amount of
elasticity in the creation of moral distance from the wrongdoing. Using an oft-cited
example from the moral manuals, 507 consider the Catholic nurse whom a superior
schedules to assist in an illicit procedure. The nurse typically assists in any number of
ways such as preparation and handing instruments. This person has a few options to
register or display disapproval with the request after communicating dissatisfaction so
others know why the nurse objects: He or she may request a schedule change to assist to
in a licit procedure; refuse to participate under grounds of conscientious objection;
continue to participate but only in nonessential (i.e. mediate material cooperation) after
appealing for assistance with the theological analysis; resign and hopefully take a
comparable, different position. The presence of duress changes conditions somewhat. 508
Even so, the example goes to show the range of options that, typically, are readily and
rapidly available for individuals, allowing most persons flexibility to move away from
the evil, injustice, or malfeasance.
Institutions do not have the flexibility of individuals in order to move further
away from the evil, injustice, or malfeasance. 509 Consider the hypothetical example from
chapter one with the regional, Catholic system, St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH),
which signed a letter of intent (LOI) to form a partnership with a small, accountable
health care network, St. Bernardine of Siena Wellness System (SBW), formerly owned
by a Protestant denomination and now owned and operated by a secular company. (The
story changes somewhat from the previous example to assist this one.) The period of due
diligence after LOI signing did not reveal anything unusual from either organization.
However, after the SFH and SBW integrate, sharing associates and resources, they notice
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many issues (the ones mentioned in chapter one) – in SBW, people who are more affluent
receive better service, there is a developing PGD program that was not disclosed in due
diligence, selective reduction services continue despite wishes from SFH to the contrary,
and the practice exists of patient ‗cherry-picking‘ and ‗dumping‘ in order to self-select
healthier patients. The reaction of the administrators (i.e. ―we are too far along now to
make such changes‖ and ―this deal needs to go through‖) is indicative of the difficulty
organizations have in creating moral distance.
Changing culture and practices for individuals is similar to driving a speedboat;
they are light, sleek, and agile, quickly changing to most variances in the water. Altering
institutional culture is more like steering a cruise ship or ocean liner; it takes much more
time to alter course when compared with the speedboat. The rudder in the cruise liner is
more sluggish than the speedboat, representing the difficulty involved in transforming
culture, systemic changes, and even the time needed to amend or resolve previous
agreements.
IIF. Greater Responsibility for Organizations to Prevent Irreparable Harms
At this point, this section established scandal is an elevated moral concern, scope
is greater, influence of others is wider, decisions last longer, and there is less flexibility to
create moral distance exists with organizations. Part of organizational agency involves
being accountable for official messages (e.g. press releases, internet, advertising, internal
policies) and unofficial messages (e.g. postings on social media, publicly available data,
community benefit ministry, national recognition such as rankings, awards, accolades,
and scandals). This means individuals working for the institution transmit organizational
agency even when not intending to do so. The result of all these factors is an increasing
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accountability and conscientiousness for organizations when contrasted with
individuals. 510
The above claim depends on awareness of some associates (employees) in
organizations and making others aware. In an article about whistle-blowing, the author
comments on other conditions shaping individual and organizational agency:
…We must recognize that ethics education often proceeds from the
assumption that individuals make decisions with far more
information, power and freedom than actually exists. Individual
actors are immersed within a web of other demands and
responsibilities, ranging from the personal to the civic…As
organizations becomes more complex, powerful and multi-agent,
the potential for harm to society grows. This makes necessary a
sense of responsibility that exceeds the scope of any particular
organization.511
Those in bioethics know well the radical autonomy and self-sufficiency – as well as the
pervasiveness – of the individual over community in U.S. society. Even ethics theories
such as Englehardt‘s libertarianism, which promote the maximization of individual
liberty through minimal societal or communal interventions, also concede a certain
amount of tension between respecting persons and accomplishing good, based on moral
communities. 512 The passage above not only reflects this tension, but the idea that
individuals assume liberties in the ‗name‘ of respect for autonomy more so than truly
exists in a complex, interconnected web of relationships. A logical inference is that
organizational agents inherit the tyranny of autonomy and collective apathy of their
individual agents. As Susan Dorr Goold explains, organizations are ―the dominant actors
in health care,‖513 and when taken in tandem with the previous statement, which (to use
an analogy) is similar to two trains leaving the same station in opposite directions. On
one hand, the ‗voice‘ of health care organizations is the prevailing one. On the other
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hand, the individual voices may have their bases in an overdeveloped sense of freedom as
well as a certain amount of apathy.
Conceivably the analogy of two trains leaving the same station in opposite
directions is not as appropriate as two trains heading on a collision course for each other
after leaving different stations (similar to the old story problem of two stations 240 miles
apart where train A leaves the west station headed east at 70 m.p.h. and, at the same time,
train B leaves the east station headed west at 90…). A number of recent, case-based
situations seem to support non-empirical claim that the latter analogy is more apposite
than the former. Recent scandals including the collapse of Enron may be the product of
fostering unchecked ambition and breaking rules, 514 twisting or suspending ethics
guidelines (e.g. conflict of interest policies), 515 ignoring and terminating
whistleblowers,516 inattention or disregard on the part of industry watchdogs,517 selfimposed rapid associate attrition (i.e. quickly and automatically terminating the ‗bottom‘
or low performing 50% associates in the workforce within a year), 518 and top executives
hiring friends into other high-level executive positions.519 Societal and organizational
methods for troubleshooting these situations include encouraging that good-faith
complaints and worries are brought to the attention of others in the company, 520 crafting
new legislation and higher fines for conduct breaches, 521 acknowledging the respecting
the immense accountability of organizational leaders (i.e. the shadow cast by leaders), 522
giving multiple stakeholders greater decisional and corporate control, 523 and codes of
ethics, policies, procedures, and statements that articulate reasonable constraints on
autonomy (autonomy does not mean at will liberty).524

184

Enron was neither the first nor the last in a long line of unethical organizational
conduct: Some of the recent companies charged with fraudulent financial reporting
include Sunbeam ($60 million, 1996-1997), Xerox ($1.5 billion, 1997-2000), Adelphia
Communications ($3.1 billion, 2001), Waste Management ($1.7 billion, 2002),
WorldCom / MCI ($3.8 billion & $400 million, 2002), Tyco ($600 million, 2002), and
Healthsouth ($4.2 billion, 2003).525 Further charges of irregularities include Adelphia
Communications for theft of assets (2001), Anderson for obstruction of justice (2002),
Tyco for theft of assets and unauthorized loans to management (2002), Imclone Systems,
Inc. for insider trading and perjury as well as obstruction of justice (2002), Parmalat for
looting the company (2003), and Ahold NV for management fraud (2003). 526
Someone may observe that the preceding statements have their bases in a claim,
namely that these corporate scandals and federal charges indicate that the corporations
were unethical. Stated differently, the above statements misuse the is/ought distinction
by inferring moral impropriety with scandal and judicial charges. While such a remark
has legitimacy, scholars react to these scandals by addressing the organizations‘ moral
culpability rather than exonerating their morality, as if separate and additional evidence
was required to demonstrate moral culpability. 527
Various reasons accompany the response pertaining to the morality of these
organizational agents, as illustrated by scholars. First, regarding the is/ought distinction,
organizational agents may have gotten themselves into trouble because they used the
same assumption for different conclusions. Assuming no overlap between the legal and
moral, an organization that is operating with disregard for ethics ought not to have this
affect their legal adherence. Assuming total congruence between the legal and moral,
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immorality is contextual (i.e. the law is casuistic or case-based and nuances differences
between organizations) and ought to respond only in the most egregious cases. That is,
the knowledge that everyone bends the rules a bit and the watchdogs rarely call any
organization to task is (or was) the situation. To behave by bending the rules as much as
possible because this is the practice infers what ought to be the norm. While morality
and legalism are not synonymous, it is reasonable to assume there is overlap between
laws and moral behavior.528 People craft and pass laws that are reflective of national or
state values, which change as persons‘ sense of morality changes over time. 529 The law
relates to morality because it supplies a path or course for reflective ethical decisions.
For example, the law reflects the most serious issues and concerns for society. Legal
foundations, reasoning, precedence, and value of impartial judgment also evidence in
morality; thus, legal analysis (process), judgment, and justification are similar to moral
analysis, judgment, and justification. 530 A reflective business approach recognizes the
letter and the spirit of the law.531 It also may catalyze internal discussions about the
extent of the overlap between legal and ethical behavior with organizations in every
instance. One cannot assume that acting within the bounds of the law is also ethical
behavior in this situation. In other words, deliberating about the legal and the ethical is a
method to become more reflective about what moralists call the is/ought distinction.
Second, in each case mentioned above, the infractions mentioned were not the
result of only one behavior. Consider that ―the types of fraud were pervasive, extended
over years rather than single episodes, and involved very large sums of money.‖ 532
Behaviors were repeated numerous times with various individual agents.
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Behaving morally, third, is akin to aircraft safety checks for quality reasons in the
era before regulatory mandates, or beginning checklists in industries or processes that do
not have or mandate them. Prolific author and physician Atul Gawande relates a
conversation with a business leader and investor about, generally, using checklists as a
means to catalyze thoughtful reflection and, specifically, considering the utility of
checklists with Enron. This investor states, ―‗This is basic basic basic. Just look! You‘d
be amazed by how many people don‘t do it [i.e. do not use checklists or a reflective
decision-making process]. [In reference to Enron,] People could have figured out it was a
disaster entirely from the financial statements.‘‖533 Thoughtful employment of a
checklist exhibits concern for quality above and beyond the letter of the law as well as
disciplined attention to mundane processes for the good of others.534 It is also an
opportunity to ensure that an organization‘s mission and values infuse all levels of
decision-making. An organization demonstrates moral literacy when it identifies and
attends to situations and prospective ethical issues before any legal ramifications; that is,
good ethics precedes legal compliance.535 The justification is that responsible,
accountable, ethical behavior will prevent the failures described above. 536 Similar to an
iceberg, it is the organization‘s public face that is the visible part of the iceberg above the
water‘s surface. This observable portion of an iceberg is only a fraction of its total
volume. The iceberg‘s majority, which is underwater, is comparable to the
organization‘s culture and behaviors. Insufficient attention to moral behaviors is
comparable to the iceberg becoming bigger. Damage may result from any piece of the
iceberg, public or hidden. In fact, the hidden portion may be even more dangerous
because it remains unseen by the outside.
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Continuing the metaphoric iceberg, one may ask what the issue is with an iceberg
becoming bigger. Maybe it runs an increased risk of bumping into other icebergs. It is
possible that the greater volume will distribute evenly. Then again, it may not. A
company may be lucky if the extra volume is below the surface and remains largely
unnoticed by society. Unlucky companies may have the added size above the water,
meaning that practices have been exposed to the public.
All of the imagery so far ignores the proverbial elephant in the room – society,
which passes by as numerous freighters just trying to reach their destinations. Without
fail, every organization serves four different groups of stakeholders, namely customers,
employees, owners, and the community. 537 In Catholic health care, we may term the
groups as patients, associates, public juridic persons and founding religious communities,
and community. The U.S. Senate report examining the Enron failure spoke of
organizations‘ fiduciary duty, which goes beyond narrow self-interest. U.S. Courts
acknowledge the fiduciary obligation categories of obedience, loyalty, and due care. 538
Fiduciary obligations to the company include all of the stakeholder groups above. ―It is
hard to believe that popular (and accepted) thinking has become individualized and jaded
to the point of only ‗what‘s in it for me‘ is the thing that counts most.‖539 Arguably,
employment itself is what links the individual to the fiduciary obligations of the
organization.
By extension, organizations have a greater responsibility than individuals for
preventing irreparable harms. 540 The reasoning and examples above serve to prove the
point about the amount of harm that organizations may create, and their accountability to
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avoid them. President George W. Bush took measure of the harm created by corporate
scandals and deceptions:
[These] high-profile acts of deception have shaken people‘s trust.
Too many corporations seem disconnected from the values of our
country. These scandals have hurt the reputations of many good
and honest companies. They have hurt the stock market. And
worst of all, they are hurting millions of people who depend on the
integrity of businesses for their livelihood and their retirement, for
their peace of mind and their financial well-being.541
President Bush‘s statement is both prophetic and ironic given that he was addressing the
corporate scandals early in decade that began in 2001. It was made before the ‗bursting
of the housing bubble‘ later in the decade that brought down mortgage and other lending
companies, such as Freddie Mac and Fannie May, because of immoral lending practices
tantamount to usury. The subsequent financial recession has brought down many more
organizations, including ones that operate ethically and justly. Inattention to the
prevention of irreparable harms is cataclysmic.
IIG. Defining Who Is On the Team (Moral Agent)
With individuals, it is obvious who the moral agents are in most situations that
apply cooperation. For instance, it is the obstetrics (OB) physician who consults the
patient who requests an elective sterilization stating, ―I am done having kids; my family
is big enough.‖ The OB physician performs the surgical procedure and, throughout the
procedure, a nurse hands instruments to the physician. Obviously, the physician is a
moral agent as well as nurse. Using the cooperation terminology established before, the
physician is the agent and the nurse is the cooperator.
In organizations and communities, social dynamics, roles, and relationships make
the accountability with organizational agency more complex. Consider the Enron
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debacle for an initial example. It was clear early in the scandal‘s fallout that Enron‘s
leaders, including Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, were responsible for initiating and
commissioning counter-cultural climate as well as approving specific decisions to ignore
warnings, push boundaries, and foster an unrestrained, aggressive culture. 542 The
question that investigators are still trying to process is how much others, such as ―Lay‘s
Lieutenants,‖543 had to do with each specific decision including cooking the books. A
lieutenant whom the media credits often with being the Enron whistleblower (Time
Magazine chose her as person of the year in 2002) is Sherron Watkins, Vice President for
Corporate Development. Watkins submitted an anonymous comment about financial
mismanagement to a comments and suggestions box after leadership prompted associates
to do so. She met with Kenneth Lay three times when her comment was not addressed
(Lay did not have a response), and submitted an unsigned memo where she encouraged
Enron to silently rectify concerns. Watkins did not notify anyone about the distressing
practices outside of Enron.544 Despite the press attention, her individual culpability for
Enron‘s organizational agency is dubious.
At least two expansive categories of responses about individuals and
organizational moral agency generally, counting the Enron example specifically. One
approach is that the entire organization is responsible. With respect to Enron, this means
that Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, Sherron Watkins, entry-level associates, as well as all
other associates bear the same accountability and responsibility for Enron‘s misguided
organizational agency. The other approach is incongruent with the first approach. If
anything, Watkins exemplifies that not everyone has the same level of accountability for
immoral organizational agency. At least she made some attempts to bring awareness to
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disturbing practices in the corporation. She could have made more of an effort, but hers
illustrated that almost all her colleagues made less of an effort. With this perspective,
Watkins should be less culpable than Lay or Skilling, less culpable than Enron associates
who knew about the immoral practices and did nothing about it, but more culpable than
associates who did not have the slightest clue about the practices.
A similar issue garnered the world‘s attention in 2011 when the Murdoch
publication News of the World shut its doors due to phone hacking allegations. The
allegation, with substantial evidence and indictments, is that wires of politicians and
authorities were tapped. Accusations of payments to Scotland Yard in attempts to bribe
the justice system also subsist. Rupert and James Murdoch appeared before the British
Parliament‘s House of Commons to answer questions regarding the phone hacking and
payments.545 Parliament is attempting to ascertain the level of involvement of others in
the organization. Questions of interest may include who approved, sanctioned, protected,
covered-up, created, supervised, participated, or ignored the immoral actions as well as
who knew about it and who did not. In other words, people are interested in who the
agents and cooperators were.
To suggest that all individuals in the Murdoch empire or The World, which is less
than 1% of the Murdoch empire, are equally accountable for the phone hacking and
payments is preposterous. It is probable that many individuals within organizations with
suspect or dubious agency know about the organizations‘ immoralities and injustices.
Certain individuals in organizations have less involvement in organizational agency at
any given moment and situation. Within organizational agents, there is a cascading
culpability, or accountability, for every decision. In this way, a visual representation of
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accountability and responsibility within organizations looks more like a patchwork quilt
or mosaic than a solid color. Persons accept the work or piece in its entirety, which is
comparable to the culpability of an organizational agent; still, in that piece, there are
variances of color and patterns that render the whole as a montage or medley, making it
anything but homogeneous and uniform.
Patrick Miller, mentioned previously, speaks about the constitution of a moral
community. They center on relationships, lives lived together, and conduct between
members. Their moral character is intrinsic, a component of their being as communities.
Individual membership in moral communities does not only depend on official
acceptance in the group but the eagerness and capacity to be moral. Other community
attributes the incorporation of time and space (even though communities may continue
over generations), voluntary associations, sanctioning and rationalities, commitment to
ideals and ideologies, human ambitions and desires, orders and liberties (freedoms),
memories and experiences, inclusive and exclusive behavior (communities have
relationships, memberships, and reject ‗the other‘ or others).546 Sub-communities also
enter the consideration of larger communities.
All of these factors mean that organizations assessing past or future opportunities
to cooperate require more energy in defining their own moral agency and cooperation
than individuals. Cooperation can be episodic, continuing, or contractual. 547
Organizational consideration of the culpability or accountability of particular, individual
agents for the organizational agency necessitates intentional consideration about which
sub-communities, committees, and teams were involved most with any particular moral
behavior, decision, or repercussion. Going back to the image of the community quilt or
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mosaic, this is akin to finding out who is responsible for the patches or tiles of the
dominant color in the art, assuming that various people contributed to begin with.
This section summarized the differences in moral agency when individuals and
organizations apply the principle of cooperation. The differences include the greater
possibility of scandal, broader affect of decisions (i.e. they impact more people, have
greater scope, etc.), longer lasing decisions (i.e. duration of decisions is longer), greater
responsibility to prevent irreparable harms, increased intentionally and effort defining
who is on the team in any given situation, and less capability to create moral distance
from injustices and evil with organizational agents when compared to individual agents.
One other notable difference between individual and organizational agency has so many
facets that it is the predominant focus of the next section.
III. The Moral Agency of Health Care Organizations Applying the Principle of
Cooperation
IIIA. The Kinds of Issues Weighed are Dissimilar between Individuals and Organizations
The other, extensive distinction in moral agency between individual and
organizational agents applying the principle of cooperation is that the kinds of issues
considered are dissimilar. A few of the individual applications of cooperation covered in
the last chapter consist of assisting in a morally illicit procedure (e.g. pregnancy
termination, direct sterilization), genetic counseling, using stem cell lines from research
involving aborted fetuses, prescribing and distributing contraceptives (e.g. birth control,
condoms), prescribing and distributing erectile dysfunction substances, and voting for
health care legislation that, especially, involves morally grave procedures such as
pregnancy termination. This final segment in the chapter details the exercise of
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organizational agency with applications of cooperation typical for health care
organizations and groups.
At hand are some differences in the exploration process of individual and
organizational applications of cooperation between the former chapter and this one.
Chapter two attended to a thorough explanation of the topic, the relevance of cooperation,
and the variety of different ways to apply cooperation. This segment and chapter will not
explain the topics in the same way as the last, precisely because this groundwork was
covered before. To be perfectly clear, the applications of cooperation between
organizations and individuals are different even though some of the moral evils and
injustices are same. The moral evils and injustices were covered in the last chapter, so
this segment about organizational applications of cooperation is significantly shorter than
the last chapter section about individual applications of cooperation.
To recap, health care organizations act as moral agents when they apply the
principle of cooperation to the different types of issues mentioned above. This is explicit
in some literature and implicit in other literature.548 The following are some common
examples of institutional uses of cooperation.
IIIB. Sponsoring, Allowing, or Initiating Groups, Messages, and Initiatives with
Controversial Content
As the subtitle indicates, the sponsorship, permission, or initiation of groups,
messages, or initiatives with content controversial to Catholic Church teaching is an
expansive topic. One such topic is about how a Catholic health care organization treats
those patients who have tried to commit suicide. The Catholic Church‘s stance on
suicide was one of the few moral evils not discussed in the previous chapter. It specifies
the following the Catechism of the Catholic Church:
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Everyone is response for his life before God who has given it to
him. It is God who remains the sovereign Master of life. We are
obligated to accept life gratefully and preserve it for his honor and
the salvation of our souls. We are stewards, not owners, of the life
God has entrusted us. It is not ours to dispose of. Suicide
contradicts the natural inclination of the human being to preserve
and perpetuate his life. It is gravely contrary to the just love of
self. It likewise offends love of neighbor because it unjustly
breaks the ties of solidarity with family, nation, and other human
societies to which we continue to have obligations. Suicide is
contrary to love for the living God.549
Theologian David Kelly writes about suicide in at least two of his books. Suicide is a
pillar of consensus between law, secular society and its morality, and the Catholic
Church. This is the reason that state identifies an interest in preserving life – life has
value even though a person may rebuff that value. 550
Knowing this, it becomes easier to understand why Catholic health care
organizations could use the principle of cooperation in instances of treating individuals
whom unsuccessfully try to commit suicide. The Ethics Department in Catholic Health
East reviews a scenario where clinicians treat an 82-year-old patient with COPD after a
failed suicide attempt. According to cooperation, the organization needs to exercise its
agency by making it clear that their intentions and actions are different from the
patient‘s. 551
Richard McCormick writes about a different situation he became involved in
regarding a proposed student group at Georgetown University. In this case, the issue
involving cooperation pertained to a decision about not allowing a gay, lesbian, and
bisexual group to be recognized as an official student organization of Georgetown
University. This situation exemplified the need to walk a fine line between respecting
Church teachings about homosexual acts (i.e. sex between two men, sex between two
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women) and avoiding unjust discrimination in all forms, which is also in Church
teaching:552
[Men and women with homosexual tendencies] must be accepted
with respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every sign of unjust
discrimination in their regard should be avoided. These persons
are called to fulfill God‘s will in their lives and, if they are
Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the Lord‘s Cross the
difficulties they may encounter from their condition. 553
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, before becoming Pope Benedict XVI, was all too aware of
this dichotomy and the tension, or moral distress, created by balancing these interests in
his ―Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual
Persons (1986).‖554
Catholic health care organizations also must weigh factors including their
response to homosexual associates and patients. One tool available for Catholic
organizations considering actions such as ‗plus one‘ insurance coverage or
organizationally affiliated groups is cooperation. The reference point is always the
‗homosexual act‘ and how the cooperative act relates to it. For instance, group agents
may use the framework of cooperation questions to ascertain the cooperation level
presented by CHA: Does the organization intend homosexual intercourse by providing
‗plus one‘ coverage? Does ‗plus one‘ insurance coverage somehow support or contribute
to homosexual intercourse? Is the act of ‗plus one‘ coverage closely related to gay
sex?555
Christianity and Catholicism have always been countercultural, and the issue of
conscience clause protections is another that connects organizational support with a
controversial message. In Health Progress, law professor Lynn Wardle wrote that
pressure on rights of conscience would increase in three different ways. Medical schools
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that do not offer ‗opportunities‘ to participate in certain procedures (i.e. ones contrary to
Catholic teaching) are less attractive to competitive medical school candidates. The
demands of aging populations place increased pressures on health systems, which could
truncate conscience protections in lieu of the system‘s ‗necessities.‘ Plans for health care
reform threaten to change the few provisions for conscience protection in federal law, and
state protections are lacking with challenging case law that diminishes the significance of
legislated conscience protections.556 Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), women‘s groups, and abortion-right activist groups are progressively more
challenging, citing ideological differences to conscience protections. 557
Ordinarily, rights to conscience seem like an issue for individuals and, indeed,
opting out because of moral or religious beliefs is the decision of a natural person. It is
for this reason alone that Catholic health care organizations ‗have a horse in the race.‘
Religious institutions have used their option to ―‗opt out‘ of public policy in conflict with
their religious beliefs.‖558 Individuals know this and count on the organizational agency
of their workplace to protect their consciences and advocate larger communities, such as
the government, to follow suit. Conscience clauses provide exemptions for in vitro
fertilization and other assisted reproductive technologies, contraception, sterilization, and
abortion.559
Ultimately, all of these dynamics are indicative of the rift between the Church and
secular society.560 On one side of the chasm are the Church and its longstanding support
of conscience, even to the extent that conscience leads one to faithful dissent from
noninfallible Church teaching.561 A conscience motivated by truth has priority over
groups and their consensus, accommodations, demands and power as well as personal
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preferences and tastes.562 On the other side of the rift are secularist groups and U.S.
society-at-large that label conscience clauses as ―refusal clauses.‖ 563 To an extent, part of
the secular perspective is the regard for religion as a routine or way of life and nothing
more. The predominant component of the secular view is the individual rights
perspective, which they believe entitles U.S. citizens to positive liberties in addition to
negative liberties – people have a right to reasonable services and goods whenever and
wherever they request it.564 So the seemingly incommensurate sides with their own
versions of the summa bonum reside with their tensions suspended across the rift.
The application of cooperation to organizational conscience rights and conscience
protection may not be evident. In a manner of speaking, this is an issue about not using
cooperation. Following the trends of diminishing secular conscience protection means
that, at some point, Catholic health care organizations may have to apply cooperation to
their inability to opt out of procedures such as sterilizations and abortions for reasons of
conscience. To do so (i.e. opting out) would threaten the ministry itself and its
continuing witness within the U.S. Stated differently, exercising organizational
conscience by opting out could be a catalyst for applying the principle of cooperation in
the future.
Consider a more immediate application of cooperation as a function of
organizational agency with conscience protections. Institutions need to consider their
own internal messaging with respect to conscience protections. Responding to other
messages, preparing press releases, and talking points for frequently asked questions, for
both internal and external stakeholders, all may be opportunities to employ cooperation.
Cooperating with groups such as the ACLU, especially given its messaging, are also
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occasions to apply the principle of cooperation. Organizational cooperation with groups
is the focal topic in two of the following subsections, including the next one.
IIIC. Philanthropic Donations
Catholic institutions respond to Christ‘s commitment to charity as a part of their
identity, as exemplified through generous and extensive efforts to eliminate social ills and
injustices such as poverty and disease. Acting charitably and for the love of one‘s
neighbor necessitates partnerships or charitable recipients who do not share a
commitment to Catholic identity, teaching, and values. Occasionally, there are instances
when donations and activities with associations and organizations conflict with Catholic
teaching. 565 For this reason, another burgeoning context that has received increased
attention in the past ten years is philanthropic organizations‘ use of Catholic donations
for purposes understood as sinful to the Catholic Church.
It is not necessary to cover the breadth of moral evils and injustices that external
organizations use with charitable donations. A few examples should be adequate.
Ethicist John Brehany writes about the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF):
[O]ne of the most successful [health and medical charities –
JDRF], not only publicly endorsed research involving human
embryonic stem cells, but dedicated millions of donated dollars to
fund it. Moreover, JDRF engages in political advocacy to promote
such research, donating over $1 million to a California initiative to
provide state funds for human embryonic stem cell
research…JDRF contributes approximately $10% of its research
budget to stem cell research (over $10 million in FY 2005), with
the vast majority of such grants funding human embryonic stem
cell research. 566
March of Dimes (MoD), a medical or health charity, has addressed birth defects and
infant health for over 50 years. Starting in the 1970s, MoD promoted abortion after
positive tests for birth defects, followed by legalized abortion and selective reduction
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support in the 1990s, and public endorsement of human embryonic stem cell research
even more recently. 567 Other philanthropic organizations supporting or endorsing stem
cell research include the American Diabetes Association and the American Cancer
Society.568
Another philanthropic organization under scrutiny is Susan G. Komen for the
Cure, which was established in 1982 and has dedicated itself to early detection of breast
cancer, fund treatment and prevention, advocacy at all levels (i.e. local, state, and
national), as well as encouragement and aid for women grappling with breast cancer. The
alleged immorality on the part of Susan G. Komen is an affiliation through grant awards
to Planned Parenthood. Specifically, Komen awarded 21 grants to Planned Parenthood
chapters for a total of $475,000 (1.24 percent) out of $38.4 million donated in 2003.
More recently, it conferred 19 grants for a total of $375,840 (0.54 percent) out of $69.6
million given in one year.569 Planned Parenthood has ties to abortion clinics. 570 The
result is similar to giving money to a friend who used some of the money to buy gas to
encourage another to get an abortion. The general description above is not the full story
regarding Komen and Planned Parenthood. Komen awards two different kinds of grants,
and one applies to the kind given to Planned Parenthood. Yet, grants petitioned to
Komen are restricted, meaning that the affiliate petitioning the grant uses the funding in
accord with the terms of the grant. ―All the Planned Parenthood grant proposals that are
funded are concerned with breast health education and screening, or with the prevention
and treatment of breast cancer.‖571 These grants often serve underserved and low-income
women. 572 To reiterate, none of the funding goes to moral evils; at most, it goes to a
secondary source that, under different circumstances, advocates abortion to different
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patients ‗under the same roof.‘ Suggesting the withdrawal of Catholic funding for these
reasons is somewhat akin to boycotting your physician‘s office because a different
physician in the practice referred your friend to an abortion clinic after disclosing she was
pregnant from an affair. This boycott makes sense to some, but seems an overreaction,
and a bit drastic, for others.
The University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame) is an example of a Catholic
institution that maintains a periodic review of charitable giving and philanthropic
donations. Notre Dame may require affiliates to provide written assurance of how they
use the funds. It has the right to withhold funds from future endeavors if it finds
inappropriate uses of funds. Notre Dame also provides a guideline of seven questions to
guide those considering institutional donations. 573
In a fashion similar to Notre Dame, ethicists Ron Hamel and Michael Panicola
suggest answering eight sets of questions for Catholic health care organizations to assess
wrongdoing:
1. Does the philanthropic organization (PO) openly and publicly
promote or advocate for the wrongdoing? If so, does the PO‘s
activity constitute a central part of its mission and does it
dedicate a considerable amount of resources toward this end?
2. Does the PO provide support to another engaged in
wrongdoing?
3. Does the PO‘s support contribute in essential ways to another‘s
ability to carry out the wrongdoing?
4. Does the PO‘s support contribute in non-essential ways to
another‘s ability to carry out the wrongdoing?
5. Does the Catholic health care organization‘s (CHCO‘s) support
contribute in essential ways to a PO that promotes wrongdoing
and/or supports the wrongdoing carried out by another? (Note:
if the PO is not engaged in this type of activity or relationship,
then the CHCO‘s support is not problematic.)
6. Does the CHCO‘s support contribute in non-essential ways to a
PO that promotes wrongdoing and/or supports the wrongdoing
carried out by another? (Note: if the PO is not engaged in this
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type of activity or relationship, then the CHCO‘s support is not
problematic.)
7. Does the CHCO‘s support of the PO lead to scandal?
8. Is there a proportionate reason for the CHCO‘s support of the
PO?574
Note that the questions not only assess the level of cooperation with the Catholic health
care organization but the philanthropic organization‘s involvement in wrongdoing.
Using their proposed scheme, Hamel and Panicola find that the intent of Komen
in working with Planned Parenthood is to provide breast health screening for underserved
women; Komen has not taken a public stance regarding abortions; and Komen does not
provide anything essential to the procurement of abortions. At most, Komen is in remote,
mediate material cooperation with Planned Parenthood. The Catholic organization‘s
moral object is sponsoring a team to run in Komen‘s race for the cure, which is
indifferent; there is no intent for wrongdoing on the part of the Catholic organization; the
organization does not have any link to the wrongdoing; and there is little chance for
scandal. 575 Thus, a Catholic organization‘s funding to Susan G. Komen is permissible
given the listed conditions.
IIID. Research Participation (Stem Cell and Birth Control Protocols)
Organizational agents are accountable for the variety of issues that arise in
research, as discussed in the previous chapter. Rather than recounting detail, it is
sufficient to give some examples, while referring to chapter two for the detail. At least
two general contexts exist pertaining to cooperation with research.
First, involves the moral evil of partnering with research using stem cells or
therapies derived from immoral procedures. When drafting or revising research policies,
a Catholic institution must take into account the involvement of the research sponsor as
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well as the sponsor‘s request of participating institutions. Clearly, a moral distinction
exists between using adult stem cells that do not result in death, and the use of fetal or
embryonic stem cells, which result in the destruction of the fetus or embryo. A careful
way of applying cooperation is to not allow any partnerships with research institutions
sponsoring, suggesting, or participating in embryonic stem cell research. 576 This is the
view offered by the Pontifical Academy for Life about a Catholic organization obtaining
embryonic stem cells offered by other researchers – it is not morally acceptable.577 The
research issue, however, is not only about the research itself. It is about the therapies that
result from the research.
The most accurate, albeit being nondirective, summary about Catholic
organizations and stem cell research derived therapies is from Albert Moraczewski,
―Arguments may be made on both sides of the question as to whether or not research and
therapies that do not require any further destruction of human embryos constitute
immoral cooperation of scandal.‖ 578 This is a thorny predicament for Catholic health
care.579 On the one hand, some things seem clearly inappropriate as formal or immediate
material cooperation. For instance, several sources acknowledge the unsuitability of
having another organization ‗do the dirty work‘ of extracting, or to encourage the
harvesting of, stem cells from the embryos for use in Catholic organizations. 580 This is
formal cooperation as the cooperator shares the intent of the moral agent. On the other
hand, some other interactions with embryonic stem cell therapies are permissible as
mediate material cooperation. For instance, therapies that use immortalized cell lines or
suspended fetal tissues do not have a connecting relationship between research and
therapeutic uses and the original abortions. 581 Cell lines derived from abortions are many
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generations removed from the aborted fetal tissue used to start them. 582 A sufficient
distance may exist for Catholic health care institutions to use therapies derived from the
lines. In addition, options that skirt the issue include harvesting stem cells from umbilical
cord blood or placentas, which are both plentiful sources of stem cells and do not destroy
embryos during gathering procedures.583 Catholic health care organizations also must
reflect on social justice considerations. For this reason, Michael Prieur and colleagues
recommend that Catholic institutions adopt guidelines that include provisions about not
using stem cells attached to a profit – that is, when organizations pay the donor.584
Second, Bishop Anthony Fisher states unequivocally that an agency dispensing or
circulating contraceptives is in formal and illicit cooperation. 585 His statement is accurate
to the extent that allowing another agency to dispense contraceptives especially within a
Catholic organization is explicit or implicit formal cooperation. This is only one piece of
the puzzle when it comes to cooperation, research, and organizations.
Catholic health care organizations also must consider policies and procedures as
they relate to research investigations and protocols that recommend contraception or
other forms of birth control. Examples include cancer treatment protocols. Cytotoxic
substances and radiotherapy (i.e. chemo and radiation) generally result in abortion or
significant, congenital fetal abnormalities when conception occurs in conjunction with
these cancer treatments. Naturally, no one expects mature adults to abdicate their
sexuality while being treated for cancer. 586 Another source adds:
The literature advises that a pregnancy should not be attempted for
2 years following a breast cancer diagnosis, due to recurrences
occurring most often in that period (Isaacs, 1995; Petrek, 1994b).
According to a review of the breast cancer and pregnancy
literature, avoiding pregnancy in the short term brings forth a
―quagmire of issues related to contraceptive methods‖ (Puckridge,
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Saunders, Ives, & Semmens, 2003, p. 502). Despite little concrete
evidence, nonhormonal contraceptive methods are preferred
(International Planned Parenthood Federation [IPPF], 1999).587
Research protocols as well as standard disclosures for cancer treatment often involve and
even stress the need for contraception during the treatment course.
With respect to cooperation, a former Director of Education at The National
Catholic Bioethics Center, Germain Kopaczynski, addresses cancer treatment research
protocols that encourage contraceptive practices for participants. As an example, he uses
a sixty-page protocol for LC3267 – an experimental substance in Phase II trials for
patients with non-small-cell lung cancer – that counsels sexually active persons to take
precautions to avoid conception given the presumed powerful effects of the substance on
the fetuses. Kopaczynski advises Catholic health care institutions that they may serve as
sites for such research as long as they promulgate natural family planning (NFP) and
abstinence, not artificial birth control methods (e.g. barriers such as condoms, hormones
and substances such as ‗the pill‘). 588 Seemingly, Kopaczynski likens the blanket
advocacy of not conceiving within Catholic health care institutions with formal
cooperation. It is the sole promotion of NFP and abstinence that makes the participation
of Catholic organizations mediate material cooperation.
His logic regarding the application of cooperation has flaws on two levels. First,
a general backing for not conceiving has the same intent as NFP and abstinence. In fact,
broad recommendations, such as not conceiving, do not endorse any particular method. It
is information absent description in its object with contraceptive intent for patients in dire
circumstances, which describes both the overall, general recommendation as well as the
encouragement of NFP and abstinence. Second, a high burden-of-proof exists to
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categorize mentioning specific barrier or chemical contraceptives with NFP and
abstinence as formal cooperation. Part of this burden includes the establishment of intent
and essential causal links to the evil. It is doubtful that mentioning barrier and hormonal
contraceptives, information available on the internet, is a necessary link. Furthermore,
the intent of all methods is to warn in order to make sure a difficult situation does not
become even more so. Much of the proof should explore if the provision of information
is equivalent to advocacy of that information. (Keenan made a similar argument about
artificial contraception information from health professionals for the prevention of
HIV/AIDS transmission.)589 By extrapolation, reasonable arguments exist that general
recommendations or NFP and abstinence as parts of a range of options are all permissible
as mediate material cooperation.
IIIE. Physicians’ Practices (Insurance, Residents’ Training, Unrestricted Funding for
Procedures)
Situations within the context of physicians‘ practices may relate to evils according
to the Catholic Church, therefore making cooperation analysis essential. It is not
necessary to apply cooperation to each instance because cooperation has been applied and
discussed in relation to the same moral evils previously. A quick survey of issues
relevant for applying cooperation within physician‘s practices suffices. The provision of
vaccinations derived from aborted fetuses (and distributed through physicians‘ clinics)
was covered already. Like acute care organizations, clinics administer therapies and
conduct research that may, somehow, connect to a moral evil. 590 Clinicians, and others
such as therapists, who make home visits to evaluate patients (clients) occasionally find
some who live in ―physically dangerous situations.‖591 Lease agreements with
physicians‘ practices and other clinicians typically include provisions about abiding by
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the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care (ERDs). These
agreements give the Catholic organization in ownership the right to revoke the lease if
indiscretions come to light.592 Organizations that are also teaching institutions should
consider policies, guidelines, or procedures dealing with issues such as employed
physicians teaching students ‗required‘ but immoral professional procedures offsite,
requesting participation of residents and students for these procedures, immoral demands
of supervisors, and how to respond when asked for counsel or referrals about immoral
treatments and procedures.593 All of the occasions mentioned above are ripe for applying
cooperation.
IIIF. Social Injustices and Inequities
At least one infers that the use of cooperation is appropriate for gauging
organizations‘ complicity with evil for the elimination of social injustices. Keenan, as
mentioned previously, seems to understand the paradoxical relationship between
injustice, mercy, and cooperation. In order to correct injustices, one must act with mercy
without intending or being closely complicit in moral evils.594 An example is Keenan‘s
argument in favor of the distribution of prophylactic information within Catholic
organizations as a health measure to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS, which
affects populations disproportionately (i.e. HIV/AIDS epitomizes and perpetuates
existing social injustices).595
One way to describe Catholic social teaching is a yardstick to measure the
accomplishments and limitations of specific social justice characteristics. 596 Similarly,
cooperation is a compass to navigate a sailboat through the stormy seas of behaving with
integrity. Sailing is not as simple as setting a course and going the direction of the
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course. A sailor knows to tack, using the elements of wind and waves, which are never
constant, to zigzag to the destination. Overreacting to the elements can be destructive.
On one hand, avoiding them entirely by staying close to the shore never takes the vessel
away from familiar land. On the other hand, ignoring the elements while at sea may
cause the craft to be swept away by the very forces it could use to its advantage.
IIIG. Mergers, Partnerships, and Affiliations with Other-than-Catholic Organizations
One of the most popular applications of cooperation is for mergers, partnerships,
and affiliations with other-than-Catholic systems that do procedures such as direct
sterilizations. Many moral theologians and ethicists comment about mergers,
partnerships, and affiliations.597 Part Six of the ERDs is ―Forming New Partnerships with
Health Care Organizations and Providers,‖ and description of cooperation has been
tailored to the context of mergers, partnerships, and affiliations because they have
become so prevalent.598
Organizations flex their muscles of moral agency when they perform due
diligence and integrate with other organizations. The structure of ventures assumes
various forms depending on the identity of the institutions:
[Involvement may be between] two Catholic institutions; a
Catholic and another denominational institution; a Catholic and a
nondenominational (secular) institution.599
(Readers may notice an incongruity with the quote immediately above and the
subheading of this section. Merging or affiliating Catholic organizations act as moral
agents, Part Six of the ERDs is relevant, and cooperation applies. In all probability,
Catholic organizations have fewer issues to apply cooperation to in a merger or affiliation
because it is unlikely that moral evils exist in those institutions than when contrasted with
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their other-than-Catholic counterparts.) Multiple aspects merit close consideration in a
merger, acquisition, or joint venture. Some are board structure, policies and procedures,
assets, administrative structure, operations, revenue, and legal provisions. The number
and specificity of features for consideration is intricate. Organizations frequently codify
these considerations into binding legal documents for the new organization or between
the new entities.600 The reference point(s) for cooperation, the behaviors of the moral
agent (as opposed to the cooperator), could be any one or more issues, including the ones
mentioned in this chapter and chapter two. For example, the other organization could
perform direct sterilizations, fit patients for contraceptive devices, do IVF or other
artificial reproductive technologies, and/or contribute to social sins and social injustices
such as inhumane treatment of its associates. While possible, it is less likely that acute
care organizations being considered in a venture, merger, or acquisition perform direct
abortions. An example of an organizational merger includes the hypothetical example of
St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH) and St. Bernardine of Siena Wellness System
(SBW) presented both in the previous chapter and the ―moral distance‖ segment of this
chapter.
IIIH. Resistance that Health Care Organizations Encounter when Applying Material
Cooperation
Associates in health care organizations may be resistant to applying cooperation,
for reasons that either may be intentional or inadvertent. An unintentional reason is
apathy or a lack of awareness about processes or available resources. Beth Dixon, an
associate professor of philosophy at the State University of New York, makes a
distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance, with culpable ignorance

209

reflecting that the person proclaiming his or her ignorance should have known to do
something correctly. A person with non-culpable, or what Aquinas calls ―antecedent,‖
ignorance has circumstances that legitimize that person from not knowing what to do.601
―The difference between these two types of ignorance rests not in the specific state of the
agent nor in his personal description of what he was about. It concerns instead the more
public matter of what we reasonably expect people to know.‖602 Liguori adds that there
must be full knowledge about the truth of an evil or offense for a sin to have
significance.603 Examples of ignorance from apathy include an individual who does not
know the moral act is wrong or unjust, organizational resources for dealing with issues,
or about the incongruence with Mission and Core Values. Another is an organization that
does not know ordered cell-lines were originally derived from something illicit, such as
an abortion. 604
Intentional reasons for resistance when applying cooperation may originate from
theological grounds, such as another principle being better suited or an individual being
unconnected with the issue. For instance, one may argue that the Church‘s stance on the
use of condoms for HIV/AIDS reduction and prevention is either an application of the
principle of cooperation or the principle of lesser evil. 605 In addition, various individuals
with the organization may disagree that something is a cooperation issue at all, or one
that they are remotely connected to. Such perspectives depend on some knowledge of the
issues and Church teaching as well as weighing information in order to conclude that
cooperation is not relevant.
Agents may have practical concerns. Persons may have time constraints, work
deadlines, or a lack of resources or support. For instance, physician M. Scott Peck
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detects that certain professions such as medicine seem inherently resistant to religious
and morality talk and examinations. The resistance may be societal in nature, resulting in
professionals feeling that they do not have support in religious and moral matters, as they
do not want to offend their coworkers.606 Agents may disclose issues with processes,
including the model proposed in chapter five as well as with the principle of cooperation
itself. Furthermore, associates within the organization may not agree about the issue
itself and its priority with other organizational concerns. Individuals have experiences
that, rightly or wrongly, attract them to or lead them away from issues and processes. 607
The last series of obstacles to the organizational application of cooperation is personal
reasons that the organization‘s associates will not become involved in an issue. Instances
consist of disagreement that the issue is relevant or fear of ‗burning platforms.‘ Many of
these issues translate to a lack of consensus within the organization and an inability to
prioritize issues.

In conclusion, this chapter showed that organizations are moral agents, exercise
their moral agency by applying the principle of cooperation, and confront different issues
while applying cooperation when compared to individuals. Organizational issues were
explored, such as the sponsorship of groups, messages, and initiatives with controversial
content; philanthropic donations; research participation; physicians‘ practice issues;
social injustices and inequities; and mergers, partnerships, and affiliations with otherthan-Catholic systems. Resistance to applying cooperation within organizations may
occur and persist. Some areas and examples of resistance were discussed. Solutions to
these categories of opposition exist. For instance, critical analysis is necessary for
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employees‘ experiences to become meaningful and educational. 608 The next chapters
consider methods for overcoming resistance, including a model that directly addresses
these and other barriers.
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Chapter Four – Interpreting the Implementation and Use of Material
Cooperation as a Function of Moral Development
This chapter diverges in its content from the previous two chapters. Exploration of the
use and application of cooperation is no longer under the backdrop of individual and
organizational agency from a predominately theological context. Instead, this chapter
considers the use and application of the principle of cooperation as a function of moral
development.
The introduction establishes that individuals exercise their moral agency and
conscience in their decisions, the principle of cooperation is a method to gauge
complicity with malfeasance, moral development theories are means to regard agents‘
perceptions and reactions to malfeasance, and moral development explains an agent‘s
evaluation of his or her application of material cooperation. Various developmental
theories such as psychosocial, identity, typology, and cognitive-structural theories are the
means situate the most appropriate developmental theories for the purpose of this
dissertation. The best theories, cognitive-structural theories, are most apposite and,
therefore, garner the most attention – two theories in particular. There is not only
discussion about the stages of the two theories, but corresponding stage-related
behaviors, both generally and in the context of business. The emphasis of the chapter‘s
reminder is the alignment of moral development with discernment and agency – that is
not dependant on moral decision-making approaches such as deontology (duty-based),
consequentialism (consequence-based), teleology (goal-based), and virtues-based – and
understanding that the application of the principle of cooperation is a function of moral
development.
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I. Moral Development as a Foundation for the Moral Agency to Identify
Wrongdoing
IA. Introduction
Moral development is the backdrop or foundation for the moral agency to identify
wrongdoing. Individuals exercise their agency and conscience in their decisions, and
material cooperation is a method to gauge complicity with perceived evil, injustice, and
wrongdoing.609 There are means to look at agents‘ perceptions and reactions to perceived
evil, injustice, and wrongdoing.610 These means are moral development theories, which
are not new, but have existed in psychology and development literature for decades.
These theories have empirical support, moral language, and general acceptance and
respect, although there are significant comments and apprehensions about some of them,
which this argument will address.
A focal concept of this chapter is that moral development explains an agent‘s
application of material cooperation. The basis for this idea is that moral development is
fundamental for moral agency, which includes the identification of wrongdoing. 611 As
stated before, moral agency applies to both individuals and organizations, as does
development, as both are able to exercise agency and conscience in decisions, which is
inherent in one of Richard McCormick‘s critiques about the Catholic Church in
Corrective Vision. 612 Therefore, applications of cooperation are functions of moral
development.613
The mechanism or process of demonstrating one‘s moral development while
applying cooperation involves the moral agent‘s discernment. In this case, the moral
agent uses his or her discernment to identify the relevant evil, injustice, or wrongdoing.
Then, and equally as important, the agent uses discernment while employing the
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categories (i.e. lexical components) in the principle of cooperation. Methods exist to
measure and develop individuals‘ moral reasoning and, hopefully, corresponding
behaviors.
While the former context is individual, the former distinctions also apply to
organizations. Organizations express moral development while discerning issues in
whatever decision-making process the organization employs, which may include the
identification of wrongdoing and utilization of cooperation. Organizational cooperation
is a product of its associates‘ (i.e. employees‘) formation and development. Development
of an organization‘s conscience and response, as both evidence through its reasoning and
behaviors, to evil and injustice is dependent upon assessing and fostering the
development of its associates.
IB. Appropriate Developmental Theories
Various developmental and typology theories are available to gauge development.
The rest of this segment concentrates on the available theories for categorizing moral
development. The goal of this endeavor is to select and focus on the most appropriate
developmental and typology theories.
First, one group of relevant theories is psychosocial and identity development.
Psychosocial and identity development theories are examinations of the content of
development and how individuals cope (respond) to changes in the environment.
Theorists believe that development occurs throughout one‘s life and there is a
foundational structure steering development. Components of this foundational structure
include in the influence of environmental demands, culture and gender-related influences,
and cultural norms.614 Examples of psychosocial theories are Erik Erikson‘s eight stage
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theory, Arthur Chickering‘s Theory of Identity Development (seven vectors of
development), and Ruthellen Josselson‘s Theory of Identity Development in Women
(four identity groups). Identity development theories include Jean Phinney‘s Model of
Ethnic Identity Development, sexuality identity development theories such as Vivienne
Cass‘s Model of Homosexual Identity Formation, and change and transition theories such
as Nancy Scholssberg‘s Transition Theory. 615
The next group, second, are systems called typology theories. Typology theories
identify characteristics that create particular ways of coping because people respond
differently depending on type. They are not developmental in the same way that
psychosocial and cognitive-structural are because they do not consist of progressive
stages. The distinctiveness of individuals‘ learning, interests, and mental processing
results in development in other areas, based upon the underlying presumption that variety
(i.e. not seeing things in the same way) is positive and vigorous.616 Examples of typology
theories are David Kolb‘s Theory of Experimental Learning, John Holland‘s Theory of
Vocational Personalities and Environments, and the Myers-Briggs Adaptation of Jung‘s
Theory of Personality Type. 617 The Myers-Briggs theory and inventory, called the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® is an excellent, popular example of a typology theory. A
person using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® chooses options from a series of
preferences, which places that person into any one of sixteen personality types. That
person who took the inventory being evaluated may exist in a world of introversion (I)
and extraversion (E), assimilate information through the senses (S) or intuition (N), make
decisions according to thoughts (T) or feelings (F), and create structure by judging (J) or
perceiving (P).618 A person taking the inventory only ‗falls‘ into one of the two options
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in each category. Four categories with two options (e.g., I-E, S-N, T-F, J-P) results in
sixteen different personality types, often referred to as ‗table types.‘ In a list, these
categories are:
▪ INFJ
▪ INTJ
▪ INFP
▪ INTP
▪ ISTJ
▪ ISFJ
▪ ISTP
▪ ISFP

▪ ENFP
▪ ENTP
▪ ENFJ
▪ ENTJ
▪ ESTP
▪ ESFP
▪ ESTJ
▪ ESFJ619

None of the sixteen types and their gradations, as each characteristic is not binary but on
a gradient, represents a better or more morally developed form than another.
Another group, third, is the theories describing people‘s interaction with their
surroundings, or person-environment theories. Foundational to these frameworks is the
idea that environmental conditions impact people‘s growth and development.
Interventionists occasionally alter or manipulate the surrounding circumstances to
facilitate development. Examples of person-environment theorists are Nevitt Sanford, A.
Astin, Nancy Schlossberg (also mentioned above under psychosocial theories), and L.
Rendón.620
Fourth and finally, the last group of development theories is the cognitivestructural theories. Cognitive-structural theories focus on how people think, which
developmental theorists categorize into stages. Stages are set, universal, hierarchical,
occur in the same order, and refer to general characteristics. Changes happen as a result
of assimilation and accommodation. 621 Models include Jean Piaget‘s four periods of
development, William Perry‘s Theory of Intellectual and Ethical Development (nine
positions), Marcia Baxter Magolda‘s Model of Epistemological Reflection, King and
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Kitchener‘s Reflective Judgment Model, James Rest‘s Theory, Lawrence Kohlberg‘s
Theory of Moral Development (six stages and three levels), and Carol Gilligan‘s Theory
of Moral Development (three levels and two transitions). 622
IC. Situating and Selecting the Appropriate Development Theory
Situating the various developmental and typology theories was a precursor to
selecting the theories that are the most helpful for advancing this thesis. Examining the
contents of development, things people think, or distinctive types and ways of coping to
situations and others are not as helpful as studying how or why people think they way
they do. To a lesser degree, characteristics of coping with the environment are also not as
helpful as knowing how persons‘ filters or lenses change for identification and
assessment of situations. The pertinent interest is about how people think and a universal
hierarchy (i.e. not culturally specific), with the hope that relevant models can, at
minimum, increase awareness and opportunities for development and, at maximum,
catalyze the moral development of persons. 623 For these reasons, cognitive-structural
development theories are the most relevant, as they attend neither to coping,
categorization, nor environmental adaptation. 624
A specification is in order. The model of cooperation advanced in chapter five
uses a form of situational (i.e. interpersonal interactions with others are a subset of the
environment) adaptation by creating opportunities that would not otherwise exist. This
does not mean that the relevant development models are person-environment theories,
which center on the precursors or optimal conditions for development. 625 The existing
environment of the organization, its culture, is set and does not change easily. Using
Sanford‘s postulate as an example, there is only so much one can do in order to avoid too
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much or too little challenge, resulting in less adaptive modes of behavior, polarization
and solidification of current behaviors, disregard in light of no escape, or be complacent
in their current environment. In other words, barriers to development (discussed at the
end of the previous chapter) evidence themselves in one‘s reasoning to participate, or not,
in development opportunities. Environmental adaptations through interventions occur,
but only in response to evidence of a person‘s level or stage of moral development.
Stated differently, person-environment theories would be more relevant to this
dissertation if they were the chief and germane concerns. They are not the paramount
concerns; they are partners (or cooperators) with cognitive-structural development
theories, setting the stage for the main act, which does enhance development.
There are cognitive-structural theories that expressly attend to moral
development, and the philosophy of how to educate or catalyze moral development. 626
Kohlberg‘s Theory of Moral Development and Gilligan‘s Theory of Woman‘s Moral
Development are time-tested and, arguably, the best of the specific cognitive-structural
theories that concentrate on moral development.627 Both the Kohlberg and the Gilligan
theory relate to each other.
Lawrence Kohlberg is in the tradition of Dewey and Piaget. His focus was on
how people make moral judgments, and persons‘ views of justice are central to his
theory.628 Kohlberg researched formulated, researched, and tested his theory over a
period of thirty years at the University of Chicago and then Harvard. 629
Gilligan was a student of Kohlberg and felt that woman reasoned differently than
men. 630 A significant departure and difference between the Kohlberg theory and the
Gilligan theory is that men reason using ―the justice voice‖ and women reason using the
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―care voice.‖631 Gilligan also perceived Kohlberg to have an individual and hypothetical
orientation to his theory (Kohlberg‘s formulated his theory from hypothetical examples),
while her theory has its basis in relationships and actual situations. 632
Despite some critics, they are both appropriate as respected and empirically tested
theories. 633 The nature of the theories‘ critics, for example, has incorporated concerns
about the assertion that stages are ‗universal and invariant,‘ which researchers have
challenged. For example, James Rest, another moral development theorist addressed in
invariance of stages, ―[finding] that while people evolve in their moral development, they
keep vestiges of their earlier stages with them, and thus the behavior and reasoning
marking earlier stages sometimes reappear.‖634 In addition, others have challenged the
ability to universalize the theories. For instance, does Kohlberg‘s theory bind all people
in all cultures, or is it simply a representative example of a heterogeneous, diverse,
individualistic, Western culture, which is where Kohlberg studied and tested his
theory?635 This matter has not been settled, much like the continuing discussions about
whether a common morality connects all human persons or if morality is fractured into
smaller moral communities (e.g. camps, academic disciplines). 636 Another critique is that
Kohlberg‘s theory, specifically, centers too much on cognitive process (e.g. the reasons
supporting moral decisions), ignoring other crucial factors in moral decision-making (e.g.
the motivations and emotions structuring moral behavior). Arguably, emotions and
motivations have central roles in decisions in addition to cognitive reasoning. 637
ID. Characteristics of Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s Theories of Moral Development
Kohlberg‘s Theory of Moral Development has six distinct stages divided into
three levels, with two stages per level. The Kohlberg stages are synonymous with
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another developmental theorist mentioned above, James Rest. Because they are
complimentary (with the caveat that an individual could regress in Rest‘s stages), Rest‘s
stages will appear in parenthesis next to the explanation of Kohlberg‘s stages.
The title of Kohlberg‘s first level of moral development is preconventional
morality. The description of the level is that morality derives from external sources. In
other words, the locus for morality is not set or derived from the individual; it is a product
of authorities and their standards, which they impose on the individual. This level of
development typically involves children between one and ten-years-of-age.638
In the preconventional morality level are two stages. Stage one is heteronomous
morality, where an agent bases his or her actions on punishment avoidance (Obedience –
―Do what you‘re told‖). Persons in stage one have absolute deference to authority
figures, acting not for the good of others but out of fear of penalty and harm. Authorities
are those persons who can reward or punish others, thus its popular coining as the
‗obedience and punishment stage.‘ All persons start in this stage per Kohlberg.
Individualistic, instrumental morality is stage two. In this stage, someone follows rules
because it benefits a person to do so; interests may conflict so fairness is about equal
exchange or agreement (Instrumental egoism and simple exchange – ―Let‘s make a
deal‖). The foundational value for this stage is pragmatism and achieving a balance
between advancing personal needs and satisfying others‘ needs only to the extent that
doing so avoids repercussion, retribution, or punishment.639 Stage two, or what others
often call the ‗individualism and reciprocity stage,‘ persons practice a weighted or
stacked mechanism of barters, connoting that he or she will always enter a trade thinking
in his or her own self-interest. One enters agreements to promote self-interest, or one
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changes the conditions of the agreement to favor oneself. 640 An example is a weighted
consequentialism where benefits and burdens (i.e. positives and negatives, pleasure and
pain, happiness and unhappiness) become more or less pronounced when it affects the
stage two individual evaluating the agreement. Thus, the stage two individual needs a
greater proportionate benefit for the agreement to seem fair; a moderate burden may seem
like a huge burden to someone in stage two.
The next developmental level is conventional morality (i.e. conventional
reasoning). By this stage, individuals have partially internalized their morality. Still,
external sources still have a large influence on the person‘s sense of right and wrong.
Social norms and expectations shape a person in this level, even though authority figures
are less dominant in their ability to manipulate a response. Persons ten to twenty-yearsof-age often are at the level of conventional morality.641
The two stages in the conventional morality level are interpersonally normative
reality and social system morality. Interpersonally normative reality, stage three, is when
doing right is being acceptable in relationship according to social roles and in the
expectations of those who are close (Interpersonal – ―Be considerate, nice, kind, and
you‘ll get along with people‖). Being virtuous is being good, which one garners through
the acceptance of others. This is why a name for the stage is the ‗interpersonal
conformity stage.‘ While this stage is not as egocentric as others, an overarching social
fairness perspective – where interests of the self and others balance differently and
appropriately according to the needs of the situation – does not yet exist. A person just
begins to understand a moral problem by putting himself or herself ‗in the shoes‘ of
others. One‘s scope is not comprehensive enough to gauge the needs of the common
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good. Community is local, typically tied to a social group or business organization.
Persons with knowledge of organizational wrongdoing who do not become
whistleblowers may typify this stage. What matters is being a good Enron employee, for
instance, with exceptional performance and not making waves. Broader social welfare
and responsibility is outside of these persons‘ scope. Stage four is social system
morality, which is doing right by obeying or upholding laws established by society
because adequate social system functioning depends on people obeying coherent rules
and procedures applying uniformly to everyone (Law and duty to social order –
―everyone in society is obligated and protected by law‖). Maintaining the system and its
regulations and conventions is the ultimate good of someone in a social system morality
stage.642 Because of the emphasis on the preservation of social functioning, some
commonly call Kohlberg‘s stage four the ‗law-and-order stage.‘ Kohlberg believed that
most adults in the U.S. culminate their moral development at this stage.643
The highest level for Kohlberg is postconventional or principled reasoning.
Those who reach this level have completely internalized their morality. Others have little
ability to influence moral standards. It is rare to find an individual under twenty-yearsof-age who exhibits thoughts and behaviors from a postconventional or principled
reasoning. 644
A stage in the postconventional level is stage five, human rights and social
welfare morality, where social systems and codifications, such as laws, are open to
interpretation. The evaluation of social systems and codifications is according to how
much they promote basic, or more fundamental, human rights (Societal consensus – ―You
are obligated by whatever arrangements are agreed to by due process procedures‖).
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Social systems are useful and ‗good‘ to the extent that they promote guard rights and
promote values, and according to their helpfulness, individuals may enter and exit,
validating or invalidating the social contract, according to needs. Phrased differently,
stage five persons have perspectives that begin to transcend particular cultures and
societies, making the persons less dependent or attached to their own specific culture or
society. Agents illustrate their coherentism, contractarianism, or rational metaethical
absolutism with their perspective that all rational persons would agree to basic
determinations of right and wrong. ―This hypothetical social contract is taken as the
basis for moral decisions by persons at this stage.‖645 The characterization of the final
stage, stage six, is what Kohlberg calls the morality of universalizable, reversible, and
prescriptive general ethics principles. The exceedingly few persons in this highest
developmental stage believe that basic or fundamental ethics frameworks apply in all
situations. There is equal consideration for the points-of-view of all stakeholders in any
particular situation. Fair process and procedures are just as important as decisions
(Nonarbitrary social cooperation – ―How rational and impartial people would organize
cooperation is moral‖). Some title this stage the ‗universal ethical principles stage‘
because of the common and collective application of norms to all people, based on their
intrinsic rights and human dignity. 646 The ‗principles‘ term of the title originates because
―moral decisions are not based on simply what is best for everybody. They are based
instead on principles that are chosen freely by the agent, but that agent would be willing
for everyone to live by as well.‖ 647 All contracts and agreements materialize within a
milieu, which one must consider when evaluating obligations and the fairness of any
situation. Persons in this stage may endure passive suffering in order to show respect for
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all, as well as ―transform the world in accordance with a divine and transcendent
image.‖648
The description of Kohlberg‘s highest stages illustrates what philosophers call
reflective equilibrium. Philosophers David DeGrazia and Tom Beauchamp summarize
reflective equilibrium as the affiliation between general norms of morality and specific
judgments of morality:
[Rawls] argues it is appropriate to start with the broadest set of
considered judgments [emphasis in the original] (i.e. a technical
term referring to judgments in which moral beliefs and capacities
are most likely to be presented without a distorting bias) about a
subject and to erect a provisional set of principles [i.e. or values,
goals, obligations, etc.] that reflects them. Reflective equilibrium
views investigation in ethics (and theory construction) as a
reflexive testing of moral principles, theoretical postulates, and
other relevant moral beliefs to render them as coherent as possible.
Starting with paradigms of what is morally right or wrong, one
searches for principles that are consistent with these paradigms as
well as one another. Such principles and considered judgments are
taken, as Rawls puts it, ―provisionally as fixed points,‖ but also as
―liable to revision.‖649
John Rawls explains how he derived the name – equilibrium describes how theory,
ideals, and ideologies (e.g principles, duties, goals, and values) correspond with acts (e.g.
judgments and behaviors), and reflective depicts that we know to what theory, ideals,
ideologies, and acts coincide and how they derive.650
University of Michigan M.E. Tracy Distinguished Professor of Organizational
Behavior and Human Resource Management Robert Quinn understands the concept even
though he does not refer to reflective equilibrium by name:
…[O]ur actions can be symbolic representations…[They] are like
seeds. They carry transformational potential. Each time we act,
we represent our beliefs and values. We embody possibilities and
illustrate constraints.651
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In one of his books, philosophy professor Jacob Needleman refers to the need for
congruity between understanding good principles, duties, goals, and virtues and acting in
accord with them. 652 Professors John Rich and Joseph DeVitis use the psychology and
development terms ―‗self-actualized person‘ (Maslow)‖ and ―‗fully functioning human
being‘ (Roger)‖ to describe Kohlberg‘s stage six, which is similar to reflective
equilibrium. 653
Adding all-the-more credence to Kohlberg‘s stage six as reflective equilibrium is
the description from John Rawls that the various points on the reflective equilibrium line
are not permanent and unchanging. They are always in a state of flux where actions from
situations and experiences refine postulates, theories, and ideologies. Vice-versa is true
as well – postulates, theories, and ideologies constantly influence actions.654 In his study
of morally developed persons, Quinn notices that change agents, which Kohlberg stage
six persons are typically, are constantly in a process of translating and responding to our
and others‘ behaviors:
We are thus ever-involved in a process of co-creation with the
world around us. We create the world that also creates us. This
process can then be correctly interpreted in two opposite ways: The
world creates us or we create the world. Both statements are true.
Overemphasis on the first, however, can lead to resignation in
which who we are increasingly becomes determined by external
forces. An overemphasis on the second leads to self-deception in
which we claim that all constraints are illusions. The focus here is
on the reality of constraints and the reality of potential; both are
true… [Actions carry our beliefs and values.] With each action,
we become a living symbol that others must interpret and to which
they must respond. That is, our actions are signaling devices in the
process of co-creation. What we represent matters deeply. 655
The theoretical claim is solid, albeit not empirically tested, that the few persons in
Kohlberg‘s stage six of development exhibit the most congruence with reflective
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equilibrium. In a sliding scale to lower stages, persons in each lower developmental
stages display less self-actualization, full function, all-encompassing ethical frameworks,
and ability to adequately maintain a reflective equilibrium.
Kohlberg and some others proposing revisions to his theory hypothesize that there
is a seventh stage of development. ―At one point, Kohlberg himself postulated a seventh
stage, a religious one, beyond Stage Six. This level was said to be the stage of moral
development reached by such religious figures as Jesus or the Buddha.‖ 656 Kohlberg
eventually revised this stage because he acknowledged that religious development was its
own process with of development. While there are points of interconnectivity, someone‘s
religious development may follow its own independent path from moral development.
An example of a religious development theory is James Fowler‘s Stages of Faith
Development. Similar to Kohlberg and Gilligan, an individual grows through several
different stages or levels of faith, beginning with a pre-stage (ages three through seven)
called intuitive-projective faith where a child adopts the symbols and rituals of his or her
caregiver(s), intertwining fantasy (i.e. illusion) with reality. Concrete operational
thinking generally transitions a child to the next stage, which is mythic-literal faith (ages
seven through early adolescence), typified by factual thinking of hyperbole, allegory, and
parable. The next stage is synthetic-conventional faith (adolescence; some never
advance), catalyzed by the recognition of inherent contradictions in stories; and
characterized by following the convention and expectations of others without any
conscious thought (i.e. examination) about the adherence to a particular ideology. The
vehicle for another stage, individual-reflective faith (early to mid-twenties; some never
advance), is often disagreements between authority figures or changes to rituals (i.e.
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practice), symbols, and teaching (i.e. policy) formerly understood as unchangeable and
sacrosanct. Its categorization is through individuals who adopt an identity that is
independent of authorities and their hopes, critical reflection about self and ideology, and
the acceptance of rituals, symbols, and teaching as less literal and more conceptual. A
person is not ready for transitioning to the next stage until he or she abandons the rote,
overdependence on logical, rational, conscious thought and accepts the influence of
unconscious, multifaceted, and abstract concepts. Upon recognition of the former
disillusionment, a person evolves to the subsequent stage, called conjunctive faith (midlife; some never advance), distinguished by the individual‘s recognition of the
unconscious mind, gratitude for the contradictions and paradoxes inherent in the truth
(i.e. accepting conflicts with a both/and disposition rather than an either/or orientation),
and the ability to create meaning through imagination and (theoretical) obligations to act.
Exceedingly few persons make it to Fowler‘s last stage, universalizing faith, exhibited by
rare exemplars – Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King, and Mother Teresa. Those who
transition into this stage eliminate the disparity between a world in need and the
transformative power of action and change. Inaction perpetuates injustice and inequity,
so self-actualization becomes more than thinking about good; it is doing good.
Gilligan does not refer to her developmental categories as stages. Nonetheless,
they are phases or levels of sorts, which each has a corresponding transition. The
intricacy and understanding of self in relationship with others becomes more multifaceted
with each level, culminating in a ―sophisticated understand between selfishness and
responsibility.‖657
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The categorization of the first phase or level is an orientation to individual
survival. A person can only have a framework for right and wrong if that particular
decision emerged already in that person‘s own life. Individuals are self-centered and
preoccupied with survival. Their goal is the preservation of self and they have no way to
distinguish between what should occur and what would occur. Often, relationships fall
short of their potential for persons in this level. The first transition is from selfishness to
responsibility. Individuals realize that there is potential for social acceptance, integrate
responsibility and care into moral decision-making patterns, and transition from
independence and selfishness into connection and responsibility. In other words,
―should‖ and ―would‖ become distinguishable. The key to the first transition is the
recognition and acceptance of relationships and associations with others. 658
In Gilligan‘s second level, agents define goodness as self-sacrifice. Survival
becomes linked with social acceptance, and judgments may favor social connection over
individual judgment because choices that hurt others reflect disequilibrium. Discontent
and unease for the prioritization of others over self exists, but acknowledgment of this
may occur in private rather than public because public acknowledgment may hurt others,
making any disequilibrium worse. The second transition is from goodness to truth. An
individual in this transition questions why pleasing others is favored to the detriment of
the self, and decides that the needs of the individual need to have the same weight as
others. The struggle to balance care and harm between self and others maintains, but
with the conclusion that the self is important as others. The needs of the self are not
frivolous or egoistic, and the fulfillment of needs is valid and sincere. 659

239

The third and final phase (level) is the morality of nonviolence. Here, the
individual recognizes the moral equality between self and others, achieving an elevated
understanding of relationships and morality through the principle of care. Nonviolence,
the imperative to avoid hurt or pain, trumps the needs of the self and to appease others,
such that previous dichotomies disappear. 660 The settlement of prior divergences ―opens
the door for the individual to recognize her power to select among competing choices and
to keep her needs within the mix of moral alternatives.‖661 A transition from this level
does not exist because it is the most developed phase of reasoning. 662
II. Aligning Moral Development with Discernment and Organizational Agency
IIA. The Lenses of Ethical Theories and Frameworks
While applying cooperation, or when reasoning in general, persons may use
reasoning that illustrates approaches in addition to developmental ones. There are at least
three main styles of moral reasoning and justification – consequentialism, teleology
(virtues), and deontology. Accepting moral development theory, the highest stage of
moral development, perhaps the goal of human development, is the flourishing of all,
with universally applied, equitable norms, fair processes, and just procedures. The ends
of human development as being perfectly just and fostering flourishing, and the
corresponding characteristics to achieve this, are the hallmarks of goal-based theories,
which include teleology and virtues.663 As Robert Quinn observes in Change the World,
virtuous persons embody these ends, which are the characteristics of an advanced stage of
moral development.664 In deference to moral development theory again, a deontologist‘s
duty becomes to create a scheme with the correct principles such that every obligation
has a lexical priority to others. Crafting appropriate rules may assist. 665 The ultimate
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result is that each action or behavior is measured in accord with aspiration-oriented rules,
presumably consistent with perfect flourishing and equity in process, procedure, and
product (decision). In the words of Immanuel Kant:
Rules of ethics are measuring-rules of action and ought to set
before us the standard of moral necessity. They ought not to be
trimmed in consideration of [humankind‘s] capacity. Any system
of ethics which accommodates itself to what [persons] can do
corrupts the moral perfection of humanity. The moral law must be
pure.666
Those making use of consequential reasoning consider the immediate repercussions of a
decision – the consequences, effects, or products.667 The result of many of the lower
developmental stages, using consequentialism, appears to be an increase in happiness, but
this is a façade, as it may increase your (the agent‘s happiness) at the expense of making
others unhappy; the amount of unhappiness greatly increases. Persons in later stages or
levels of development understand the difference between a more objective, balanced
consequential reasoning and a subjective, imbalanced (i.e. weighted) consequential
reasoning, and they adopt the more objective standard.
Using any of the three frameworks and approaches does not invalidate
applications of cooperation as indicative of moral development. 668 Indeed, all of the
above theories and frameworks – and others, many based on the above theories and
frameworks – are significant when assessing and crafting an intervention to advance
moral development.669 Using any of the above three frameworks or approaches, or
others, does not invalidate applications of cooperation as indicative of moral
development.670 They are the equivalent of different color lenses on a camera or tints on
a photograph. Ultimately, they do not change the ways of seeing, but not the components
of the background or objects in the image itself.
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Examples will facilitate a better perspective of the former point. Someone could
describe Kohlberg‘s stage six using any of the moral theories or frameworks mentioned
above. Using teleology and virtues, and accepting moral development theory, the highest
stage of moral development, perhaps the goal of human development, is the flourishing
of all, with universally applied, equitable norms, fair processes, and just procedures. As
noticed by Robert Quinn in Change the World, virtuous persons embody the
characteristics of an advanced stage of moral development. Accepting moral
development theory again, this time using deontology, duty in stage six is to find and
adhere to the correct principles such that every action is consistent with flourishing and
equity in process, procedure, and product (decision). Crafting appropriate rules may
assist. With consequentialism, the result of many of the lower developmental stages
appears to be an increase in happiness, but this is a façade, as it may increase your (the
agent‘s happiness) at the expense of making others unhappy. The amount of unhappiness
greatly increases. Higher stages of development add less weight to the self, including a
subordination of personal interests to that of others.
IIB. Kohlberg Stage Behaviors
Persons‘ behavior corresponds with their developmental stage. As the context of
this model is professional and organizational, rather than personal and clinical, it is useful
that the authors of Practical Business Ethics, Warren French and John Granrose, spend
most of their book outlining the Kohlberg stages, how they present in the business
setting, and the corresponding managerial styles to the stages. Their text serves as an
exemplar for surveying the behaviors that accompany each stage while being precise to
the business setting.
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Exercise of power is nothing new to business. Still, it is in the abusive
implementation of power or obedience to authority through coercion that stage one
businesspersons show their true colors:
…[C]oercive power is most likely to be accepted by persons who
are at Stage One of moral development since they consider
themselves to be ethical when they obey a more powerful force.
In effect, Stage One adherents narrowly interpret the third
component of our definition of ethics – societal well-being – to
mean only their own person well-being. 671
Coercion relies on one party giving into another because of fear generated through
threats. Presumably, the authors are referring not only to those who obey such authority
without considering those others affected by and left out of the decision-making process,
they are making an observations about those who inappropriately use coercive force.
Behaviors of stage one persons are selfish and egoistic:672
Many of the individuals who rely on Stage One reasoning can be
identified by the defensive nature of their statements. They are
not so much interested in resolving conflicts as in presenting
their perception of the facts and principles underlying their
positions.
Scholars such as Jürgen Habermas explain that this type of communicative behavior is
self- or ego-centric, which focuses on the listener rather than the person speaking. 673
The key word for stage two of Kohlberg‘s moral development is exploitation,
which is different than reciprocity and mutuality. (Mutuality is a reciprocal relationship
where both parties treat each other respectfully or as end-unto-themselves, meaning that
there is appreciation for the other person‘s goals. This is not true with reciprocity, where
both or all parties use the other as means to their own ends; it is mutually self-serving.
Exploitation is disproportionate because only one party takes advantage of another.)
Those in stage two will not totally ignore others, but they are still ego-centric, only
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seeking to frame their rationale and justifications in more socially appropriate ways.
Rather than being defensive in communication, stage two persons go on the offensive,
attempting to reframe others‘ positions to their own advantage using tactics such as
paraphrasing negatively, observing incongruence, assailing interpretations, establishing
incommensurate examples, and broadening analysis to an improbable end. From this
description, exploitation and coercion is not only written and physical (i.e. threatening
posture, gestures, and body language), it is verbal. Some persons, just as philosopher
Johann Schmidt, advocate the ethical egoism involved with stage one and two persons.
This approach, nevertheless, garners little support because of the strength of arguments
that refute it.674
Conformity epitomizes stage three reasoning, which French and Granrose title
custom, convention, and courtesy. Another way to describe business behaviors in this
stage is that they are deferential to force-of-habit or etiquette. The models for custom and
convention are generally small or medium groups, such as teams or cliques or
organizations, rather than large groups, including religions (in their entirety) or societies.
A person in this stage will conform to the expectations and practices of an organization or
business, but has no concept that these practices may be right or wrong when one
expands the scope beyond these groups:675
The classic stereotype associated with this stage is that of the
―Organization Man.‖ Loyalty to the firm more than any other
characteristic marks this person‘s behavior. Stage Three people
seek acceptance and respect from others and do not mind giving
up person autonomy in the interest of mirroring the group‘s
image. Hence, the connections with custom and convention
should be obvious [emphasis in the original]. The group-directed
values of those in Stage Three, as contrasted with the selfcentered nature of people in the first two stages, stem from a
different motivating force. Shame, rather than punishment or
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deprivation of personal rewards, is the perceived penalty that
results from behavior that does not live up to the ethics of this
―Organization Man‖ mentality. 676
To oversimplify somewhat, the individual at Stage Three is
likely to be (1) more motivated by group acceptance and
complimented for team play than motivated by selfish gain; (2)
more motivated by consequences benefiting the reference group
from which self-worth is derived rather than by consequences for
society as a whole; and (3) more motivated by only those
deontological norms that are held as sacred by the chosen
reference group rather than by universal principles. Individuals
may go far in the business world, at least as employees, by
adopting a Stage Three profile of behavior. Their thought pattern
can be captured by the phrase, ―Be a team player.‖ 677
Social appearance, looking good, fitting in, keeping one‘s ‗nose to the ground,‘ or ‗not
making waves‘ all demonstrate loyalty and courtesy. The pitfalls of this approach should
be obvious and were demonstrated in the discussion of the recent ethical failures of big
business in the previous chapter on organizational and business ethics. Simply, it
muddles the is/ought distinction, implying that industry and organizational standards
must be ethical. On one hand, organizational values and behaviors may not reflect
society as a stakeholder. Organizational values and statements, on the other hand, may
reflect societal values, but behaviors may not match.
Legal approaches are always components of business ethics. A law-and-order
perspective, with its concentration on the letter rather than the spirit of the law, is
archetypal for Kohlberg‘s stage four persons. The legal and the ethical are the same thing
for those in stage four even though the law, like morality, is one way to appease
conflicting or contradictory interests.678 French and Granrose describe the business
behaviors of stage four individuals:
The law provides an external reference point for resolving
conflicts. That reference point is usually more unbiased than the
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individual and group perspectives that underlie the first three states
of moral reasoning. The law also draws a detailed boundary about
what constitutes the society over whose well-being the business
community must be concerned. But laws are not perfect; in many
cases they show both an obsolescence and a vagueness that bring
consternation to business decision makers. 679
It seems likely that those who stress the importance of adhering to
the letter of the law when conflicts involving business arise –
rather than considering the spirit, intentions, or purpose behind the
law – are comfortable with Stage Four reasoning (the so-called law
and order stage).680
Each approach has a downfall, as does those behaving in Kohlberg‘s stage four. St. Paul
succinctly summarizes the inadvertent drawback of stage four in Second Corinthians 3:6,
namely that – according to one interpretation of the passage as ―our qualification comes
from God, who has indeed qualified us as ministers of a new covenant, not of letter but of
spirit,‖ – the spirit of the law matters.681
The most obvious sign of a person‘s transition to Kohlberg‘s stage five reasoning
is a scope that now accounts for the spirit of the law. French and Granrose have a
potentially disproportionate focus on decision-making they term as ‗cost/benefit
analysis.‘ They base their observations off of a comment by Kohlberg that persons at
stage five go beyond laws, duties, and obligations and begin to consider overall utility. 682
Perchance it would be best to honor the spirit of Kohlberg‘s statement rather than the
letter of it. It seems more likely that Kohlberg intended to express that the scope of the
stage five person goes beyond the law to a basic understanding of the common good, not
that individuals suddenly develop comprehensive, consequential reasoning in stage five.
Laws may contribute to the common good, but they are not the totality of the common
good. Furthermore, stage five persons exhibit congruence between a cycle of thoughtbehavior-justification not seen in other stages:
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Stage Five behavior implies rights as well as correlative
responsibilities. If one goes beyond or against the traditional
moral norm in the name of individual autonomous rights, it is his
or her concurrent responsibility to reasonably justify his or her
actions in terms of enhancing societal rather than person (Stage
Two) well-being. This is the obligation under the social contract
of the justice that allows such behavior.683
A business example of stage five reasoning ‗in action‘ provided in Practical Business
Ethics is someone who is a whistleblower. In the authors‘ estimation, the case‘s
circumstances determine if the whistleblower‘s development stage is four, five, or six. 684
They do not go into detail, but whistleblowing in itself does reflect postconventional
reasoning (stages five and six). For instance, someone in stage four reasoning may work
entirely within the legal framework for whistleblowing from identification to the process
itself, which not only demonstrates rote adherence to the law (a hallmark of stage four
reasoning), it depicts risk-averseness that high stages do not. It is, for example, much
more risky to be a whistleblower when a practice meets industry (i.e. regulatory, legal)
standards, and the whistleblower argues that the practice does not meet good ethical
standards, or that the industry standard is unethical. Besides, strict adherence to the legal
process of whistleblowing does not present the personal risk of bypassing the legal to do
moral good in the interest of others and at the expense of self.
Stage six behaviors, generally and in the business setting, epitomize our ideals of
equity, justice, and fairness. Moral judgment and reasoning have little to do with the
expectations of others and more to do with internal guides, whether they are values,
goals, consequences, obligations, principles, analogous cases (i.e. comparative,
contrasting, casuist), relationships, or other ethics frameworks:685
[Stage six persons are] (1) more motivated by autonomously
arrived-at personal goals with a societal orientation than by
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imposed social rules or totally self-focused concerns, (2) more
motivated by long-term consequences than by short-term
consequences, and (3) more motivated by universal principles than
by calculations of utility. 686
They are not lofty ideals, but congruent with actions. The scope of stage six persons is
immense; their moral compass is even more expansive than stage five persons, with the
flourishing of society always in mind as well as noted appreciation for the decision‘s
impact on people. Decisions do not have the same impact on people (e.g. primary
stakeholders, secondary stakeholders), and stage six persons consider this in their
judgments and reasoning.687 The ensuing passage describes the methods of
communication with stage six persons:
The individual at Stage Six is likely to engage in what Habermas
labels Discursive Communication [emphasis in the original] to
resolve conflict. This form may be contrasted to Ordinary or selfserving Strategic Communication. Kurtines has isolated separate
types of Discursive Communicative action that flesh out
Habermas‘s concept: (1) Reflective action by which we make
explicit to the other party our understanding of the facts underlying
that person‘s position. (2) Reflective action by which we state in
explicit terms to the other party where we understand are the
principles underlying that person‘s position. (3) Integrative action
by which we attempt to establish a new shared mutual
understanding with the other person, based on facts and
principles. 688
Although not specified in the passage, those in stage six know how to master the
communication process such that these steps adapt to every situation with deference to
timing, style (e.g. assertive, ‗laid back‘), and setting.
IIC. Gilligan Level Behaviors
Behavior may look different when considering it from Gilligan‘s framework,
which emphasizes relations. Level one persons think there is not an answer that is more
correct than another because they do not know how to respond to situations outside of
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their experience.689 Gilligan‘s first level is similar to Alasdair MacIntyre‘s argument in
After Virtue that humankind has fractured into various moral camps or traditions that
need reconstruction. The loss of an ultimate human telos reduces normative ethics to an
exercise in subjectivism or emotivism. 690 In essence, people have lost a shared, common
moral structure, which is analogous because people in Gilligan‘s first level lack a mutual,
joint appreciation for issues outside of their experience. An example of a level one
woman in Gilligan‘s studies was an eighteen-year-old who was asked about her views
and normative position on abortion. She responded, ―‗there was no right decision‘‖ about
the issue because she had not been and did not want to be pregnant. 691
Persons in Gilligan‘s second level will go along with others in a group situation,
even if the majority of others disagree with those persons‘ opinion. The tyranny of the
majority rules in this stage as the preservation of relationships through socially
conformist behavior outweighs ‗sticking out of a crowd,‘ dissent, and even recognized
(but unsupported or unpopular) injustice. The authors of Student Development in College
provide an example of two young women who believe that the intramural volleyball team
has become too competitive (intramural sports are for fun and recreation only).
Additionally, one of the two young women believes that her lifelong friend, Vanessa,
should be able to join the team. Both women, however, initially have trouble speaking up
to the team about their views, knowing that other members of the intramural volleyball
team feel differently about both issues. 692 On one hand and of relevance to cooperation
discussions, does agreement about perspectives and courses-of-action truly reflect a
genuine and sympathetic agreement between the will and intent of an individual? On the
other hand, is the connection between the will and intent of an individual weak because
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the disposition of the will is not absolute equity, but the egoistic approval of a group?
The disciplines of philosophy and theology have attempted to discern the will and intent
for thousands of years; much remains unknown despite the effort. The prospect exists
that altering the size and constituency of the group – by breaking it up into smaller groups
for instance – may change the dynamic for Gilligan‘s level two individuals.
Just as Kohlberg‘s higher stages, those in Gilligan‘s third level demonstrate
reflective equilibrium, meaning that relationships fit into a congruent structure between
higher-order beliefs and practical judgments and behaviors. Level three persons
understand the duty to care, as this relates to cooperation, in the broadest way possible,
including the role of self. This may require subverting personal interests for the group, or
standing up for what is correct, despite personal risk. Either way, the greatest violation
for someone in this level is being disingenuous to one‘s beliefs, even if this immediately
strains some relationships.693 Using the above example, the Student Development in
College authors point out that both women involved with the intramural volleyball league
initially have trouble speaking out and ‗going against the grain.‘ However, one
eventually does:694
[She moves] beyond her individual desire. She chooses to speak
out in favor of accepting Vanessa onto the volleyball team at the
risk of other members‘ rejection. [She] rejects the unstated criteria
for membership on the volleyball team, which [other members]
adhere to, and makes a strong appeal to disregard them and include
Vanessa on the team. 695
The selfish egocentrism of before has been replaced with overarching moral ideologies,
methodologies, decisions, and behaviors.
III. Understanding the Application of Cooperation as a Function of Moral
Development
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IIIA. Moral Agency Discerns Wrongdoing and Applying Cooperation Distinctions
(Lexical Matrix Components) Requires Discernment
It is central to understand how cooperation is a function of moral development.
Moral agency discerns wrongdoing in different ways. As illustrated above, moral agents
discern or perceive evil, injustice, or wrongdoing differently. Furthermore, agents justify
thoughts and reasoning in disparate ways. An organization‘s moral agency is a
composite of its associates‘ development and exercise of agency. Therefore, fostering
moral development assists organizational agency and discernment.696
Applying cooperation requires discernment on the part of moral agents. 697
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reflects an agent‘s moral development. One may exhibit that person‘s framing of
cooperation by using the statements about moral stages given above. Relating this back
to organizations, interpreting the application organizational material cooperation is
reflective of its individual associates‘ development.
IIIB. Discernment Functions to Identify Evil, Injustice, and Wrongdoing as well as Apply
Categories of Cooperation
Both theoretical and real examples exist of agents reflecting their moral
development while discerning cooperation. Exploring the theory first, someone asked to
use cooperation in Kohlberg‘s stage one may question the benefit of using the
cooperation. He or she may ask, ―What‘s in it for me?‖ Someone in Kohlberg‘s first
stage may display unease around changes to defined standards, including how
cooperation fits into or deviates from those standards, as well as wish to defer to the norm
or what has been done in the past that this may deviate from. A corresponding question
is, ―Why would we do this if we didn‘t get into trouble before?‖ Angst or concern for
getting into trouble while applying cooperation may surface. It is possible that some

251

persons in Kohlberg‘s stage one need to be told what is right or wrong. Trying to discern
such matters for one‘s self becomes a daunting and intimidating matter.698
Those using cooperation in Kohlberg‘s second stage will exhibit concern for
associating with something that may or may not be bad, look for rewards such as money
and prestige in exchange for participating in assessments using cooperation, and seek
relatively equal benefit for time and money burdens, either in process or as a result using
cooperation. Persons in Kohlberg‘s second stage will not like the idea that a form of
cooperation could be formal cooperation or immediate material cooperation, which are
impermissible. The obvious method for minimizing negative consequences is to avoid
participation or the use of cooperation altogether for persons in this stage. Egoistic
pragmatism also expresses persons in the second stage. One may question, ―What‘s in it
for me if I participate in this discussion of cooperation? Do I receive remuneration or
comp time?‖699
Moral agents using cooperation in stage three will craft compromises to appease
stakeholders. Doing good is appeasement, making themselves and respected stakeholders
happy, not taking action with the recognition that pleasing everyone is not always an
option. Stage three persons want to know the opinions and expectations of persons that
the agent respects with respect to the cooperation issue. After all, one must know how to
appease someone, meaning what the boundaries and parameters are for making a person
happy, before doing so. Persons in this stage often exhibit personal unease with
nonconformists, disagreements resulting from cooperation discernments themselves, or
lacks of definitional uniformity. 700 Nonconformists represent precisely the items stage
three persons seek to avoid – dissent or disagreement is uncomfortable. The wish to
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evade uncomfortable situations extends to instances when people do not agree, but they
also do not disagree, often referred to as ‗agreeing to disagree.‘ For instance, one person
agrees that an issue is unjust while another dismisses it as a justice issue, labeling it as an
unfortunate circumstance that nobody can control. After a discussion, the two persons
involved in the definitional disparity simply agree to disagree. The tension resulting from
this leaves others uncomfortable.
Those in stage four, social system morality, can be fiercely systematic. They
could insist on a uniform process for triggering cooperation discernment and procedure
for using cooperation. The idea that cooperation discernments only have rough
frameworks and may proceed in any number of different directions is unnerving.
Because they are intensely methodical, stage four persons would appreciate, for example
Hamel and Panicola‘s structured cooperation questions in Health Progress. Skipping
questions, even irrelevant ones, and revising questions generates anxiety. They believe
that doing what is right, potentially resulting from cooperation discernment, should not
break a laws, codes, policies, and procedures (strict principlism, rule utilitarianism). For
instance, it is better to have a member of the legal counsel check into relevant laws
surrounding the donation of food and emergency supplies after a local, natural disaster
than going to the immediate aid of persons in need. With cooperation, stage four persons
will create scales, systems, and procedures for assessing the gravity of evil, levels of
injustice, or use of cooperation. They will not deal with nonconformists – meaning those
who will violate laws and rules to do the right thing (e.g. those in higher stages of
development) – well.701
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The few persons who advance to Kohlberg‘s stage five will realize that different
people discern cooperation issues dissimilarly and discernment depends upon the
evaluator‘s values. Disagreement is not failure, despite its discomfort. She or he will not
let regulations or rules, such as organization and system policies, get in the way of doing
what is right. Stage five persons notice the existence of other injustices and associations
with evil along the way, meaning while in process. To provide an example, a cooperation
issue examines the injustice of closing a halfway house in the inner city – a noble
purpose. Meanwhile, stakeholders attend the discernment, but they are cut off and
drowned out by a highly focal majority in the meeting. Stakeholders have not been able
to get a word in edgewise, much less adequately represent a difficult and contrary opinion
– a flawed process. People in stage five will perceive the complexity of some scenarios,
but not necessarily let the difficulty dissuade one from doing what is right, while insisting
that some values outweigh others, even to the point of standing out against the crowd. 702
Stage six persons will be fair and equitable to all parties during the cooperation
discernment process, which includes making sure the appropriate stakeholders are ‗at the
table.‘ In other words, fair process has a wide scope encompassing stakeholders who
others may not recognize as such. This is because he or she understands that interpreting
concepts, such as the common good, needs to be in the broadest sense possible. The use
of cooperation in this way is an opportunity to correct other injustices and associations
with evil noticed along the way, meaning those things noticed while in process. Being
fair and equitable to everyone at every stage means being fluid and adaptable to changes
during processes and the reevaluation of results. The few persons who reach Kohlberg‘s
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stage six understand that following one‘s conscience can come at extreme personal risk
and act despite the threat of harm. 703
Predictable responses in the application of cooperation also accompany Gilligan‘s
theory and levels. Those persons, as her theory applies to women and men, in her first
level will not know how to respond to a cooperation dilemma that they do not connect
with themselves for any number of reasons. Participants in the first level may experience
disconnect because Catholic teaching does not resonate, the evil or injustice does not
have import, or the affected stakeholders experience is not commensurate. They may not
understand the complexity of a particular cooperation issue, especially with situations the
agent has not encountered. Their ontological discomfort with others applies to the
discernment of issues outside their experience, meaning that they could be aloof or
disquieted by many of the alien cooperation topics. For example, in a cooperation
discernment (or many other settings), a woman born into privilege – consisting of wealth,
education, and limitless resources – in Gilligan‘s first level will not connect with the
underprivileged person whose misfortune was exacerbated by poor organizational
decision-making.
It is Gilligan‘s second level that applies to those persons who submit to a certain
group-think or peer pressure, which causes them to relegate their own interests in favor of
the majority. Behaviors such of these have implications for group settings such as the
model for applying cooperation advanced by this dissertation. Not taking views during
cooperation discernment that seem contrary to the group (because they may sever
relationships) means that the setting for the scope of harm is still, largely, the individual
and his or her ‗inner circle‘ of relationships. Using consequentialism, the scope of
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pleasure/pain, happiness/unhappiness, and benefits/burdens is not comprehensive enough
for a neutral balancing. Level two persons already have weighted the scale. Women and
men in this level will assume a position contrary to that person‘s actual view or
perspective (incongruent thought and action) to keep the peace or ‗save face‘ in a
cooperation discernment. These situations present a challenge for cooperation
discernment facilitators, as these women and men may need isolation from others in order
to educe their authentic opinion and reasoning.
Persons in the third level who participate in this model of cooperation will be
attentive to the group‘s interpersonal dynamics, potentially even challenging those who
seem disingenuous or detached. They will understand the duty to care, as this relates to
cooperation, in the broadest way possible, including the role of self. A more objective,
broad-scope utilitarianism for determining the best action replaces the narrow-scope or
weighted-to-self utilitarianism of the second level. They may resolve disputes and
differences in ways that do not exclude self or the group. These third level persons are
useful in many ways, which consist of helpfulness in shaping or revising the model itself
so it is even more inclusive and just.
Advanced stages or levels per Kohlberg and Gilligan may be challenging for
those organizing and facilitating the proposed model for non-traditional reasons. They
may not fully appreciate the process for reasons of fairness, inclusiveness, objectivity,
sensitivity, and relationship building. Suggestions for improvement may accompany
their interpretation. For instance, it may be insincere and uncaring to bring in the poor
and underserved persons who were disadvantaged by the initiative in question while not
making appropriate accommodations for them. Food, transportation, and methods of
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remuneration are reasonable to avoid inadvertent nonmaleficence, or the obligation not to
harm, 704 even while attempting to serve justice. Higher stage and level persons will
notice incongruities throughout the process, which others may not observe or address.
Organizations are replete with examples of moral agents who exhibit their levels
of moral development in group situations. For instance, the director of spirituality in an
organization begins weekly worship services. She offers an orientation session for
colleagues who would like to lead the services. At the end of the leader training session,
a young man discloses that he has trouble with the idea of inclusive language in worship
and liturgy. His reasoning is that ―it alters the Word of God.‖ The director of spirituality
points out that, historically, the Bible was not transcribed immediately after the life of
Jesus, nor was it written as an entire work. Furthermore, there are many different
versions of the Bible (i.e. King James Bible, New American Bible), which were
translated into English. He seemed to acknowledge this, but later articulates five
passages in his version of the Bible, including Deuteronomy 4:2 and Galatians 1:9-10,
which address altering the word of God or the Lord. The director responds that she will
print the words with revised inclusive language on the bulletin, so he does not participate
in the alteration of Biblical passages. He seems to accept this compromise. Still, when
she asks him to read a passage during the worship service, he takes out his different
version of the Bible and reads directly from it to the confusion of the worship
participants.
Arguably, these behaviors all may demonstrate this young man‘s level of
development. His discomfort with breaking rules, unease with nonconformity (probably
because this is different from his faith tradition), and systematic approach reveal a
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Kohlberg level two – stage three or stage four – reasoning. From Gilligan‘s theory, he
does not seem to appreciate the feelings of others, those who may prefer inclusive
language for instance, or the confusion of the participants. This may reveal that he is in
Gilligan‘s first level of relationships because he seems to disassociate with the things that
he does not have experience in or comfort with.
Another example, as told by The Catholic Health Association, involves a diocese
that associated charitable gifts and fundraisers for a philanthropic group as being immoral
because of purported, but not verified, associations with evil. The diocese prohibited any
association. It did so without any investigation as to the specifics of the situation. The
prohibition seemed to be a reaction to others‘ fears without investigation into the
particulars.705 No discernment, in fact, seemed to take place.
This event, rote reaction without discernment and reflection, appears to exemplify
Kohlberg‘s first level of preconventional morality because they promote following the
rules as it is in the interest of the diocese to do so.706 Rome (i.e. the authority conferred
by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church) will not question the reasoning and justifications
of the diocese if it avoids the appearance of impropriety through a categorical ban. This
is a textbook example of Kohlberg‘s stage two, instrumental morality.
Some considerations about exhibiting moral development while applying
cooperation relate to organizational uses of cooperation as opposed to individual uses of
cooperation. A definitive threshold does not exist for officially categorizing something
as a certain kind of cooperation. Examining an issue is not a utilitarian calculus, nor is it
simply acting in accord with duty or principles:
There are more than practical reasons, however, as to why all of
the actions of a corporation can not be reducible to individual
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actions. There are philosophical reasons as well, having to do with
the nature of a corporation as a collective entity. There is
something called collective corporate action even though the actors
are individuals who make individual contributions to the collective
action. But one individual action in itself is not sufficient to
produce a collective action. In a collective action is mixed with
others and transformed into an action or policy of the organization.
Because of this process of transformation the collective action of
the corporation is quite different from the primary inputs of any of
the individual contributors. In principle, at least, it is possible for
an immoral collective action to be the result of a mixture of moral
primary actions, this making the moral evaluation of corporate
actions different from the moral evaluation of individuals within
the corporation who played a role in the action. 707
Policies themselves demonstrate the convolution of the organizational machine. They are
not the result of one person, but demonstrate another form of collective action. All these
factors along with the size and intricacy of organizations make it difficult to assign the
apposite responsibility to the appropriate individuals within the organization. 708
Other difficulties subsist, but there cause for hope. Barriers in group situations
include fear, wish for privacy, inability to confess and change failures, and failure to
acknowledge vulnerabilities, proving once again that organizational agency is more than
the sum of individual agencies. Individuals can affect organizational change through the
cultivation of improvement. Change is the facilitation of others‘ learning, which is
dependent on our own consciousness and willingness to make our own actions open to
inquiry. Improvement means that we learn that we have roles in evils and injustices
associated with our organization, the ability to make a difference (agency), recognize our
own role in the development of others, and respond accordingly, which means that
actions correspond with preferences.
An illustration of the difficulty of the barriers mentioned above is a series of
events that unfolded with a health system of a program called Higher Ground.
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Facilitators asked participants in Higher Ground, a series designed to enhance their
spirituality and formation, to disclose something personal that no other work associates
knew about them. This made participants nervous, as the instructions were interpreted as
a mandate to expose private information. One uncomfortable associate disclosed she had
an abortion. Her discomfort later manifested as paranoia, feeling that her coworkers
judged her and treated her differently based on her disclosure.
IIIC. Conclusion
Some specifications about the developmental theories deserve attention. A
common reaction to the two theories is that they are antagonistic or contrast one another.
This is not so. Gilligan was, indeed, a reaction to Kohlberg, but even according to
Gilligan, her theory does not invalidate Kohlberg‘s. They are complimentary. Men and
women use both care and justice in their reasoning and justifications, proving that both
theories are relevant.709
Researchers continue to examine relationships and discernment with various
different methods and instruments, some described below. One particular area of interest
is the worldwide, cross-cultural character of the theories. Do they apply to everyone in
every society? For instance, Gilligan has expanded her studies beyond the original
sample of predominantly white women of privilege in order to examine the cultural
differences inherent in relationships and development. Some findings related to the DIT
have been validated in other countries besides the United States, perhaps giving a certain
amount of the credibility of Kohlberg‘s stages as universal and invariant.
Both Kohlberg and Gilligan had assessment instruments for their theories.
Generally, psychological or developmental assessment instruments gauge or measure a
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person‘s stage or level, type, or approach. 710 Assessments in developmental research
have challenges and limitations. As many go beyond linear answers (e.g. true/false,
multiple choice, etc.), scoring and understanding responses requires dedicated training
and experience. The amount or number of reliable and valid instruments is small,
especially when assessing particular aspects of development. It would be rare to have a
choice of three to five instruments to measure an aspect of development; for instance,
there are only three main measures of gay, lesbian, and bisexual identity development –
the Cass‘s Stage Allocation Measure, Cass‘s Homosexual Identity Questionnaire (HIQ),
and Brady‘s Gay Identity Questionnaire (GIQ).711 The authors of Student Development
in College specify some other difficulties with developmental assessment instruments:
Often, [assessment instruments] must be individually administered
and hand-scored. These are costly and time-intensive procedures
that limit the number of participants in studies. For many theories,
no standanrdized instruments exist to test related propositions and
hypotheses. For other theories, such as that of Chickering, existing
instruments relate to only certain components of the theory. To
compound the problem further, some existing instruments are
becoming dated. For example, the Defining Issues Test (Rest,
1986a) includes a dilemma that references the Students for a
Democratic Society, an organization active in the 1960s that many
individuals today would not recognize. Obviously, the lack of
appropriate instrumentation limits how research is conducted and
what can be studied.712
Kohlberg and Gilligan‘s assessment instruments are not immune from the inherent
difficulties just described.
Two instruments are available for determining a person‘s level or stage of moral
reasoning per Kohlberg and the corresponding theory from Rest. Incidentally, the same
theorists, Kohlberg and Rest, constructed corresponding assessment instruments, namely
Rest‘s Defining Issues Test (DIT) and Kohlberg‘s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI).
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Rest completed design of the DIT in 1986. It is a written estimation of moral
reasoning using six hypothetical dilemmas that respondents read and rank. Each situation
has twelve statements that accompany them, with each statement exhibiting an
interpretation and way of reasoning in response to the predicament. The instrument
instructs participants to appraise and hierarchically position statements in order of
importance or most to least appropriate reasoning. Every statement connects to Rest‘s
stage descriptions. Weighted ranks are the bases for determining a percentage of
reasoning at each level and a p score, which has the highest reliability and validity, in the
.70s and .80s range, among all test-scoring mechanisms. By no means are test-retest
reliabilities in the .70s and .80s exemplary. Accordingly, Rest was cautious about
overemphasizing minor changes in repeat tests of the DIT.713
The year after Rest (1987), Kohlberg issued the final version of the MJI, an
instrument that has three analogous versions and scoring systems that underwent three
revisions. The arrangement is a structured written or verbal interview with respondents
where each format (i.e. three version) has three hypothetical quandaries. Each problem
demonstrates a conflict between moral issues where some challenge participants to
decide between two seemingly bad options. The converse is true, as well, meaning that
the instrument forces participants to pick one of two equivalently good options. 714 An
example follows:
[The Heinz dilemma places] the value of preserving life and the
value of upholding the law [into] conflict…, in which a husband
must decide whether to steal a drug to save his wife‘s life when the
druggist is charging more for the drug than the husband can pay.
Other conflicts [in the MJI] include conscience versus punishment
and authority versus contract.715
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Between nine and twelve standardized questions are together with each dilemma in order
to elicit participants‘ explanations, rationalizations, and elucidations. For this reason,
theorists and researchers prefer the verbal interview, as it allows investigators (i.e. the
person or persons conducting the interview) to clarify a subject‘s responses if any
ambiguity exists. As stated above, there have been three revisions to the MJI scoring
system, with the final version labeled Standard Issue Scoring, which does not have
guidelines for stage six thinking since none of the subjects in Kohlberg‘s research
reached this level of reasoning. Not only did the scoring undergo three revisions, there
are three different procedures for arriving at a final score. For instance, one of the
versions provides a mixed or cusp stage score, where persons can be in two stages at the
same time (e.g. stages one/two, stages three/four). The subsequent passage relates to the
reliability and validity of the MJI:
Colby and Kohlberg (1987) reported very good to excellent testretest reliability (high .90s), alternate form reliability (.95), and
interrater reliability (.98) for the MJI. Walker (1988) and Colby
and Kohlberg (1987) have demonstrated construct validity, in the
form of invariant stage sequence and consistency of stage usage
across moral issues.716
Before attending to Gilligan‘s assessment instruments, some stipulations are in
order with respect to the DIT and MJI, both individually and as they relate together.
Concentrating on the latter first, a modest association exists between the DIT and MJI, at
.70s for varied (i.e. heterogeneous) samples and less for the same, identical (i.e.
homogeneous) samples. Rest felt that it is easier for participants to understand and
concur with statements than to create an unguided response. At least one research team
provides data that corroborates Rest‘s reflection. This team found that DIT scores are,
time and again, more diverse and susceptible to change when compared with MJI, which
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reflects sluggish stage movement with a typical peak of stage four before midlife. With
respect to each test individually, other measures – ones assessing moral concept
understandings, legalism and ordered society attitudes, and political open-mindedness –
have a moderate correlation with the DIT. A pertinent different between the DIT and
MJI is that the DIT, on one hand, relies on recognition, where participants read moral
dilemmas and then select a written response that aligns best with their reasoning. The
MJI, on the other hand, depends upon recognition, or the participant reacting instinctively
to questions about the verbal or written moral dilemmas. 717
A number of formal assessments, including verbal interviews with intricate
scoring and written tests, existed in order to recognize and determine various care
approaches. One of Gilligan‘s students, Nona Lyons, was the initial person to create a
systematic, empirical test specifically for Gilligan‘s theory in the early 1980s. She
developed dependable, assessable conditions to correlate self-perception and moral
reasoning. An improvement in the early 1990s was the Ethic of Care Interview (ECI),
which was conceived and expanded to refine the assessment of moral reasoning such that
it coincided with the levels and transitions in Gilligan‘s Theory of Moral Development.
The inventory‘s format was an interview where facilitators ask participants to express
their reactions to four dilemmas. One is a genuine, real dilemma and the other three are
theoretical, hypothetical dilemmas. Scoring of the responses corresponds to Gilligan‘s
three levels and two transitions, such that answers fall into one of five categories (i.e.
one, one-and-a-half, two, two-and-a-half, and three). Studies testing the validity of the
ECI generated an interrater reliability range from .78 to .96 with one untrained and two
trained female raters with, in the original study, eighty-six female, undergraduate student
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volunteers. A correlate was found between Gilligan‘s level of development, as
established through the ECI, and an theory of identity development, called Marcia‘s four
levels of identity development (diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, and achievement). 718
Modifications to testing instruments and methods allowed for the investigation of
identity, moral relationships, and moral reasoning derived from Kohlberg‘s and
Gilligan‘s theories with both men and women. For instance, Skoe and Diessner
administered the MJI, ECI, and Marcia‘s Measure of Ego Identity Status to 134 (76
female and 58 male) predominantly white high school and university (ages 17 to 30)
students within the Boston area in 1994. When researchers examined the test results,
they found that Marcia‘s identity status was a better correlate of ECI and MJI scores than
chronological age for men and women. A few researchers developed and improved the
Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO) during the early and mid-1990s.719 It was targeted
for ―traditional-aged college students, … was designed to be easy to administer and
score, [and] … is the only paper-and-pencil instrument designed to measure justice and
care.‖720 It was revised in the mid- to late 1990s, which included enhancing the scoring
through, for example, the removal of a moral problem. The following section addresses
the structure of the MMO itself:
The instrument measures preference for care or justice responses to
moral problems through a series of nine moral dilemmas. Each
dilemma includes an option to choose a care or justice orientation.
Participants choose from a four-point Likert scale (strongly agree,
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree) in
response to each option. The instrument also measures [the]
―respondent‘s perception of himself or herself as caring or just‖
(Liddell et al., 1992, p. 327) through a twelve-item self-description
questionnaire. 721
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A stipulation is that the MMO does not measure Kohlberg‘s and Gilligan‘s moral
development stages; it does, however, heighten the awareness of students aged in their
late teens and early twenties to the idea that morality involves both justice and care. The
MMO is a reliable measure of an individual‘s interpretation of a state of affairs (i.e. a
measure of moral sensitivity). 722
Arguably, measurements of development are imperative; still they are not the
preferred or desired end of moral behavior. Doing more good (doing better) nor moral
development are for the purpose of ‗teaching to the test‘ or getting better scores on an
inventory. Morality is inherently a social enterprise. Moral development is for the
betterment of others and self – benefiting society, which also betters the person. Ideally,
people demonstrate moral behavior in their actions and behaviors, not just their thoughts.
Moral reasoning and moral behavior were correlated at higher developmental stages for
Kohlberg. Others, with some exceptions discussed in the next chapter, validate
associations between moral reasoning and moral behavior. 723
In conclusion, this chapter began by establishing moral development as a
foundation for the moral agency to identify wrongdoing through, among other things,
establishing and examining the appropriate development theories. The next the task was
the alignment of moral development with discernment and organizational agency, which
required a more detailed exploration of individuals‘ behaviors, many of them in an
organizational setting, with the corresponding Kohlberg stages and Gilligan levels.
Finally, going from theory to application, the chapter concludes by ‗drilling down‘
specific behaviors within the context of applying cooperation within a group,
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organizational setting in order to understand the application of material cooperation as a
function of moral development.
Both literally and metaphorically, this represents a ‗new chapter‘ of this
dissertation. The literal meaning of new chapter is obvious. A brief review about the
progression of the dissertation provides context for the metaphoric meaning. This
dissertation began with the cultural milieu of health care, generally, and Catholic health
care, specifically. Chapter one framed the historical and contemporary problems facing
Catholic health care, which include the need for formation within relevant traditions and
moral engagement and development in order to make values and principles congruent
with behaviors. The principle of cooperation was introduced and nuanced as a
mechanism to analyze collective behaviors and relationships in chapter two. The chapter
concluded with individual applications of cooperation. Chapter three was a smooth segue
from chapter two because it discussed the nature of organizational agency, namely that
groups and institutions act as organizational agents, as well as organizational applications
of cooperation. This chapter shifted gears in the ways mentioned above to address moral
development and moral interventions. It is now feasible and appropriate to recommend a
model using cooperation for addressing and assisting the moral formation of stakeholders
after having resolved that the use of and implementation of material cooperation is a
function of moral development.
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Chapter Five –The Contribution of Material Cooperation as a Function
of Moral Development for Ministry Formation
Whereas chapter three served as a bookend to chapter two, this chapter, chapter five, is
particularly complimentary to the previous chapter, chapter four. Differently stated, this
chapter discusses interventions generally and a model for cooperation as a function of
moral development for ministry formation in specific. This chapter was based on
foundations established in the previous chapters and especially the groundwork of moral
development and the application of the cooperation as a form of moral development in
the last chapter. Knowing commonly how, what, where, why, and to whom interventions
apply must precede the establishment and description of this exact intervention.
This chapter divides into the segments mentioned above. First, the chapter
situates the model for ministry formation and ministry discernment, which includes
further specifications about ministry formation and ministry discernment, qualifying the
likely effects and character implications of this and similar interventions, and stipulating
the benefits of using cooperation for moral formation and discernment. Second, the
chapter proposes a specific model using cooperation for ministry formation and ministry
discernment, which necessitates attention to the model‘s structure, roles of those involved
with the model, and process.
I. Situating the Model for Ministry Formation and Ministry Discernment
The latter part of this chapter builds upon the former portion, similar to the
foundations from former chapters serving this chapter. For this reason, this section is
more empirical and oriented to interventions generally, as opposed to the next section that
uses the observations in the literature to construct a particular intervention. To this end,
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this section begins by defining and describing the similarities and differences between
formation, ministry formation, discernment, and ministry discernment. The next task is
to position Kohlberg and Gilligan‘s theories amidst the complexity of reasoning,
behaviors, and measurements. Subsequently, moral interventions are ‗thrown into the
mix,‘ or roux, of moral thoughts and actions. Folding in the face of such complexity and
challenges is to abdicate our duty as moral teachers and ignore the utility of cooperation
for formation and discernment. Cooperation‘s characteristics as a postmodern concept in
a modern principle‘s ‗clothing‘ are portions of what enables its utility.
IA. Introduction
Beginning with definitions for ministry formation and ministry discernment is
appropriate groundwork for a chapter about material cooperation as a model for
advancing formation and discernment if not moral development. Formation is an
indoctrination or inculcation into a particular system or way of thinking. At least one
theorist argues that formation involves the recognition and acceptance of moral agency,
the development and improvement of ethical deliberation skills, as well as shaping and
configuration of conscience. Formation is a constant process, meaning that the
conscience is both the product of past formation and will be the effect of current and
future formation.724 As it relates to morality, formation is ―laying down a path which
leads to coherence in understanding and interpreting the world, living in the story,
allowing it to become the framework of one‘s own worldview and shaping life within its
horizon.‖725 Just as every act has a moral component, all actions and exchanges form
moral conscience, character, and decision-making. 726
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Thus, ministry formation is about becoming steeped in the beliefs, traditions,
rituals, history, ethos and morality, and behaviors, called charisms, of a hospital system‘s
founding congregations. This involves a responsible negotiation between respecting
Church teaching and development of one‘s own conscience and exercising it according to
sponsors‘ charisms.727 Material from the Sisters of Mercy Health System‘s Advanced
Formation Program also describes the ministry formation process:
(Organization name) has defined formation as a continuous process
for leaders to assess and deepen their understanding of and
commitment to the healing ministry of Jesus in the spirit and
charism of (Organization name). As part of (Organization name)
formation, this developmental initiative is intentionally and
specifically focused on formation of participants, that is, it will
assist leaders in modeling the (Organization name) mission and
values and integrating our Catholic / Christian identity into
decisions, behaviors, and organizational activities.
Formation shapes and orients an individual‘s life, identity, and
heart for ministry. The format of sessions, therefore, will be
different from other leadership meetings. Leaders will meet
consistently with a small group of peers. Sessions are designed to
enable leaders to reflect on their experience, expand their
knowledge and understanding in the context of their abiding
convictions and commitments, pray together, engage their
heart/emotions, and identify ways in which the content will effects
their behavior and decisions as a Mercy leader.
Since this program is meant to be formative in nature, it will focus
on increasing knowledge, and deepening abiding convictions and
aligning one‘s behavior with (Organization name) values.
Sessions will include educational content, experiential learning,
integration of knowledge and application in daily work, discussion
and faith development.728
The intended audience for the above material is ministry leadership. One does not need
to occupy a leadership role, though, to be the recipient of ministry formation (i.e. to be
formed). It applies to anyone who is a stakeholder in the organization, its mission, or its
values. Formation is a more expansive category than mere education because it involves
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shaping character in addition to providing information. In formation, information (the
pun notwithstanding), events, and experiences combine to, ideally, change character such
that information and behavior processes reflect the content of information, events, and
experiences.
Transcendent formation is when the indoctrination or inculcation alters the
participant. This kind of formation concentrates on symbols and encourages transcendent
acts. Such acts may encourage corresponding character dispositions. Character
formation inherently involves the definition of exploration of roles between a person, and
his or her uniqueness, and community. Transformation inherently implies congruence
between dispositions and behaviors, meaning that people show integration of the
transformation in the internal and external realms. Finally, there is harmony between
character dispositions as a result of transformation. 729
Discernment positions towards decision-making that best reflects morals, values,
and relationships. It is a process that helps users interpret right or moral behavior
according to Christian understandings of persons and society. 730 At least one author
suggests that the Bible reflects the contemporary understanding of discernment in at least
two different passages. First, Solomon prays for discernment in 1 Kings 3:9 when he
states, ―Give your servant, therefore, an understanding heart to judge your people and to
distinguish right from wrong.‖731 (At least one translation uses ‗discern‘ instead of
‗distinguish.‘) 732 Next Paul mentions it throughout Romans 8 with the passage that ―‗the
renewing of our minds‘ will help us ‗discern what is the will of God.‘‖733 In an article
about discernment, musical liturgist Kathleen Harmon provides additional definitions of
discernment:
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According to Augustine, discernment is ―love distinguishing with
sagacity between what finders it and what helps it … prudence is
love making a right distinction between what helps it towards God
and what might hinder it.‖ For Joseph Pieper, discernment is ―a
studied seriousness … a filter of deliberation‖ and ―the perfect
ability to make decisions in accordance with reality … the
quintessence of ethical maturity.‖ Finally, Lewis Smedes defines
discernment more colloquially as ―having a nose for what‘s going
on under the surface.‖734
Peter Browning believes that discernments function as a channel or method:





Recognize and acknowledge what God is doing and what God
desires;
See a situation from God‘s perspective;
Uncover, rather than make, a decision; and
Listen to the Holy Spirit, who prays within and among us.735

Harmon continues her explanation of discernments by quoting John Witvliet with the six
qualities or characteristics needed for good discernment:
First is the willingness to give an alternative viewpoint, movement,
or style…a fair hearing [meaning that]…we need to be open to
examine viewpoints different from our own. … Second,
discernment involves making choices [and] becoming selfconscious [emphasis in the original] about the choices we make,
realizing to what we are saying ―yes‖ or ―no,‖ why we are saying
this, and what the implications are. … Third, discernment requires
knowledge [as it provides]…the tools necessary to pass judgment
on the options before us. … Fourth, discernment requires love [i.e.,
Christian agapaic love] that prompts us to both listen
empathetically to another and to challenge the other when fidelity
to the gospel calls for such a challenge. … Fifth, discernment
comes out best when done in community…in ongoing
conversation with one another. … Sixth, [accept and acknowledge]
the presence of the Holy Spirit [because]…discernment is only and
always a gift of the Spirit.736
Discernments require both an internal disposition, such as openness to other viewpoints
and becoming self-conscious, as well as alignment of external factors, such as the
inclusion of appropriate stakeholders and provision of the relevant information.
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Mission discernment and ministry discernment are similar concepts. They are
deliberative reflections about right and wrong courses-of-action, using the filter of the
organization‘s mission or ministry‘s identity. The difference between discernment and
mission discernment as well as discernment and ministry discernment is the end or goal
of the discernments when comparing mission discernments and ministry discernments.
Paul‘s, Aristotle‘s, and Browning‘s definitions (above) all refer to the discriminate either
the service, will, desires, or perspectives of God. God is the end or orientation of the
discernment. With mission discernments, the goal or aim of the discernment is the
organization‘s or system‘s mission, whether it is the mission‘s preservation, flourishing,
fulfillment, propagation, protection, or actuation. The purpose or aspiration of ministry
discernment is acting in accord with the principles, values, obligations, or goals of the
ministry. Although specifics may change specific situations, mission discernments focus
more on the mission and core values of the organization than ministry discernments,
which center on the identity and charisms of the organization. The ultimate object or
orientation of a mission discernment or ministry discernment may still be God, but
mediated through the ministry or its mission as intermediate ends. Ministries still serve
God through their mission, values, identity, and functioning, even with these as endsunto-themselves. An ecclesiastical positivist view would understand the function of the
health ministries to follow or be in sync with the Church Magisterium, or the teaching
authority of the Church, as promulgated by the Church hierarchy (i.e. the pope and
bishops).737 Patrick Hays, former and then-chairperson of Trinity Health, Novi, MI
described mission discernments as prerequisites to significant decisions by the board.
―The board wants to know, for instance, how a given decision ‗meets our Core Values
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and who might be adversely affected.‘‖738 Inclusion of mission discernment in decisions
such as the ones described here is not exclusive to the Trinity Health board. Others share
the responsibility for intentional decision-making in all areas of the organization or
system. The specific model using applications of the principle of cooperation may also
function is discernment, ministry discernment, or mission discernment.
These are different concepts, as formation has more to do with instruction and
conscience advancement than discernment, while discernment has to do with considerate
decision-making according to our values and beliefs. 739 Formation relates to the
amendment of character, as demonstrated through reasoning, behaviors, and actions.
Discernment pertains to the exercise of conscience by congruence between a relevant
decision and identity, values, and beliefs. At least one source states that formation and
discernment interrelate, mainly that formation supports discernment. ―Formation in the
skill of discerning the ‗voice of God‘ should become the key educative and formative
goal of all moral education in the parish, particularly for adults.‖ 740 Even though this is
about parish formation, the same holds true for formation within other settings – one
could use formation as indoctrination into an organization‘s particular discernment
process.
IB. The Reality of Using Cooperation for Formation – Advancing Formation But Not
Necessarily Development
Kohlberg‘s and Gilligan‘s theories were cognitive, meaning that they explore the
connection between the capacity to reason from conflicting values with living in accord
with those chosen values. The theories are also about reasoning, disposition, and
possibly judgment. In addition, some think awareness of self and others, or what some
call moral sensitivity, is important. There is a disconnect with evidencing that moral
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behavior is a result of reason, disposition, and judgment because of the complexity
between reasoning and behavior. The divide has empirical evidence. For instance, Krebs
and colleagues demonstrated that there is a connection between moral judgment and
moral performance (i.e. behavior) which seems to vary between dilemma types (nuanced
below), proving that stage-theory is like a tiered cake (i.e. people will exhibit a lower
stage of development depending on the dilemma) even though individuals rarely
demonstrate higher stage reasoning outside of a western academic context. 741
The mere assertion of intricacy is not enough. This argument must nuance the
issue‘s complexity. Specifying the distinctions must precede the discussions of
interventions, as this intervention must respond to difficulties and barriers in order to
have the greatest effect with participants in this model.
First and foremost with respect to reasoning itself, persons must realize that
multiple right and wrong answers to any situation may exist simultaneously – using the
same form of moral reasoning or different forms. One moral theory or framework for a
state of affairs does not necessarily outrank another. Two examples about charitable
giving may assist this point: In some occasions, decision-makers may agree to use a
utilitarian, consequentialism theory to allocate charitable donations; however, they
disagree about the level of need of certain individuals and, consequently (pardoning the
pun) how much to allocate relative to need. In other occasions, some decision-makers
agree to apply utilitarian reasoning to resource allocation, whereas others wish to donate
a little extra to whomever ‗walks through the door‘ of the charity for reasons of sentiment
and compassion because it is the holiday time. Either party in both cases is not more or
less correct that the others. In other words, reasoning using moral theories and
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frameworks is only one feature of behaving morally. 742 A certain amount of ambiguity
exists.743
Certain variables influence moral reasoning. Gender is one of them. Gilligan‘s
belief that women reason differently than men influenced her development theory, which
was initially tested with women. When Gilligan widened her investigations, by studying
reasoning and development in both genders, she concluded that most people use both
justice (e.g. Kohlberg‘s development theory) and care (e.g. Gilligan‘s development
theory) moral orientations. Roughly three-quarters of all men favor a justice approach,
and over three-quarters of all women defer to a care approach according to Gilligan, who
also theorized that over one-third of men do not use a care approach at all and one-third
of all women do not use a justice approach at all. Others investigators, wishing to know
more, developed studies to explore gender differences in moral reasoning with more
specificity. Another study categorized undergraduate students into four gender-related
categories – masculine, feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated. The researchers
used participant responses to real-life and hypothetical dilemmas; all dilemmas had
justice and care components. They found that the difference between females and males
in moral judgments was not statistically significant. Some difference existed between
gender roles. In general, participants tended to use more of a care-based orientation with
real-life dilemmas, and more of a justice-based orientation with hypothetical, nonpersonal dilemmas. Given the results, the investigators assumed that there was not a
predominant approach, signifying that participants used both approaches in dilemmas.
Sometimes researchers noticed incongruities when participants stated the significance of

281

one approach (i.e. a certain kind of justice, caring about power relationships and
struggles) and then used another (or multiple approaches as justification). 744
An observation, noticed by Gilligan and others, is that Kohlberg‘s dilemmas to
gauge moral development stage were hypothetical. It begs the question, pondered by a
few theorists, if reasoning in hypothetical dilemmas differs from the moral reasoning
employed in real dilemmas. A number of studies have replicated the results of a study
reported by Cheryl Armon – using the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) and others, such
as the Good Life Interview, studies have found that responses to real and hypothetical
dilemmas are similar. Also consistent between all the studies, any differences in
dilemma responses manifested as higher moral development exhibited in hypothetical
dilemmas when compared to real-life dilemmas:745
This supports the commonsense notion that the requirements of
hypothetical moral dilemmas, usually lacking the subject‘s actual
interests, motives, and skills are easier to generate than those of
real-life moral events, each of which contains its own unique
constellation of values, desires, and nuances of interpretation, as
well as its variable fit with the specific competencies of the moral
actor.746
The investigation also concluded that women‘s everyday moral reasoning appears to be
significantly lower than men‘s, even though abstract, hypothetical moral reasoning is
equivalent. A reason for this is that women in the study reported more real-life dilemmas
of a personal or impersonal nature than men. The study has limitations; most notably,
descriptions of reasoning for past moral dilemmas may not be predictive of behaviors at
the time of the real-life dilemmas.747 Only studies gauging moral reasoning and behavior
in the moment would be the most predictive of future correlates between thought and
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action in the future. Still, it is possible that the other variables described below are
reasons why moral reasoning does not always transcribe to corresponding moral actions.
The previous chapter established the association of age with moral reasoning,
which is worth reiterating. Previous theories hypothesized that people‘s moral reasoning
abilities tapered off with age, as represented graphically by Robert Keegan and Lisa
Laskow Lahey in Immunity to Change: How to Overcome It and Unlock the Potential in
Yourself and Your Organization (Leadership for the Common Good) by a plateau effect
in the beginning of a person‘s third decade of life after rapid growth of moral reasoning
complexity. (Mental complexity means that the individual is less ego-driven, more
accountable, and has a more comprehensive view of the realities of human nature and
relationships.) This was the standard perspective thirty years ago.748 The perception of
people‘s ability to grasp abstract moral reasoning with age has changed, which is now
more indicative of another graph by Robert Keegan and Lisa Laskow Lahey in Immunity
to Change. This time the graph shows a continuous incline of mental complexity
reasoning over time, such that people are able to grasp more difficult moral concepts
throughout their lives, without a plateau. The graph illustrates that people can
comprehend increasingly more difficult concepts into their 60s and 70s.749 Perspectives
about the ability of adults to learn morally complex concepts have changed. The obvious
implication is that moral education and interventions have the ability to be effective with
adults.
Moral agency has pre-conditions, similar to elements of informed consent.
Choice, vision, and end-in-view are constituent components of moral agency. Choice
involves a few interrelated concepts. Actions must be free or voluntary (i.e. absent undue
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influence), more than one competing or conflicting course-of-action must exist, and the
decision-maker must be in control, have capacity, and understand the situation. Even
though vision may seem vague, it refers to the ability to understand any given situation
from a variety of perspectives, taking into account our own biases and preferences.
Vision is an awareness of different worldviews and is analogous to the moral sensitivity
concept explained below. End-in-view is the ordering of choice and vision towards a
goal or objective. Goals are not self-serving but ordered to the common good or social
benefit. An assumption regarding end-in-view is that increased consciousness about the
import of involvement in social goods leads to a more profound understanding of moral
agency. The end-in-view is malleable and can change. Reasoning, moral or otherwise,
and reassessment may produce a fresh end-in-view.750
Emotions are considerations in moral reasoning and action. Philosophers have
argued for a long time that emotions are adverse to moral decision-making involving
choice and judgment. However, those with backgrounds in anthropology, sociology, and
feminist theories have not only challenged the previous dialectic, they have risen above it
to illustrate and test the following points of almost uniform agreement: ―Emotions are a
way of knowing. They are socially and culturally constructed. Emotions are ineluctably
tied to power relationships. Emotions are fundamental ingredients of the moral life.‖ 751
The authors of Emotional Intelligence 2.0 believe that people need to concentrate more
on their awareness and processing of emotions in their theory of EQ (i.e., Emotional
Quotient, which combines with other personality traits and IQ during decisionmaking).752 Aristotle differentiated between three different types of emotional virtues,
which also describe ways that our emotions ‗interact‘ with moral sensitivity, motivation,
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reasoning, and behavior. Emotion-virtues are emotions, in themselves, are morally fitting
feelings (e.g. compassion). Emotion-regulating virtues are methods of controlling or
normalizing emotions, but are dispositions and not emotions themselves (e.g. courage
counteracting fear). Emotion-combining virtues help lexically prioritize emotions into a
timely and acceptable hierarchy and, similar to emotion-regulating virtues, are
dispositions and not emotions themselves (e.g. justice). 753
Layers of nuance exist about the ways that emotions relate to moral decisionmaking. One layer is that many conflicts characterized as conflicts of principles, values,
goals, duties, or consequences are actually disagreements about apposite emotions in
situations. For example, parents should bond with their babies, even those with terrible
prognoses, and failure to do so is a signal to health care professionals, such as nurses, that
the parents are neglecting their roles (i.e. derelict or abusive parents). Conversely, health
care professionals and others often react with equal concern if the parents bond with an
infant with an incurable, fatal prognosis. Emotional attachment, to some, then impedes
or impinges more ‗neutral‘ decision-making in these cases. Another layer is emotional or
emotive dissonance, which is when one‘s actual experience disagrees with perceived
apposite emotions. For instance, professionals in NICUs and special care nurseries must
deal with the reality that mortality and morbidity in such settings are better today than
previously, and they may care for infants who grow up to have profound disabilities.
Professionals develop strategies, such as situational emotional engagement and
detachment, to cope with the emotional dissonance of caring amidst thorny circumstances
and prognoses. Yet another layer exists. Power relationships convey emotions, and some
may use emotions strategically and politically to disparage, criticize, or disavow others.
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A case-in-point is a physician who discredits nurses‘ legitimate concerns by stating that
nurses, in general, are too emotional. 754
Mustakova-Possardt, Hartshorne and May, and Morton and colleagues believed
that more processes mediate or connect moral reasoning with moral behavior. Stated
differently, moral behavior is not the sole byproduct of moral reasoning. In fact, moral
reasoning only accounts for 10-20% of the variance in moral behavior according to
Morton and colleagues. 755 Hartshorne and May observed only a slightly higher correlate
between moral reasoning (as measured through a moral knowledge test) and moral
behavior at 30%. Although Kohlberg made the same distinction (between moral
judgment and moral behavior), he believed that cognitive moral development is the
―‗only distinctively moral factor in moral behavior,‘‖ ―the single most important or
influential factor in moral behavior,‖ and ―the ‗will‘ becomes normal only when
informed by moral judgment.‖756 At first, this may appear contradictory to the findings
of Mustakova-Possardt, Morton, and colleagues. For Kohlberg, some other factors, such
as emotions and the will, play parts in moral reasoning and development: 757
He [Kohlberg] would argue that the exemplars of Stage 6 morality
– Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Jesus – are proof that ‗the
cognitively developed‘ person is also a person of great moral
passion and feeling. Will and emotion are certainly not irrelevant
factors in moral development; but rather that existing as
independent factors of morality, they are part of and flow from
general cognitive-moral development. The Stage 6 person who has
reached the heights of cognitive moral development is also a
person of great moral passion. 758
Jonathan Friday also challenges the determinants of moral behavior as well as the basic
ethical assumption that optimal moral reasoning is unbiased application of reasoning to
specific situations. Stating his second conclusion differently, knowing more about moral
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theory (e.g. educated and trained ethicists and moral theologians) does not make one a
better person.759
The other considerations in addition to emotions and moral reasoning are moral
sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral character. Moral sensitivity involves the
determination of values, duties, consequences, or goals at-stake. It is the awareness of
problems or dilemmas, including their stakeholders and impact. In their proposed model,
emotions and their regulation are skills that apply moral sensitivity. For instance, the
ability to be empathetic exemplifies moral sensitivity. Moral motivation is the filtration
or negotiation between values, duties, consequences, or goals, meaning the prioritization
of these qualities amongst themselves, others, and self-interest.760 For instance, one
researcher studied the moral ―motivational process by studying the role of empathy in
motivating an orientation to justice.‖761 Mustakova-Possardt seems to encompass moral
sensitivity and moral motivation in what she calls moral identity, which is rooted in
values and mediates social conventions, becoming the determiner of what is understood
as the right thing to do.762 Higher religious and spiritual development may aid a person‘s
ability to prioritize. Moral character is the capacity or capability to persevere in the face
of obstacles. 763 Having a well-formed or cultivated character is the substance of the
virtuous person.764 Morton and colleagues‘ statement about perseverance amidst
difficulties implies that resilience is a desirable quality. (It would be interesting for
Morton and colleagues to address how resilience differs from less desirable attributes
such as stubbornness.) Although moral reasoning has been described, it is making the
determination about how to act, given the available considerations. 765
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Experimenters tried to test the interrelatedness between moral sensitivity, moral
motivation, and moral reasoning. The hypothesis is that moral sensitivity mediates the
relationship between motivation and reasoning. Moral motivation measures, moral
reasoning measures, and some with moral sensitivity measures correlated. Moral
sensitivity positively correlated with moral motivation and one moral reasoning
measure.766 Critical consciousness is a comprehensive theory that incorporates moral
identity (including moral sensitivity and moral motivation), moral reasoning, emotions,
moral development, and faith development. It is the glue that binds all elements with its
developmental themes of moral interest, moral authority, moral responsibility, expanded
moral and social responsibility, sociopolitical consciousness, principled vision,
philosophical expansion, and historical and global vision. These occur across
consciousness levels of pre-critical consciousness (CC), transitional CC, CC, and lifespan
development, with critical consciousness as the tipping point for sufficient moral
engagement.767 Critical consciousness is another way to categorize moral development
(taking into account moral identity, moral reasoning, emotions, moral development, and
faith development), where pre-CC, transitional CC, CC, and lifespan development are the
levels; moral interest, moral authority, moral responsibility, expanded moral and social
responsibility, sociopolitical consciousness, principled vision, philosophical expansion,
and historical and global vision are the corresponding descriptors or stages. Another way
to conceptualize CC is by progressive concentric circles similar to the ‗rings‘ of a tree,
starting with the awareness of self representing Kohlberg‘s stage one as the ―bulls eye‖
center, at least one other in stage two as the next circle, ―one‘s peer group or equivalent‖
in stage three as another larger circle, ―one‘s nation‖ in stage four (continuing as larger
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concentric circles), ―the broader group as described by a bill of rights or constitution‖ in
stage five, ―and mankind as a whole‖ in stage six. 768
The influence of experience and knowledge to moral sensitivity, motivation, and
reasoning varies. A tendency exists to assume that more experience in anything,
including ethical decision-making, makes one better positioned to properly respond to
other situations. This is not the case. There is not a correlation between age and better
learning from and application of moral experiences. Older persons do not necessarily
have more enriching experiences. Adults can live and exist in a minute moral universe;
and for this reason, romanticizing experience is not educational or helpful. 769
Conceptualizing all of these factors is difficult, but not impossible. One way to
do so uses visual representation. Figure 5 is a visual depiction provided by one of the
Catholic Health Association ethicists, Tom Nairn, of the elements involved in moral
reasoning and behaviors:
Figure 5: The Process of Inputs, Judgments, Behaviors, and Outcomes 770

Figure 5 requires minimal explanation; it depicts the input-decision-behavior-result
process. The core considerations are moral reasoning, with the influences of ―person‖
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and ―action.‖ The other factors, such as ―emotions‖ and ―motivation,‖ support the
person-judgment-action-consequences progression. Moral sensitivity (i.e. awareness) is
the notable absence, which one could easily add to the ―person‖ influences.
Amidst the complication, our goal is simple. It is to create a more moral
organization by providing opportunities using the principle of cooperation, as described
below, for associates to act morally, further associates‘ formation, and possibly advance
associates‘ moral development. Ideally, fully formed and more morally developed
associates think differently about moral issues, and of even more importance, they behave
differently. Behaving better individually (i.e. more in-line with or representative of
Kohlberg‘s and Gilligan‘s highest levels) – as typified through more deliberative
decision-making and thoughtful decisions (i.e. considerate, justifiable, and in sync with
normative morality and Catholic teaching) – means the greater possibility of behaving
better organizationally. Because of organizations‘ characteristics (refer to chapter three
descriptions), the chances of effecting meaningful, societal change increases greatly with
moral organizational agents. The result is that there is considerable complexity in
reaching the simple goal.
After making an argument about misguided perceptions about moral judgment,
one author concludes that ―the study of moral theory and its application to particular
moral problems is unlikely to make one a better moral thinker.‖ 771 This comment
pertains to the nature of moral education and interventions. A way to describe moral
education and interventions is the process of taking the goals, import, and values of a
morally-developed, mature adult and interacting with an immature, under-developed
person with the goal of changing that person.772 By the end of this segment, the reader

290

will have an appreciation about why the mere knowledge of moral theory and its
application is not enough for moral education and interventions.
Using Kohlberg‘s commentary, Robert Carter reflects Kohlberg‘s stance on moral
interventions, which should have the goals of helping someone transition through moral
stages. According to Carter, Kohlberg avoids two extremes with moral education and
interventions, which fall into accord with two camps of critics and their critiques. On the
one hand, moral reasoning and interventions must be more than values clarification,
which is non-normative and relativist in nature. Any justified answer is acceptable. On
the other hand, the deliberate inculcation of normative moral values, often referred to as
character education – without critical inquiry or exploration of how values they work – is
equally as avoidable as mere values clarification. Character education interventions
usually are methods that promote the tyranny of the majority without inquiry.
Furthermore, children will especially confuse traditional educational methods, such as
discipline and by-the-book management, as morality rather than pragmatism. Teaching
morality as doctrinal, when it is not, ―violates one‘s moral freedom‖ according to
Kohlberg.773 Education, principally education involving religion, has not always
acknowledged the element of free choice in its learners. 774 Indeed, religious education
has attempted to balance the two extremes outlives above.775 In a moderate approach,
which may be preferable to Kohlberg, moral interventions include the illustration set by
the educator, the organizational or school identity including its mission and values, and
specific instruction methods.776
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Interventions must be more than the transmission of knowledge. Consider the
example about virtue inculcation or formation provided by Dennis Moberg from Santa
Clara University:
Each virtue may be thought of as an integrated psychological
system comprised of four independent components: knowledge,
motivation, emotion, and cognition (cf., Staudinger, Lopez, &
Baltes, 1997). If individuals possess the virtue of courage, they
have expert-level knowledge about when and how to be
courageous. Additionally, the individual would have the emotional
discernment about when and how to be courageous. Additionally,
the individuals would have the emotional discernment to receive,
process, and express emotions within a courageous act. A person
with a courageous character would be motivated by a desire to be
morally excellent, and they would approach decisions wisely. 777
Adding more specificity to the above components, knowledge in this context has at least
two dimensions – knowing the parameters of the profession and organization as well as
the occupational content and information needed to do the job. Motivation describes an
optimistic, genuine regard; in other words, authentic willingness to help others animates
legitimate virtue, not using others for the means of one‘s own self-enrichment. In
addition to the attributes mentioned above, being virtuous with emotions means not only
appropriately integrating emotions with reasoning and behavior, it implies the ability to
recognize (i.e. identify) others‘ emotions and suitably address (i.e. process) them.
Cognition or reasoning entails the balancing of knowing and doubting, confidence and
cautiousness, and sensitivity and resolve. 778
The ―Classroom Mentor Project‖ is perhaps the most convincing evidence that
using emotions are a bridge linking moral thinking to meaningful moral behavior. This
was a university program that brought moral concepts ‗to life‘ by paring predominantly
white, middle- and upper-class, adult graduate students with troubled, inner-city youths in
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a mentorship program along with a traditional ethics and social justice curriculum. Of
the mentors, 66 percent strongly agreed that their initial beliefs about the population
changed as a result of the experience, 79 percent thought that they directly addressed
social justice issues during the mentorship, 82 percent believed the experiences helped
them understand racial tensions, 71 percent agreed that theory was put into practice
during the experience, and 92 percent listed the experience as personally helpful in an
immediate follow-up. After a two-and-a-half years, 91 percent of the mentors answered,
yes, that things have come up in their subsequent thoughts, attitudes, or behaviors related
to the internship experience, and 95 percent reported that the internship affected their
motivation to participate more actively in the community. Researchers concluded that
the program had significant impact on the mentors. The program enabled persons to see
impacts and problems; as one must see that a problem exists before moral reasoning and
action occur. Long-term follow-up results were similar to those of the initial study,
meaning that results were long-lasting for many, and seem to influence major life and
career changes. Another major supposition of the researchers is that mentors must have a
personal and emotional connection with the participants for experience to be meaningful.
Students not only need to understand the social problem academically or conceptually,
they need to emotionally connect and care for the people affected. The impacts of this
assumption are far-reaching, especially given the individualism present in the U.S. They
surmise that moral education and interventions should take place in the workplace, home,
and the street, while it is only typically in schools. Furthermore, they need to go beyond
abstract reasoning, so that they are applied to experienced and relevant social
problems. 779
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In a study titled and about ―Changing Moral Judgment in Divinity Students,‖
researchers divided students (mostly Protestant, ranging from 22-57 years old) at a local,
conservative, Bible-based divinity school into three groups. First, one group had 32
hours of lecture on ethics concepts, topics, and applications. Some lively discussions
about specific topics and applications ensued. Second, another group had less lecture
time, only 25 hours, with more dedicated and structured discussion time. There were
seven hours dedicated to small-group discussions of moral dilemma cases. Third, the
final group did not have lecture at all, just reading assignments for each day along with
corresponding ethical dilemmas, dedicated and structured group discussions, and required
written reflections. The number of hours dedicated to cases increased to 28. The content
or topics remained exactly the same during the comparable time periods for the sake of
eliminating variability. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was administered as a pre- and
post-test to the class. The pre-tests scored the same (i.e. little variation) between all three
groups. The difference in moral reasoning between the pre- and post-test increased the
most dramatically for the third group, which was nearly twice the increase of the second
group. The first group exhibited hardly any difference between the pre- and post-test.
The primary investigator, who is also the author, concludes that small-group discussion
of moral dilemmas improves moral reasoning more than lectures and other variables such
as setting or location. 780 Locations, nonetheless, matter, but seldom are classrooms for
adults. They may include libraries, workplaces, museums, multimedia presentations, and
self-directed study for adults.781
A way of considering the above study is that constructed experiences to process
and apply knowledge are perhaps more important than the knowledge itself.
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Observations and conclusions such as these would not have surprised John Dewey, who
theorized about education in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Dewey and his colleague,
Emile Durkheim, believed that education itself served a social function. Standard
education and its delivery (i.e. techniques, processes) also transmit understandings,
worldviews, and values. Values and morality always involve relationships with others;
thus, the institutions such as schools serve as instruments for providing the experience to
exercise morality in social settings. 782 ―It is an environment where moral forces are
created and sustained within a social context.‖783 Durkheim, therefore, believed that a
teacher is a secular priest because she or he is an interpreter of moral ideas, just as priests
interpret the divine. 784 Ideally, educators need to allow for the assimilation, processing,
and application of information in a group setting:
Because society is composed of many diverse groups, children
need assistance in understanding individuals from other groups.
The genuinely democratic society as an integrated and balanced
community rests on mutually shared understanding. Although
problem solving is individualized and personalized, it is also a
social process. Group experience is a cooperative enterprise in
which all the participants share their experiences. The more
sharing occurs, the greater are the possibilities for growth.785
Moral education has optimal impact when it arises from ―‗real events,‘ not simply
‗abstract lessons.‘‖786 In fact, one contemporary scholar explicitly links experiential
learning with Gilligan‘s care approach for at least a couple reasons. First, experiential
learning exposes a person to opportunities to interact by tending to others with care,
which is demonstrated interest in the welfare of others. Second, persons may experience
the reality that justice and care at higher developmental stages involves working with
others where they are, meaning that persons conform to individuals‘ needs (e.g., needs
for interaction and education).787 With respect to Dewey, he tested his educational
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theories at the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago from 1896 to 1904.
Although Dewey‘s pilot studies were with children, his validated conclusions extrapolate
to adults, as adult moral learning and development is possible and addressed in the
literature. Even Aristotle and Plato made observations about philosophy and moral
teaching in adults because moral formation and education requires maturity.788
Per Dewey‘s concept, imbedded learning is the ―hidden curriculum:‖
Mention the phrase, and people with a sociological background
will think of Bowles and Gintis‘ (1976) study of ―Schooling in
Capitalist America,‖ in which they argued from a Marxist
perspective that the organization of public schooling in the States
was designed to prepare pupils to be wage-slaves … For our
purposes in higher education, let us … start with Snyder (1971).
Snyder's observations pre-figured all the later research on ―Deep‖
and ―Surface‖ learning; he noted that at MIT in the ‗fifties and
‗sixties, the curriculum was getting more and more crowded as
technological knowledge grew, and so undergraduates were taking
―short cuts‖ in their learning. They could not absorb everything, so
they strategically tried to guess what would be assessed, for
example, and revised only that. Snyder's additional insight,
however, was to realize that unintentionally the Institute was
teaching them to act strategically, hence the term ―hidden
curriculum.‖789
In other words, the hidden curriculum refers to the messages, modeling, education, or
other content that is part of pedagogy or process apart from the stated or formal
curriculum (which contains its own pedagogy or process with messages, modeling,
education, and other content). The hidden curriculum is also a method that transmits
culture. Kohlberg offers that it serves the role of acclimating students to social
systems. 790 Elizabeth Vallance makes a chronological curriculum argument, which
advances that articulated concepts, many of them in a formal curriculum from a previous
age, become components of the hidden curriculum later.791 In this way, Dewey stands
with other educators, educational theorists, and educational researchers who attend to
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pedagogy, culture, organizational identity, and ideologies transmitted within hidden
curricula. A scholar in Christian ethics and theology, Werner Schwartz, illuminates two
different camps of religious and moral formation, and both exemplify hidden curricula.
In a volkskirchlich model, persons experience morality and religion, told through stories,
as individual, out-of-touch, passé, and largely irrelevant to everyday life. Whereas in a
free-church model, stories live and are organic, are personally meaningful, and integrate
into social life. The free-church model exemplifies the natural law, as persons are more
inclined to notice their role in the continuous unfolding of the Christian people‘s story.
They are also more likely to view moral actions, and their rightness or wrongness, in
community, as opposed to individually. 792
The ―shadow curriculum‖ is a similar concept explained in an article bearing the
same title (i.e., ―The Shadow Curriculum‖). This describes a particular kind of hidden
curriculum which is more than competing with a formal curriculum; it is in direct
contradiction or opposition to the public, stated mission, vision, values, statements,
policies, and curriculum. Shadow curricula are questionable subsets of hidden curricula.
For instance, a 2003 study noticed that universities with public ‗environmentally friendly‘
statements had practices that illustrated disregard or absolute neglect for the environment.
Phrased differently, universities stating their positions as environmental stewards did not
all conserve natural resources. Another example is organizations taking public positions
against direct-to-consumer marketing within industries while allowing such marketing
within their own organization.793 The shadow curriculum has an apt title because it is
opposite of what appears in the light.
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One may have the tendency to think that hidden and shadow curricula are
unintentional. While shadow curricula are more likely to be unintentional than hidden,
the terms are not synonymous with being unintentional, just as a formal curriculum is
likely, but does not have, to be intentional. ‗Unintentional‘ curricula (i.e. teaching
methods) describe when people learn despite the absence of purposeful learning
outcomes. ‗Intentional‘ curricula is the inverse or opposite, describing learning from
sources that are in accord with purposeful learning outcomes. 794
In an article about professionalism and medical education as moral formation,
Warren Kinghorn of the Duke University Divinity School notes that medical
professionalism, which is descriptive and evaluative, ―cannot be considered in abstraction
from the whole of medical practice.‖ 795 Stated differently, moral formation should
integrate into other professional education in order to enhance effectiveness. 796 Kinghorn
proposes a utility model for educational (formation) endeavors of this kind that is
strikingly close to Griffin Trotter‘s futility definition and characteristics (the notable
difference is the third step, which is a negative criterion in Trotter‘s model and a positive
one in Kinghorn‘s):797
(1) the end or goal is specified in advance of the application of
―method,‖ (2) the focus is on the best method…by which to attain
the pre-specified end, and (3) …any sufficiently skilled person,
adequately trained in the correct educational method, can
successfully implement the end…the successful application of the
method…does not depend on the moral character of the agent.798
A specification is in order for Kinghorn‘s method. Kinghorn addresses mainly
professionalism, such that professional moral formation amalgamates with, not
surprisingly, other professional training and education. The context of the model
proposed here is not specific to certain professions. It is one generated through the
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workplace, binding all who embody Catholic teachings and identity. This becomes the
glue or foundation for addressing formation, not exclusively disciplines and
professionalism.
Others have entertained similar debates about the ability to educate morality
independently from religion and religious beliefs. Compelling arguments exist on both
sides. On one hand, situations attempting to establish sufficient separation between
religion and morality have failed to do so, as interviewees exhibit standard answers that
have religious connotations. On the other hand, the knowledge of the good may precede
the knowledge of God as good, meaning that the concept of God depends on the right and
the good, and religion and morality can exist independently. 799 Taking a side in this
distinction may be irrelevant because of the context of moral interventions within
Catholic health care systems or other organizations with religiously-derived values. The
context automatically fuses religious and secular morality using mission and value
statements, core values, visions, and more.
Nel Noddings expanded many of Gilligan‘s theories about development in greater
depth. She also created a particular feminist position to moral education, based upon the
tenets that ―to be cared for is a human universal (i.e. not gender-dependent and the
language of the mother is the original condition), caring is engrossment and motivational
displacement, and asymmetrical reciprocity [is] moral independence.‖ 800 Moral
motivations and duties, as characterized by Gilligan‘s higher levels, arise when there is
recognition of and reciprocity within community. All of these conditions give rise to
Nodding‘s framework for education, as all education should be moral education, such
that it includes modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation (i.e. not making others
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conform to one particular ideal). Some of Nodding‘s particular critiques about morality
and education were the perpetuation of a western, male-dominant pattern of thinking (e.g.
leading to a devaluation of things that are earth, body, and woman), the historical
categorization and connotation of ‗evil,‘ and the lack of caring to the ―traditional
concerns of women‖ as well as modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. 801
For moral education and interventions to be successful, one scholar hypothesizes
that they must address four domains. The four domains and their descriptions are as
follows:
The direct, external domain characterizes didactic instruction
conveying clear behavioral objectives for the moral-ethical
domain, helping students understand the moral expectations for life
in the classroom, school and society.
The indirect, external domain represents classroom strategies
for shaping moral climates: with specific regard for activities
aimed at applying moral principles in the classroom and school;
also the active examination of the application of these principles.
The direct, internal domain depicts self-regulatory practices
which promote a state of harmony between the mind and body –
thereby reducing errant internal responses and fostering the
capacity to find moral conduct intrinsically rewarding.
The indirect, internal domain embodies the examination of
emotions: in oneself and in others – with special reference to their
influence on our perceptions of others and ourselves, and our
conduct with others. [There is] consideration of strategies for
controlling impulse and regulating mood.802
Goals of moral education can and should address all domains, providing ―structure and
dimension‖ for each one. 803 Stephen Brookfield from the University of St. Thomas
considers that adult moral learning encompasses five, interrelated processes. First, moral
reasoning is unavoidably related to context and situations; situations can matter without
ascribing to situationalism, and context can have import without being relativism.
Second, morality is inherently communal or social in its purpose, diffusion, and
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implementation. Third, persons can become aware of incongruence and ambiguities in
their own and others‘ moral reasoning and behavior; individuals can be conscious of
reflective equilibria. Fourth, education can and should make people aware of their own
moral shortcomings, which involves the acknowledgment of ambiguity in many
situations, including recognition on the part of facilitators and educators.804 Fifth and
finally, persons can become self-aware and thoughtful about their own moral reasoning
and assertions. The precondition for all five is that teachers must acknowledge and
respect that moral learners are adults.805 Another theorist comments on educational
processes as they relate to justice, restorative or relationship justice in particular, and
leveraging moral development for the common good. The conclusion is that fractured
relationships repair when there is a problem-solving process (an intervention) between
the victims and the offenders, enabled by their models of four kinds of victim-offender
conferencing – victim-offender reconciliation that includes resolution between the two
parties and a mediator, family group conferencing that depends on the inclusion of the
victim‘s support persons for social pressure on the offender, community conferencing that
places the locus of victimization on the community itself and involves key community
members and public officials, and circle sentencing, which is a popular form of Native
American justice and includes ―victims, offenders, their support groups, justice officials,
community members and elders…totaling 15-30 people, but up to 100 people.‖806 Such a
theory is relevant because evils, injustices, and malfeasances of the health care system
contribute to victim-oppressor cycle.
The same creator of the critical consciousness theory – described above as a
comprehensive theory accounting for moral identity, moral reasoning, emotions, moral
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development, and faith development – surmises that formational or educational
interventions must maintain equilibrium between head (mind) and heart, so that behavior
is expressive of integrated harmony. Methods of doing this include ―cultivating a moral
and spiritual sense of identity, relatedness on all levels including relationships with nature
as well as individuals and groups, conversations on the meaning of life, and a sense of
authentic personal authority, responsibility, and agency.‖ 807 Others who summarize
various approaches to moral education make similar conclusions – approaches must
exhibit balance. In a meta-analysis, a team observes that both direct (i.e. classroom
instruction, discussions, reflections, thinking, and reflection) and indirect (i.e. modeling
moral behavior, using narrative and stories, and giving opportunities to apply learning in
‗real‘ settings) approaches have demonstrated utility and effectiveness; hence, arbitrary
distinctions, such as direct and indirect, are not helpful. 808
Educators, researchers, and theorists recommend a number of approaches or
frameworks for moral education or formation. In its most simple form, any educational
or instructional process has four variables: an instructor, learners, method or subject
matter (i.e. curriculum), and setting (i.e. environment).809 One such framework, listed
below in the outline format provided by the authors, encourages consideration of
instructional methods, materials, goals (ends), and content:
A. Psychological assumptions
 Regarding what the salient features of our moral psychology
are;
 Regarding the nature of those features; and
 Regarding how those features develop and/or how they are
likely to respond to various environmental variables.
B. Moral assumptions
 Regarding the nature and scope of morality (metaethical
assumptions); and
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 Regarding what is good/right/virtuous/caring (normative
assumptions
C. Educational assumptions
 Regarding nature and scope of teaching and education in
society; and
 Regarding the aims of education.
D. Contingent factors
 Personal
 Historical
 Social
 Political
 Institutional810
A later form included the following elements:
I. Thinking
 Thinking on various levels
 Critical thinking
 Moral reasoning on the higher levels
 Divergent or creative thinking
II. Feeling
 Prize, cherish
 Feel good about oneself
 Aware of one‘s feeling
III. Choosing
 From alternatives
 Considering consequences
 Freely
 Achievement planning
IV. Communicating
– The ability to send clear messages
– Empathy – listening, taking in another‘s frame of reference
– Conflict resolution
V. Acting
 Repeatedly
 Consistently
 Acting skillfully in the areas in which we act (competence) 811
The values clarification approach, originated by Durkheim, is another general framework
for moral education. In its earliest form, it consisted of education where persons were
exposed to choosing ―freely from alternatives after thoughtful‖ deliberation of each
alternative, ―prizing (i.e. cherishing, being happy with) the choice enough to be willing to
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affirm it with others, and acting (i.e. doing something with the choice),‖ which includes
repeated behaviors. 812 Kohlberg recommended that education account for a number of
different moral perspectives (i.e. pluralism), indoctrination of particular moral thoughts
and behaviors, and the stimulation of cognitive moral development through challenge and
choice. 813 The role of the instructor in this model is to instill accountability in students,
be influential but not unrelenting, set limits or parameters on discussion, elucidate the
perspectives of individuals, occasionally clarify responses, not respond to every
individual, and to stay away from preaching, judging, and disapproving. 814
A few authors comment on the idea of identity formation. The attributes needed
for this are:
(1) frequent, long term contact; (2) warm, loving relationships; (3)
exposure to the inner states of others; (4) models who can be
observed in a variety of life settings and situations; (5) consistency
and clarity in others‘ behaviors, values, etc.; (6) correspondence
between behavior and beliefs espoused; and (7) explanation of the
lifestyle conceptually, with instruction accompanying shared
experiences.815
In this model, the teacher or instructor is a community facilitator, who must guide the
education and experience in order to live out God‘s revealed reality. 816
Others‘ frameworks concentrate less on moral education and development and
more on methodologies for faith formation. Scholars have debated the role of human
behaviors, some of them categorizing faith as only an internal (i.e. interior, e.g.
emotional, spiritual) relationship with God while religion is about external relationships
(i.e. interactions, e.g. conduct, behaviors). Such claims are weak and do not have an
adequate historical support.817 Otherwise stated, some believe that faith is about the
greatest commandment, as articulated by Jesus (Matthew 22:37), ―You shall love the
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Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind,‖ which
speaks to internal dispositions. 818 In this case, religion is more like the next
commandment articulated by Jesus (Matthew 22:39), ―You shall love your neighbor as
yourself.‖819 In the next verse (Matthew 22:40), Jesus posits that both commandments
are important.820 They are, and both are the work of faith and religion. 821 Therefore,
there is not a stark contrast between faith formation, religious education, and religious
instruction.
A simple framework for faith formation is quite similar to the moral education
and development frameworks: be open, say yes, trust, give one‘s heart, listen, and
respond.822 The basis for religious instruction should always be the instruction itself,
from its use and rigorous, empirical verification; however sufficient, robust theory is also
critical for religious instruction. 823 Religious instruction always contains the following
eight components: ―(1) product content; (2) process content; (3) cognitive content; (4)
affective content; (5) verbal content; (6) nonverbal content; (7) unconscious content; (8)
lifestyle content.‖824 Harold Burgess identifies six components in religious instruction:
―aim, subject matter, teacher, learner, environment, and evaluation.‖ 825 Efforts geared for
transcendent formation have the following qualities: They help participants become
conscious of their own congruent and contradictory character temperaments. Efforts aid
the awareness and approval of the ideal dispositions, which may be consistent with other
traditions (e.g. faith). They should assist the advancement and attainment of character
and personality traits that are harmonious with the ideal dispositions. Interventions
should focus on three types of ideas – the importance of character trait congruence, reveal
and stress the magnitude of supportive and subordinate ideals to the overarching and
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transcendent ideals, and endeavor for the effective realization of both the subordinate and
overarching ideals. Interim goals and objectives may help the process, as long as they are
realistic. 826 Finally, the setting is important.
The principles of character formation should come alive in wellguided interformation groups. The participants should charitably
and wisely interform by reflecting together on the traditioninspired character dispositions they may have in common. The
principles underlying this character formation can be clarified in
interformational discussion groups.827
People being formed have a right to ―moral self-constitution,‖ which depends on a three
stage model of moral education. First, moral education must promote three dimensions
of the good life – living well, living well with others, and working with just institutions –
characterized by self-esteem, solicitude, and justice. Second, a critical testing process
judges and calls others to action, using the three-dimensional criteria of discarding action
that harms the individual (and his or her autonomy), refraining from those things that are
unfavorable to the respect of others, and desisting from impediments to justice. Third, is
phronesis, which is the ability to be dialectic between theory (i.e. premises) and concrete
problems (e.g. both top-down and bottom-up reasoning), the recognition that individual
and group processes can be as good as product, and the attestation of processing a
conviction. 828 Catechesis, which is a dialectical and long-term process, ―implies (1)
intentional, mindful, responsible, faithful activities; (2) lifelong sustained efforts; (3)
open, mutually helpful interpersonal relationships and interactions of persons within
community; (4) a concern for every aspect of life; and (5) involvement of the entire
person in all of that person‘s relationships with God, self, neighbor, and the world.‖ 829
The ways chosen to teach and form others each have their own methods of
assessing success. For instance, it is one thing to train or teach someone a habit using
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sanctions and rewards, which is measurable though behavior patterns. It is another thing
to teach a rule and the reasons for it, assessed by communications about the appropriate
or undesirable norms. Yet another method is to teach beliefs in morality with userprovided reasoning and justifications, evaluated by the provision of appropriate reasons
for the belief. Finally, a totally different way is to teach culturally accepted beliefs
(moral norms) and to act according to conscience and convictions, which demands an
explanation and proof of behaving in accord with the behavior and explanations. 830 The
presence, absence, or degrees of behaviors are assessment measures themselves.
University of St. Thomas professor Neil Hamilton lists some behaviors relevant within
health care as empirical evidence of the central link between professional development
and formation with practice and action.
Higher moral judgment scores are related to
– clinical performance ratings by supervisors of medical
residents
– internship performances in nursing (better predictor than
grade point average, standardized entrance scores, or
age)
– resisting use of insider knowledge in a trading simulation
– detecting fraud in financial statements & whistle blowing in
organizations
– maintaining independence of judgment
– decreased malpractice claims for physicians
– effectiveness of verbal responses in a case role play831
Any one of these or other behaviors may serve as assessment measures of moral
education or interventions within health care.
Some have more specific recommendations for interventions. Based on his
Choice-Vision-End-in-View theory, Robert Boostrom challenges some typical
preconceptions about environment and learning characteristics, based on observing the
moral teachings of Socrates, Aristotle, John Dewey, and Nel Noddings. Rather than
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honoring only the teacher‘s (facilitator‘s) goals, facilitators and teachers must honor the
goals and motives of students. Classrooms (meetings) that are a ‗safe space‘ rarely
challenge people to develop and grow; students (participants) must prepare to have their
beliefs and preconceptions challenged, engage in meaningful dialogue with others about
their deliberation, and to have their vision validated by others. Learning and developing
must be reflective, and everyone involved must be able to see the fruits of their labors or
‗test their vision.‘832 Commenting the use of moral education as restorative justice,
Schweigert identifies three principles for moral education and development. First and in
reference to sources of moral authority, persons need to emphasize ―the complementarity
of communal and universal norms.‖ 833 (Essentially, this is teaching communitarianism,
which could be a significant detriment for those who approach morality and justice from
libertarian, egalitarian, contractarian, utilitarian, or meritarian perspectives.) Pertaining
to the operating space for moral authority, second, moral education occurs best in the
space between different parties (e.g. offenders and victims, responsible and less
responsible, etc.). Finally, moral education and development done in this manner should
strengthen community, which is about the process of moral authority. 834
David Candee, from Harvard University‘s Center for Moral Education, uses
Rest‘s components from moral thought (i.e. reasoning) to moral action as the basis for
assistance or interventions during the process from reasoning to action. Each of Candee‘s
steps has corresponding measures. First, one must recognize something as a moral
dilemma by identifying a statement that best frames a situation as an ethical dilemma.
Second and third, a person groups, extracts, and establishes the bases for the moral claim.
This is about the framing of the problem, or identifying the persons involved in the
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situation, as well as the behaviors, moral claims, and the basis for the moral claims of
each. Fourth and fifth, a person ascertains the legitimacy of each person‘s moral claims
and the precedence of each claim. This involves exposing individuals to other modes of
reasoning and justification (e.g., deontological, utilitarian, virtue). The assessment or
measure is about acclimating the person to the end or result of a certain line-of-reasoning.
Sixth and seventh, the person communicates and settles the decision with others. Either
the moral agent or others implements a behavior or action. 835 The author does not
disclose measures or means of gauging the last three steps.
Studies by Turiel (1966), Rest (1969), and Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) all
validated another important specification about moral reasoning and interventions.
Persons understand moral reasoning below and at their own stage of reasoning. Beyond
this, persons are likely to understand statements and justifications one stage above their
own stage, but incrementally less likely to understand each stage beyond. 836 With this in
mind, Kohlberg advocated the use of ―environmental influence by passive exposure to
external examples of higher thought with environmental influence by the induction of
conflict leading to internal reorganization.‖ 837
Arguments against moral education are present. Some have to do with the
appropriateness of some locations (e.g. schools) for this kind of education. A second has
to do with the intrusion of certain moral norms (i.e. the norms of the majority or
community) on individuals. Another reflects concern about the use of moral education as
a subjugation device to carry on social structure. There is not adequate specification for
the framework of character education both within society (some arguing it is too shallow
to do so, as well), and the framework and underlying assumptions for specific content.
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Some claim it does not have a useful, grounded, and methodical pedagogy. Rarely are
the students‘ autonomous needs for independence, reasoning, and judgment recognized.
Yet another is a claim that there has not been a significant measure of the empirical
effectiveness of moral education within schools. 838 Finally, a last claim is that schools
―have been proved to be institutions of manipulation and imposition.‖ 839
The first and last objections are not relevant to this model, which takes place in
organizations and not schools. The second and third objections – the intrusion of moral
norms and moral education as a suppression mechanism – seem less relevant, especially
in Catholic health care. It is reasonable to assume that an organization would expect
individuals who work in the organization to uphold its mission and values. One would
expect the organization to perpetuate its identity. Alasdair MacIntyre does not
specifically advocate moral education and interventions within organizations. Though,
he infers that organizations are better suited to advocate a specific morality than general,
public education advocating multiple or shared, public morality. 840
Kohlberg also seems to downplay the concerns of ‗cultural indoctrination‘
because moral development requires ―something more universal in development,
something that would occur in any culture,‖ as revealed by the results of his cross cultural
studies.841 Kohlberg, and his colleague Kramer, published graphs based on his studies of
middle-class, urban boys from ten to sixteen years-of-age in the U.S., Taiwan, and
Mexico as well as boys from isolated villages in Turkey and the Yucatan, also from then
to sixteen years-of-age. All the graphs (each graph represents an average per nation)
show a decline in stage one reasoning over these six years. Stage two reasoning either
peaks at thirteen years-of-age and then decreases, or it steadily decreases over the six
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years. In general, stage three, stage four, stage five, and stage six reasoning increase over
the six years, with more pronounced progression in stage three and stage four
reasoning. 842 (Remember that people displaying stage five and stage six reasoning tend
to be rare in general, and even more uncommon for people so young.)
Cultural differences coincide with the developmental status of youths within the
universal stage hierarchy. 843 With respect to framework and pedagogy, this model,
arguably, advances both in a grounded, specific, and useful manner. According to
Kohlberg, scholarship and methods within the moral philosophy and, even more
specifically, the Catholic moral tradition are uniquely suited to advance education with
frameworks and pedagogy. 844 This sentiment was echoed by others with other addenda:
(Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.) Children and youth cannot
take over a ready-made body of truth from other people. They
must wrestle with each aspect of truth in the light of their
experience until they make it their own and until it becomes a part
of their lives.
(Randolph Crump Miller) The clue to Christian education is the
rediscovery of a relevant theology which will bridge the gap
between content and method, providing the background and
perspective of Christian truth by which the best methods and
content will be used as tools to bring the learners into the right
relationship with the living God…The task of Christian education
is to provide opportunities for the right kind of relationships and to
interpret all relationship within the framework of the revelation of
God in Christ.845
[The grace-faith relationship with God and others] is an experience
that we cannot create, but which we are empowered to offer to
others when we have known it for ourselves…This grace is
persuasive rather than irresistible. It is the product of love rather
than coercion. It is a gracious personal relationship which we are
free to reject…Education at this point [i.e. when it offers choices
such as theses] is evangelical… When the right theology, which
again must be open-ended, and not dogmatic, stands in the
background and when grace and faith are in the foreground, the
learner‘s sense of worth will be underscored and the teacher-pupil
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relationship will operate on an I-thou level within the broader
community of the church, and the transforming power of the
gospel will work to bring about a decision of faith in Jesus
Christ.846
The method is also respectful of students‘ autonomous independence, reasoning, and
judgment. As to empirical proof of effectiveness, studies discussed later in the chapter
demonstrate effectiveness of moral teachings and interventions in settings other than
schools.
Another caution is the avoidance of theological imperialism in method or process.
In other words, theological methodology is not sufficient proof for or ability to judge the
worth of teaching processes (i.e. techniques). Theology can only justify the connection
of a specific method or practice to theology. 847 ―By attempting to be all explanations to
all reality, theological imperialism becomes no explanation to all reality, and loses its
own reality in the process.‖848 The most obvious way to avoid imperialism is to remain
neutral and objective about the application of cooperation using this model. It is one
method, albeit an historically useful one, from a religious tradition for describing
relationships where a partner is doing evil. It may not be the answer to every such
situation for everyone. The function of cooperation in this model is not theological
imperialism, but using a religious concept as mediation to a new reality as a bridge
between theology and religious instruction, in which both method and content intertwines
to create a different ontic reality. 849 Instruction becomes a mode for unveiling and
experiencing reality together, which is also Catechesis, as an intentional, methodical
process of creating and maintaining valuable relationships within a community of faith
that lives, listens, learns, worships, and witnesses together.850 In this manner (the one
proposed here), any education becomes less focused on the cognitive dimension and
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more on the interpersonal and experiential dimensions, which has been a traditional
difficulty of religious education. 851
This intricacy, and the difficulty, of addressing issues only intensifies when
considering moral education, formation, and interventions. Effectively using moral
interventions becomes tedious and daunting, but not impossible. Trends are present in
the above literature about moral education, from which one may extrapolate helpful
generalities. People can learn to be moral (i.e. good character) in a manner similar to a
skill, which requires a skilled facilitator (teacher). For moral interventions to be
effective, they must engage the person so he or she has the chance to practice moral
behavior, and have his or her views challenged. Fostering an environment that confronts
persons‘ most fundamental beliefs also defies the typical notion of the classroom as safe
space. Furthermore, the end result is the organization and its associates acting morally.
To accomplish this, moral interventions need to address the convolution of moral
motivation (intent), sensitivity, reasoning, judgment, and behavior (actions) such that
none of the elements impede the goal of associates acting morally. Arguably, the success
of interventions may have something to do with how many components of moral
reasoning and action the researchers address. In effect, the assertion is interventions that
successfully address more components linking education to moral behavior including
moral motivation (intent), sensitivity, reasoning, judgment, and behavior (actions) will do
better than interventions that do not. Objections to the claims of success in moral
education and skill building do not result in the unconditional claim that educating morals
does not work, merely that the evidence is inconclusive, which could be due to survey
instrument design and methods. Due to the inconclusive evidence, it is a much safer
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claim to state that interventions, such as the ones proposed here, advance participants‘
moral formation, but not necessarily their moral development. 852
Discussing cooperation in this context is critical. The proposed use of
cooperation maintains the context of Catholic, substantive moral principle and adds the
milieu of vehicle for moral education. One may also describe the use of cooperation here
as a moral intervention. For these reasons, it is necessary to discuss opportunities and
challenges of moral education and interventions, generally, and using cooperation as
moral education and intervention in a health care organization.
Moral teachers would abdicate their duties if they surrendered to the difficulty of
the educating morality effectively. 853 Those acknowledged as moral exemplars and
teachers, even though they may not recognize themselves as such, are ideal examples.
One may regard Jesus Christ, for instance, as having either having God‘s perfect
knowledge and phroenesis (practical wisdom), or he did not, but had special gifts and
talents. In the latter case, we concede that Jesus is a respected teacher with an
exceptional method for showing others how to be moral. In the former, the Gospels tell
us about God, who knows the perfect way to educate. Either case exemplifies the unique
character of selfless, moral teaching. Others acknowledged as moral exemplars, such as
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, were called to action, not stagnation in the face of
complexity and challenge, even at their own personal expense.854
The result of moral interventions and models, both generally and in this proposed
use of cooperation, is not necessarily moral development. Stated differently, it is possible
for someone to ‗move,‘ for instance, from a Kohlberg stage four to a Kohlberg stage five.
Likewise, it is equally as possible to expose someone in Gilligan‘s first level to a new
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situation and way of relating, such that the person advances to the second level. The
reality of the model of cooperation proposed in this dissertation is that it advances
participants‘ formation and, hopefully, their moral development. No guarantees
accompany claims to progress moral development.
A demonstration of the above claim within the proposed cooperation discernment
process should provide clarity. Assume that Brianna is in the process of defining evil.
Her annoyance rises as Darius, a coworker, insists that the ―appropriate people are not at
the table‖ for the discussion. In other words, Darius makes a compelling argument the
group omitted relevant stakeholders in this particular issue. The facilitator explains how
justice is a Core Value of the organization, and the concern of Darius is a procedural
justice issue. Andrew, the facilitator, asks Darius and Brianna if they will discuss their
concerns with each other. They consent and continue their discussion. The discussion
escalates with periodic reframing from Andrew, they eventually ‗agree to disagree,‘ and
both Brianna and Darius leave with feelings of disquiet and incompletion.
We can assume that Darius, Brianna, and the other participants learn something
more about acting justly in accord with the Mission and Core Values of the organization.
Studies and theory suggest that Brianna could progress her moral development, as
measured by the MJI or DIT posttest when compared with the pretest. Brianna may not
progress at all, albeit the intent of the facilitator to pair the two with each other to create
respectful challenge to foster moral development.
IC. The Reality of Using Cooperation for Discernment
The use of cooperation in this model is not only a good chance for moral
development, but also qualifies as organizational and moral discernment. Some
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explicitly comment on using this principle or other methods for discerning organizational
issues, albeit not with the model proposed here. 855 The reference of cooperation is
always an action that is evil, or actions that are evil (and in our case unjust or
inappropriate). By the means proposed here, this structure is conducive to some clarity
about issues. Attempting to define the evil (injustice, inappropriate activity, etc.),
discussing the organization‘s connection or proposed link to it, interpreting and applying
Catholic and/or organizational identity to the issue, and suggesting options or
alternatives, described below, all are means of discerning present or future organizational
issues. In other words, the proposed model is discernment.
Various methods or modes accompany the variety of ways associates may use
discernments. For instance, many organizations already have mission discernment or
assessment processes, performance improvement (evaluation) tools for leaders, and
organizational or social ethics committees that exemplify the organization‘s
stewardship.856 Cooperation discernments can integrate well into any of these
mechanisms, such as acknowledging a leader‘s participation in discernments during that
person‘s performance review. Values based decision-making, discernment, and process
excellence tools foster retrospective review of decisions, and cooperation discernment
could serve a useful function for ‗after-action‘ analysis. 857 Organizations may or may not
have a tool called an identity matrix (the most notable is the Catholic Identity Matrix by
St. Thomas University) to assess the knowledge (awareness), infusion (permeation), and
displays (demonstration) of Catholic identity throughout Catholic health care
organizations. 858 Again, the proposed use of cooperation may illustrate the knowledge,
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infusion, and displays of Catholic identity within the organization. This cooperation
model also could be part of the matrix itself.
ID. The Benefits of Using Cooperation for Moral Formation and Discernment
The once-prevalent culture or structure for moral and value inculcation (i.e.
education, indoctrination, formation) was a modern one, which had the following
features: Rules and regulations are useful for shaping behavior. Conscience is the inner
voice telling persons that they are guilty when wrong. Examples, inspirational stories,
and role models have an absolute, untarnished quality of perfection. Persuasion and
arguments rarely allow for persistent ambiguity (i.e. agree to disagree), but concentrate
on rhetoric and debate, which depend on the weaknesses and fallacies of others‘
reasoning. Persons should not question religious teaching and dogma. 859 The
teleological direction of modern ethics is to the legislation or regulation of human
behavior. The application of reason for rational analysis needs structure and bounds.
Modern education is egocentric, individualistic, and has the additional following
qualities:860
1. Claims are universal or universalizable.
2. It has principles and is rule-governed.
3. Ideals involve reasoning and deliberation.
4. Its nature is closed.
5. It is confident in wisdom and certain in judgment.
6. Moral presumptions are subjective.
7. Generation and justifications are instrumental and prudential.
8. Morality is timeless, holding for successive generations.
9. It attempts to be as coherent as possible.
10. Morality, ideally, is non-contradictory.
11. Unity is a value unto itself, which grounds morality in a single,
unitary, and universal ethical code.861
The pitfalls of this method involve a typical lack of explanation about why (i.e. the
reasons) to act a certain way, and it does not allow persons to practice decision-making

317

and acting morally. In addition, persons do not experience conflict, opportunities to
discard or revise previously held beliefs (possibly a sign of transitioning to another to
another Kohlberg stage or Gilligan level), nor chances to operate autonomously. 862
Ultimately, it may even diminish the autonomy of individuals who exhibit good decisionmaking in other life decisions, while synonymously expecting the same individuals to
unquestionably submit to ideologies (some that are hypocritical in their expectations). 863
Using the Bagnall criteria of modernism listed above, the Catholic Church and
natural law reasoning (NLR) is an example of modern reasoning, education, and setting:
1. NLR is universal in scope and sensitivity.
2. Laypersons and clergy inform NLR through discourse, but
NLR does not operate this way; it operates as principled with
rules and an increasingly narrow mode of application.
3. Only a few reason NLR, offering less of a feeling of sensus
fidelium or experiences of the faithful informing NLR through
deliberation.
4. The Church hierarchy increasingly regulates and comments on
pastoral application as dogma, which virtually closes it to
expression and empathy.
5. While moral theology has some latitude for determining the
appropriateness of moral acts, the Church specifies, with
increasing frequency, the suitability of specific acts assuming
confidence in its ability to determine the object, intent, and
circumstances of the act.
6. Due to the perceived loss of sensus fidelium, human experience
seems less intersubjective and more subjective, with clergy
positing norms for laypersons to follow (e.g. the Vatican
overriding the committees‘ reports during Vatican II is an
example).
7. NLR is both instrumental and prudential.
8. The Church is timeless; NLR is ahistorical.
9. The Church and NLR are coherent, meaning that it is a system
unto itself.
10. In some matters, the Church claims itself to be inerrant,
validated by the process itself, which often does not
acknowledge wisdom about doubts or contradictions noticed
by others.
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11. We acknowledge one universal, Catholic Church, which only
recently has outwardly acknowledged the wisdom of other
faiths, but not to the extent of full extent of full inclusion. 864
Those who are familiar with the Catholic Church and NLR are aware, whether outwardly
or unconsciously, of its typical method of operation and education. Although empirical
data to back this claim does not exist, people perceiving its enculturation, operation,
education, and formation as outdated and modern (versus relevant and postmodern) could
be part of its problem – the Church does not seem to appreciate or acknowledge the
observations about education, formation, and development presented here. There seems
to be a divide between what the Church proclaims and how it does so with the perception
of the faithful. Per Robert Quinn in Change the World, the Church fits the description of
not recognizing its hypocritical self. 865
A postmodern structure or context, as it relates to moral formation and education,
is one that will:
1. Encourage [persons] to make choices, and to make them freely.
2. Help them discover and examine available alternatives when
faced with choices.
3. Help [persons] weigh alternatives thoughtfully, reflecting on
the consequences of each.
4. Encourage [persons] to consider what it is that they prize and
cherish.
5. Give them opportunities to make public affirmations of their
choices.
6. Encourage them to act, behave, and live in accordance with
their choices.
7. Help them to examine repeated behaviors or patterns in their
life.866
It allows those being formed to practice morality, which is more than learning morality.
―Aristotle said, ‗we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts,
brave by doing brave ones.‘‖ 867 This postmodern model concentrates on the internal
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motivations rather than only external sanctions, has the goal of to exposing the person to
difficult situations taking account of ones with competing or conflicting morals, and
centers on the acquisition of ―second order dispositions (e.g. integrity, selfcontrol)…rather than solely first order dispositions (e.g. honesty).‖ 868 The setting of
interventions becomes a location for significant investigation of competing and
conflicting perspectives, not the obligation to inculcate (i.e. submit to) praiseworthy traits
and morality. 869
The cooperation model proposed here is a postmodern concept in a modern
principle‘s ‗clothing.‘ Employing cooperation in this manner is counter-cultural to the
Church, much as the teachings of Jesus to the culture of the time. Discernment with this
cooperation model is postmodern and counter-cultural because it is a theological
principle that does not operate like a traditional principle or rule. Again, using the
Bagnall modernism criteria, cooperation in this model is:
1. Tailored to be in response to specific situations and events.
2. Grounded in and informed by intersecting discourse.
3. Dependent on situations as a discernment and, therefore, spontaneous and
enlightened by the experience and lenses of the participants.
4. Open to self-expression, empathy, and challenges to our development and
formation through interactions between participants.
5. A framework used for categorizing participation in evil, injustice, or
malfeasance, meaning that right answers may not exist; also, moral
expertise or mediation skills do not translate to having correct answers in a
cooperation discernment.
6. A discernment process involving a group of stakeholders and interested
associates using the principle of cooperation, and the decision, if any, is
not the product of an individual moral agent.
7. Purposeful in addressing the concerns of associates about specific issues
(relevant for cooperation discernment); presumably, the impetus is not a
tangible reward, but concern for others.
8. Always a link to a particular issue and, as such, has time constraints; a
discernment cannot go on indefinitely and any results work for those
stakeholders, at that time, and in that particular setting.
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9. A discernment process that will generate differences in opinion and
justification; nothing in particular may trigger a cooperation discernment
other than concerns.
10. Not a consensus-generating mechanism, as the discernment may not yield
a unified perception or solution (this is the reason for using it to assess and
challenge moral development); several solutions may result from a single
discernment
11. Already complex, but due to its non-universal nature, but becomes even
more so, and stronger, when used in a group rather than only an individual
moral agent‘s sole employ of the principle. 870
Whatever elements are not postmodern to begin with could integrate into the cooperation
discernment to make it even more postmodern. Cooperation discernment, used as group
formation, challenges the typical means of using cooperation, which involves an
individual moral agent, a moral theologian or ethicist, assessing participation and
justifying that assessment.
II. Cooperation as the Model for Ministry Discernment and Ministry Formation
An explanation of the proposed use of cooperation for ministry development and
formation takes place below. Structure, roles, and processes are ways of dividing the
nuance of the model into distinct categories. One limitation of these divisions is the
perceptual difficulty of seeing the model in its entirety (i.e. ‗the big picture,‘ ‗30,000-foot
view‘). The intent of Table A (top of the next page) of the CD4DF Model is to alleviate
this difficulty:
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Table A: Cooperation Discernment for Development and Formation (CD4DF) Model
Meeting Number & Title
Pre-Discernment
Meeting: Organization
and Planning
1st Discernment
Meeting(s): Establishing
Relevance
2nd Discernment
Meeting(s): Defining
Relevance
3rd Discernment
Meeting(s): Introducing
Info, Ethics or Justice,
and Cooperation
4th Discernment
Meeting(s): Discussing
Cooperation
Follow-Up Meeting

Members

Cooperation Pedagogy

Purpose

Facilitator, planner,
and cooperation
specialist
Advocates, facilitator,
planner and
cooperation specialist
(both optional)
Advocates, facilitator,
cooperation
specialist, and issue
specialist(s)

Minimal; initially to process
in order to frame the issue
to facilitator and advocates

Advocates, facilitator,
and cooperation
specialists

Explain cooperation’s utility,
history; detail and discuss
cooperation categories

Process request or
issue; agree on utility of
other meetings
Introductions, determine
issue’s relevance,
confirm process and
stakeholders
Participants define the
issue; facilitator creates
development
opportunities
Informational; knowledge
about applying justice and
ethics theories,
cooperation
Participants discuss their
cooperation
categorization;
development opportunities
Review possible
changes in issue’s
status; discuss

Advocates, facilitator,
planner, and
cooperation
specialists
Advocates, facilitator,
and cooperation
specialists

Provide facts about the evil,
injustice, or malfeasance;
discuss needs for more info
Defining, discussing the evil
act (malfeasance, injustice)
and the act of cooperation

Discussion of application of
cooperation to situation;
finalize group categorization
Possible; depends on
participants’ requests

The use of cooperation in the pre-discernment meeting and the follow-up meeting is
minimal. Aside from these, all steps either frame the cooperation issue or use
cooperation in significant ways. In addition, most meetings allow for the possible moral
development of participants (advocates). Examples are the first and second discernment
meetings. Both are relevant for establishing the issue and its associated facts and
stakeholders. A cooperation issue always pertains to two separate yet specific acts.
Information and discussion about these acts is necessary before discussing the taxonomic
level of cooperation. These first meetings are more than perfunctory; they are
opportunities for development of the participants. Participants may illustrate their stage
of development at any point, including their questions and explanations. For instance, a
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participant stating, ―Lying is always evil,‖ may indicate one level of development, with
another depicted by the question, ―What is in this for me if I do this?‖
IIA. Structure
In addition to moral education models, the proposed structure of cooperation as
model for ministry formation and ministry discernment employs several suggestions for
structuring productive organizational discernments and decision-making opportunities.
For instance, Ben Davis outlines five distinctive types of ethical processes. To an extent,
this model embodies all five. That is learning about morality (i.e., moral norms and
principles, e.g., the principle of cooperation in the Roman Catholic tradition), learning
moral theory (i.e. people approach problems differently, e.g., consequentialism,
deontology, teleology), discussing social ethics (i.e., how persons react to perceived
injustice and immorality), practicing ethics applied to an issue (i.e. discussing a difficult
issue), and applying ethics to specific individual and professional situations (i.e., how this
affects each person and his or her profession). 871 It incorporates Mark Repenshek‘s and
Dave Belde‘s model for respecting experience in moral discourse through case studies
and examination, elucidating diverse moral viewpoints through experience sharing, and
studying lived meanings through the lens of the Catholic tradition. 872 In addition to
embodying moral education and intervention suggestions, the CD4DF Model also uses
other theological concepts and principles. An example is that using the model could be
an application of the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that the persons involved with the
model are the most appropriate level. 873 (Perhaps the original decision-makers were not
the most suitable for the decision.) Much of this model is dynamic, so that it fits the
needs, identity, and culture of any organization. For instance, an organization will need
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to determine how to use this model for ministry discernment (e.g., retrospective review of
decisions, for divisive issues, etc.).
To start, a focus group may want to ask the following questions: What role does
this cooperation discernment serve in the system? How does it fit operationally in the
organization? To whom do discernment discussions go? If there are any, what authority
do determinations have? Stakeholders in the formation of this cooperation model should
vet the proposed structure and operations with a wide group of associates in the
organization. Formation and discernment participants should also have a voice in the
model. 874
A few points are always helpful before seeking appropriate buy-in for a new
model. First, processes and structures should be as transparent as possible. 875 Second,
stakeholders need engagement; therefore, organizers should invite feedback for
strengthening process and structure.876

Third, it is easy for stakeholders to become

disenchanted if no evidence exists of feedback being integrated. An option to integrate
feedback is by organizing a group to do this. 877 Finally, all of these specifications
depend on associate awareness. Organizers need to promote or advertise this option to
associates so that they are aware of the ways to become involved in co-creation or as
participants.
IIB. Roles for the Cooperation Issue
Before summarizing the process itself, a description of the suggested discernment
participants will enhance clarity. The facilitator is the person who mediates the
cooperation discernment. The function of mediator is similar to how Dubler and
Liebman describe clinical ethics mediation when they contrast consultation with
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mediation in their text. For instance, mediators are optimists who assist other parties to
move from their positions to focus on solutions based on interests. The principles of
party autonomy, informed decision-making, and confidentiality are at the core of
mediation.878 The facilitator should have skill in mediation and counseling, generally,
and this method specifically. The facilitator can benefit from some other basic
techniques. Equal to other mediation roles, this is a difficult role because the person must
be a role model for acceptable behavior. He or she does this through being a respectful
challenger while being nonjudgmental, which is a delicate balance between extremes. On
one hand, a facilitator does not confront issues from a position of moral superiority. On
the other hand, he or she does not challenge people directly. 879 A meta-analysis of the
most effective pedagogies for facilitating moral reasoning by Pascarella and Terenzini
reported that the best facilitators truly facilitate and mediate discussions rather than only
provide information, meaning that these persons promote self-assessment, analysis (i.e.,
discernment), and reflection. Their feedback is multi- or cross-disciplinary, cultivates
development and formation, and if necessary, attends to injustice, bias, discrimination,
and intolerance.880 Facilitators should tailor techniques with perceived moral stages. 881
For instance, imitation, suggestion, and identification may be effective tools for those at
lower stages of development, but not for those at higher stages of development. Finally,
the facilitator also needs to be familiar with both the principle of cooperation and the
particular issue catalyzing the discernment.
Advocates are those who participate in the discernment. Presumably, most will
be associates of the organization. They do not need any background in cooperation.
Nonetheless, they should be passionate and engaged about the issue (not implying
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agreement with cooperating in the situation) and the organization. It is prudent for
members of such groups have interest in their own formation and development, and
represent different areas or various departments of the organization from leadership to
clinicians, specialists, and technicians.882
Specialists describe two different categories of persons. Category A is the
persons, or those, who know the principle of cooperation well, which is fundamental to
the proposed process that involves an explanation of cooperation to the advocates. Those
in Category B are specialists who know the germane issue. For instance, consider a
situation where within the past three months, all senior executives made their bonuses
while a rather large, inner-city clinic shut its doors. The clinic was the only vestige of the
system that had three inner-city hospitals at one time. These decisions, the closure and
rewarding bonuses, were related and many associates are outraged or disappointed. It
would help make arrangements to involve some of the previously underserved, now unserved, to be specialists in the cooperation discussion. Including stakeholders most
affected by decisions, as specialists in this case, not only exemplifies the principle of
subsidiarity, it brings the most relevant voices to the table and provides a first-hand
account for advocates who may dialogue with the issue specialists. 883 Irrespective of the
specialists‘ category, role of the specialist is that of an expert witness who presents his or
her informed perspective to the group.
The final role is the planner. A planner coordinates and helps determine the
sequence, timing, and participants, as all need specificity and are central details to groups
such as this.884 In addition, the planner organizes the events‘ details, informs discernment
advocates about specifics and asks for assent, manages schedules, and distributes helpful
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information. The facilitator, cooperation specialist, and even the planner may be the
same person, or different persons could take these roles.
IIC. Process – Mostly Accomplished Through a Series of Meetings
A series of group meetings is the suggested process for cultivating discernment,
formation, and possibly development. All of the meetings center on an explicit topic and
may take place over several months. In total, there should be at least four meetings with
the specialists, advocates, and facilitator. Most of the time in meetings is in a group
setting, although there are advantages to allowing time for individual processing of the
group time. Each of these specifications has reasonable justifications for enhancing
discernment, formation, or development.885
An organizing and planning meeting is always constructive for laying the
groundwork for other meetings. 886 The meeting would involve the associate who
catalyzed the request as well as a standing cooperation discernment planner, facilitator,
and specialist. Goals of this meeting should be to process the request to try and agree on
the utility of other meetings, and to arrange the aforementioned meetings. Some of the
preparation work includes researching the relevant issue and contacting the issue
specialists to present the issue at the first meeting.
Each subsequent discernment meeting has its own focus and characteristics,
which draws support from the literature. The focus of the first discernment meeting is for
establishing the relevance of the issue. Participants will introduce themselves to each
other as well as familiarize themselves with the cooperation issue, process structure, and
the discernment purpose and goals. Partaking in the discussions assumes the
participants‘ consent. Still, similar to any informed consent process, the facilitator should
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dialogue with participants about options, risks and benefits, and alternatives. In this case,
participants need to know everything is confidential within the group, they can opt out at
any time, there is no data collection, and processes may challenge comfort levels, as they
confront underlying assumptions and preconceptions. Moral formation and development
are not easy, but participants need to know this and judge if the end result, moral
formation and development, is worthwhile. 887 A facilitator must introduce the concept of
respectful space, meaning that participants will face challenge, which may not always
feel ‗safe,‘ but this can occur in a respectful, collegial manner. 888
Achieving the purpose of the second discernment meeting would be through each
participant defining the relevance of the issue. This involves the participants describing
how each individual group member views the alleged impropriety, whether some
perceive it as evil, others recognize it as injustice, and more may not identify an issue at
all. An ‗expected‘ way of reasoning does not exist. Nevertheless, there will be
differences that are indications of a person‘s moral development. The role of the
facilitator is not to judge. He or she catalyzes discussion between the participants about
why they categorize an issue in a particular way by calling attention to the differences in
the issue‘s characterization, for instance, by asking why one advocate calls it ―evil‖ and
another ―malfeasance.‖ The facilitator listens for indications of participants‘ moral
development. Rather than commenting perceived moral development category or stage,
he or she uses mediation techniques to catalyze discussion between participants in
adjacent stages.889
Specialists and facilitator(s) initiate advocates to concepts such as cooperation,
ethics theories, and justice theories to catalyze additional discussions in the third
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discernment meeting. Transparency about cooperation, including that no ‗right‘ answer
exists, assists participants, as well as using relevant case-based examples or casuist
reasoning (always helpful education models for health care professionals, specifically,
and adults, generally).890 Not only is it valuable to acquaint advocates to cooperation‘s
history and contemporary uses, it is equally as significant to remind participants of three
things:
1. Cooperation does not ‗tell‘ a person what to do. People can disagree, depending
on their perspectives, about the categories of cooperation.
2. Therefore, we all have wisdom as a group for discerning cooperation issues.
3. Nobody holds special knowledge about cooperation that makes an answer more
‗correct‘ than another.
Additionally, using the principle of cooperation in this manner is only one way of
addressing our complicity with evil, malfeasance, or injustice.
Encouraging each participant to discuss his or her perception of the organization‘s
level of cooperation (i.e. implicit formal, immediate material, proximate mediate
material) is the focal point of at least one other discernment meeting. Discussion should
have the goals of attempting to categorize the level of cooperation and for participants to
have some awareness of their and others‘ emotions and views. 891 Total agreement or
consensus among participants is not necessary. Written summaries of the meetings may,
and should, reflect differences of opinion. The facilitator will initiate a wrap-up of the
meetings, encourage advocates to discuss lessons learned from the meetings, and suggest
a follow-up meeting. Additional or follow-up meetings are at the discretion of the
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participants and may be constructive for reviewing any changes in the status of the
discussed issue.
IID. Conclusion
As stated in the chapter‘s beginning, this chapter serves as a natural resolution to
the previous chapter – the purpose of the former chapter to introduce moral development
and this chapter to build upon those foundations by exploring other developmental
considerations and interventions. The nature and framework of the precise intervention
entails the principle of cooperation. Chapter two detailed common individual
applications of cooperation, and chapter three stipulated conventional organizational
applications of cooperation.
This chapter built upon the general foundations of moral development by
distinguishing the other factors in moral development and behavior besides moral
reasoning. Emotions, moral sensitivity, moral motivation, character, and experience are
examples of aspects explored in the literature. Tom Nairn‘s diagram served as a visual
representation of the relation of these features in moral reasoning and behavior. Moral
interventions are methods for shaping moral reasoning, influencing moral sensitivity, and
bringing awareness about possible moral motivations, character traits, and the influence
of experience. Studies of moral influences and interventions (e.g., education) support the
complexity of successfully changing behavior. Whilst complex, it is not impossible.
Arguably, persons abdicate their role or duty as teachers when they surrender to the
complexity, or when they choose not to address as many of the above dynamics as
possible, which would give moral interventions, such as the one proposed here, the best
chance of success. The chapter concluded with an explanation of the specific proposed
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employment of the principle of cooperation. The conclusion and final chapter gives more
detail about the model through its strengths and weaknesses. It also explains why this
model is useful for other-than-Catholic organizations.
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Chapter Six – Conclusion
This chapter‘s conclusion recaps and summarizes the entire dissertation, including this
chapter. Therefore, these opening, summary comments in this introduction will be brief.
Chapter five, which explained both general and specific interventions, built on the former
chapters, which described the principle of cooperation and moral development in detail.
There are three main topics for this chapter – the advantages and disadvantages of this
model of cooperation, the relevance of this model to other-than-Catholic (whether secular
or religious in identity) organizations, and finally, a review of the progression of this
dissertation.
I. Strengths and Weaknesses of the CD4DF Model
No model is perfect, including this one. A number of strengths and weaknesses
exist that are likely to arise in the implementation and use of the Cooperation
Discernment for Development and Formation (CD4DF) Model. This model is adjustable
and highly malleable to the extent that it may be possible to alleviate or resolve some of
the drawbacks, as discussed in this section.
IA. Weaknesses of This Model
Beginning with weaknesses, there are a few that merit discussion. Planners,
facilitators, and specials can mitigate the drawbacks anywhere in the development,
implementation, and debrief and feedback of the model. Some are more theoretical, and
others are practical. This segment starts with theoretical concerns.
A popular quote in organizational culture often attributed to Peter Drucker is,
―Culture eats strategy for breakfast every time.‖ 892 To explain this quote, it is imperative
to review the definition of culture, defined in the first chapter of this dissertation. Culture
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is the ―collective personality of an organization, including its assumptions, attitudes,
values, behaviors, beliefs, and collective memories.‖893 One may further characterize the
components of organizational collective personality by what Edgar Schein calls ―culture
levers,‖ which appears as a pyramid structure with ―underlying assumptions‖ (i.e., why
people do something both individually and collectively) as the base, ―behaviors‖ (i.e.,
how individuals do something) in the next tier up, ―systems‖ (i.e., how people work as a
system) in the following upper tier, and ―technical‖ (i.e., what people do using
―processes, tools, and structures‖) at the top of the pyramid. 894 It becomes progressively
more difficult to change the culture levers going from the top of the pyramid to the base
because culture elements are ―observable and manageable‖ (e.g. ―structures, processes,
leadership values, strategic histories, metrics‖) nearer to the top, but ―hidden and hard to
influence‖ (e.g. ―collective memory, unwritten rules‖) nearer to the base. 895
Explanations of culture, culture levers, and complexity in changing culture levers
are by way of explaining the first theoretical weakness – many organizational nuances
and relics exist that could make meaningful change using this model difficult, as
evidenced by organizational responses. A number of subsets and examples of this
weakness exist. For instance, consider the use of the CD4DF model in an organization
where a senior vice president is a participant. The group is exceptionally quiet; no one
seems to disagree. Participants are aware of the organization‘s history (i.e., collective
memory) of slowly ushering those who disagree with senior leaders, even respectfully,
out of the organization. This leads to the underlying assumption that you cannot
challenge organizational leadership – ‗what a leader says…goes.‘ The organizational
climate and culture of ‗yes men‘ [sic] is not hidden; however, it is hard to change. The
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above example is one where the culture may hinder the use of the CD4DF model, which
is a strategy for formation and development.
It is entirely different, for instance, to have a situation where the planner forgets to
communicate with direct supervisors of the participants. In particular, the planner does
not mention that any time used for the discernment meetings are typical work hours and
do not need special codes or management in the digital, computerized, timekeeping and
workforce management system. All of managers have given their permission, but lacking
coding information, some tell their direct reports that they cannot attend the meetings
until they have the timekeeping codes. This example is one about a technical cultural
lever, as it involves how people use processes, structures, and tools. It is a manageable
and easily correctable portion of organizational culture, and does not present the
challenge to the optimal purposes (e.g., issue discernment, formation and, hopefully,
development) of the CD4DF model that the former example does.
Similar to persons, organizations must be minimally open to change and
feedback, making the model optimal for organizations that truly value feedback and
accountability. As established before, persons may have more or less reflective
equilibrium, which is the affiliation between general norms of morality and specific
judgments of morality.896 Matching individual moral agents‘ (i.e., natural persons)
actions or behaviors with specific judgments and general norms is in the same vein.
Organizations (i.e., juridic persons) are also moral agents, as discussed in chapter three.
They decide, make goals, act to achieve goals, are accountable for harm and praised for
good, and are responsible for the evaluation and assessment of the suitability of those
goals and behaviors. 897 Organizations also possess culture or collective personality.
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Arguably, organizational reflective equilibrium is just as conceivable as individual
reflective equilibrium. With respect to culture, assumptions, attitudes, values, beliefs,
and collective memories, all part of basic underlying assumptions and values, which are
difficult to change, while behaviors are part of behavioral and technical cultural levers,
which are less difficult to modify. Ideally, cultural congruence (i.e., organizational
reflective equilibrium) should exist. In other words, saying that there is value to
accountability within the organization is not enough. Actions and behaviors, as cultural
characteristics, must match statements and claims in order for the model to have optimal
chances for success.
The absence of definitive ends or goals for participants in the model could be
problematic, if not a teleologist‘s nightmare. It is more about process (i.e., means) than
product (i.e., ends). On one hand, this theory does not ensure or guarantee moral
development. While it seems more certain, despite being perfunctory, that one could
contend that the definitive ends are formation and issue discernment. On the other hand,
one could employ a more distant end and contend that this model is part of the unfolding
of reasoning and moral order (e.g., serving the common good) through the natural law or
the work of the Holy Spirit, which is redemptive in itself. 898 An answer such as this may
be unsatisfactory for some as well:
The theological approach really does not comes to grips with
environmental variables by issuing vague and amorphous
statements about the Holy Spirit or the faith community providing
the environment for effective religious pedagogy…To be practical
and useful for…instruction, advocates of the theological approach
must not simply state that the Holy Spirit and/or the faith
community act as powerful environmental factors, but how these
environmental forces specifically affect religion teaching and
learning…[A]ssertions about the Holy Spirit as the basic
environmental factor mean nothing beyond what is known
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empirically about the specific effects which various environmental
factors have on teaching and learning. 899
Theologians from Martin Luther to Karl Barth question humans‘ capability to know the
natural law, or that everything possesses a natural end. 900 Therefore, there is no way of
knowing or proving the claim that this model is part of unfolding natural law. 901 A
compromise, perhaps, between the more immediate and distant goals is the establishment
of a process-oriented purpose. It is what Lawrence Richards calls mutual experience and
participation in the unfolding reality established though Jesus Christ, which is similar to
Kuczewski‘s concept of mutual self-discovery discussed below.902
One could claim a theoretical weakness because the model embodies Catholic
teaching, including common good and subsidiarity, and is communitarian in its
foundations, subsequently. Such a claim has merit. The CD4DF model is a textbook
example of how bioethics scholar Marck Kuczewski describes Ezekiel Emanuel‘s
approach and liberal communitarianism, ―Communal deliberation is intrinsic to
communitarianism. So it is natural that some communitarians should propose that
community members gather and deliberate to develop consensus.‖ 903 Furthermore, the
possible impact of the model on the individual is similar to what Kuczewski calls mutual
self-discovery (within the communitarian model), which is an intentional, dialectic
process where a person interprets behaviors, goals, and values through the community
where others engage their own self-discovery, and adjusts his or her own response. 904 To
concede that the model has communitarian groundwork demands concurrent justification
from someone contending that this is a weakness. Namely, the objection must
demonstrate how this model impedes or undercuts those who use different foundations
(e.g., consequentialism, libertarianism). For instance, how does this communitarian
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model act as a positive liberty, which forces the libertarianism believer to use it?
Providing such proof is difficult, as the model does not force anyone to do something that
she or he does not want. Absent justification, the ultimate result is a stalemate – the ageold attempt to prove that one philosophy and way-of-seeing the world is better than
another.
Somewhat similar to the last objection and weakness, one could also contend that
applying the model to situations is an exercise in theological or moral imperialism.
Differently stated, imperialistic claims are overtly or intrinsically oppressive attempts to
assert that one system of morality is superior to another.905 (The theoretical struggle
between relativism and universal, normative understandings, often interpreted as
imperialism, has not resolved.)906 Practically, however, to assert this is to maintain that
this theology and model are fundamentally normal for all persons, which is not the
case. 907 Illinois Institute of Technology professor Michael Davis discusses five types of
ethics across the curriculum. One type is what he titles ―morality across the curriculum,‖
which describes when a school or university indoctrinates students to a specific moral
code, often written, and stresses the significance of adhering to the code or specific moral
norms.908 According to Davis, this type of specific moral codes and norms were common
in U.S. liberal arts colleges in the 1800s and in Christian liberal arts colleges today.
Another type of common ethics education is instruction about moral and justice theories
themselves, often in a separate class in universities.909 The implicit worry is that
educating about moral and justice theories without practice and experience, or
perpetuating rigid adherence to particular moral norms is myopic, sheltered (i.e.,
confined), and narrow. The situation does not exist because facilitators and specialists do
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not purport Catholicism and the model to be ‗all things to all people‘ (i.e., ‗everything to
everyone‘). The model‘s function and utility must be realistic and not overinflated. It is
a useful tool and a description of one perspective, which is coherent with the reality and
nature of Catholic teaching and moral theology. 910 Using the model is simply ―one
possible way to understand our lives and history, [make] possible particular experiences,
and [impart] particular ways of living.‖ 911 Facilitators and specialists should describe the
model this way.
Unfortunately, religious education in general and Roman Catholic education in
particular does not enjoy a forward-thinking and respected status and history. In fact,
religious education has struggled to come unto its own throughout the 1900s. This is, in
part, because theology has driven and guarded content, structure, and form. Additionally,
perspectives and languages are binary, implying that a person is either in or out of the
religion, including its educational pedagogy. Because each religion views itself as the
way, education will naturally reflect wholehearted commitment to the faith, demanding
total devotion of students to that way. 912 This observation encapsulates some other
difficulties people may have with the model, some discussed previously – it represents
Roman Catholic imperialism, is mechanism for conversion, reflects a traditional binary
view of the faithful, and has a sheltered, non-progressive, and self-perpetuating form.
Some concerns – namely the imperialism and sheltered, non-progressive format – have
been attended to previously. (Chapter five discussed the progressive format of this model
as a post-modern teaching method in a modern principle‘s ‗clothing.‘ This model is not
sheltered nor is it archaic.) The other points of unease – binary outlook regarding the
faithful and others as well as conversion method – merit a reciprocal remark that Catholic
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health care has come to terms with the idea that many associates, perhaps the majority,
working in Catholic health care are not Catholic themselves. Little or no empirical
support exists that bolsters claims that Catholic organizations are trying to subtly or
overtly convert their associates. The same holds true for binary views about the faithful.
Again, if the distinction exists at all, Catholics working in Catholic health care regard
associates of different faiths, or agnostics, who perpetuate the Catholic Mission, Core
Values, identity, and traditions as being ‗in the family‘ or ‗a family member.‘
Claiming and boldly proclaiming the model‘s Roman Catholic foundations also
eliminates another contentious issue and possible objection. University of Illinois at
Chicago‘s professor Larry Nucci and Indiana University‘s professor Robert Kunzman
debate about if religious content and norms are inherent to morality, or if moral and
religious norms are independent, in the Journal of Moral Education. In other words, the
following question could summarize their debate: Is there a ‗public‘ morality that is free
or unaffected by religious norms? 913 While both make compelling, empirically-based
arguments, they are not relevant for our purposes, as their debate pertains to education in
secular education and public schools. Barry Chazan summarizes the caution as, ―Moral
education is not a legitimate activity of schools and that it should, in fact, have no place
therein.‖914 In all probability, Nucci, Kunzman and others such as Godwin, Rosseau,
Tolstoy, and Illich would concede that there is a suitable setting and method for religious
education and interventions, namely in religious organizations with the requisite
knowledge. This describes many of the settings that could use this model. The next main
section will make a compelling argument about why this model is useful to secular
organizations. If nothing else, organizers could predicate the use of the model in a
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secular organization as a framework with some historical success for catalyzing good
discussions and debate within the Catholic Church and organizations.
Problems may arise related to the use of a modern principle in a postmodern way.
The two approaches do not mesh – a modern approach denies or abolishes an individual‘s
decision-making and action based upon experience, and a postmodern approach is critical
of modernism‘s attempt to replace self-determinism with rule-following behavior.915 In
practice, this presents as a participant disagreeing with the structure of the principle of
cooperation or offering to revise (i.e. ‗improve‘) the lexical matrix. Nothing is wrong
with doing so. It is a legitimate, postmodern critique made even more understandable
with appropriate justification. Still, it does bring participants, facilitators, and specialists
into uncharted territory concerning responses and the utilization of a new model that
lacks testing and history.
The CD4DF model is theoretical and difficult to measure. Some standard tests,
such as the Defining Issues Test (DIT), gauge moral reasoning and may help determine
moral development. One could administer a pre- and post-test (i.e., before and after the
CD4DF model) using a standard reasoning test such as the DIT to detect changes in
participants‘ moral reasoning before and after the CD4DF model. Doing this, however,
would only capture changes in reasoning, not moral behavior. It would be more
successful to assimilate a test such as the DIT with another method to estimate changes in
the moral behavior of individuals and the organization. Professor Neil Hamilton and
Verna Monson offer empirical evidence about the role of formation and moral
interventions on practice. Higher moral judgment scores, calculated using instruments
such as the DIT, correspond with changes in health care practice such as ―clinical
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performance ratings by supervisors of medical residents, internship performances in
nursing (better predictor than [other standard measures]), maintaining independence of
judgment, and decreased malpractice claims for physicians.‖ 916 Process improvement
and performance change professionals are appropriate associates to connect with for the
establishment of optimal performance measures, which may include the quantifications
above or others, such as increased associate satisfaction, congruence between values and
behaviors, and highly engaged senior leadership in an organization‘s associate surveys.
With respect to practical concerns, moral development researchers James Rest
and Darcia Narvaez believe that even well-constructed interventions may have difficulty
affecting the moral reasoning for the lowest-scoring (i.e., less developed, e.g., Kohlberg
stages one and two, Gilligan level one) individuals. For example, reframing this using
Mustakova-Possardt‘s ―critical moral consciousness‖ model begs the question if it is
more difficult to elevate persons from a pre-critical consciousness to a transitional critical
consciousness level than from transitional critical consciousness to ‗pure‘ critical
consciousness. These persons, meaning those at a lower stage or level, cannot anticipate
the concepts discussed in group. Topics may seem vague or imperatives to these persons.
The conclusion that interventions are ineffective with lowest-scoring is not consistent
with the experience, research, and recommendations of others. 917
Participants (facilitators and specialists, for that matter) develop many coping
(i.e., self-regulatory mechanisms) skills over a lifetime, which evidence at various times.
Such occasions may include the use of the model. The use of coping skills includes
moral disengagement whilst behaving as a moral agent. Famous psychologist Albert
Bandura describes moral disengagement as reorganization of immoral, inhumane, or

347

unjust conduct into something more harmless, or even praiseworthy, through displacing
and diffusing mechanisms such as euphemistic or sanitizing language, displacement of
responsibility, diminishing or overlooking consequences, or attributing blame to someone
or something else.918 This is similar to Alesdair MacIntryre‘s notion that people can
seem virtuous without actually being so. Virtue is a façade or visage. 919 Kohlberg,
similarly, discusses genotypic and phenotypic educational objectives and behavioral
changes, where genotypic changes involve ―underlying processes and structural
organization which determine moral behavior,‖ and phenotypic changes are more
―immediate, observable changes in moral behavior.‖920 Stating MacIntyre‘s concept as
Kohlberg, one needs to get beyond the phenotype, which is the observable characteristic,
to detect the genotype.
Similarly, persons are often resolute, passionate, and compelling about their
convictions. Someone clearly in the wrong from another perspective can justify his or
her actions, knowing that it was the right, substantiated, and acceptable thing to do.
Phrased another way, some persons do not experience any cognitive dissonance nor do
they have any awareness about a fractured reflective equilibrium. This situation puzzles
philosopher Beth Dixon, who poses the question, ―Under what circumstances do we hold
a person blameworthy for the beliefs she acquires about the moral correctness or
incorrectness of the acts she performs?‖ 921 Some of her reflections indicate that
diminished cognitive or deliberative capacities are reasons to suspend blame and
accountability; whereas self-induced vices, bad decisions, or failure to self-reflect then
self-correct are reasons to hold someone accountable for poor choices. Difficult
upbringing and socialization are considerations, but they are not ones that exonerate
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persons from blame and accountability. Other important information includes knowing
―the extent of a person‘s social isolation, the degree of cultural homogeneity she
experiences, and the amount and kinds of educational opportunities available to her.‖ 922
In response to Dixon, facilitators of this model are not trying to attribute blame. They
may challenge presumptions of participants, but their role is not one of judge.
The challenge is recognizing such behavior when it happens and responding
accordingly, which requires skill on the part of the facilitator. For these reasons, it would
help facilitators to be familiar with common coping, displacement, diffusion, and other
self-disruptive behaviors. These behaviors are not insurmountable challenges, just ripe
for reframing, perhaps using the example of Edmund Burke, ―‗The only thing necessary
for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing…[and] a lot of people, doing a bit of
it, in a morally disengaged way, with indifference to the human suffering they
collectively cause.‘‖923
Attending to matters involving ethics and spirituality are not tidy; in fact, they are
quite contrary – they are messy. Theologian Jack Shea ‗connects the dots‘ when he
observes that people should pay attention to spiritual wisdom. Spirituality and its insight
are matters of the heart that reveal internal conflict, manifesting conflicted results in
matters of the head and hands.924 The CD4DF model proposed here impacts people both
internally and externally. Effects may range from disappointment and malaise with self,
groups, and the organization to frustration and even rejection of person(s) and groups.
For example, an organization may witness a certain amount of attrition when those
experiencing a high degree of conflict decide that they are not called to be a member of
their particular profession or work for the organization. At face value, this seems to be a
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weakness inbuilt to any formation, spirituality, or other inner-directed process. Further
thought and reflection capitulates different insights. Organizations and their personnel
should be congruent; a mutual best-fit enhances both the organization and its associates.
An individual noticing contrast or rifts between personal and organizational goals, values,
and obligations is saving the person and the organization time, effort, and money. What
seemed to be weakness is actually strength.
Participants may not understand each other, making productive, respectful
challenges more difficult to achieve. Using Brian O‘Toole‘s four different ethics
approaches (and there may be even more than four), a participant using a moral sentiment
(i.e., feelings, emotions) approach may not understand the participant using a duty-based
approach (i.e., obligations, e.g., framing duty according to principles). People not only
reflect their spiritual-theological insights with these approaches, they also articulate
themselves using any of the approaches. 925 This is an innate weakness to any moral
decision-making model or process. Facilitators can mitigate these difficulties by
reframing the different perspective to the participant using that participant‘s moral
approach. For instance, stating, ―I think what Eve is trying to say is that she
acknowledges your feeling about the issue, but her ‗gut reaction‘ is to follow our own,
internal protocol on this matter – imagine how others would feel if we started to break
our own procedures‖ to the moral sentiment person. The statement above reframes a
principle- or duty-based statement as a moral sentiment. Likewise, one could frame a
moral sentiment as a principle- or duty-based statement – ―While Peyton is appreciative
of the role of protocol, he also acknowledges an obligation, perhaps an even stronger
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duty, to follow his intuition and instinct, which is just as valid even though he may not be
able to justify his perspective in the same way that you explain yours.‖
By at least one account, participants do not only want to critically reflect. They
wish to also ―act out of the joy of living in moral ways.‖ 926 At face value, this may seem
to be a weakness of the CD4DF model because of the critical reflection involved with
applying the principle of cooperation. Conversely, this is one of the reasons why the
model promotes participation of community members affected by the decision among
other ‗tangible‘ efforts. Using the model is not an academic exercise; it is an opportunity
for meaningful change. It brings social justice issues to the learner. 927
This model requires substantive time commitments from participants, facilitators,
specialists, and planners. Sr. Pat Talone from the Catholic Health Association makes a
corresponding and compelling argument, regarding starting and maintaining
organizational ethics committees, about why time allocation and participation is critical.
For one, successful implementation is dependent upon time allocation and associate
availability. Most of all, ―Members [who] do not do their homework or fail to attend
meetings…[do not serve the organization well.]‖ 928 Ensuring attendance often
incorporates other factors. Associates will need to ask their supervisors about their
comfort level with participating in the model for a few days total throughout a several
month period. Any letters or communiqués sent to supervisors on behalf of organizers
should frame this as associates channeling their productivity in a different way, but also
for the benefit of the organization, for a few days total. It is not ‗lost‘ productivity. It is
alternatively directed efficiency. In fact, at least one study about volunteerism, one
supporting workplace-endorsed volunteerism during work time, suggests that work time
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spent volunteering is not ‗lost‘ productivity, as associates become more engaged and selffulfilled overall. The corollary should be evident. The CD4DF model is another method
for associates to gain a greater sense of organizational and community engagement.
Catholic health care organizations with substantive, independent ministry formation
programs may have their own data and assessment tools for illustrating the impact of
similar programs on associates. (Ministry formation is one of many interrelated variables
affecting job satisfaction, engagement, and other scores on general surveys. Some
ministry formation programs may have their own ways of trying to isolate the impact of
ministry formation, to the extent possible, with program pre- and post-assessments.)
Finding the correct person for the role of facilitator is a significant challenge.
This person, as explained in the last chapter, must be a Jack-of-all-trades or Jill-of-alltrades, requiring, at minimum, experience and skill, and at maximum, mastery of
numerous different subjects – counseling, moral development, mediation, education
pedagogies, health care organization and operations generally, specific organizational
Mission and Core Values, this model of cooperation, as well as ethical and justice
theories and frameworks. The facilitator must tailor his or her style, as well as edit the
responses of others, to the developmental needs of each participant.929 He or she must
―demonstrate genuine concern for the issues and others‘ moral development…[and] not
‗force‘ ethics down [others‘] throats, but neither should [he or she] be afraid to engage
[others‘] concerns and their own.‖930 Furthermore, there are understandable hesitations
about trying to assess a person‘s stage of moral development because of perceived ties to
sin, damnation, culpable versus non-culpable upbringing, and intrusion into private
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domains. 931 The role of facilitator is a difficult one to assume and attract talent to
because of these factors.
There are other practical considerations endemic to this and other similar models
and committees. Sufficient funds must exist.932 It is unlikely that the CD4DF model will
be costly, but transportation costs and other reimbursement for specialists, meals for
participants and others, and other associated material are matters requiring awareness and
deliberation. Needed organizational resources include administrative services (provided
primarily through the planner), the use of public relations personal and mechanisms to
inform associates about the model (generally and then related to specific initiatives), and
the enlistment of support and cooperation from key executives and department leads. 933
This subsection entertained counterarguments to the weaknesses. For this reason,
this subsection is longer than the next, which is about the strengths of the CD4DF model.
Also for the same reason, there are few references from the next segment on strengths
back to this segment on weaknesses.
IB. Strengths of This Model
The attractiveness of the CD4DF model involves its strengths, which are
impressive both in number and significance. Similar to the weaknesses, some strengths
are more theoretical, and others are practical. This segment begins with theoretical
strengths and gradually transition into more practical or applied strengths.
One of the most obvious strengths relates to the observation above. To the delight
of utilitarians, the CD4DF model has many more strengths than weaknesses. The
implication is that the theory is solid and well-supported, which could translate to strong
chances for producing tangible and helpful results.
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Especially if the cooperation issue involves organization-society relationships,
this is a good first step to furthering the organization‘s mission within itself and society.
It is a good way to witness the organization‘s role and influence in wider society. In
itself, it may not be the mechanism of social reform. All social reform, though, has
catalysts, which are often ―small group discussion, reflection…and charitable service,‖
leading to social change.934 This model qualifies as such a catalyst, meaning that it is an
embodiment of ―the Catholic vision of the human person…grounded in our relatedness to
one another and God.‖935 For Dewey and Durkheim, morality is essentially social in
nature, and its practice should involve others for the good of groups and society. 936 The
CD4DF model fits the Dewey and Durkheim vision.
The method and pedagogy of this model nicely fits into some of the larger trends
within education and development, which includes suggested educational pedagogies and
structure as well as new insights from developmental research. For instance, it is now
known that the development of moral reasoning does not plateau after young adulthood.
These studies inaugurated a new era of education – ―lifelong moral education‖ and ―adult
education.‖937 With the progression of moral education, another approached amidst two
endpoints developed – on one side, there is the values clarification approach that simply
elucidates the morality involved in any given situation or decision and, on the other side,
there is teaching reasoning, moral theory, and preferred behaviors as academic topics.
According to Kohlberg, the latter approach tends towards indoctrination, while the
former lends itself to moral relativity. In either case, students do not learn about the
validity of moral norms for themselves. Amidst this, another approach emphasized
students as moral actors, based upon the need to practice behavior and moral agency as
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well as attend to social justice issues. 938 ―Practice may not make perfect, but ‗practice
makes morals.‘‖939 The teacher must avoid the appearance of only values clarification or
indoctrination with the third approach. For instance, it would not help to promote a
number of rules for using, nor principles assisting, the model without explanation. 940 The
best teaching (facilitation) and learning environments are ones tailored to the
developmental needs of individual participants. 941 Appropriate use of this model is one
that honors moderation in the interest of moral development – the facilitators and
specialists, on the one hand, do not want inflexible, regimented, and doctrinal adherence
and, on the other hand, also do not seek to clarify without direction. They can also
explain the relevance of moral concerns within all professions, both related to the
organization and independent from the organization. 942 It also honors the developmental
needs of individual participants through the pairing of persons in adjacent stages or levels
for conversation and respectful disagreement. It also avoids the flaws inherent to only
presenting moral theory without meaningful application. 943
Further research and reflection reveals that adults wish to be part of ―a more
skilled and education workforce, and the desire…for wider-participation.‖944 Adults wish
to be part of progressive workforces that encourage active citizenship. They also
acknowledge the imperative for education to extend beyond classroom walls, including
self-directed learning, group situations, libraries, museums, and more. 945 This model
does exactly that. Chapter five recommends putting those made more vulnerable by a
particular decision at the ‗front and center‘ of the issue by involving them in the process.
Doing this embodies the Gospel ethic of putting the sick and poor at the center of the
organization.946 The danger of Machiavellian, self-righteous, single-minded individual
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who does not want to change, or wishes to deflect accountability, is evident, and it is
something that the facilitator can respectfully challenge. 947 Participants must be open to
seeing their own shadow after having their thoughts, behaviors, and contradictions
exposed to others.948 The use of the model is also malleable, so that exercises such as
‗field trips‘ to visit with affected persons and to see impacted settings are also possible
because of their value and proven helpfulness. 949
Method and pedagogy also exemplify some of the trends in religious education.
For instance, theology and educational theory in a model should operate as dialectic,
where method and pedagogy encourage students to think and act in the face of real
problems. Likewise, acting or doing illustrates the relevance of theological concepts and
may even inform these theological theories, models, and principles. 950 The correct model
will act as a mediator, ―in which two or more realities become united in a new reality,‖
and the new reality will include the following characteristics concurrently: 951
(1) Incorporates and retains the essential features of its original
components, and (2) puts the essential features of the original
components in to a new fused relationship with each other so
that they are no longer separate but become inextricable
combined in the new reality – so inextricably combined, in
fact, that in this new reality the components are no longer
separate and distinct ontic entities but exist in the new reality
only in their united state.952
One component does not dominate another in this new reality. ―A dynamic equilibrium
reigns.‖953 This mediation balances theology and instruction (i.e., substantive content
and structural content), where external criteria do not determine the place of theology, but
how internal criteria, namely how instruction and its function, fit the needs of specific
communities and times.954 Because it is social in nature, the structure of a social setting
model, such as this, should have the characteristics of prolonged contact, supportive and
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agapaic relationships, contact with others‘ inner states, models to observe in a variety of
settings, steadiness and clearness with others‘ behaviors and values, congruence between
others‘ behaviors and their beliefs and ideals, and the persistence of clarity in concept
with corresponding group experiences.955 Much of this, of course, originates from the
commandment to love one‘s neighbor and perpetuate culture or a way of life, which is in
community. 956
Alasdair MacIntyre may identify the CD4DF model as being strong and resilient
as well as vulnerable at the same time. His position is consistent and well-documented
that morality has fractured into different moral camps, ones that do not ‗speak the same
moral language,‘ which need mending by reconstructing moral traditions in themselves
before engaging each other.957 Surely the CD4DF model is a first-rate method for
reconstructing the moral tradition of a Roman Catholic organization or components of the
Catholic tradition within the U.S. (The former is a presumptive statement because the
Catholic tradition in the U.S., or even one Catholic organization, is a conglomerate of
many other cultures, as introduced in the first chapter.) It may appear, at first blush, that
this model is not the relevant instrument for other traditions. A response to this is that the
CD4DF model has the flexibility to adapt to the needs of other organizations and moral
traditions. It is not a one-size-fits-all product. It is a tool for adjusting and adapting to
the needs of distinct groups and moral camps.
Opportunities are present to expand the model to integrate other important facets.
There is, for instance, occasion to connect experiences within a group to scripture, which
is appropriate especially for Christian organizations. Moreover, the experience of
discerning in community is occasion to correlate other communities doing the same in
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scripture. Examples are Deuteronomy 6:6-8, Hebrews 10:24-25, 1 Corinthians 14:26,
Acts 2:42-47, and Acts 4:32-35.958 In the interest of meaning, though, the group should
complete the circle by reflecting on the import and association between the Biblical
passages and the contemporary issue and process. 959 Scripture, case studies, and stories
are means to obtain fuller or analogous narratives. Without delving into the dense
amounts of narrative literature, comparable case studies, experiences (without idolizing
them), and telling narratives, in written or verbal form, are ways to create value and add
moral coherence to any situation. 960 Creating a comprehensive narrative and providing
case studies for casuistic comparisons are methods to get all the facts necessary to make a
good group decision. Although the model already integrates many components, another
opportunity is to integrate Zigler‘s version of the Jakari window, the four domains of
moral education. This means that the pedagogy should include direct external (e.g.,
sharing objectives of the experiences as well as expected behaviors), indirect external
(i.e., strategies for achieving the objectives, e.g., exposing participants of various moral
stages and levels to different moral stages and levels through structured discussion of
real-life dilemmas), direct internal (i.e., reflective and self-regulatory practices, e.g.,
structured periods of silence, reflection, and journaling for participants), and indirect
internal (i.e., examining how emotions factor into discussions, e.g., taking time within a
group to acknowledge emotional affect).961
The debate between Nucci and Kunzman about the existence of a secular morality
apart from religious values was discussed above. Nucci argues that religion and religious
values are independent of a secular morality and not important for moral decisionmaking. Kunzman disagrees. While religion is not the sole catalyst for ‗secular
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morality,‘ it is an influence, has relevance, and cannot extricate or separate itself from
morality generally (i.e., religion and morality cannot be wholly independent). 962 As
mentioned above, the debate may be irrelevant to the use of this model within religiousbased organizations. The context of Nucci and Kunzman‘s debate was public schools.
One expects the foundations and derivations of morality in religious-based organizations
to be religious, even if in part. This debate becomes more relevant when considering the
application of a theological principle and model within a secular organization. A method
for justifying its relevance and use is by mentioning its helpfulness and historical use in
the Catholic setting for framing certain problems. A later section addresses the role of
mission and values within secular organizations. It is worth mentioning that the debate
between Kunzman and Nucci did not resolve; subsequently, one could assume that
organizations may already have mission and values with religious foundations and
derivations. Attempting to strip anything with a remote religious message from secular
organizations and society sends its own message, and it is not necessarily a positive
one.963
The segment about weakness of the model remarked that it is presumptuous to
label it as part of unfolding revelation and natural law, because of the difficulties inherent
to proving (or disproving) this claim; and while it is equally as presumptuous to call
embodying the model ‗a slice of the City of God,‘ applying the model in the way
described here serves as a role model not only for a Catholic witness in the world, it
exemplifies deliberate and relational decision-making as well as a form of justice. It is an
example of religious education materializing from a theological position in an
imaginative and skilled manner, and in this way, it works in a ―temporal sequence of
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creativity‖ with God.964 As stated many times before, this model proposes uses and
applications of the principle of cooperation in a new and innovative way, as it is
communal, formative, and, hopefully, transformative. It also embodies the restorative
justice characteristics of Schweigert‘s four kinds of community-based victim-offender
conferencing. Namely, the model is a framework for a mediated discussion and conflict
resolution per victim-offender reconciliation programs, community participation in
societal-community injustices and malfeasance per community conferencing programs,
and brainstorming and enacting restorative justice plans that address underlying causes
per circle sentencing, which is common in Native American communities. 965
The end of the first section of chapter five explored the relationship of this model
using a modern principle in a postmodern way. Rather than going through modern and
postmodern qualities, it merits noting that postmodern methods are new to some cultures
and subcultures, especially considering that professional societies and organizations tend
to address complaints and concern through regulations and rule-adherence, which is
modernist in structure.966 It is the fusion of modern and postmodern in this model that,
optimally, creates the following situation:
When the right theology, which again, must be open-ended, and
not dogmatic, stands in the background and when grace and faith
are in the foreground, the learner‘s sense of worth will be
underscored and the teacher-pupil relationship will operate on an Ithou level within the broader community of the church, and the
transforming power of the gospel will work to bring about a
decision of faith in Jesus Christ. 967
The model utilizes the technique of not telling persons what to do; it lets participants
discuss and find out for themselves, which has not been the traditional approach. 968 It
exemplifies what Davis calls attention to social ethics situations as well as ―ethics from
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across the curriculum,‖ symbolizing when a group attends to an issue that it considers
important.969
Integrating the conclusions from empirical studies strengthens the CD4DF model,
including its utility, relevance, and persuasiveness (i.e., academic support). Some data
suggest that incrementally less traditional lecturing and more small-group case
discussions improves persons‘ moral judgment.970 Other studies demonstrate the value of
interpersonal interactions, especially with those affected by injustice and intolerance, in
order for people to form meaningful connections and develop. 971 Another study
recognizes the need to address other vectors besides moral reasoning – including identity,
authority, responsibility, agency, relationships, and the meaning of life as they relate to
categories such as moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and emotions (i.e. feelings, e.g.
caring) – in moral development, which another has adapted into educational theory and
pedagogy. 972
Without even knowing it, participants in the model are cast into the roles of
students as moral agents. That is, they entertain significant moral agency about the
distinct cooperation issue. Participants are unawares because education typically has not
permitted students to exercise their moral agency. Applying this model allows such
decision-making. The CD4DF model achieves Boostrom‘s conditions for moral agency,
which were based on Plato‘s Meno, of honoring choice, vision, and end-in-view; and,
moreover, it also promotes the characteristics of a modern classroom or learning
environment, also discussed by Boostrom, which he derived from his conditions for
moral agency. Namely, the classroom honors the students‘ own motives, redefines the
notion of ‗safe space,‘ promotes dialogue between students and teachers about genuine
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issues, acknowledgment and encouragement of students‘ visions on the part of teachers,
and allows students and teachers to test their vision. 973
The model utilizes a number of respected principles and approaches. This will
not go into detail about them because explanations are in previous chapters. Some of the
Catholic principles and approaches are the principle of cooperation, of course, the
principle of subsidiarity (i.e., ideally, it is inclusive of the people who should be part of
the decision-making), mission and ministry discernment, ministry formation, and
Catholic social teaching. Other methods and approaches include mediation techniques,
adult learning techniques and methods, change leadership methods, and if needed,
casuistry, principlism, and justice theories.
II. Relevance of the CD4DF Model Outside of Catholic Organizations
IIA. Relevance of Accountability in Other-than-Catholic Settings
The introduction in the first chapter of the dissertation compared the variety of
challenges and struggles in Catholic health care to the heat surrounding a pressure
cooker. The pressure cooker itself is the organization; the fare inside the cooker is the
organization‘s associates. This suggested mechanism does not only work on one pressure
cooker, corresponding to not only working with Catholic organizations. It can work for
others.
Although cooperation is a Catholic moral principle, its use applies to other-thanCatholic organizations. In fact, it is particularly relevant in contemporary situations with
complex relationships and accountabilities. Individuals act within groups in a variety of
situations, and ―because participating individuals orient themselves in acting with respect
to collective outcomes, they may be warrantably accountable for acts done by other group
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members in pursuit of the collective object. Among structured groups, therefore,
accountability can be simultaneously collective and individual.‖ 974 This does, of course,
relate with more basic concepts of individuals, society, and baseline assumptions about
the function of morality. Discussed in the segment about weaknesses above,
communitarians may more readily accept the description above and agree to the concept
of societal moral norms than libertarians. 975 Methods exist for introducing the notion of
causality to those who are skeptical or not accepting, for instance, by showing how
denying collective relationships and causality may force others into unfortunate
situations. Some tools and methods occur after the examples below.
Two examples may suffice. The first relates to individual accountability in
actions with collective influence. It is a good example, albeit its position outside of an
organizational setting. Mia wants to buy a hybrid car and has looked at several different
models. Her justification is that the car is more environmentally ‗friendly‘ (less
deleterious to the environment) than other vehicles. She is has not ‗done her homework‘
regarding the assembly and production of various vehicles. Cameron, Mia‘s friend,
knows much more than Mia about the assembly and production of hybrid vehicles. He
suggests that Mia expand her search to other vehicles because of the carbon footprint left
by other vehicles and processes associated with making the hybrid vehicles. In other
words, there is a larger carbon footprint (a.k.a. more environmental degradation)
associated with producing hybrids than other cars. A person interested in the
environment should be aware that buying a hybrid is more deleterious to the environment
before purchase than other cars.
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Christopher Kutz uses the bombing of Dresden in 1945 by the Allied forces as an
example. Its purpose was mostly retaliatory, as payback for civilian bombings in Allied
countries, and ideological, as disapproval of Nazi methods (that included indiscriminate
killing). To achieve this purpose, Allied forces waited until the meteorological
conditions were precise, to inflict the most damage by generating a firestorm for more
civilian causalities.976 It was a massive undertaking with thousands of persons
contributing and participating:
The city was bombed in three raids, and at least 1,000 plances and
8,000 crewmen were directly involved in the raids, in various roles
as pilots, navigators, bombers, and gunners. The firestorm was
already raging before many crews dropped their bombs…Many
thousands further were involved in planning and support at
Bomber Command – what Freeman Dyson, the physicist and peace
activist, would later call ―a huge organization dedicated to the
purpose of burning cities and killing people, and doing the job
badly.‖ (A consequence of this mass participation is the wealth of
personal accounts about Dresden as well as Hamburg and Tokyo,
in which participants reflect on the nature of their responsibility for
the events…)977
By the end of the destruction, nearly 35,000 civilians lost their lives. Admittedly, not
everyone who participated in the process knew what was going on. Some did. 978 For
those who did, the defense of ―I was just following orders,‖ is just as repugnant for the
Allies as a defense from high-ranking Nazi officers justifying the Holocaust.
A few different tools and methods are available to analyze the examples above –
some traditional and some different ways of framing individual actions. Two ways of
viewing contributions to collective action are individual in orientation and framework.
As such, they are traditional to U.S. culture. Kutz labels them the ―Individual Difference
Principle‖ and the ―Control Principle:‖
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Individual Difference Principle: [Emphasis in the original.]
(Basis) I am accountable for a harm only if what I have done made
a difference to that harm‘s occurrence. (Object) I am accountable
only for the difference any action alone makes to the resulting state
of affairs.
Control Principle: [Emphasis in the original.] (Basis) I am
accountable for a harm‘s occurrence only if I could control its
occurrence, by producing or preventing it. (Object) I am
accountable only for those harms over whose occurrence I had
control.979
Kutz is unsatisfied by the two approaches above because of the ability of an individual to
absolve his or her accountability in group actions due to diminished (i.e., minimal)
control or the lack of an individual difference (i.e., action, behavior) profoundly affecting
the group‘s results.980
Two main reasons present for Kutz‘s discontent with the approaches. First,
traditional ethics theories and frameworks are not equipped to handle collective
wrongdoing including malfeasance, sin, and injustice. In the case of utilitarianism, for
instance, this deficit partly results from individual variances in the use and application of
objective versus subjective, hypothetical versus actual, rule versus act utilitarianism to
groups. Likewise, deontology, including Kant‘s categorical imperatives, is not equipped
to deal with individual participation in collective wrongdoing, similar to
consequentialism. The problem is that firebombing cities does not lend itself to
becoming a universal maxim; therefore, a lesser statement about marginal participation
(e.g., ―I will drop my…bombs…in order to avoid the criticisms of my commander and
follow crew, but only because I know these few bombs won‘t make a difference to
whether a firestorm arises.‖) is equally as skeptical as a universal: 981
…[T]he problem posed by collective action is that it introduces a
gap between act and harm. In the standard case, where individual
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agency is sufficient to produce the harm, universalizing the act
universalizes the harm. In the case of marginal participation,
universalizing the act is no longer the same as universalizing the
harm, in light of the fact that the act requires universal (or at least
very wide-spread) participation for there to be any harm. Since
universalization is already built into the collective act, a
universalized harm does not simply follow logically from
universalizing the individual act…[The following is a description
of the moral link:] An agent who wills even a remote connection to
a nonuniversalizable harm wills a world incompatible with
relations of cooperation and reciprocity. [This kind of situation
breaks more fundamental, a priori duties.]982
Variations exist between the import of intention, results, probabilities, and marginality
that marginalize the effectiveness of traditional ethics theories and frameworks. Second,
defining a different connection between individuals and groups makes accountability less
complicated. An example is Kutz‘s definition of collective intention, which a group
achieves upon meeting the subsequent three conditions:
(1) Members of the group are intentionally members of that group.
That is, they are disposed to participate as members of the
group in deciding upon a shared plan and then in acting in
conformity with that plan.
(2) There is an explicit or implicit collective-decision rule by
which a collective intention may be assigned to the group in
virtue of individuals‘ intentions to participate in forming and
abiding by that collective intention.
(3) The participatory intentions of the individuals overlap
sufficiently to meet the constraints of the collective-decision
rule.983
Another way of stating the above conditions is that collective intention describes when
groups have structure such that persons are intentional in membership and plans of
action, method where individuals share their intentions and pledge (explicitly or
implicitly) to abide by group decisions, and occasion where individuals evidence similar
intentions.
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This explanation of collective intention creates compelling individual links to
group malfeasance and injustice. Consider the example of various professionals who
reviewed the documents for the example in chapters one and three of the regional,
Catholic system, St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Health (SFH), which signed a letter of intent
(LOI) to form a partnership with a small, accountable health care network, St. Bernardine
of Siena Wellness System (SBW), formerly owned by a Protestant denomination and
now owned and operated by a secular company. As discussed previously, presume the
observation of many distressing practices – including multiple infractions of
confidentiality and ignoring and dismissing legitimate patient and associate complaints –
after SFH and SBW integrate. Unlike the former scenarios, assume that professionals
performing due diligence found distressing issues during document reviews and visits;
though they did not mention anything because ‗too much was riding on the merger.‘
Their justification may have been that their individual ‗red flags‘ may not have made a
difference in the overall merger. Likewise, the professionals reviewing documents and
visiting were not the persons conducting the questionable practices, nor were they in a
position of authority such that they could slow down or stop the process until the suspect
customs were addressed. Still, the professionals performing the due diligence were
nominated and subsequently accepted departmental responsibility for reviewing
documents and visiting sites. They attended group meetings with other departmental
leaders about due diligence. In these meetings, a process for addressing questions or
suspect practices was addressed. Additionally, discussion in the due diligence planning
meetings also articulated a few different intents – perpetuate the mission and guiding
values throughout the proposed transaction by checking for congruent and compatible
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values, the articulation of such values in policies and other guiding documents, and
evidence of behavior and practice that corresponds the complementary values of the other
organization(s).
With these parameters in place, the department head could claim could claim
absolution under the Individual Difference Principle and the Control Principle. On one
hand, claims such as these, indeed, would fit the definitions of both principles. Yet, both
principles, by definition, are insufficient for linking individuals to collective action for
the two main reasons discussed above. On the other hand, the situation meets the three
criteria for strict interpretation of collective intention. Namely, an intentional, methodical
process for the selection of group member occurred. Leaders from the Department of
Mergers, Developments, and Acquisitions in each organization formed a plan, openly
shared the intent of due diligence within their own organization, and the other group
members within their own organization demonstrated that they shared the intent by
agreeing to participate as leads for their own departmental review. (In fact, for the
purposes of this situation, group leaders meet the standard elements of disclosure for
informed consent by detailing the recommended course-of-action, benefits and
drawbacks, and the alternative of electing someone else to participate. Participants had
the chance to clarify their understanding, ask questions, decide, and authorize freely,
without undue influence.)984 Then the group members actuated the plan by leading the
due diligence within their own departments. This was a strict interpretation of collective
intention because it applies to those involved with this specific initiative, denoting the
associates charged with due diligence. One could make the weak case that employment
in an organization is an intentional membership, which includes commitment to the
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Mission and Core Values as a shared plan, spanning all departments, which all associates
act in accord. In their initial orientation, associates become aware of the centrality of
Mission and Core Values as well as the need to uphold these ideals throughout the
organization. All associates demonstrate a sufficiently overlapping collective intention
by an implicit rule where all, presumably, agree to uphold that intention in the form of
ensuring that actions are in accord with Mission and Core Values. It is possible to
construct a weak obligation to hold oneself accountable for any situations that seem to
impinge or violate the organization‘s ideals.
The Individual Difference Principle and Control Principle are categorically
different from the ―Complicity Principle,‖ also described by Kutz:
Complicity Principle: [Emphasis in the original.] (Basis) I am
accountable for what others do when I intentionally participate in
the wrong they do or harm they cause. (Object) I am accountable
for the harm or wrong we do together, independently of the actual
difference I make. 985
On one side, the Individual Difference Principle and Control Principle are attractive from
a first-person and third-person perspective, meaning that the principles are more
convincing for moral agents complicit with evil, injustice, or malfeasance as well as from
a typical, Western bystander perspective. The two principles are less pleasant from a
second-person perspective, signifying those who were harmed. On the other side, the
Complicity Principle is uncomfortable for cooperators, who are morally complicit with an
evil, injustice, or malfeasance. It is much more palatable from the second-person vantage
of those who were harmed. 986 Kutz explains the interrelation between all three
principles:
The Complicity Principle conflicts with well-rooted convictions
about the necessity of a link between individual accountability and
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individual causal contribution. Its ground, however, lies not in a
consequentialist conception of accountability, but in a conception
that relates agents to wrongs and harms in virtue of the content of
their wills. Given a proper analytical understanding of collective
intentional action and of the nature of intentional participation in a
shared project, the Complicity Principle stands secure. When we
act together, we are each accountable for what we all do. 987
Clearly, it is the Complicity Principle that bears the most import when compared with the
Individual Difference Principle and Control Principle for Kutz.
Kutz does not reference the principle of cooperation, but his distinctions are
similar to cooperation distinctions. Three notable differences exist when contrasting the
Complicity Principle to cooperation. First, the Complicity Principle is about complicity
generally, whether the reference point is the moral agent (i.e., the person causing the evil,
injustice, or malfeasance) acting as an individual or as part of a group, or a cooperator
with various levels of connection (e.g., proximate association, remote association).
Cooperation is only a principle of association, where the focal point is the cooperator and
not the moral agent. Second, the Complicity Principle presupposes intention by
definition with, ―I am accountable for what others do when I intentionally participate in
the wrong they do or harm they cause.‖988 Cooperation distinguishes different affiliations
of intention and justification. These gradations do not share universal agreement, as
discussed in chapter two. In principle, though, formal cooperation describes direct
participation of cooperation independent of the agent‘s or cooperator‘s attitude or motive
(i.e., motives or justifications of intent are irrelevant), the cooperator‘s approval of evil,
or the cooperator‘s consent or concurrence to the evil. 989 Material cooperation is when
the cooperator does not intend the evil, injustice, or malfeasance; it is the absence of evil
intent on the part of the cooperator, or cooperation without the knowing and willing
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assent, or approval, of the agent‘s act on the part of the cooperator.990 Third, Kutz goes
on to explain the difference between a cooperator‘s different levels of association or
relationship (e.g., proximate, remote) with the moral agent even though it is not explicit
in his Complicity Principle. These differences are inbuilt to cooperation. For example,
immediate material cooperation is the willful, intentional contribution to the essential
circumstances of the agent‘s immoral act while not intending the agent‘s evil, injustice,
or malfeasance. 991 Mediate material cooperation is when the cooperator assists the evil
act by contributing in a non-essential and secondary way, but the cooperator‘s act is
lesser when compared with the primacy of immediate cooperation. 992 The cooperator‘s
help intimately connects with the evil of another in proximate mediate material
cooperation, and the cooperator‘s help does not closely connect with the agent‘s evil in
remote mediate material cooperation. 993
The differences between the Complicity Principle and cooperation evidence
themselves during the application of both. The Dresden fire bombings is a tragic but
valuable example if and only if one eliminates the theory, influence, and justification of
―just war‖ reasoning, which would mitigate all persons‘ accountability. With this caveat
in place, it is easier to contrast the Complicity Principle with cooperation. Kutz recounts
the role of the firebombing crews, ―Each crewman‘s causal contribution to the
conflagration, indeed each plane‘s, was marginal to the point of insignificance.‖ 994 A
bomber, for instance, could try to justify his actions with the Individual Difference
Principle and the Control Principle by explaining that he is only accountable for the result
of his own actions, if noticeable harm occurs at all, and that he is accountable for the
harms that he could control. Implied is that his actions were minor or insignificant in the
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overall result, and he could not minimize or prevent the harm. Justification according to
these two principles alone is unsatisfactory. Using the Complicity Principle, the bomber
is accountable because he intentionally participated in a collective wrong and harm,
which was not dependent on the actual difference he made. 995 This links the bomber to
the collective evil. According to Catholic moral theology, the Catholic bomber is not in
collaboration, as collaboration is a deliberate joint action but not in relation to a moral
evil. Bombing innocent civilians is unjust, ill-advised, or evil, (depending on
perspective) so collaboration is not valid. 996 The principle of cooperation also may not
apply to the bomber. Remember that cooperation is association, affiliation, or other
partnership with evil, when another chooses to assist an immoral act of by an individual
or institutional moral agent.997 The bomber is one of the agents directly committing the
evil, so the principle of cooperation is not relevant.
Applying the principles to different agents yields dissimilar results. Consider the
commander who strategically plans the mission, the specialist who attaches the bombs to
the planes, and the pilots who fly the planes in the execution of the mission. Assume that
all of the described persons know the mission generally, as well as the specific, tactical
plan. Just like the last situation, the Individual Difference Principle and the Control
Principle are insufficient explanations. Again, the commander, specialist, and pilot are
accountable because they intentionally participated in a collective wrong and harm,
which was not dependent on the actual difference they made. 998 The Complicity
Principle is relevant and applicable. So is the principle of cooperation according to the
brief definition above and the extensive definition in chapter two because all the
cooperators, presumably, intend the moral evil and have a connection to the moral agents,
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such as the bombardier, who directly cause the evil. Pilots, commanders, and specialists
may not have the same level of connection – pilots seem to be much more instrumental to
the commission of sin than commanders. Still, proximity or remoteness does not make a
difference with applying cooperation this case because all parties intend the evil. It is
explicit formal cooperation when the cooperators directly will, which is approval of, the
immorality of the agents.999 It is implicit formal cooperation when the cooperators claim
no intent or approval because the act is not sinful in itself (e.g., commander giving orders,
specialist ensuring the plane is safe and ready to fly, pilot flying a plane) but the nature
(object) of the act cannot have any other meaning (ex fine operis).1000
At least two main reasons exist for the nuance provided about Kutz‘s theories as
well as the extended application comparison with the principle of cooperation. First,
Kutz convincingly argues for the relevance of individual accountability when another or a
group causes injustice or malfeasance. He does so solely from a secular perspective. The
significance is demonstration of secular significance and importance for the principle of
cooperation. Second and furthermore, Kutz‘s Complicity Principle bears some
similarities to the principle of cooperation. It is helpful for establishing individual
connection and accountability to group injustice or immorality. The Complicity Principle
links the causal connection between evil, primary agency, and cooperation (i.e.,
secondary or antecedent agency). The principle of cooperation picks up where the
Complicity Principle stops. Therefore, the lexical matrix of cooperation may prove
useful in secular society for differentiating different affiliations of intention and
justification and different levels of association or relationship between the cooperator and
the moral agent.
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The various sources in this dissertation illustrate that many accept the premise that
knowing the barbarism, unfairness, or unacceptability of certain acts and, nevertheless,
participating in them does not release a person from accountability. All of us are
accountable, and we are all part of something that is cooking – the unfolding of the
Natural Law and the improvement of the common good. Methods correctly identify that,
when it comes to cooking, we are all chefs, belong in the kitchen, and bear responsibility
for not burning the stew.
IIB. Ideals and Norms in Other-than-Catholic Settings
Applications of the principle of cooperation are analogous to ships anchored in
the open sea. The vessel, representing the cooperator, has various positions or locations
in comparison to the anchor, which depends on the length of chain to the anchor, cardinal
direction of the bow, weather and water currents, and internal momentum. The heavy
line connecting the ship to its anchor is symbolic of the relationship between the
cooperator and the agent causing the moral evil, injustice, or malfeasance. The relevance
of this relationship, including the accountability of others to sin (i.e., evil, injustice,
malfeasance), in all settings was established in the last subsection. This subsection
attends to the anchor, which is the person(s) causing the sin as well as the sin itself. It
demonstrates how the anchor is still germane for secular and other-than-Catholic settings.
In other words, incongruence can survive between ideals, norms, and behaviors despite
any claims about the irrelevance of Catholic teaching about sin in other-than-Catholic
contexts according to other-than-Catholic theories, frameworks, explanations, and
justifications.
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In short, secular and other-than-Catholic organizations have anchors in the form
of mission, philosophy, and value statements. For instance, Macy‘s, Inc. corporate
philosophy statement specifies that it:
[I]s committed to open and honest communications with
employees, shareholders, vendors, customers, financial analysts
and the news media. The company seeks to be proactive in sharing
information and in keeping these key stakeholder groups up-todate on important and material developments. 1001
Without implying any past, current, or future malfeasance, it is hypothetically
conceivable that a partner of Macy‘s could cover-up an error, an accounting error for
instance, which other associates within the corporation ‗turn a blind eye to‘ even though
it will affect shareholders and other key stakeholders. This situation may be a good place
to use cooperation because, at face value, it seems to violate the corporate philosophy
statement.
The premium ice cream company, Ben & Jerry‘s, is also known as a company
‗with a heart‘ because of their social activism. Their mission statement and ‗progressive
values‘ codify this in the following way:
[The social mission] is to operate the Company in a way that
actively recognizes the central role that business plays in society
by initiating innovative ways to improve the quality of life locally,
nationally and internationally. [The product mission] is to make,
distribute and sell the finest quality all natural ice cream and
euphoric concoctions with a continued commitment to
incorporating wholesome, natural ingredients and promoting
business practices that respect the Earth and the Environment.
[The economic mission] is to operate the Company on a
sustainable financial basis of profitable growth, increasing value
for our stakeholders and expanding opportunities for development
and career growth for our employees. [Progressive values include
seeking and supporting] nonviolent ways to achieve peace and
justice. We believe government resources are more productively
used in meeting human needs than in building and maintaining
weapons systems.1002
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Hypothetically, it is possible that one of Ben & Jerry‘s charitable causes could, in turn,
support causes that use aggressive methods to ‗advance‘ peace and justice. (Again, this is
hypothetical and does not imply any past, present, or future malfeasance.) This is another
opportunity to use the principle of cooperation and the CD4DF model.
Johnson Controls has a 34-page guide, called Ethics Policy: Integrity Every Day.
It articulates the Johnson Controls International (JCI) vision and values:
Our Vision –
[Is] a more comfortable, safe, and sustainable world.
Our Values –
Integrity: We act with honesty, fairness, respect and safety,
furthering a culture of unquestioned integrity. This strengthens
relationships across businesses and functions.
Customer Satisfaction: Out future depends on us serving as
customer advocates and customers‘ success. We are proactive,
hard-driving and easy to work with. We offer expert
knowledge and practical solutions. We deliver on possibilities.
Employee Engagement: As we grow, so will our people. We
foster a culture that promotes excellent performance,
teamwork, inclusion, leadership and growth. Our employee
and leader diversity will mirror our global markets and
population.
Innovation: We believe there is always a better way. We
encourage change and seek the opportunities it brings. We will
commercialize innovations globally at an accelerating pace.
Sustainability: Through our products, services, operations and
community involvement, we promote the efficient use of
resources to benefit all people and our planet. The
environment and sustainability are key elements of our
business proposition.1003
The introduction of the JCI ethics policy acknowledges that only clear-cut choices are
easy, but most ethics dilemmas are not between good or bad, right or wrong, yes or
no.1004 The hypothetical situation facing JCI (which is not intentionally in reference to
past, present, or future real-life persons or situations) is that a ‗third-party,‘ engineering
firm has been in trouble with the Better Business Bureau for alleged improper practices,
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including claiming others‘ intellectual property as their own. The firm is being audited.
This firm has been an intermediary between a key client and JCI‘s business as the
designer and tester of the client‘s climate control systems. During design and testing, JCI
associates work with the engineering firm, not the client directly. JCI is not working with
the firm at present and the alleged inappropriate activities happened in association with a
different client, meaning that neither JCI nor the clients were involved. This may be the
perfect occasion for JCI to use the CD4DF model, as the engineering firm‘s conduct is
not cohesive with JCI values.
Portions of the Starbucks mission statement about partners, customers, stores and
neighborhoods as well as a corporate ethics statement are as follows:
Mission –
Our Partners: We‘re called partners… Together, we embrace
diversity to create a place where each of us can be ourselves.
We always treat each other with respect and dignity. And we
hold each other to that standard.
Our Customers: …[Our work] is really about a human connection.
Our Stores: …[O]ur stores become a haven… [They are] always
full of humanity.
Our Neighborhood: Every store is part of a community, and
we take our responsibility to be good neighbors seriously. We
want to be invited in wherever we do business. We can be a
force for positive action – bringing together our partners,
customers, and the community to contribute every day. Now
we see that our responsibility – and our potential for good – is
even larger. The world is looking to Starbucks to set the new
standard, yet again. We will lead.1005
Ethics –
Starbucks believes that conducting business ethically and striving
to do the right thing are vital to the success of the
company…We share our customers‘ commitment to the
environment. And we believe in the importance of caring for
our planet and encouraging others to do the same. 1006
Starbucks commits to the wellness of its own partners (i.e., associates), including various
programs and the provision of health insurance for part-time and full-time partners since
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1988.1007 Hypothetically, a situation that could call for cooperation (not implying any
actual past, present, or future wrongdoing) is if Starbucks was to partner with a
community development firm, which advances community initiatives but does not
provide basic services, such as health insurance, to its employees.
There is always use for this model of cooperation because of our accountability to
each other. It is a multi-agency principle for improving the way we handle our dynamic,
multi-faceted, complex organizations, relationships, and lives. Cooperation always has
an anchor to someone or a group doing something we do not agree with, where the heavy
chain tying the vessel (i.e., the cooperator) to the anchor (i.e., the moral agent) is a
relationship or association. The compass (i.e., values, mission, standards) does not have
to be religiously-based to be relevant.
III. Summary and Conclusion
Cooperation has been called one of the most difficult concepts in moral
theology.1008 It is not only a difficult concept because of the nuance of its taxonomy;
people rarely interpret and apply it in the same way. ―Cooperation is so difficult because
it reflects the complexity of life.‖ 1009 For these reasons, one could easily regard it as a
recipe for frustration, if not disaster.
The thesis did not begin with the complexity of the principle or the suggestion of
a different and novel use. Three topics preceded this in chapter one. It started with
foundational assumptions as context, historical challenges for Catholic health care, and
the complexity of challenges in contemporary life and Catholic health care. It
transitioned by introducing cooperation as an essentially social principle.
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Specifying the complexity of cooperation was the latter task of chapter two. This
included defining material cooperation and its taxonomy from within the tradition,
relating (e.g., comparing, contrasting) it with other principles within the tradition,
locating it (i.e., describing its development) within the history of theological ethics,
applying it to individual issues within Catholic health care, and identifying fundamental.
Establishing the Roman Catholic theological foundations of cooperation was the former
task of chapter two.
Cooperation has organizational uses, which was the topic of chapter three. It
began with the assertion that, indeed, organizations have moral agency, although their
form of agency differs from individual agency. Organizations‘ agency is a function of
organizational ethics and acknowledged within the Catholic theological tradition. The
chapter completed by comparing and contrasting individual and organizations during the
application of cooperation as well as conversing about the organizational applications of
cooperation, which are different from the individual applications.
A strategic shift in emphasis occurred in chapter four that set aside cooperation
and switched to the implementation and use of cooperation as a function of moral
development. The chapter began with moral development as a foundation for moral
agency to identify wrongdoing. Next, it aligned moral development with discernment
and organizational agency, and it ended with an understanding that the application and
justification of material cooperation is a function of moral development. In other word,
an agent who employs cooperation may reveal cues as to his or her moral development
while explaining why he or she categorized an issue in a particular way (e.g., explicit
formal, immediate material, proximate mediate material).
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Chapter five had two major divisions, both pertaining to the contribution of
cooperation as a function of moral development for ministry formation. The first division
was about situating the model for ministry formation and ministry discernment, which
consisted of defining formation and discernment, discussing the complex connections
between moral reasoning and moral behavior than moral interventions, the reality of
using cooperation for discernment, and the nature of this postmodern use in a ‗modern
principle‘s clothing.‘ The second division discussed the CD4DF model itself – its
structure, roles, and process.
This chapter, the sixth and final, covered the benefits and burdens, advantages and
disadvantages of this CD4DF model. It also extrapolated the relevance of the CD4DF
model outside of Catholic organizations – secular and other-than-Catholic organizations.
Making this argument necessitated substantiation that secular and other-than-Catholic
organizations have missions, values, and thus, reason to establish malfeasance,
incongruence, and injustice, if not moral evil in the sense of the Catholic tradition.
Similarly, people in secular and other-than-Catholic organizations have relationships and
moral proximity (or distance) to those causing the malfeasance, incongruence, or
injustice. Cooperation, therefore, has relevance in these settings.
With reference to cooperation‘s intricacy, it is precisely this nuance – this mixture of
ingredients – that makes cooperation the perfect principle for gauging persons‘ moral
development when applying cooperation to an issue. Utilizing the above model, the
complexity of cooperation in its application is one mechanism for addressing multiple
dynamics including organizational ministry discernment, individual ministry formation,
and possibly individual moral development. The relationship and interconnectivity, if
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any, between moral motivation (intent), sensitivity, reasoning, judgment, and behavior
(actions) is complex and unclear, presenting a significant challenge for many moral
interventions. Still, by addressing what we know about this relationship as well as moral
and adult education, we create an optimal environment for advancing participants‘ moral
development by addressing as many of the mentioned factors as possible. The CD4DF
model becomes an optimal release valve for ensuring that the fare inside the pressure
cooker, the people in an organization, reaches its full potential, which is their formation
and development.
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